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ABSTRACT
Beginning with the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978, the dramatic changes in the passenger commuter airline
segment of the U.S. aviation industry are identified and
evaluated. The results of this evaluation provide a background
for judging the future course for government policies in this
segment of the U.S. airline industry. Since airline deregulation,
there has been accelerated growth in this segment of aviation,
frequently without regard to available resources. Unanticipated
increases in fuel prices, the strike of air traffic controllers,
and a general business slowdown in the United States, have adversely
impacted the commuter airline industry and their basic constituency,
the small communities. The performance, and perhaps the survival,
of the approximate 150 passenger commuter airlines, and the air
service to small communities will depend on governmental policy
adjustments in the areas of: essential air service standards,
subsidy goals and standards, airport access priorities, joint fares,
commuter aircraft development, and FAA commuter loan guarantees.
Sound planning, and more realistic allocation of resources for
the commuter management, small community air service advocates,
and governmental policy makers are required. This means there is
a need for enlightened regulatory policies, and improved and
strengthened management.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert W. Simpson Ph.D.
Title: Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
The passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 19781 and actions
of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) immediately preceding were major
steps toward deregulating what was previously a highly-regulated
industry. These steps were the result of several years of debate as
to the requirement for economic regulation in the maturing airline
industry, an industry that in 1978 carried 275 million passengers.
A major concern which surrounded the deregulation steps was the
potential impact on the services at small communities. The
provisions of airline deregulation made both entry to, and exit from,
airline markets much easier. Many feared that these provisions would
lead to an abandonment of low-density markets, especially those
large airlines serving smaller communities, in favor of high-density
markets by the large scheduled airlines.
Congress was certainly alerted to this possibility before the
time of the passage of airline deregulation. Accordingly, provisions
were included that would guarantee that service would be retained
through 1988 in all communities which were listed on the certificates
of the then-existing certificated airlines, regardless of the service
status in 1978. In an attempt to ensure a smooth transition to a
less-regulated environment, the law recognized the important role of
the commuter airlines and sought to provide incentives for their
service to small communities through an "Essential Air Service" (EAS)
program to be developed by the CAB. Some of these incentives
included:
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o Allowing the CAB to provide direct subsidy to commuters for
providing essential air service to small communities.
o Permitting commuters to participate in the FAA Loan Guarantee
Program so that this category of airlines might be able to
move readily and acquire the additional aircraft necessary
to meet their expanding role in providing air service to
small communities.
o Putting the commuters into the uniform method for establishing
joint fares used by certificated air carriers.
o Authorizing an increase in the size of the aircraft flown by
commuters under which they would be exempt from the basic
economic regulations applicable to certificated air carriers.
Thus, aircraft with 56 seats (later increased to 60 seats
by the CAB) and 18,000 pounds of payload capacity were
exempt from economic regulation. The previous limitations
were 30 seats and 7,500 pounds of payload.
For purposes of this study, the following definition of a
commuter airline will be used, except when noted. A commuter airline
is an airplane operator who offers scheduled airline passenger
service between any intercity pair of points within the 48 states
(Alaska, Hawaii and the Caribbean area are omitted) at least 5 days
per week with aircraft scheduled with 85 seats or less.
1.2 Objective/Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the impact of
airline deregulation on the commuter airlines and the related small
community air service since mid-1978, when it was apparent that the
United States airline economic regulations were to be changed or
eliminated by the United States Congress. The study analyzes commuter
-29-
performance resulting from the new freedom for airline operations,
especially by the previously-certificated airlines. In turn, this
performance is related to federal government policies in order to
assess their effectiveness. Alternative policies are identified,
with recommendations made as to future policies necessary to achieve
the objectives of airline deregulation, especially as they relate to
commuters.
1.3 Methodology
In order to bring this study into a manageable size, it was
necessary to impose constraints or establish parameters. These
constraints are as follows.
Georaphic
Only U.S. commuters whose operations are confined to the 48
states in the continental U.S. were analyzed. The Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 has separate and unique provisions that relate to the
State of Alaska, due to its large geographic areas and low population
density. The remaining U.S. areas, the State of Hawaii and the
Caribbean (Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands), are unique due
to the water barriers that generate abnormally-high levels of
commuter-type service and volumes for inter-island communications/
transportation.
All Cargo
Air cargo was the subject of "Air Cargo Deregulation Act of
1977"12 in November of 1977. The entry conditions and economic freedoms
allowed by this legislation have made it possible for airlines to
operate dramatically-different operations, combination passenger/
cargo service and all-cargo service. With very few exceptions, the
U.S. commuter airlines which elected to operate combination passenger
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and cargo service have done so in consideration of the provisions of
the deregulation law. Only four of the 150 commuter carriers
identified as offering scheduled passenger service in December 1981 also
offered all-cargo service.3 As of the end of 1980, there were 59
all-cargo commuters operating service in the United States. 4
Helicopter Service
Since airline deregulation there have been several helicopter
operators who have commenced scheduled service. These services are
often classified as commuters. Since these services tend to be local,
intra-metropolitan areas, involve an entirely-different type of
vehicle and different management focus, they have been excluded
herein.
Exempt Carrier Fil ings
Prior to airline deregulation, the commuter airline passenger
segment of the U.S. aviation industry was exempt from economic
regulation, with the exception of minimal traffic reports, provided
they operated aircraft that carried 30 passengers or less. The
exemption was continued with the beginning of deregulation. The law
raised the seating maximum for the exemption from economic regulation
to 56 seats. The basis for traffic data comes from these minimal
CAB filings. The reports are filed quarterly; thus, when a carrier
ceases operation in the middle of a quarter, they invariably fail to
file data for that quarter. Also, there are a few commuters which
frequently skip a quarter in filing. With its reduced staff, the CAB
has not been able to completely police these filings. Shortly after
airline deregulation became law, the CAB on its own initiative
increased the exemption to 60 seats.
The exempt commuter airlines are required to file on a quarterly
basis only the following data:
-- ------ 
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-- enplaned passengers - system
-- revenue passenger miles - system
-- cargo pounds - system
-- mail pounds - system
-- airports served
-- on-line passengers by segment
The last item, traffic by segment, has frequently been restricted
from the public for a full year in order to protect the competitive
position of the commuters.
Commuter Fitness
The deregulation law did provide that the CAB determine commuter
fitness. In the performance of this requirement, the CAB required
submission of financial data. Consistent with the commuters' desire
for confidentiality, the CAB has refused to make this data accessible
to the public.
Essential Air Service Fijjngs
Also under the deregulation law, commuters who desire to operate
"Essential Air Service" with Section 419 subsidy are required to file
limited financial data so that the CAB will have basis for the award.
This data tends to be prospective. The subsidy award does not have
a requirement for filing of financial or operational data beyond the
routine traffic filing.
Section 401 Commuter Filings
5Prior to the passage of the deregulation law, four commuters
as defined in this study, were required to file detailed financial and
operational data because of their certification under Section 401.
Since the passage of the deregulation law, through December 1981,
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there were 24 commuters certificated by the CAB (Table 1.1). However,
for several reasons, five of these carriers no longer hold these
certificates. When Air New England, which ceased operations in
October 1981, was eliminated, there were only 20 newly-certificated
and 4 pre-deregulation certificated commuters remaining. These
carriers are required to file detailed financial data with the CAB.
Unfortunately, the enforcement of this requirement has been sporadic.
Thus, some of the carriers simply do not file. Even those that file
often file late and then file only portions of the data. Most
importantly, the data filed is often inconsistent from carrier to
carrier. For example, some carriers do not file data for the non-
certificated, under-part-298-exemption portions of their routes,
while other carriers will report the entire system as if it were
certificated.
Commuter Schedules and Fares
Information on fare charges on aircraft and flights operated
have been obtained from the Official Airline Guide from 1975 through
June 1982. The use of this source assumes that the flights listed
were in fact operated and fares listed were charged. Due to the
filing deadline requirements, 45-60 days before publication, some
commuters failed to meet the deadline for schedule submissions and/or
changes. This is especially true of small commuters, which have a
shorter planning horizon than the larger carriers.
1.4 Organization
_Mail Survey
In order to obtain publicly-unavailable, private information, a
mail survey (Appendixl.l) was undertaken of all commuters which had
schedules listed in the Official Airline Guide in July 1981. This
survey was mailed in March 1982 to 165 commuter airlines. A follow-up
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postcard was sent to non-respondents in May 1982. A cut-off date to
responses was established on June 15, 1982. Forty-five surveys were
returned in various stages of completion.
Because of the extreme anxiety that the managements of the
commuter airlines have with divulging financial information about
their operations, it was necessary to promise that the data obtained
would not identify the individual airline. In fact, most of the
commuters were unwilling to even have a disguised name used. In
accordance with this desire of the commuters, whenever the data
obtained is not publicly available, the information and results have
been aggregated. Thus, most of the financial data is in this
aggregated form, even though a few carriers are publicly-owned or are
required to file public financial data due to their form of
certification.
In responding to the survey, not all respondents answered all
questions. Thus, there are a different number of respondents for each
question. An insight into the commuter airline perspective is the
fact that a large number of carriers responded to a few questions and
then provided source material from which this author was requested to
complete the responses. Frequent comments were made to the effect
that they, commuter managers, were too busy to complete the survey.
Commuter Airline Field Interviews
In-depth surveys directly with top management were conducted
with commuter airlines listed in the following table between September
1981 and June 1982. These interviews were conducted in order to obtain
perspective as to the management's method of operation, the changes
made since airline deregulation, potential geographic effects of
deregulation, and the issues that are poised by airline deregulation
from the Commuter airlines vantage point. Other more limited contacts
were with 11 other commuters (Appendix 1.2).
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Commuter Airlines Location
Air New England Boston, MA
Command Airways Poughkeepsie, NY
Harbor Airlines Oak Harbor, WA
Midstate Airlines Stevens Point, WI
Pilgrim Airlines Groton, CT
Provincetown Boston/
Naples Airlines Naples, FL
Rio Airways Killeen, TX
Wright Airlines Cleveland, OH
Since all major areas of each carrier's operation were probed,
it was possible to obtain information for a number of potential case
studies in managing today's commuter airlines. Appendix 1.3 contains
the topical areas discussed with each commuter airline.
Airport Surveys
Shortly after commencing this study, it became apparent that a
key actor in the development of commuter airline activity since
deregulation is the airport. As will be shown in subsequent chapters,
since airline deregulation there has been a significant increase in
the number of airports used by commuter airlines, 440 in 19766 to
536 in 1981.7 A high turnover of commuters at airports and the
"Essential Air Transportation" aspect of the deregulation law
suggested an analysis in greater depth for commuter airports.
In May 1982, a mail survey (Appendix 1.4) was forwarded to the
airport managers of 495 airports, which were listed in the July 1981
Official Airline Guide as having commuter airline service. There
were 119 responses. Worthy of note is the fact that a small number
(5) returned the questionnaires indicating that they did not keep
records on the basic information requested.
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Key Actor Interviews/Contacts
The complexity of changes that have occurred within the commuter
airline segment of the U.S. aviation industry since deregulation
required that some direct contact be made with representatives of each
of the key actors. Appendix 1.2 lists the agency/company/organization
and personnel contacted to obtain their inputs and perception of
airline deregulation as it affects commuter airlines.
Miscellaneous
Since the deregulation law was signed on October 24, 1978, a number
of major unanticipated factors have occurred to partially obscure the
results of airline deregulation upon commuter airlines. The key
factors are briefly mentioned here so that the reader can be alerted
to the impact on potential conclusions relative to airline
deregulation and the commuter airlines.
PATCO Strike
On August 3, 1981, the air traffic controllers in the United
States went on strike. The subsequent firing of the striking
controllers by President Reagan reduced the capacity of the air traffic
control system. During the early weeks, the impact on commuter traffic
was severe. Uncertain travelers frequently decided that the risk of
a delay or cancellation on short distances traveled on commuters could
be obviated by using surface transportation or by cancelling the trip
entirely. As the President took action, it became clear that the air
traffic control system had to be operated at less than capacity for
an extended period of time. Certainly, this event has inhibited
commuters from operating as freely as in the past. Since the PATCO
strike, 22 of the major airports (Table 1.2) have had restricted
operations. In addition, the FAA's enroute ATC centers in 24 areas
have had restricted operations.8  In most of the above points and
areas, commuters have been forced to reduce service or to utilize
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slots at less-than-desirable times. For example, Midstate Airlines
had 24 operations (slots), a landing or a take-off, scheduled each
weekday in August 1981 at Chicago's O'Hare airport. At the time of
the strike, their operations were reduced to 16 daily slots. The
June 1982 schedule of Midstate has the slot level up to 20 per day.
Of this total, 8 are after 7:00 p.m. compared to 4 on the August 1981
schedule.
Recession
Since the early months of 1980, the U.S. economy has witnessed
a steady erosion of its economic indicators. For example, the
unemployment rate in December 1979 was 5.9'9 in May 1982, the
unemployment rate had risen to 9.5%.10 This recession, in turn, has
depressed U.S. domestic air travel. For example, the domestic traffic
of U.S. certificated scheduled airlines, as measured by revenue-
passenger-miles, showed a reduction of 3.0% for the year 1981 over
1980. 11
This was the second year in a row that a reduction was recorded,
a first since early-post-World War II years.12
nergy
Immediately after airline deregulation legislation was passed,
the availability of fuel was a concern of commuters. As fuel became
more plentiful in 1980 and 1981, the price of fuel to the airlines as
well as the private sector went down. This, in turn, permitted people
an expanded choice of private autho travel because of both fuel
availability and lower cost, in the market areas of most commuters
(150 miles).
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1.-_Time Span
This study evaluates the performance of commuters, and the
changes in small communities air service, including subsidy, and the
related peripheral areas of commuter access to the air transportation
system, mandatory joint fares, FAA commuter loan guarantees, and
commuter aircraft development from the time just before airline
deregulation and in October, 1978, through 1981 and 1982, when data
was available. This four-year period of time thus should be
considered as a short-term assessment of the impact of airline
deregulation in the studied areas. Some of the trends are clear, but
other trends will clearly require additional time before a final
judgment can be made.
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Table 1.1
U.S. COMMUTER AIRLINES'
WITH CAB CERTIFICATES FOR
SCHEDULED PASSENGER SERVICE
AS OF 12/31/81
MONTH/YEAR
COMMUTER AIRLINE
I. Pre-Deregulation
Aspen
Rocky Mountain
Wright
Air New England
Air Midwest
II. Post Deregulation
Altair
Cochise
Swift
Golden West
Mississippi Valley
Apollo
Newair
Big Sky
Aero Mech
Air Wisconsin
Southeast
Empire
Imperial
Cascade
Golden Gate
Air North
Mid South
Southern Air
Pilarim '
Air Nevada
Imperial
American Trans Air
Colgan
Midstate
Start CAB
Cert. Service
Pre 1972
Pre 1972
Sept. 1972
March 1975
August 1976
January 1979
January 1979
January 1979
February 1979
April 1979
May 1979
May 1979
June 1979
July 1979
July 1979
July 1979
October 1979
January 1980
April 1980
June 1980
June 1980
June 1980
June 1980
December 1980
March 1981
March 1981
June 1981
June 1981
September 1981
End CAB.
Cert. Service
November 1981
June 1981
March 1981
December 1979
March 1981
December 1980
Source: US CAB "Air Carrier Financial Statistics," December 1980
and December 1981.
1/48 states
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Table 1.2
U.S. AIRPORTS
THAT HAVE RESTRICTED OPERATIONS
DUE TO CONTROLLERS STRIKE
AUGUST 1981 THROUGH MID 1982
ATLANTA
BOSTON
CLEVELAND
CHICAGO
DALLAS
DENVER
DETROIT
FORT LAUDERDALE
HOUSTON
LAS VEGAS
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
MINNEAPOLIS
NEWARK
NEW YORK - LAGUARDIA
NEW YORK - KENNEDY
PHILADELPHIA
PITTSBURGH
ST. LOUIS
SAN FRANCISCO
WASHINGTON - DULLES
WASHINGTON - NATIONAL
Source: Aviation Daily, August 20, 1982, p. 330.
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CHAPTER 2
DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL COMMUNITY AIR SERVICE
AND COMMUTER AIRLINES IN THE U.S.A.
2.1 Pre-World War II
Prior to World War II, the airline industry in the United States
suffered the growing pains experienced by most fledgling industries.
Specifically, these were lack of recognition, early-stage
technological development, and resistance from entrenced competitors.
These problems were exacerbated by the fact that the aircraft of that
era did not possess the capability of rendering the speed and range
which have become the hallmark of this dynamic industry.
The need for a major technological breakthrough was imperative
if the industry was to become firmly established. Significant
capital investment in aircraft development was needed so that the
speed differential over long distances could become materially
greater from competing modes. In those early days the airlines
were confined to airline service over segments of 50 to 200 miles in
length. Aircraft averaged a speed of 150 mph at best and carried a
maximum of 24 passengers when fully loaded. These factors, in turn,
dictated that the airline industry concentrate on short-haul service
and offer that service where it could pick up the few passengers
desiring air movement. The pre-World War II airlines were truly in
short-haul, low-density service.
The passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 brought a great
deal of order to an industry that had been financially unstable and
often fraught with scandal. In retrospect, this legislation was the
platform for the development of a truly vital industry.
Grandfather domestic routes were granted to 18 scheduled,
domestic passenger/cargo air carriers. In subsequent years these
carriers became known as Trunklines. Some of these carriers did
have long-haul routes, such as New York-Los Angeles, but the aircraft
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technology was such that those routes required multiple stop service.
For example,the typical service offered by United Airlines from New
York to San Francisco in the summer of 1946 included stops at
Chicago, North Platte, Cheyenne, Salt Lake City, Elko, Oakland and
San Francisco.2 The necessary multi-stop services meant the airlines
of this era were truly short-haul carriers. They were also
operating segments that in 1981 would be considered low-density
segments. For example, the New York to Los Angeles route generated,
for all carriers, only 888 point-to-point passengers, less than 30
per day, in November 1939.3 The "large" 24-seat aircraft also was
a further reflection of the low-density nature.
Thus, it can readily be argued that the original trunklines were
the first commuter airlines. This is especially true if you logically
define commuters as carriers operating over short-haul, low-density
segments.
The charge given to the CAB in 1938 by Congress contained many
objectives, but basically it was to promote and develop a safe, sound
and economic air transport system and provide service that was
warranted by the public convenience and necessity.4 In order to
accomplish this, the CAB was given authority over:
1. Routes
2. Rates
-- passengers
-- freight
3. Mergers, consolidation and acquisitions
4. Subsidy
At first there were two classes of air common carriers:
1. Trunk airlines were providers of scheduled service on
fixed routes.
2. Small non-scheduled carriers were providers of service on
request from a fixed base. These services were incidental
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to the ground service of aircraft sales, service and flight
training.
The CAB's concern was initially confined to the first category.
The original legislation in 1938 did not provide for economic
regulation of fixed-base operators engaged in common-carrier service.5
The CAB set out to accomplish its assignment in a variety of
ways, but one of the most significant was the recognition of the need
for financial support, today called "subsidy", through establishment
of excessively high mail rates. These high rates were awarded to all
carriers. This system of awarding subsidy was continued until 1954
when the Post Office Department complained about paying for passenger
services. The CAB then took over the support payment and properly
called it subsidy.
With this mail pay and later subsidy support, the U.S. domestic
trunk air carriers set about to plan the future with respect to
routes and newer, more-advanced aircraft. Unfortunately, World War II
disrupted civil air transportation in the United States. The military
almost overnight took nearly 50% of the civilian fleet, including
pilots and support personnel. The military also took the delivery
positions for all new aircraft on order by the airlines.
2.2 World War II
The hiatus of World War II was not unfortunate from the stand-
point of the development of air transportation in the United States,
for a number of reasons. The war increased public awareness of,
and contact with, aviation at an accelerated rate. Also, the long
distances to any and all of the war zones dictated that the U.S.
develop ways to delivery people and goods in a shorter time span.
The expanded use of air power by the Axis further pushed the U.S. to
develop aviation and its technology rapidly. Accordingly, the U.S.
was required to train pilots and mechanics numbering in the millions.
I WIN III M - I, .= I In" I M".
-44-
At the same time, war films and movie news reports tended to spotlight
the airplane's role for the entire population.
The aforementioned need to accelerate aviation output and
technology was uppermost in the effort to prosecute the war. With
this challenge before the United States, there was a significant
advance in the development of faster, larger and longer-range aircraft.
By the end of the war, the largest commercial aircraft being
manufactured was the DC-4, with 60 to 70 seats, 200-plus mph and a
1,000-plus mile range. The step up to aircraft of this type by the
post-war airlines appealed to the public because of the time savings
over long distances. Each succeeding generation of new aircraft from
that point up to the Boeing 747 tended to fly longer distances at
faster speeds with increased seating capacity. The consequent rapid
increases in aircraft productivity, available seat-miles per day,
were achieved through flying longer-distance segments. These segments
attracted the attention of all the airlines. Short-haul, low-density
segments took a back seat as far as use of the modern aircraft,
frequency level, and schedule timing for the certificated carriers.
These developments, when coupled with the post-war disposal of.
the older short-haul, lower seat capacity, and slower DC-3 aircraft
by the Government at low prices, and the discharge of almost one
million military pilots, led to the formation of many new airlines
which sought to fly short-haul services.
2.3 The Local Services Airlines
On July 11, 1944, the CAB announced that it was initiating an
"experiment" to expand air service to the smaller and more-isolated
communities of the country, even though "the traffic potential at
small cities is not encouraging."6 A new group of airlines, called
"feeders" and later called "local service" carriers, was introduced
specializing in short-haul, low-density air service. The first of
these new carriers, Essair, began service on August 1, 1945 with a
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daily round-trip between Houston and Amarillo, Texas with intermediate
stops at Austin, San Angelo, Abilene and Lubbock.7  The aircraft was
a nine-passenger Lockheed L-10 Electra. Between 1945 and 1951, the
CAB certificated 19 of this type of scheduled air carriers. 8  Of
these original 19 there are 6 remaining in 1982, but their role has
truly changed to that of trunklines.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 did not delineate a role for
the fixed-base operation performing as a common carrier. In 1947,
the CAB established two categories of non-scheduled carriers, "large"
and "small". The "small" category consisted of operators with single-
engine aircraft with gross take-off weight of 10,000 pounds or less.
These "air taxis" were the forerunners of today's commuter airlines.
During the early post-World War II years, federal regulations
concerning the certification of aircraft also changed. Civil Air
Regulation (CAR) Parts 3 and 4(b) separated the standards affecting
utility, acrobatic, and restricted-purpose aircraft. In the first
group were included the aircraft under 12,500 pounds gross take-off
weight which were to become the mainstay of the commuter fleet two
decades later. The separation became necessary because the larger
transport aircraft acquired more sophisticated equipment which would
have rendered the smaller aircraft uneconomic.
The separation of these CAB sections was part of a larger concern
for the quality of air service to small communities. The local-service
carriers began service at communities smaller than those of interest
to the trunks. Even so, the CAB was required to view the total system
of air transport, so as to recognize that there were communities
even smaller than those to which local-service airlines were flying.
At the same time, the CAB recognized that scheduled service was not
always required at the smallest points and that smaller aircraft
than the DC-3's generally employed by the newly-certificated local-
service operators were required.
- 11, Mllw
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Accordingly, in 1949 the CAB experimentally granted exemptions
from economic regulations of all commercial operations of aircraft
having a maximum gross takeoff weight (weight of aircraft, fuel,
crew, payload at the moment of brake release for takeoff roll) of
12,500 pounds or less.9 This experiment generated little activity
if only because there was no assurance that the exemption would be
continued long enough to permit recovery of capital. In 1952, the CAB
made permanent the exemption with the adoption of Economic
Regulation, Part 298. The precedent for exemption was established in
1938 and again in 1947, but more importantly, the CAB wished to
protect from competition the newly-certificated local-service airlines,
which were heavily subsidized to the cities slightly larger than
those that might be served by the "air taxis" created under Part 298.
Originally, the CAB often required the local carriers to fly
between designated terminals and to land at every intermediate point
on every flight even if there was no traffic available. This was
an attempt to make a clear separation between the locals and the
trunklines. Gradually, the CAB modified this posture since it
recognized the restrictions the policy imposed on market development
and aircraft utilization. This modification was accomplished through
various decisions permitting local-service carriers to overfly points
once a minimum level of service was rendered. Gradually, the locals
put more emphasis on the high-density routes and lowered the quality
of service to the smaller communities.
During the late 1940's and 1950's, the CAB launched a concerted
program to eliminate subsidy payments to the trunklines. As long as
the government subsidized them, the trunklines were willing to take
on any point. It was a "no-lose" proposition. If a point turned
into a traffic jewel, the airline was a winner. If the point failed
to generate traffic, it cost the airline little. Without subsidy, the
trunklines' view of the world changed. Marginal stations were a
burden that required internal cross-subsidization. Thus, trunklines
often sought suspension from these stations, and by 1964, the CAB
had suspended the trunklines from 78 points.10
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These suspensions were touted as route-strengthening for the
locals, but in fact, the trunklines also benefited in most instances.
At the 78 suspended points, the trunks generated only 9.5 passengers
per day during the year prior to suspension. Admittedly, these
were marginal trunk points but often proved major sources of new
traffic to locals.
Another step in route policy of the CAB was the addition of 51
new service points from 1951 to 1959. The locals were the
beneficiaries of these new points. Since many of the points proved
to be very poor traffic generators, the CAB focused on the need for
a minimum traffic standard for complete elimination of service at a
point. Accordingly, the CAB adopted a "use it or lose it" standard
of five passengers per day. Contrary to popular belief, this
standard was not developed as the result of an analysis of avoidable
costs or marginal costs to serve a point. The CAB simply suggested
it as "reasonable". In the Southwest Airways Company Permanent-
Certificate Case, the CAB said:
"The experience of the Board with local service carriers
in the past has indicated that, in general, on-line
intermediate points generating in the neighborhood of
300 passengers on and off monthly, have borne a reasonable
share of expense incurred by the carriers in providing
service to the intermediate point on existing flights.
The result of past operations have also led the Board
in ordinary circumstances to conclude that local service
carrier points generating in the neighborhood of 5 or 1112
more enplaned passengers per day warranted recertification.
In the mid-1960's, the CAB greatly expanded local service
operating authority. Competition with trunks, selection for new
non-stop authority over trunks, permission to overfly hubs in order
to carry more traffic point-to-point and the approval of three
geographically-expanding mergers were signs of this policy.
Needless to say, the locals responded by acquiring new
equipment, By 1970 nearly 40% of the fleet consisted of 69- to
144-seat pure jet aircraft (Table 2.1). By 1980 over 88% (424 of 480)
local service aircraft were pure jets. Starting in 1960, the
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DC-3's, the workhorse up to that time, were phased out in 8 years.
The same fate befell large piston (40 to 50 seat) aircraft, which
peaked in 1965 and represented only 6% of the 1970 fleet. Thus,
1970 saw the locals in possession of an entirely-modern turbo prop
and jet fleet.
The natural result of all these changes was a predictable
decreased emphasis on small communities. The local-service airlines
gradually broadened their horizons once they perceived the burdens
and controls imposed by the subsidy payments. Their growth was
towards longer-haul, higher-density segments and eventually into
segments competitive with the trunklines. The growth of key
statistics for this industry segment is shown, starting with 1950,
on Table 2.2. These data demonstrate that the local-service airlines
gradually, but inexorably, moved from their original roles of small,
low-density, short-haul airlines to that of mini-trunklines. The
dramatic shift came in the late 1960's when the local-service
airlines moved into the jet era. The lower unit costs of the jets
were simply too tempting. The only problem, of course, was that
the higher seating capacity and faster speeds meant a shift to a
different route structure than that previously operated.
In an effort to reduce local-service dependence on subsidy,
the CAB looked at the elimination of weaker stations. On the other
hand, it had to be done carefully or it might well raise congressional
initiatives. Thus, by the end of the 1960's, the CAB began to look
with favor on transferring some of the weaker local-service routes
to a new and rapidly-growing group of air carriers -- the scheduled
air taxis, third-level carriers or commuter airlines.
2.4 Air Taxi Commuter Airlines/Third-Level Airlines
After reviewing the annual reports of small irregular carriers
and other factors, the CAB promulgated the above-mentioned Part 298,
which created the new class of air carrier known as "Air Taxi
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Operators". In so doing, the CAB removed regulatory restrictions
and recognized that air taxi service was not competitive with
scheduled airlines.
Under Part 298 of the CAB's Economic Regulations, the above-
defined commuters were exempt from the federal economic regulations
as long as the 12,500 pounds gross weight rule was observed. The
only reporting requirements were:
1. Register with the CAB
2. Carry the passenger liability and the personal property
insurance as prescribed by the CAB
3. Provide the CAB with the copies of their scheduled
fares, rates and charges
4. File quarterly reports covering their operations in the
carriage of passengers, cargo and mail. 13
At the time, the CAB considered Part 298 a "rather liberal
approach to Federal regulations of the air taxi industry."14  Part
298 permitted cooperative arrangements between air taxis and
scheduled air carriers. Standard interline traffic agreements for
handling traffic were negotiated for the first time.
During the intervening years up to 1965, the air taxis
maintained a low profile. In fact, in 1964 there were only 12 air
taxis rendering scheduled air service. The principal reason that
scheduled air taxi service was non-existent in this period (1952
to 1965) was that the available aircraft were either too large,
e.g. DC-3, or too small, e.g. utility aircraft, to meet the demands
of the low-density markets which the Part 298 carriers were supposed
to serve.
However, the period 1952-1965 witnessed several events in the
trunk and local-service carrier segments of the airline industry
which would later profoundly affect the commuters. The most important
series of events pertains to the increased pace in aircraft
technology, and especially the introduction of turbojet aircraft in
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1958. From 1958 through 1961, the domestic airlines witnessed the
introduction of the Boeing 707 series, the DC-8 series, the Convair
880, the Boeing 720 series, and the French-built Caravelle. These
new aircraft were not only a technological leap forward, but
also forced upon the trunk airline industry a massive reequipment
cycle because no large carrier could for very long remain competitive
with slower turboprop aircraft. Many of the older turboprop
aircraft were sold to the local-service carriers which also had a
number of new turboprop aircraft to choose from. As the size of the
average aircraft used by the certificated airlines grew, the gap
between these turboprop and turbojet aircraft and the 12,500-pound
aircraft used by the limited number of air taxi operators obviously
grew with it. As the regulated carriers' aircraft grew larger,
their utility in the short-haul, low-density markets diminished, as
did the profitability of using them in such markets. Thus were
created the economic incentives which later led to the growth of
commuter airlines.
During this same 1952 through 1965 period, three developments
in the local-service industry also foreshadowed the growth of the
commuter airlines. In 1955, Public Law 38 amended the Civil
Aeronautics Act to permit the permanent certification of local-
service carriers. With permanent certification, the local-service
carriers were in a better position to grow into the routes which the
trunk carriers would later abandon as the size of aircraft increased.
In the "Skip-Stop Operating Authority Case" of 1958, the CAB
permitted the local-service airline to skip some intermediate points
in some markets. This decision, in effect, authorized local-
service carriers to compete directly with trunk carriers on certain
routes. It was instrumental in fostering the growth of the local-
service carriers, especially when they began to acquire small
turbojet aircraft in the 1960's. The increased competition with
trunk carriers, together with the availability of larger aircraft, led
to the subsequent abandonment of certain markets by local-service
carriers in the mid-1960's.
1,
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Also in 1958, the CAB decided in the "Seven States Area
Investigation" to set a standard for guaranteed air service for
communities (under investigation in this case) which enplaned five
or more passengers per day. While this case pertained directly to
the local-service carriers, it set a precedent for the guaranteed
service provisions which were incorporated twenty years later in
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
However, the key to the development of the commuter industry as
we know it today was the technological breakthrough in power plants
for smaller aircraft. The development of the lightweight turboprop
engine in 1964 resulted in the introduction of such aircraft as the
DeHavilland Twin Otter and the Beech 99. This permitted, for the
first time, the operation of 15- to 18-seat aircraft under the
12,500 pound limitation of Part 298.
In 1969, the CAB officially defined a commuter air carrier as
an air taxi operator that first performs at least five (5) round
trips per week between two or more points and publishes a flight
schedule, and secondly, transports mail by air pursuant to a
current contract with the U.S. Postal Service. 16 At the same time,
a number of significant amendments were made to Part 298. These
were characterized by the CAB as "basic changes in the regulatory
scheme for this class of carrier,"17 and provided as follows:
1. Every air taxi operator must register with the CAB.
2. Compulsory liability insurance was established covering
both passengers on board the aircraft and persons and
property on the ground.
3. A distinction was made between air taxis performing
scheduled passenger or cargo air services or mail
transportation and all others. The former were designated
as "commuter air carriers".
-52-
4. Commuter air carriers were placed under a reporting
requirement in order to give the Board traffic and
schedule data concerning this type of service.
The CAB noted that its various actions were indicative of the
rapidly-increasing importance of air taxi operators in the total
national air transportation field.18 During the first year under the
new regulation, 168 commuter carriers registered with the Board.
During the fiscal year 1970 the Board amended Part 298 in relation
to foreign air transportation of passengers by commuters -- either
directly or on an interline basis -- so as to raise the limits of
passenger liability established by the Warsaw Convention to $75,000
per passenger. During that year the CAB also instituted a proceeding
to determine whether the existing air taxi limitation dictated using
aircraft of 12,500 pounds maximum certificated takeoff weight
should be modified. This proceeding was concluded in fiscal year
1973 with the Board's decision to permit air taxi operators to
use aircraft having up to 30 seats and payload capacity of up to
7,500 pounds. The introduction of basic passenger amenities, such
as toilets and galleys in the small aircraft, was thus permitted.
The advent of the new turboprop commuter aircraft, the evolution
of economic regulations, and the development of advanced models of
piston-powered aircraft, were factors in the substitution of commuter
airlines for scheduled carriers. Such substitution provided the
commuter air carriers with relatively large markets which they could
integrate with hubs to form viable economic route systems. The
first of these substitutions occurred in 1967 when Apache Airlines
was substituted for American Airlines at Douglas, Arizona. Although
the Apache service to Douglas was for a trunk carrier, most of
the subsequent substitutions were for local-service carriers.
Coincident with the above-mentioned events which laid the
foundation for the current commuter industry, the FAA adopted Part 135
in 1964. This was the first set of operating regulations which
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pertained specifically to air taxi/commercial operations. Formerly,
the air taxis operated under CAR 42(a), a special subset of the
operating authorities which pertained to scheduled airlines. The
passage of Part 135 anticipated the coming growth in the commuter
industry and the need for tightened air safety regulations. As
instituted, these regulations included requirements for the carriers'
basic organizational structure, administrative procedures, crew
member qualifications, aircraft and equipment.
Up to the time of passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, the following were the principal federal regulatory requirements
19
and exemptions applicable to a commuter air carrier:
Regu atory Requirements
1. Performs at least five roundtrips per week between two or
more points and publishes flight schedules.20
2. Does not use "large aircraft", i.e. aircraft having a
maximum passenger capacity of more than 30 seats or a
maximum payload capacity of more than 7,500 pounds,
except by specific exemption.
3. Does not hold a certificate of public convenience and
necessity issued by the Board.
4. Has registered with the CAB.
5. Maintains liability insurance in effect which is in
compliance with Part 298.
6. Has filed with the Board an agreement and tariff raising
its passenger liability limits from the $8,290 established
by the Warsaw Convention to $75,000 per passenger.
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7. Files flight schedules and a statement of rates and
fares charged for scheduled flight operations.
8. Files reports covering aircraft, flights and traffic
operated in its various markets.2 1
Regulatory Exemptions (From Sections of Federal Aviation Act
1. From the requirement to obtain a certificate of public
convenience and necessity [Subsection 401(a)].
2. From the requirement to file tariffs (Section 403), except
for (2) joint fares with air carriers or foreign air
carriers, and (b) Warsaw Limitation tariff.
3. From the requirement to provide and furnish air transportation
under a certificate [Section 404(a)-partial].
4. From the prohibition against discrimination or preference
[Section 404(b)] except in relation to joint fares and
through service.
5. From the requirement for filing flight schedules
[Section 405(b)].
6. From the requirement for disclosure of stock ownership
and adherence to a uniform system of accounts [Section
407 (b), (c) and (d)].
7. From the prohibitions against acquisition of control over
aviation enterprises and other than a relationship with
a person operating a large aircraft [Subsection 408(a)].
8. From prohibitions against interlocking relationships
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with other than operators with large aircraft [Subsection
409(a)].
9. From the requirement to file cooperative working arrange-
ments affecting air transportation, other than those
involving operators of large aircraft [Subsection 412(a)].
2.5 Deregulation
After much debate, the United States Congress in September 1978
passed the so-called Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which amended
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. This legislation was signed into
law on October 24, 1978 by President Jimmy Carter. The key
provisions of this law insofar as they related to commuter airlines,
include:
1. Permitting the CAB and its successor to award direct
subsidies to airlines, including commuters, for rendering
required service at an EAS point. This is commonly
referred to as 419 subsidy payments.
2. Acknowledging and permitting commuter airlines to fill
Essential Air Service requirements for scheduled service.
3. Including commuter airlines as eligible recipients in
the FAA equipment loan guarantee program for the first
time.
4. Including the commuter airlines in the uniform methods
which establish joint fares between airlines. This
provision ostensibly facilitates issuance of lower fare
interline tickets and joint marketing programs.
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5. Providing commuter airlines greater flexibility to use
aircraft that are related to the growing marketplace by
permitting operation of aircraft of up to 60 seats and
18,000 pounds of payload.
Coincident with deregulation, the FAA commenced promulgating
rules changes that have tended to tighten the safety regulations
as they apply to commuter airlines. For example, in December 1978,
Part 135 (the regulations under which commuters fly small aircraft)
of the Federal Air Regulations was amended by: 22
o Requiring stricter initial qualification of pilots
o Requiring more detailed maintenance programs and training
o Requiring more detailed and organized initial and
recurrent training of pilots
o Establishing a minimum equipment list for multi-engined
aircraft and flight continuation rules
o Requiring retention of detailed operators' manuals
o Adding a continuous-maintenance program for aircraft
greater than 10 seats, similar to those used by the large
(Part 121) airlines
Subsequently, new regulations for flight and duty times were
promulgated, reducing the total monthly hours that can be flown by
commuter pilots operating under Part 135.
The impact of all these FAA changes is clearly oriented towards
improved safety. However, it has in almost every instance increased
regulation and costs for the commuter airlines. Changes in the
economic regulations have expanded opportunities for commuter airlines.
The safety regulations changes reduce the risk to the public, but
increase the regulations on this previously-deregulated segment of
U.S. aviation industry.
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2.6 Commuter Performance Since Dergul ation
2.6.1 Commuter Passenger Traffic
From 1978 to 1981, the enplaned passengers for U.S. trunklines
and local-service airlines decreased one percent (Table 2.3).
During the same period, all U.S. commuters showed the strongest
growth, with a 38.1% increase. Significantly, the total of
15.3 million commuter passengers represented 5.3% of all U.S.
enplaned passengers in 1981, up from 4.0% in 1978 (Table 2.3). A
graphic display of the U.S. passengers by the above three groups is
shown from the 1930's to 1981 on Figure 2.1. In effect, the total
commuter passengers in 1981 were at a level that was achieved by
the trunklines in the late 1940's and by the local-service airlines
in the mid-1960's.
The commuter enplaned passengers in the 48 states, as opposed
to the total for the entire U.S., is an increasing share of the total.
As of 1981, the 48 states represents 87.5% of the total, compared
with 79.2% in 1975 and 83.6% in 1978 (Table 2.4). Thus, the commuter
passengers have grown faster in the 48 states than elsewere in the
United States.
The number of commuter enplaned passengers, as defined in this
thesis, is slightly higher than the number of strict 48 state
commuter passengers, because of the inclusion of certificated airlines
which are really rendering commuter services (Table 2.5). This data
shows that the commuter passengers since airline deregulation have
grown 76.6% through 1981, if it is assumed that the base year for
deregulation was June 30, 1978.
Breaking down the commuter-passenger-related data into some
meaningful units of measurement has been difficult because of the
limited CAB reporting requirements. However, with a significant
number, 26 (Table 2.6) of the commuters receiving CAB 401 certificates
since deregulation, there is more data available. Thus, a look at
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the data for the past few years, comparing the large, regional
commuters with the small commuters (now called medium regions)
produces some interesting trends, as follows)
Large Medium
Regionals (%) egionals (%)
Passenger Load Factor YE 6/30/80 50.63 47.80
YE 12/31/81 53.37 36.76
Passengers/Mile YE 6/30/80 12.4 6.8
YE 12/31/81 26.1 6.1
Length of Passenger YE 6/30/80 153 133
Trip YE 12/31/81 256 133
Passengers/Departure YE 6/30/80 9.2 5.7
YE 12/31/81 12.9 5.0
Source: Table 2.7
This shows that the larger commuters with improved load factors,
despite the poor economic environment, dramatically increased
passenger loads and significantly increased length of passenger trip.
On the other hand, for the numerous small commuters, all these
units of measurement are either down or stable during the two periods.
Also, the small commuters were by 1981 showing units of measurement
that were well below those of the large commuter regionals. The
latter are trending toward passenger characteristics that place them
similar to the local-service carriers of the early 1970's.
As a group, the commuters have clearly shown a trend toward
carrying a higher percentage of their passengers in longer-haul
markets (Table 2.8). Almost all shares of commuter passengers in
segments of over 100 miles show increases from 1976 to 1978 and again
from 1978 to 1980.
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The last view of commuter passenger data shows an increasing
share of the revenue passenger miles in the U.S. for U.S. commuter
airlines (Figure 2.2). From 1978 to 1981, the commuters' share
doubled. For the five years prior to deregulation, the commuters'
share of revenue passenger miles in the U.S. was reasonably constant.
2.6.2 Commuter peratig Data
The number of commuter airlines in operation in the 48 states
initially increased with the onset of airline deregulation. For
instance, at the end of 1976 there were 117 commuter airlines
reporting data to the CAB at the end of 1976. This number grew to
175 by June 30, 1981 (Table 2.9). However, after the PATCO strike
in August 1981, the number of commuter airlines decreased to 142
by December 31, 1981. The annual number of new start-up commuter
airlines increased from 31 in 1977 to a peak of 72 during the year
ended June 30, 1980. Since that time, the number of commuter start-
ups has decreased considerably. On the termination side, the
pre-deregulation annual rate was 10-20, the post-deregulation annual
termination rate increased to a peak of 59 for the year ended
June 30, 1980. The maximum commuter airlines in service was 175
at the end of June 1981. By December 31, 1981, the number had
decreased to 142, a number which is only 5 above the year ended
December 31, 1977 level. Appendix 2.4 shows that only 51 commuters
of those in March 1975 were still operating in June 1982. From
June 1982 to Spring 1983 another 3 of the 51 have filed for
bankruptcy.
Another view of the commuter airline turnover is reflected by
an analysis of published schedules. As of March 1975 there were
105 commuter airlines publishing schedules in the Official Airline
Guide. By the middle of 1982 there were 158 commuter airlines
publishing schedules (Table 2.10). Only 51 of the commuters with
schedules published in 1982 were flying in 1975. Thus, there were
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107 new commuter airlines in 1982 that did not exist in 1975.
The number of points served by commuter airlines increased from
415 in 1976 to 536 in 1981 (Table 2.11). During the period 1976
to 1980, the trunklines and local-service airlines decreased from
421 points to 291. Since deregulation, 1978 to 1981, the North
Central and East South Central areas of the United States experienced
growth in points served by commuter airlines in excess of 38%
(Table 2.12). By 1981, the South Atlantic, Mountain and Pacific
Coast areas all had commuters at 77 or more points.
The number of segments served by commuter airlines increased to
1,736 in 1980 for an increase of 60.7% from 1976. New England, the
South Atlantic and the West South Central areas of the United States
all experienced growth in segments served by commuters, 104.6%
from 1976 (Table 2.13).
A review of miscellaneous operating data for commuters shows
that the small commuters (medium regional) showed only modest changes
in available seats per mile (14.2 to 16.6), flight stage length
(111 to 109), and aircraft speed (170 mph to 160 mph), from the
year ended June 30, 1980 to December 31, 1981 (Table 2.14). The
large regional commuters show dramatic increases in all these units
of measurement, again indicating that there are two levels of
commuters.
2.6.3 Forecasts
The FAA annually reviews U.S. airline traffic and forecasts for
the next 12 years. In their latest forecast (1983), the FAA
projects commuter passenger growth from 1982's 13.6 million
passengers to 35.1 million in 1994 or 158% (Table 2.15). The
projection is for annual growth rates in a range of 6.8% to 10.0%.
As of 1982, commuters carried approximately 5% of U.S. passenger
enplanements in the 48 states (Table 2.16). By 1994, the FAA
forecasts commuters will carry almost 7.5% of U.S. total passenger
enplanements in the 48 states.
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2.7 Financial Performance of U.S. Commuters
Combining survey data for the commuter survey conducted as part
of this thesis and the data obtained from CAB reports permitted
evaluation of 33 commuter airlines for 1981. These 33 commuter
airlines carried 48.6% of the enplaned passengers carried by the U.S.
commuter airlines in the 48 states (Table 2.17).
In 1981 these 33 commuters collectively generated $342 million
in passenger revenues had an operating loss of $4.9 million and net loss
of $28.2 million (Table 2.17). If the performance of the star
performer, Air Wisconsin, is deducted, the operating loss increases
to $13.2 million and the net loss increases to $32.3 million. Of
the 33 commuters, 12 had net profits of $10.4 million, while 21 had
net losses of $38.6 million.
The revenue data for 1981 indicates that these 33 carriers
received only $19.5 million in subsidy and $22.1 million in other
revenues (Table 2.17). Thus, only 5.7% of total revenues was for
revenues other than subsidy or passenger (Table 2.17).
The balance sheet data indicates that 30 commuters had invested
$103.6 million in equity and by the end of 1981, this investment had
decreased to $37.3 million (Table 2.18). When Air Wisconsin is
excluded, the equity investment is $102.3 million, and by the end of
1981 it had been reduced to a small $12.7 million. By the end of
1981, there were 18 out of 30 commuters who had equity bases that
were less than the equity investment. Thus, losses have seriously
eroded the equity base of these commuter airlines.
These financial results produce some interesting financial
measurements. For example, the debt-to-equity ratio at the end of
1981 was 8.7 to 1.0 (Table 2.19). This means that the debt and lease
holders have $8.70 invested in these 30 commuters for every $1.00 of
equity investment. When Air Wisconsin is excluded, the debt-to-equity
ratio goes to 23.0 to 1.0. Debt-to-equity ratios of 1.5 - 3.0 to 1.0
are considered desirable for an airline by financial institutions.
Only seven of the commuters had debt-to-equity ratios in the
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desired range. Thus, the commuters' excessive debt in
relation to equity is a poor financial omen for servicing debt and
leases. As a corollary to this, it should be noted that seven of
the commuters included in the 1981 balance sheet data are either
in bankruptcy or ceased operation by spring 1983.
Another sign of financial stress is the fact that the 33
commuters collectively don't have sufficient depreciation to offset
the net losses (Table 2.19). Even though these commuters had $25.0
million in depreciation (Table 2.17), the losses were $28.2 million.
Thus, a negative cash throw-off of $3.2 million. Again, when Air
Wisconsin is excluded, the negative cash throw-off reaches $10.8
million. In the capital-intensive airline industry, the airlines
have often been able to incure large losses when the depreciation
or non-cash expenses were in excess of these losses; thus, the
operating expenses could be paid. In 1981, 15 of the sample commuters
had a negative cash throw-off.
Another sign of financial weakness for these 33 commuters is the
high proportion that accounts payable are of the passenger revenue
generated. The 1981 proportion of 10.3% (Table 2.19) is extremely
high in an industry where labor costs amount to approximately 40%
of all costs. This suggests that accounts payable payment is slow.
Another ratio worthy of note is the passenger revenue generated
per passenger mile where it amounts to 31.8t in 1981 (Table 2.19).
This rate compares with a net combined rate for the certificated
carriers of 12.834 per revenue passenger mile in 1981 (Table 3.36).
The star performer, Air Wisconsin, had a yield of 39.64 per revenue
passenger mile. Interestingly, Air Wisconsin in 1981 experienced
costs of 18.44 per available seat mile compared to 17.5t (Table 2.19)
for the other commuters. Thus, the Air Wisconsin profit came from
higher-than-normal passenger revenue yields, as opposed to an efficient
cost structure.
All this financial data suggests that the U.S. commuter airline
industry was not strong in 1981. At the end of the year, the balance
sheets were weak.
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2.8 Summary
The structure, place and level of service of the commuter
airline industry, as it existed up to the passage of airline
deregulation, was a creature of three principal forces. The first
and most obvious influence is that of Government policy and regulation
as represented by the CAB with its economic rules and route policy,
and by the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) operational/
safety regulations. A second key influence has been the development
of aircraft technology for commuter-type aircraft, as discussed in
Chapter 6. The third influence has been the all-important marketplace
itself. 23
All three of these influences have become strong enough that a
vital part of the success of airline deregulation now rests with
the performance of the commuter airlines. This is especially true
in the area of small-community air service. Services to these
communities were inconsistent from 1960 to 1978 when the CAB allowed
trunks and locals to withdraw from many of the short-haul, low-density
markets. From 1960 to 1978, 187 small and medium sized communities
were dropped from regulated airline routes.2 4
Since the passage of airline deregulation, the commuter airlines
have been major beneficiaries with their above-average passenger
growth and consequent increased share of the total U.S. passengers.
Many commuters have opted for CAB certification. The commuters that
have survived from prior to deregulation show faster-than-average
commuter growth.
There has been a large increase in new commuters. However, the
stay in the business is often short-lived. From June 30, 1978 to
June 30, 1981, there were 126 commuter terminations and 147 new
commuters started up (Table 2.9). The number of commuters serving
from 1975 to 1981 were 51 (Table 2.10).
The number of points served by commuters has increased from 415
in 1976 to 536 in 1981 (Table 2.11). The segments served by commuters
from 1976 to 1980 increased 60.7% to 736 (Table 2.13).
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There appears to be two levels of commuters emerging. The first
level is, for the most part, the established commuters, who have
expanded into larger aircraft, higher density and longer-haul routes.
The second level, containing most of the commuters, still serve the
traditional short-haul, low-density feeder routes.
The financial posture of the commuters at the end of 1981 is not
strong, based on available information. Losses appear to be common
and the debt/equity position of commuters is extremely poor. These
two facts suggest that there will be a struggle for survival, except
for a few strong well-supported commuters.
As for the future, the FAA anticipates strong rates of growth
through 1984 (Table 2.15). In fact, the growth rates will be well
above industry growth; thus, by 1994 the commuters are forecast to
carry almost 7.5% of all U.S. enplaned passengers (Table 2.16).
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TABLE 2.1
FLEET COMPOSITION
OF LOCAL SERVICE CARRIERS
1953 - 1970
AND 1980
Number of Aircraft -
Large Turbo
Piston Prop
2
24
25
52
59
98
153
180
193
201
160
92
55
42
27
20
31
35
38
35
40
51
63
116
198
240
228
228
36
December 31
Jet
2
22
46
97
138
157
424
Sources: U.S. CAB, "Handbook of Airline Statistics",
1973 edition.
Gunter G. Enders, "World Airline Fleet",
1981 edition.
DC-3
150
202
203
220
215
216
179
172
149
118
97
58
10
1953
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1980
Total
152
226
228
303
309
352
367
392
393
389
395
394
402
408
412
480
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TABLE 2.2
GROWTH OF KEY FINANCIAL AND
OPERATION STATISTICS FOR
U.S. LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINES
Total Average Local Service
No. of Transport Length Average % Revenue
Pass. Revenues Pass./ Length Passenger
Year (000) (000) Trips A/C Hop Of Total
1950 969 27,495 195 61.6 5.0
1951 1,479 36,424 196 70.7 6.0
1952 1,735 42,284 196 73.6 6.3
1953 2,032 49,188 192 73.6 6.4
1954 2,433 31,590 190 75.4 6.9
1955 2,940 37,080 182 75.9 7.0
1956 3,457 44,132 183 78.9 7.5
1957 3,955 51,923 189 81.6 8.0
1958 4,265 61,778 192 84.1 8.7
1959 5,213 80,135 197 87.4 9.3
1960 5,591 91,637 204 91.1 9.7
1961 6,470 113,248 208 91.7 11.1
1962 7,651 136,988 210 94.2 12.2
1963 8,865 156,689 211 98.0 12.4
1964 10,481 186,305 214 102.3 12.8
1965 12,316 223,505 213 105.5 13.0
1966 15,540 290,537 223 111.7 14.2
1967 18,146 344,842 227 118.5 13.7
1968 22,177 455,114 248 130.3 14.8
1969 23,143 570,043 273 143.6 14.5
1970 24,547 569,843 257 143.5 14.3
1971 26,726 688,795 281 155.9 15.6
1972 27,432 750,582 286 159.6 15.8
1973 30,501 858,524 292 164.5 15.9
1974 35,200 1,200,317 307 183.1 17.0
1975 24,027 1,258,357 314 187.7 16.6
1976 27,947 1,516,672 319 195.4 17.0
1977 41,853 1,794,881 323 204.7 17.4
1978 48,853 2,161,702 339 218.1 17.7
1979 51,629 2,666,856 385 258.5 16.3
1980 51,490 3,537,518 419 283,4 17.4
Source: U.S. CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics, 1973 Edition.
U.S. CAB, -Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, December 1974-1980.
U.S. CAB, Air Carrier Financial Statistics, December
1974-1980.
TABLE 2.3
Summary of U.S. Enplaned
Air Passengers Since Deregulation
1978 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers (000) % Change
1978 1979 1980 1981 1978-1981
Trunks
Locals
196,073 211,554 190,404
48,612 51,629 51,490
Subtotal 244,785 263,183 241,894
11,072 13,972 14,810Commuters
Other
TOTAL
% Commuter of TOTAL
39,969
274,716
4.0
53,500
316,683
4.4
54,009
296,903
5.0
194,176 (10%)
46,338 (4.7%)
240,514 (1.7%)
15, 00 38.1%
45,206
285,720
30.3% 1
4.0%
5.3
SOURCES: U.S. CAB, "Air Carrier Traffic Statistics," December
1978 throuqh 1981.
31,
Commuter Airline Association of America, Annual Report,
1981.
U.S. CAB, "Air Carrier Industry Scheduled Service Traffic
Statistics - Medium Regional Air Carrier Details," for
the year ended September 30, 1981.
k'Includes international, territorial, and new entrants.
(
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TABLE 2.4
U.S. Commuter Airline Traffic-
1975 - 1981
Number of Passengers (Millions)
Fiscal Year
48
States
5.7
6.3
7.4
9.2
12.1
13.0
13.3
Alaska, Hawa ,
Puerto Rico-=
1.5
1.6
1.8
1.8
1.9
1.8
1,9
Total
7.2
7.9
9.2
11.0
14.0
14.8
15.3
% 48 States
of Total
79.2
79.7
80.4
83.6
86.4
87.8
87.5
SOURCE: CAAA, "Annual Report - Commuter Airline Industry," 1975-1980
U.S. DOT, "FAA Aviation Forecasts, Fiscal Years 1982-1993,"
FAA, February 1982.
U.S. CAB, "Air Carrier Industry Scheduled Service Traffic
Statistics - Medium Regional AIr Carrier Details,"
September 30, 1981.
i/Includes all carriers operating all aircraft with less than
90 seats
!/Fiscal year data.
.!Year ended September 30, 1981.
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
19811Y
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Table 2.5
Summary of Commuter
Airline Enplaned Passengers-
1976-1981
Year Ended
Number of
Enplaned Passengers
% of
June 30, 1978
December 31, 1976
December 31, 1977
June 30, 1978
June 30, 1979
June 30, 1980
June 30, 1981
December 31, 1981
5,949,633
7,242,092
8,123,034
9,356,123
12,249,338
13,283,442
14,353,011
Source: USCAB "Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics" 1976-1979
Table 2
USCAB "Air Carrier Industry Scheduled Service Traffic
Statistics - Medium Regional Air Carrier Details"
June 30, 1981 and December 31, 1981
1/ Commuter airlines operating in 48 states and District of Colum'bia
as defined in this thesis.
73.2
89.2
100.0
15.2
50.8
61.4
76.7
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1/ Table 2.6
Commuters- with CAB 401 Certificates
Through December 31, 1981
Offering
Service
6/15/82 Commuter Name
I. Pre Deregulation
Effective
Date Headquarters
Air Midwest
Air New England
Aspen Airways
Wright Airlines
Wichita, KS
Before Boston, MA
October 24,
1978 Denver, CO
Cleveland, OH
II. Post Deregulation
Air North
Air Wisconsin
Altair
Apollo Airlines
Big Sky Airlines
Britt Airways, Inc.
Cascade Airways
Cochise Airlines
Colgan Airways
Empire Airlines
Freedom Airlines
Golden Gate Airlines
Golden West
5/1/80
11/1/78
11/1/78
2/2/79
6/26/80
11/18/81
4/30/80
12/4/78
11/18/81
1/25/79
Needs FAA
Approval
8/28/80
11/9/78
Burlington, VT
Appleton, WI
Philadelphia, PA
Goleta, CA
Billings, MT
Danville, IL
Spokane, WA
Tucson, AZ
Manassas, VA
Utica, NY
Johnson City, NY
Monterey, CA
Newport Beach, CA
(Continued)
x
x
x
X/
X-=
x
x
x
x2/
x
x
x
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Table 2.6
Commuters with CAB 401 Certificates
Through December 31, 1981
(Continued)
Commuter Name
Effective
Date Headauarters
II. Post Deregulation (Continued)
Imperial Airlines
Marco Island Airways
Mid South Commuter
Airlines
Mid State Airlines
Mississippi Valley
Airlines
Newair
Pilgrim Airlines
Rocky Mountain
Airways
Sky West Airlines
Southeast Airlines
Swift Aire
Transwestern Airlines
Air US
11/19/79
2/25/81
8/28/80
11/18/81
12/18/78
8/28/80
2/23/81
11/18/81
12/4/78
10/10/79
11/9/78
12/16/81
11/18/81
Carlsbad, CA
Marco Island, FL
Southern Pines, NC
Stevens Point, WI
LaCrosse, WI
New Haven, CT
New London, CT
Denver, CO
St. George, UT
Miami, FL
San Luis Obsipo, CA
Logan, UT
Denver, CO
SOURCE: U.S. C.A.B., "Report on Airline Service,
Fares, Traffic, Load Factors, and Market Shares,"
Issue Number 19, February 1982.
Official Airline Guide (6/15/82).
I/Carriers operating passenger service in the 48 states
with all aircraft less than 90 seats.
2/
- Carrier in bankruptcy as of 6/15/82.
.!Requested decertification 12/28/81.
Offering
Service
6/15/82
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Table 2.7 1/
Summary of Recent Commuter-
Traffic Performance Measures
Years Ended June 30, 1980 & 1981
December 31, 1980 & 1981
6/30/80
Passenger Load Factor %
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
Passengers/Mile
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
Length of Passenger Trip
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
Passengers/Departure
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
47.80
50.63
48.76
6.8
12.4
8.1
133
153
139
5.7
9.2
6.5
12 Months
12/31/80
46.53
48.71
47.43
7.2
12.8
8.9
131
165
144
6.2
9.6
7.1
and
Ended
6/30/81
45.92
50.17
47.88
7.2
16.6
10.5
132
192
143
5.5
9.1
8.1
Sources: USCAB "Air Carrier Industry Scheduled Service Traffic Statistics"
Medium Regional Carrier Details - Years Ended June 30 and
December 31, 1981
USCAB "Air Carrier Traffic Statistics" Years Ended June 30 and
December 31, 1981
Appendix 2.2
1/ 48 States
Item 12/31/81
36.76
53.37
46.56
6.1
26.1
12.7
133
256
177
5.0
12.9
8.6
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% of Totals
0-24
25-49
50-74
75-99
100-124
125-149
150-174
175-199
200-224
225-249
250-274
275-299
over 300
TABLE 2.3
'ECENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUTER
PASSENGERS BY MILEAGE GROUP
1976, 1978, 1980
Number of 0 & D Passengers
1976 1978
1.5%
17.7
16.2
19.1
14.5
10.3
7.9
5.6
2.5
2.4
1.0
0.2
1.0
1.2%
15.1
17.9
17.8
14.2
10.7
8.1
6.0
3.1
2.3
1.6
0.4
1.5
Sources: USCAB "Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics", Years Ended
December 31, 1976, 1978, 1980, Table 7.
Appendix 2.3.
1/ Excludes certificated commuters
1980
1.2%
9.0
16.8
17.8
16.1
12.1
10.1
6.5
3.3
2.7
1.2
0.7
2.0
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TABLE 2.9
CARRIERS REPORTING PASSENGER
TRAFFIC TO CABI/
1976 - 1981
Year Ending
December 31, 1976
December 31, 1977
June 30, 1978
DEREGULATION
June 30, 1979
June 30, 1980
June 30, 1981
December 31, 1981
Start
of Yea
117
135
145
148
160
175
Number of Commuter Air Carriers
Start- Termin- End
r Ups ations of Year
- 20 117
31 13 135
40 39 145
148
160
175
142
In Service
During Year
137
148
175
184
219
196
196
Sources: USCAB "Air Carrier Industry Scheduled Service Traffic Statistics -
Medium Regional Air Carrier Details" Years Ended June 30, 1981 and
December 31, 1981.
USCAB "Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics" Years Ended June 30,
1978, 1979, 1980 and December 31, 1976, 1977.
1/ 48 States only
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Table 2.10
Summary Comparison of
Commuters Offering Service
1975 & 1982
Period Serving
Number of
Section
401 2/
Certificated-
As of March 1975
As of June 1982
Both March 1975 & June 1982
June 1982 Not in March 1975
March 1975 Not in June 1982
1/Commuters-
Part
293
132
1/ Serving within 48 states
2/ As of December 31, 1981
Sources: US CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares, Traffic & Load
Factors, and Market Shares", Issue No. 19, February 1982
Official Airline Guide, June 1982
Total
105
158
107
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Table 2.11
History of Points Served by
Category of Airline
48 States
1948 - 1980
Number of Points Served - December
Cegificated Mrline
Trunks-' Locals- Total
363
459
468
433
380
392
391
361
305
196
454
539
567
524
474
394
421
420
386
343
291
3/Commuters-
N/A
N/A
415
440
467
526
505
536
Total
Source: Regional Airline Association "Regional/Commuter Airline
Industry" 1931 Annual Report
- Includes points served with locals and commuters--data
as of December 31 through 1975; June 1 thereafter.
. Includes points served with trunks and commuters--data
as of December 31; June 1 thereafter.
- Includes points served with trunks and locals--data as
of June 1.
Year
1948
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
454
349
315
223
210
180
196
197
176
164
159
454
539
567
524
474
394
647
645
643
635
583
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Table 2.12
Summary of Trend in Points
Served by Commuters by Georaphic
Regions - 48 States
1976 - 1982
1/ %Increase# Pbints Served by Commuters (Decrease)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 76/78 78/81
New England
Mid Atlantic
26 30 32 38 36 33
45 50 52 53 53 55
East North Central 44
West North Central 42
South Atlantic 56
East South Central 19
West South Central 43
Mountain
46 50 56 57 69
38 39 62 57 59
63 64 69 66 83
13.6 38.0
(7.1) 51.3
14.3 29.7
27 16 24 15 23 (18.8) 43.6
49 57 62 63 57
67 65 80 80 74 81
32.6
19.4
0.0
1.3
Pacific
TOTAL - 48
73 72 83 82 84 77
States 415 440 472 526 505 536
13.7 (7.2)
13.7 13.5
SOURCE: CAAA, "Commuter Airline Industry - Annual Report," 1976
through 1981.
- Data as of June 1 of each year.
U.S.
Region
23.0
15.6
3.1
5.8
Table 2.13
Number of Segments Served
by U.S. Commuters by Geographic
Area - 48 States
1976, 1978, 1980
U. S. Region
New England
Mid Atlantic
Number of Segments Served
by Commuters-/
1976 1978 1980
107
221
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
TOTAL
168
154
196
72
112
220
232
1080
159
271
190
181
213
67
225
292
360
1384
254
414
195
187
401
96
285
296
404
1736
% Increase
(Decrease)
78/80 76/80
59.7
52.8
2.6
3.3
88.3
43.3
26.7
1.4
12.2
25.4
137.8
87.3
16.0
21.4
104,6
33.3
154.5
34 .5
74.1
60.7
SOURCES: Regional Airline Association "Regional/Commuter Airline Industry" 1981 Annual Report
Commuter Airline Association of America "Commuter Airline Industry" 1976, 1978 &
1980 Annual Reports ; Appendix 2.5.
!/Excludes commuters after certification. Totals exclude duplication of
interstate segments since segment is counte' in each state.
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Table 2.14 1/
Summary of Recent Commuter-
Operating Performance Measures
Years Ended June 30, 1980 & 1981
and December 31, 1980 & 1981
Item
Available Seats/Mile
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
Speed (MPH)
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
Flight Stage Length
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
6/30/80
14.2
24.4
16.6
170.0
184.6
174.0
111
114
112
12 Months Ended
12/31/80 6/30/81
15.5
26.4
18.7
169.5
190.3
175.0
111
124
115
15.8
33.1
20.8
169.0
200.3
177.0
111
133
117
Source USCAB " Air Carrier Industry Scheduled Service Traffic
Statistics - Medium Regional Air Carrier Details" Years
Ended June 30 & December 31, 1981
USCAB "Air Carrier Traffic Statistics" Years Ended June 30
& December 31, 1981
Appendix 2.2
1/ 48 States
12/31/81
16.6
48.8
27.2
160.0
214.3
174.0
109
155
121
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Table 2.15
Forecast of U.S. Commuter Passenger Traffic
48 States
1983 - 1994
Fiscal Year
Historical
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982E
Forecast
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Revenue Passenger
Enplanements (Millions)
Year 3-Year Average
5.1
5.7
6.7
8.3
10.2
11.9
13.5
13.6
15.0
16.5
18.1
19.7
21.4
23.2
25.0
26.8
28.7
30.8
32.9
35.1
5.8
6.9
8.4
10.1
11.6
13.0
14.0
15.0
16.5
18.1
19.7
21.4
23.2
25.0
26.8
28.8
30.8
32.9
% Increase in
3-Year Average
19.0
21.7
19.0
15.0
12.1
7.8
7.1
10.0
9.7
8.8
8.6
8.4
7.8
7.2
7.5
6.9
6.8
U.S. FAA, "FAA Aviation Forecasts: Fiscal Years
1983 -1994," Washington, D.C. (February 1983), p. 49
SOURCE:
-85-
Table 2.16
Forecast of U.S. Commuter Share of Total
U.S. Passenger Traffic
Through 1992
(48 States Only)
Fiscal Year
Historical
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982E
Forecast
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
# of Passenger Enplanements
(millions) 3/
Commuters U.S. Domestic-/
5.1
5.7
6.7
8.3
10.2
11.9
13.5
13.6
15.0
16.5
18.1
19.7
21.4
23.2
25.0
26.8
28.7
30.8
32.9
35.1
184.9
195.1
216.6
246.5
233.4
778.2
264 .3
272.6
284.2
304.3
322.4
335.8
352.5
370.4
386.7
400.6
416.9
434.5
451.9
471.1
% Commuter
of Total
Domestic
2.76
2.92
3.09
3.13
3.60
4.28
5.10
4.99
5.28
5.42
5.61
5.87
6.07
6.26
6.46
6.69
6.88
7.09
7.28
7.45
U.S. FAA, "FAA Aviation Forecasts: Fiscal Years,
1983 -1994," Washington, D.C. (February 1983), p. 49.
k/U.S. certificated route carriers plus commuters (48 states).
SOURCE:
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Table 2.17
Profit & Loss Performance
For 33 Commuters Providing Data
Year 1981
I tem
Revenues:(000)
Passenger
Subsidy
Other
Total
33 Commuter
Total
$ 342,580
19,521
22,057
384,158
Total
Exclucling
Air Wisconsin
S 299,660
19 , 521
19,223
338,404
Expenses: (000)
Operating Expenses - Total
Depreciation/Amortization
Interest
Operating Income (Loss)
Net Income (Loss)
Number of Passengers
Enplaned (000)
Total Commuter Passengers
Enplaned (000)
% Passengers of Total
389,871
24,985
29,674
(4,903)
(28,161)
352,422
21,586
26,795
(13,207)
(32,340)
6 ,927
14,353
48.3%
6,223
14 ,353
43.4%
Source: Appendix 2.1
Commuter Survey
US CAB, "Air Carrier Financial Statistics" December 1981
US CAB, "Air Carrier Traffic Statistics" December 1981
US CAB, "Air Carrier Industry Scheduled Service Traffic
Statistics" - Medium Regional, 12 months ended
December 31, 1981
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Table 2.18
Key Balance Sheet Data
For the 30 Commuters Provieina Data
As of December 31, 1981
Item
Current Loan/Debt, Lease
Payable & Notes Payable
Long Term Debt & Leases Payable
Total Debt & Leases
Accounts Payable
Paid in Capital
Ending Equity Balance (Deficit)
Total
30 Commuter
(000)
$ 43,241
281,630
324,871
35,393
103,647
$ 37,321
Total
Excludina
Air Wisconsin
(000)
$ 39,839
252,391
292,230
34, 013
102,267
$ 12,664
Source: Commuter Survey
US CAB, "US Air Carrier Financial Statistics" December 31,
1981
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Table 2.19
Key Traffic & Financial
Performance Measures
For 33 Commuters Providing nata
Year 1981
Financial/Traffic Ratio
Financial
Debt to Equity Ratio
% Accounts Payable of
Passenger Revenue
Depreciation plus Net Income
(Deficit) - 000 -
Passenger Revenue Per Revenue
Passenger Mile
Total Expenses Per Available Seat
rile
Traffic
Passengers Enplaned (000)
Revenue Passenger Yiles (000)
Available Seat Miles (000)
Passenger Load Factor
Tota]l
33 Commuters
8.7 to 1.0
30.3%
($3,176)
17.74
6,927
1,077,699
2,332,062
46.2%
Total
Fxc luding
Air Wisconsin
23.0 to 1.0
34.1%
($10,754)
30.90
17.50
6,223 4
968,762
2,121,946
45.7%
Source: Table 2. 17 & 2. 18
Commuter Survey
US CAB, "Air Carrier Traf fic Statistics" December 1981
US CAB, "Air Carrier Industry Scheduled Service Traffic
Statistics" - Medium Regional, 12 Months Ended December 31,
1981
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CHAPTER 3
SERVICE TO SMALL COMMUNITIES
3.1 Objective
Air service to low-density regions and small communities of the
United States has been a public-policy issue for the Federal Government
since the inception of the local-service airlines in the late 1940's.
These local-service airlines (like their forerunners, the trunklines)
grew and expanded to a point at which they sought reduction and
elimination of services at small communities. Between 1960 and 1978,
187 small- and medium-size communities were dropped from certificated
airline routes. 1
Congress has consistently sought access to the airline system
for small communities. Each successive action of the CAB over the
past 30 years has reflected the same desire. This has manifested
itself in the CAB's gradual acceptance of the third-level carriers,
now termed commuters, as a means of providing air service to small
communities. In response to the often-expressed view that airline
deregulation would result in further deterioration of service to small
communities, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 guaranteed continuous
scheduled airline service for ten years to any community then
receiving certificated airline service. In order to ensure that this
would in fact occur, the CAB was authorized if necessary to pay a new
form of subsidy, Section 419. In addition, the CAB established an
Essential Air Service (EAS) program which implements the air service
guarantee.
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The objectives of this chapter are to analyze and evaluate the
performance of airlines, certificated and commuter, at small
communities in the 48 states since passage of the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978. The subsidy issues will be addressed in Chapter 4.
More specifically, this review of air service to small
communities attempts to answer these questions:
1. To what extent has service to small communities changed
since airline deregulation?
2. What has been the experience at EAS points of air service
since airline deregulation?
3. What are the factors that have caused the change, if any?
The incentives and barriers to the commencement, maintenance
or expansion of air service at small communities fall roughly into
four categories: economic, technological, environment, and
institutional. The institutional and economic aspects are addressed
as the above questions are answered in this chapter. The environmental
and technological areas are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
3.2 Background
Rationale
The principal function of small-community air service has been
to provide access to the air transportation system. This service has
been thought to be particularly vital in low-population-density areas
that are isolated (due to long distances and/or physical barriers)
from airports receiving scheduled air service. A number of studies
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have suggested that scheduled air service is an important factor in
urban economic growth and in the ability of small- and medium-sized
2
communities to attract industries needed for economic growth. Lack
of air transportation has been found, especially in isolated
3
communities, to have a potential adverse economic impact. A more
complete discussion of arguments in support of small-community air
service is covered in Chapter 4.
Federal policy has stressed the development of an air transport
system that meets the present and future needs of all regions. 4 The
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 specified that this would require
"the maintenance of a comprehensive and convenient system of continuous
scheduled airline service for small communities and for isolated
areas." 5 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 is much more specific
than all previous aviation acts in that it encourages the "entry into
air transportation markets by new carriers.. .and the continued
strengthening of small air carriers so as to assure a more effective,
competitive airline industry."6 The same act also provides for "the
maintenance of a comprehensive and convenient system of continuous
scheduled airline service for small communities and for isolated
areas, with direct Federal Assistance where appropriate".
Based on FAA criteria, the vast majority of points with airline
service can be considered small or non-hub points.7 The data for 1981
indicates that 606 out of 666 communities (90.9%) with airline
service are in these categories (Table 3.1). Continuity of airline
service involves communities in all states.
Loss of air service clearly can impact many, if not all,
Congressional districts. Politically, the continuation of air service
is desirable when major realignment results from legislation such as
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Airline Deregulation's success,
to a large degree, will be measured in terms of the impact on small-
community service.
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Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
The important aspects of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
that will have or have had a direct impact on small-community service
are:
1. Greater opportunity is afforded commuter operators by making
them eligible to: render "essential air service"; receive
subsidy; obtain aircraft loan guarantees; and, obtain
joint fares.
2. Certificated airlines are granted almost-unlimited authority
to enter or abandon markets. Replacement services, if
necessary, can be provided by commuters.
3. Non-certificated carriers may now operate aircraft with a
capacity of up to 60 seats.
4. The small-community program, basically EAS and 419 Subsidy,
will continue and be transferred to DOT upon "sunset" of
the CAB.
A summary of Federal regulations pertaining to small-community air
service is contained in Figure 3.1.
3.3 Trends in Small-Community Air Service
3.3.1 Definition of Small Communities
There is no precise definition of small communities in aviation
circles. It has been suggested8 that small communities are simply
those which: 1) generate little traffic; 2) have marginally
profitable service; and 3) appropriately use small aircraft with
a capacity of less than 15 passengers. Under these criteria, medium
points would be those that support larger, more profitable service.
-93-
Figure 3.1 Federal Regulations Pertaining to Service to Small
Communities
1969 "Birth" of commuters
1972 Limit on aircraft size raised to 7,500-lb payload or 30
passengers
1977 Air Cargo Deregulation Act (PL 95-163)
1978 Airline Deregulation Act (PL 95-504)
1979 Implementation of FAR Part 135 Safety Equipment by FAA
1980 International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979
(PL 96-192) Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of
1979 (PL 96-193)
1981 CAB "Sunset" Provision 1: Domestic route program terminated
Prescription of FAR Part 24 Certification Requirement by FAA
1983 A subsidized local service carrier may be replaced by a
commuter on the basis of subsidy reduction or improved
services; CAB "Sunset" Provision 2: Expiration of
authority over fares and charters
1985 Termination of subsidy to local service carriers
Abolishment of CAB: Small Community Subsidy Program
transferred to DOT
1988 Essential Air Service Guarantee Program terminates for
"subsidy-eligible" commuters;
Exemption of noise requirements terminates for two-engine
aircraft (100 seats or less) service to small communities
Source: Yupo Chan, "Airline Deregulation and Service to Small
Communities": Presentation at Annual Meeting of Transportation
Research Board, January 1982, Figure 4.1
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These definitions suggest that points requiring subsidy are small and
those not requiring subsidy are medium. In terms of population, Chan
suggests that small communities, with fewer than ten passengers
carried per day, generally have populations of 10,000, while medium
cities go up to 100,000.8 However, there is no hard-and-fast formula,
since some communities with populations of 500,000 have only service
from small commuter aircraft. In Chan's study, the small communities
are defined in relation to air traffic generation based on the FAA's
hub classification. This means that communities enplaning 0.25% or
less of U.S. air traffic (approximately 900 passengers per day) are
considered small or non-hub airports. Non-hub airports, 541 of 666
airports, or 81% (Table 3.1) would perhaps be the most appropriate
category for small-community service evaluation, but several of the
small hub points are included in the CAB's essential air service
category. Thus, both small hubs and non-hubs are used as the basis
for this evaluation of small-community air service. We shall call
these the "smaller" points, while the medium and large hubs shall be
called the "larger" points.
3.3.2 Trends in Short Haul Air Traffic
Small-community air service, because of the low traffic volume,
has been historically carried to a nearby (short-haul) larger point
by the airlines where access was gained to the air transport
system. Small-community services have often been equated with short-
haul air service.
The certificated airlines normally flew short-haul air services
at small communities only when they served them as an adjunct or
feed to long-haul services. The exception, of course, was when they
were externally subsidized to render such service. In providing
these short-haul services, some short-haul, local, point-to-point
passengers were accommodated. The majority of the short-haul
passengers were usually interline-connecting passengers. Also, in
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the pre-deregulation days, the short-haul services, primarily from
low-density points, were cross-subsidized by the long-haul, high-
density services. Accordingly, it is interesting to note the changes
that have taken place in short-haul air traffic of certificated
airlines over the past decade as the certificated airlines have had
greater freedom to abandon points and routes. For the ten years
prior to deregulation, 1968 to 1977, the following were the annual
passengers and growth rates for originated air passengers by
certificated carriers over short-haul distances.
Number of Originated Passengers -- Certificated Carriers (000)
% of % of % Increase
Mileage 1968 Total 1977 Total (Decrease)
0- 99 1,450 1.4% 1,223 0.8% (15.3%)
100-199 12,228 11.8% 11,854 7.9% ( 3.1%)
Subtotal 13,678 13.2% 13,077 8.7% ( 4.4%)
200-299 15,195 14.6% 17,023 11.4% 12.0%
300-399 10,357 10.0% 14,181 9.5% 36.9%
400-499 9,394 9.1% 11,932 8.0% 27.0%
Subtotal
Under 500 48,624 46.9% 56,213 37.6% 15.6%
Over 500 55,122 53.1 93,251 62.4 69.2%
Total 103,746 100.0% 149,464 100.0 44.1%
Sources: U.S. CAB, "Handbook of Airline Statistics", 1969 edition,
p. 38.
U.S. CAB, "Origin-Destination Survey of Airline Passenger
Traffic-Domestic", Calendar Year 1977, Table 5.
The certificated airlines placed priorities on rendering service
for the passengers traveling distances beyond 200 to 300 miles, with
an even-greater emphasis beyond 500 miles. In fact, traffic carried
by certificated airlines on trips of under 200 miles actually
decreased 4.4%, while traffic over 500 miles grew over 69.2%. As
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debate over deregulation heated up in the mid-1970's, the CAB
permitted the abandonments noted in Chapter 2. After airline
deregulation was signed into law in late 1978, some similar yet
different trends in certificated airline traffic emerged through 1981.
Annual Number of Originated Passengers -- Certificated Carriers
% of % of % Increase
Mileage 1977 Total 1981 Total (Decrease
0- 99 1,223 0.8% 881 0.5% (28.0%)
100-199 11,854 7.9% 12,646 7.7% 6.7%
Subtotal ~3~077 8.7% 13,527 7.6% 3.4%
200-299 17,023 11.4% 20,836 11.7% 22.4%
300-399 14,181 9.5% 18,844 10.6% 32.9%
400-499 11,923 8.0% 15,380 8.6% 38.9%
Subtotal 56,213 37.6% 68,587 38.5% 22.0%
Over 500 93,251 62.4% 109,632 61.5% 17.6%
TOTAL l49464 100.0% 178,219 100.0% 19.2%
Source: U.S. CAB, "Origin-Destination Survey of Airline Passenger
Traffic-Domestic, Calendar Years 1977 and 1981", Table 5.
The very-slow growth in passengers on trips of under-200 miles
continued, but the growth in the remaining segments up to 500 miles
was areater than in the over-500-mile segment. The under-500-mile
passengers in 1981 represented 38.5% of passengers flown on the
certificated airlines, compared with 37.6% in 1977 (after a reduction
from 46.7% in 1978).
Similarly, from the data concerning revenue-passenger-miles
(Table 3.2), almost all categories in the passenger-mile measurement
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showed increases from 1977 to 1981, similar to the data on passengers
given above. This data shows some concentration of certificated
carriers (trunks and locals) on the 300-500 mile markets in the
1977-1981 period.
However, the certificated carriers have abandoned city-pair
markets in all ranges. This is supported by Table 3.3, which shows
an increase of 17.0% in markets over 500 miles served from 1968 to
1977, but since that time the certificated carriers have abandoned
13.3% of the city-pair markets served under 300 miles, 13.7% for
all markets under 500 miles and 13.6% of all markets over 500 miles.
But what happened to the short-haul traffic can only be answered
by including the performance of the commuter airlines. After all,
the commuter are operating primarily in under-300-mile segments.
The only available data from the CAB (Table 3.4) is for the 1977-1980
period and it suggests that the commuters did make up for the low
growth (3.4%) of passengers in certificated carrier markets of under
200 miles. The computer airlines in markets under 200 miles increased
their passengers from 7,708,000 in 1977 to 9,774,000 in 1980, for an
increase of 2,066,000 (26.8%) with the last year (1981) not recorded.
Assuming that 1981 commuter-airline passengers remained at the 1980
levels in the 200-miles-or-less segments, then the 1977-1981 increase
in that category would be 19.2%.
The commuter city-pairs showed a similar average increase to
passengers, 30.9% from 1977 to 1980, but the largest increase (72.9%)
was in city-pairs over 200 miles (Table 3.5). The commuters, thus,
in the 1977-1980 period also show a greater willingness to enter
longer-haul markets.
3.3.3 Traffic at Hub Points
The Civil Aeronautics Board has prepared special tabulations
on the passenger enplanements for the largest of the hub categories:
large, medium, and small, 9 for the 1978 and 1980 calendar years. This
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excludes the large non-hub category which is of particular concern in
this thesis. However, the tabulations do provide helpful insight
into activity at the largest hubs and some insight into the smaller
hubs.
The 135 domestic points which represent the large, medium, and
small hub points from 1978 to 1980 show that the large hubs are the
only category showing an increase in total passengers enplaned by
certificated and commuter carriers (3.8%), while the medium and small
hubs showed decreases in passengers enplaned, of 2.7% and 2.8%,
respectively (Table 3.6). However, during the same period, the
certificated carriers alone reported 3.9% and 6.3% decreases in the
medium and small hubs. The increase in the share of traffic carried
at the medium smaller hubs by the commuters is demonstrated in
Table 3.6. The commuters carried 6.2% of the passenger traffic at
small hubs in 1980 compared with only 2.7% in 1978, and they carried
2.9% of passenger traffic at medium hubs in 1980, compared with 1.7%
in 1980. Over all hubs, the commuter share of passengers increased
from 2.1% to 3.2% from 1978 to 1980.
Since the focus of this chapter is small-community service, it
is appropriate that the data at small hubs be given extra scrutiny.
At the small hubs, some geographic areas have a greater dependence
on commuters than others. The areas where the commuters accounted for
more than 10% of the enplaned passengers at small hubs in 1980 are:
Pacific 14.4%
New England 12.7%
Mid Atlantic 11.4%
East North Central 11.0%
Source: Tables 3.6, 3.7, and Appendix 3.2
In the remaining geographic areas10 -- West North Central, South
Atlantic, East and West South Central, and Mountain -- the commuters
in 1980 account for less than 5% of the traffic. In large measure,
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these were the areas still served extensively by former local-service
carriers of Republic, Frontier, Ozark and Piedmont. These airlines
continued on Section 406 Subsidy with Republic still serving many of
the 406 subsidy points through 1982 and into 1983. As discussed in the
following chapter, some of these carriers remained at small points
in order to receive the extra incentive offered during the transition
to service-related Section 419 Subsidy. At the end of 1982, Republic
remains as the only local-service carrier in subsidized service.
The other carriers have been replaced by commuters.
In 1980 the following small hubs had commuters carrying over
20% of their traffic, all up considerably from 1978:
% Commuter of Total Passengers
Small Hub Point 1978 1980
Fort Wayne, Indiana 6.3 45.8
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 14.4 23.3
Monterey, California -- 21.2
Santa Barbara, California 30.8 62.4
South Bend, Indiana 4.6 24.5
Source: Appendix 3.3
Table 3.8 provides a different look at all the different U.S.
hubs including non-hubs, for three years before and three years after
deregulation. This look is obtained by analyzing data from the
airport survey conducted for this thesis. Of the 119 airports
responding to the survey, 71 reported the passenger traffic in all
years from 1975 through 1981. The total passengers enplaned on
certificated and commuter airlines from 1975 to 1978 showed an
overall increase of 34.8%, ,with the non-hubs recordinq a siqnificantly
higher increase of 48.2% (table 3.8). The same airports report
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that for the period between 1978 and 1981, total passenger traffic in
every hub category (except large) decreased. The large hubs increased
7.8%, while the medium hubs decreased only slightly by 0.5%, and
the small and non-hubs experienced a marked decline in total
passenger enplanements of 16.0% and 15.4%, respectively, from
1978 to 1981.
The conclusion that the smaller points have had overall
passenger reductions since airline deregulation is partially
confirmed, when the CAB-reported data (Table 3.6) shows that through
1980 the small hub passengers decreased 2.8%. The CAB data
(Table 2.3) shows that passengers at all hubs decreased from 296.9
million in 1980 to 285.7 million in 1981 (3.8%). Recently-published
1981 CAB domestic airport activity statistics show the following hub
category passenger changes.
No. of U.S. Domestic Enplaned Passengers (000)
Change
Hub Category 1978 1981 1978-1981
Large 181.359 186,524 2.8
Medium 48.163 50.628 5.1
Small 25.823 20.932 (19.0)
Non-Hub 8.686 7.699 (11.4)
TOTAL 264.027 265.783 0.7
Source: U.S. CAB, "Airport Activity Statistics", Year Ended
December 31, 1978 and 1981
The reasons for the decrease in passenger traffic at the smallest
hubs will be probed in several ways in subsequent chapters. The
indication is clear that the overall passenger traffic is down at
these smaller hubs. However, it should be recognized that 10 of the
points, out of 52 in the survey, showed the same or increased
passenger traffic from 1978 to 1981 (Appendix 3.5).
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Aggregating the data into large and medium hubs, and then into
small and non-hubs, reveals that the certificated carriers simply
have concentrated on the large points (Table 3.9) and the commuters
have made dramatic inroads into the reduced traffic at small
points (Tables 3.10 and 3.11). By 1981, the commuters had taken
13.8% of the passengers at small and non-hubs (Table 3.10). This
data distribution indicates that without commuters the small and
non-hubs would have had an even-larger decline from 1978 to 1981.
In that period, only one small point recorded an increase in
certificated airline passengers, whereas 39 small and non-hub points
recorded decreases for these carriers.
Further examination of the survey data shows the certificated
airlines experienced passenger enplanement declines in excess of
23% in small hubs and non-hubs from 1978 to 1981. However, during
the same period, commuters showed significant passenger traffic
increases at these smaller points. In fact, commuter passenger
enplanements at all hubs increased 57.6% during the 1978-1981 period
(Table 3.8).
A sort of the survey passenger data for total traffic at the
small and non-hubs indicates that the smallest of these small
points (based on 1978 enplaned traffic) had the largest passenger
decreases from 1978 to 1981, as follows:
1978 Daily
Enplaned No. of Enplaned Passengers (000) % Increase
Passengers Points 1978 1981 _LDecrease)
0-100 37 600.4 405.3 (32.5%)
101-200 14 687.2 507.9 (26.1%)
Over 200 19 8,357.5 7,236.8 (13.4%)
Source: Table 3.11
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Thus, we see that since deregulation, the total air passenger
demand at smaller points has been dramatically reduced. Both the survey
data and CAB data confirm these results.
3.3.4 Trends in Flights and Departures at Hub Points
In order to put the changes in passenger enplanements into proper
focus, an analysis of scheduled flight frequencies, i.e., flights
going to all destinations with flights duplicated as they serve
additional points, is helpful. An analysis of all scheduled flight
frequencies between and within the various hub categories from April
1978 to April 1982 shows that all hub groups had a reduction in all
scheduled flights. As with passenger enplanements, the smaller
points (small and non-hubs) experienced a larger decrease (14%) than
the 7.8% that the larger points (large and medium hubs) experienced
(Table 3.12).
The overall number of all scheduled departures for the hub points
in the 48 states from April 1978 to April 1982 actually shows an
increase of 2.9% (Table 3.13). When combined with the above frequency
data, this says that the average unduplicated flight had 1.78
departure destinations in April 1978 and only 1.55 in April 1982.
Thus, fewer multi-stops and more non-stops were scheduled in April
1982. By hub class, the number of destinations per departure in the
two time periods were as follows:
Hub Class April 1978 April 1982 % (Decrease)
Large 2.61 2.26 (13.4%)
Medium 3.42 2.93 (14.3%)
Small 3.77 3.35 (11.1%)
Non-Hub 2.86 2.58 ( 9.8%)
Total Duplicated1  2.94 2.57 1 3.5T
Total Unduplicated 1.78 1.55 (12.9%)
Source: Tables 3.12 and 3.13
1 See Table 3.13 for explanation of duplicated flight.
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The reduction in stops per scheduled flight is evident in all
classes, with a greater reduction in the large points than in the
small points.
Addressing the hub breakdown of departures indicates again the
small and non-hubs lost 4.5% of scheduled departures, whereas the
larger points, large and medium hubs, increased 6.5% from April 1978
to April 1982 (Table 3.13). The number of smaller points that
experienced scheduled declines (354) represents 58.4% of the total of
those points. On the other hand, only 31.7% of the larger points
had scheduled departure decreases (Table 3.13).
Returning to the airport survey responses,as they provide
departure data, reveals that larger points (large and medium hubs)
increased departures for the three years before and also the three
years after airline deregulation (Table 3.14). The total growth rate
for three years before deregulation was 15.8%, while the three post-
deregulation years recorded only a 4.2% increase in total departures.
For certificated carriers, there was a 11.6% growth rate in departures
before deregulation, which reduced to 0.6% afterward. For commuter,
the 39.6% growth rate before deregulation reduced to a 20.7% growth
rate afterward. The commuters with the small aircraft increased their
share of departures from 14.8% in 1978 to 20.7% in 1981.
A similar review of the survey data for the smaller points (small
and non-hubs) shows a 1975 to 1978 growth of 12.2% for total
departures, but only a modest 2.3% increase from 1978 to 1981
(Table 3.15). The percentage of commuter departures has increased
dramatically, from 30.2% of all departures in 1978 to 54.3% in 1981
(Table 3.15). The certificated carriers at the smaller points
increased departures in the three years prior to deregulation (1975-
1978) by 5.4%, whereas since deregulation (1977 to 1981) these
carriers decreased 33.8%.
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A summary of the changes in aircraft departures at survey hub
points corroborates the increased dependence of small points on
commuter service (3.16). The surprising aspect is the decrease in
total departures of 6.3% at the non-hubs, from 1978 to 1981. The
commuters have increased their share of the departures to over 50%
(Table 3.15). With the substitution of aircraft of much smaller size
it would appear logical to expect increased departures, even with
less traffic available. However, the survey data tends to parallel
the earlier CAB hub data analysis, which shows a decrease of 8.0% in
departures, 1978 to 1981 at non-hub points (Table 3.13).
3.3.5 Trends of Seat Offerings at Hub Points
For describing the service available to small communities, we
would like to know the actual seating capacity available. This
is difficult data to obtain without access to individual carrier
segment flight loads and actual seat capacity available on all
flight segments. However, an analysis of points which assigns all
seats as available for each departure can then be performed and can
provide insights into the trends in the capacities offered.
Analysis of the April 1978 to April 1982 schedules, which assigns
all the seats on the aircraft as available at each stop of the
airlinesindicates that the 6% seat increase (Table 3.17) at larger
points (large and medium hubs), is very close to that recorded in
passengers (Table 3.8) and departures (Table 3.13). However, the
seat changes at the smaller points (small and non-hubs) are
significantly different. The seats offered at the smaller points
(small and non-hubs) decreased 14.5% from April 1978 to April 1982
(Table 3.17). This confirms the anticipated results of the increased
smaller aircraft service of the commuters in 1982.
A further probe of the seat data shows that 423 points or 70%
of the smaller points either had no increase or had a decrease in seat
offerings from April 1978 to April 1982 (Table 3.17). This compares
with no changes or decreases in departures in only 370 points or
61% of the small points (Table 3.13).
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Another area to be considered in the analysis is the trend in
seats per departure as displayed below:
% Increase
Hub Class _Aril 1978 April 1982 (Decrease
Large 110.7 113.3 2.3
Medium 110.9 94.5 (6.3)
Small 83.3 75.0 (10.0)
Non-Hub 47.1 40.7 (13.6)
Total 91.6 91.2 (0.8)
Sources: Tables 3.13 and 3.17.
The seating capacity of the aircraft operating at large hubs,
despite the increased departure share of commuters (Table 3.14) with
their small aircraft, increased 2.3% to over 113 seats per departure
from April 1978 to April 1982. Logically, the smaller the size of
the point, the smaller the number of aircraft seats. This is true in
the hub categories, but significantly, the number of seats offered
per departure declined at an increasing rate at each lower level of
the hub category.
3.3.6 Causes of Greater Decreases in Number of Passengers at
Smaller Points
Another interesting insight into the changing environment at
the smaller points can be gained by analyzing the changes at Michigan
airports. Michigan furnished traffic and activity data for all of
its 21 commercially-served airports. Michigan is atypical in that
its economy has been hit hard by the problems in the automobile
industry. Thus, it is not surprising to observe that airline
passenger enplanements declined 10.6% from 1978 to 1981 even though,
nationally, certificated and commuter air traffic increased slightly
4.0%l1 during the same period. The interesting observation is that
passenger traffic at the small and non-hub Michigan points declined
27.2% and 37.0%, respectively, while Detroit, the one large hub,
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decreased by only 6.9% during the same 1978 to 1981 period (Table 3.18).
Thus, the small and non-hubs, which in 1978 attracted almost 25% of
the state's air passengers, in 1981 garnered less than 20% (19.24%).
The reduction in their share of the state's passenger traffic is almost
universal at all small and non-hubs (Table 3.19). Detroit now has
over 80% of the state's air passengers. The reduction in aircraft
size and number of both seats and departures at the Michigan points
approximates the national changes. The critical question is why
does such a big shift from the small points to the large hub points
exist? It is the opinion of the airline executives who serve small
points in Michigan that a significant number of air passengers at
the small points find it more economical to drive to the large hub
point in order to obtain a low discount fare unavailable on joint
fares at the small point. In addition, the departure changes have
reduced the direct services and destinations served. Thus, the
inconvenience of connections is avoided by going directly by surface
transport to large hubs which have the availability of discount fares,
multiple destinations, direct services and large aircraft.
A similar phenomenon is observed at Worcester, Massachusetts,
and Providence, Rhode Island, in relation to Boston's large hub
service. Providence, a small hub, is approximately 43 miles from
Boston's Logan Airport. Worcester, a non-hub, is approximately 39
miles from Boston's Logan Airport. Providence has had a drop in
passenger traffic of 20.4% from 1978 to 1981.12 Worcester's passenger
traffic from 1978 to 1981 declined 55.2%.13 In both cases, the
evidence is that surface transportation to Logan has improved
sufficiently so that many passengers are taking advantage of the
cost savings and added services to be gained by traveling via surface
means to a large hub, in these cases, Boston.
The Wall Street Journal 4 recently ran a story citing several
places where it was worth the traveler's time to drive from smaller
points to a hub point to take advantage of low discount fares. Among
the combinations cited were:
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Via Approx. Approx.
Larger Air Fare Drive Time/
Hub Saving Distance
From To Airport One-Way to Hub
Allentown San
Francisco Newark $140 90 minutes
St. Louis Tampa Chicago 50 180 minutes
Bloomington,
Ind. New York Louisville 35 90 minutes
Harrisburg Boston Baltimore 80 60 minutes
Ithaca New York Syracuse 76 45 minutes
The topic of small community and commuter fares will be subjected
to additional analysis in the essential air service section of this
chapter, and in Chapter 6 in the discussion of joint fares. Suffice
it to say at this point that there is a body of evidence suggesting
that part of the reason for the decline of traffic at small points is
the discount rates available at larger hub points. Joint fares are
not applicable to discount fares. Thus, there is incentive to travel
to the larger hub via surface means, especially when the local air
fare to the large hub is high.
3.4 Essential Air Service
3.4.1 Background
A major component of airline deregulation is the "Essential
Air Service" (EAS) guarantee to small- and medium-sized communities. 15
The CAB has been charged by Congress with the responsibility of
insuring that there is a continuation of air service at all points
which had certificated air service on October 24, 1978, and
reviewing the need for service at points which lost certificated air-
line service between July 1, 1968 and October 24, 1978.16
A community becomes eligible for an essential air service
determination when the last remaining certificated air carrier
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proposes to eliminate all or most of its scheduled service to that
point. However, the point must have been served by only one carrier.
A few exceptions, notably Bakersfield, California, have been added to
this list. When the last carrier proposes elimination of service,
the CAB must seek a replacement air carrier, certificated or commuter,
willing to provide service at the minimum essential level of air
transportation, as determined by the CAB, for that community. If the
CAB is unable to obtain a replacement air carrier, the incumbent
airline is required to maintain minimum air service until a suitable
replacement air carrier can be found. 17  Often, subsidy compensation
is provided, as discussed in Chapter 4. Similarly, the reinstitution
of services at points which lost certificated service in the ten
years prior to deregulation has been evaluted by the CAB as to the
need for subsidy. This, too, is discussed further in Chapter 4.
There are 555 points18 in the United States that are eligible
for EAS determination. The largest number of these points, 228, are
in Alaska. These, because of the unique requirements of this spdcious
and sparsely-populated state, are not evaluated in this thesis. In
addition, eliminating the points in Hawaii and Puerto Rico reduces
the total in the 48 states to 313 points. Six of the mainland points
are served through nearby points, thus the points evaluated in this
thesis are only 307.19
There are nearly 100 points in the 48 states with scheduled
air carrier service that were not listed on certificates of CAB
certificated carriers on October 24, 1978, since this service was
provided exclusively by commuter airlines. Examples of such points
are: Provincetown, Massachusetts and Naples Florida, served by
Provincetown-Boston Airlines; Oak Harbor, Washington, served by
Harbor Airlines; or Marshfield and Wisconsin Rapids, Wisconsin, served
by Midstate Airlines. These points have not been put under the EAS
program. Similarly, at hyphenated points such as Augusta/Waterville,
Maine, where there in fact was service at airports in both communities,
but service is only required by the CAB at one point, the EAS
guaranteed service obligation can in fact be satisfied by service
at only one point.
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Basically, the program is regulatory and applies to single-
airline cities. Even though only a small portion of the traffic comes
from these points, they account for almost 50% of the nation's
airports receiving air service (307 points out of a total of 666
hubs in the 48 states). 20
3.4.2 Objective of Essential Air Service
Congress intended EAS as a transitional program for smaller
cities negatively impacted by the airline industry's move from a
regulated environment to complete deregulation.21 Its ten-year
life was envisioned by Congress as the period required to bring the
interim stability and prevent service disruptions.22 "The ultimate
goal [of essential air service] is to sustain and encourage self
sufficiency "23 at the small points in the United States.
3.4.3 EAS Standards and Problems
In determining the extent and quality of the essential air
service for a community, Congress directed the CAB to adopt a minimum
standard. The standards adopted include 24
o Two-engine aircraft
o Two-person crew
o Two daily flights
o Two well-timed round-trips to one or two hubs (one on
weekends), with no more than two intermediate stops
o Maximum capacity of 160 seats per day (80 outbound and
80 inbound at a 50% load factor for a standard of 40
passengers per day).
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Basically, the CAB is relying on historic traffic levels (principally
1978) and travel patterns to guarantee each community adequate seats
and a minimum number of departures to large nearby airports with
connecting airline services.
Once the minimally-required number of airline seats is determined
for an essential service point, a tiered system is established to
convert the seats to frequency, depending on aircraft size, with
lower frequencies specified for larger aircraft, and higher
frequencies for smaller aircraft.
A cap on the guaranteed seats has been set by CAB, on the theory
that a community generating 40 passengers per day or more can
generally support subsidy-free air service, and that the carriers
will provide any additional air services needed because of the market
opportunity available.
As of mid-1981 airline service at the 307 points served under
EAS in the 48 states, only 14 (or 4.6%) had fewer daily seats than
guaranteed (Table 3.20). At the same time, only 41 points of the
total 307 had the guaranteed minimum of two daily frequencies or
less (Table 3.21). Furthermore, of these 41 points with minimum
frequencies, the 1978 daily enplaned passengers were ten or fewer
at 23 points and only three points had 1978 daily passenger levels
above 25. These levels of service failed to support the anticipated
fear that the service levels would all be reduced to the minimum of
two flights per day.
The apparent CAB standard of two flights per day is the minimum
level required by the law. These are viewed in many cities and states
as being too restrictive, except at the smallest of points. Another
anticipated problem with the CAB's approach is that it only evaluates
the impact of a potential service loss, triggered by the carrier's
notice of termination, at a time when the community is down to the
last certificated airline. This is probably only after the damage
in lost traffic and reduced frequencies has already occurred, and
ignores the numerous carrier actions which preceded the final
termination notice. It concentrates on the final reduction which
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puts the community into the EAS program.
Another aspect of the EAS program that is frequently
questioned is its reliance on the so-called "marketplace theory". This
theory suggests that if a community enplanes more than 40 passengers
per day, the competitive market forces will furnish adequate service
to meet the traffic demand. However, market forces rarely respond
positively to carrier terminations, thus the passengers per day
standard may well be misleading.
The standard EAS notice period for carrier termination is 90
days. In the real world, 90 days is not long enough to find a
replacement carrier. Airline scheduling and planning cycles are
usually much longer than 90 days. This can lead to costly
disruptions of service at the EAS point.
The hub designation program for the EAS is also a potential
problem. Generally speaking, the CAB has opted25 for the designation
of the closest hub point. In many cases, these hub points are small
hubs, with limited services available. This means that the traveler
often must make several connections. It also fails to recognize that
many EAS points may well have two or more hubs where there exists a
strong community of interest. For points, especially in the Midwest,
such as North Platte, Nebraska, with a hub point of Omaha, 251 miles
to the east, it means a westbound traveler must travel at least an
extra 502 miles to get to the west-coast destination. Thus, numerous
EAS points require more than one hub designation in order to avoid
excessive circuity.
3.4.4 Trends in Service at EAS Points and Markets
The EAS points, which are almost entirely non-hub points, have
become increasingly reliant on commuter airlines. From mid-1981 to
mid-1982, the commuters increased the number of EAS points served
from 56.4% (or 172) to 87.6% (or 269) of the 307 points (Table 3.22).
At the same time, the trunklines and local-service carriers eliminated
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service at 119 points, for a 55% decrease. In July 1982, the
trunklines and local-service carriers (and primarily the latter)
were reduced to serving only 31.6% of the EAS points.
The take-over of EAS points by commuters is almost complete in
the New England, Mid-Atlantic and Pacific states, where the commuters
serve over 98% of the points (Table 3.23). The Midwest and South
Atlantic areas, served by the Section 406-subsidized carriers
(Republic, Ozark and Frontier) account for the major portion of
the local-service carriers.
The same pattern is true for EAS markets (some points have two
markets designated for service), where the commuters in mid-1982
served 33% of 431 EAS markets (Table 3.24). Again, the trunklines
and local-service carriers only served 142 EAS markets or 32.9% of
the EAS markets (Table 3.25). Collectively the trunklines and local-
service airlines reduced EAS markets from 299 in 1978 to only
142 in 1982.
3.4.5 Trends in EAS Passenger Traffic
Returning to the airport survey, the total passenger traffic
changes in both EAS and non-EAS smaller points is the same since
deregulation, a 17% decrease (Table 3.26). Over 90% of these points,
both EAS and non-EAS, report passenger decreases from 1978 to 1981.
The commuters' share of the traffic at both EAS and non-EAS smaller
points increased. However, the commuters' share in 1981 at EAS points
was double that in non-EAS points [19.0% versus 9.6% (Table 3.27)].
The passenger levels at EAS points decreased at a faster rate
from 1978 to 1981 for points with low traffic in 1978, as follows:
1978 Daily Number % Increase
Enplaned Passengers of Points (Decrease) 1978-1981
0-100 31 (36.3)
101-200 13 (25.7)
Over 200 12 (10.2)
TOTAL 56 (15.6)
Source: Table 3.28
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This suggests that the smaller the traffic base, the greater the
sensitivity to other changes such as departures, seats, or fares.
The non-EAS smaller hubs show a decrease of 15% from 1978 to
1981, similar to but slightly above traffic at EAS points with
above-200 daily passengers (Table 3.29). The larger the non-EAS
smaller hubs show passenger decreases greater than the low-density
(under 100 passengers per day) points.
3.4.6 Trends in EAS De arture Data
The survey departure data at EAS points reflects a 15.3% decrease
from 1978 to 1981 (Table 3.30). This is slightly more than, but
consistent with, the decline in non-hub departures from 1978 to 1982
of 8.0% (Table 3.13). The overall survey smaller hub departures
decrease of 3.3% is above the 1978-1982 totals, where a 4.5% decrease
was recorded (Table 3.13).
The commuter airlines at the EAS points accounted for 65.7%
of all 1981 departures, as compared with only 28.2% in 1978 (Table
3.31). This is above the 54.3% share that the commuters recorded of
all small and non-hub departures (Table 3.15). The increased share
is consistent with the increased passenger participation at EAS points
by commuters.
3.4.7 Trends in Air Fares in EAS Markets
A detailed analysis of the fares in 402 EAS markets with Official
Airline Guide quoted fares for June 1978 and June 1982 was undertaken.
The fare basis for this comparison is the economy only fare (y).
When this fare was not furnished the standard (A) or (C) fares were
used.
The results of this research, when analyzed geographically,
indicate that the average EAS local fare (assuming equal passengers
in each market and without regard to distance in these markets)
increased 98.7% over the four-year period (Table 3.32). The East
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South Central region increased a high 121.1%, whereas the West South
Central increased a low of only 75%. Overall, the eastern regions,
with the notable exception of New England, experienced faster-than-
average fare increases. The same is true for the upper Midwest.
A more detailed geographic breakdown of the fare changes in
EAS markets from 1978 to 1982 is provided in Table 3.33, where state
results are displayed. This breakdown shows a low fare increase of
only 44.6% in Connecticut, excluding the one Tennessee market, and
a high increase of 152.7% in South Dakota. Overall, the fares in
the upper Midwest appear to have increased well above 100% during
the period. On the other hand, the New England and West South Central
states appear to have had the lowest fare increases.
Relative to the fare per passenger mile in 1982 (excluding the
ultra-short-haul markets, those less than 100 miles), the high-cost
states appear to be in the east, especially Alabama, Georgia and
Virginia. The low-cost states are Arizona, Arkansas and New Hampshire,
where the fare per passenger mile was 40 cents per passenger-mile
or less.
Another view of the EAS market fare changes from 1978 to 1982 is
provided by comparing all the fare increases by mileage groups
(Table 3.34). Interestingly, this display shows that the shorter the
distance, the lower the level of increases from 1978 to 1982. The
same pattern, even to a greater degree, is shown when the fares are
displayed on a passenger-mile basis (Table 3.35).
The final step in this analysis is comparison of the results
of the EAS fare changes since deregulation with the changes in all
domestic fares. This analysis cannot be precise due to the
unavailability of 1982 data for the airlines at the time of writing.
However, all the indications are that the basic fare increases in
effect in EAS markets from 1978 to 1982 were well above average
(Table 3.36). Compared with the basic standard industry fare level
(SIFL) formula, the average EAS market fares increased 94.6%,
compared with only 69.7% for the formula level. If the SIFL increases
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were taken by the carriers in the EAS markets, the fare per passenger-
mile would have averaged only 47.2t, compared with 54.14 published
as the normal coach/standard fare, or a 15% difference. The only area
in the country where the basic fare per passenger mile in EAS
markets increased close to the SIFL formula is the West South Central
area, where the fare increased 75.0%26 As well, the discounting
in major airline markets was such that 75% of regular airline tickets
sold for less than SIFL values. Thus the reason why the combined
revenue per revenue passenger mile for the domestic certificated
airlines increased less than the SIFL formula allowed.
3.5 Airline Terminations
The final aspect of the small-community service area to be
analyzed is airline termination since airline deregulation. Under
the Airline Deregulation Act, the airlines are permitted to terminate
air services at certificated communities with the 90-day notice
period discussed above. Excessive airline changes/terminations can
have a disruptive effect on air travelers. Similarly, there is often
a psychological problem created in the minds of air travelers when
a lower-category airline replaces a higher-category airline, such as
a local-service carrier being replaced by a commuter. The lower-
category airline invariably uses smaller aircraft and provides services
at fewer points; thus the air traveler feels as though he is being
asked to accept second-best services.
Since the passage of airline deregulation through mid-1982,
only three communities have temporarily lost air service: Astoria,
Oregon; Brunswick, Georgia; and Merced, California. All three lost
service with their consent. Service to these communities has been
or will be restored with subsidy.27 In the ten years preceding
deregulation, 137 communities lost service. 28 From airline deregulation
through December 31, 1981, both certificated and commuter carriers
filed a total of 522 termination notices, affecting 356 communities. 29
From airline deregulation through April 30, 1982, commuters and local-
service carriers filed 277 termination notices (Table 3.37). Of this
total, 252 were smaller points (small and non-hubs). These notices
impacted 266 points, of which 243 were small points. This means
243, or 40% of the 606 small hub points, have had carrier terminations.
In addition, 62 notices affecting 63 other points have been filed
requesting a reduction in EAS requirements. Collectively, then,
306, or slightly over 50% of the 606 smaller points, have been
affected by a carrier termination or a request for reduced EAS
service levels since airline deregulation.
3.6 Summary and Conclusions on Small-Community Air Service
The foregoing leads to the following summary conclusions as
to how small-community air service has changed in the 48 states in
the four years since airline deregulation (mid-1978 to mid-1982).
Terminations:
o The local service airlines have terminated service at over
30% of the small points
o Commuters have themselves terminated service at 86 small
points. or approximately 15% of the points
o Only three points with certificated service in 1978 have
lost all service since deregulation
Passenger Enplanements:
o Passenger traffic at smaller points decreased approximately
15% from 1978 to 1981
o Only a few smaller points (6 out of 40) reported passenger
increases from 1978 to 1981
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o Short-haul traffic (under 200 miles) has increased only 3.4%
since deregulation
o Commuters tend to have a much greater share of the traffic
at smaller points in the East and Pacific areas of the
country than elsewhere
o Collectively, commuter traffic has shown large increases
from 1978 to 1981 in all hub categories
o Certificated airlines show a modest increase in large points
but decreases in overall traffic from 1978 to 1981 at all
other points
Departures and Flights:
o There has been an overall reduction in scheduled flights from
1978 to 1982. While there has been a decrease at all hubs,
there has been a larger decrease at smaller points
o Almost 60% of the non-hub points have had a decrease in
scheduled departures from 1978 to 1982
o Commuters have increased departures in all hub categories,
especially at small points, since deregulation
o The commuters in 1982 accounted for almost 55% of the
departures at small points
Seats:
o Smaller points have experienced a 15% decline in seats,
whereas the large points have increased 7% since deregulation
o The seats per departure, at small points, decreased in excess
of 10% from 1978 to 1982
-118-
o The average of the 541 non-hubs in 1982 have a 40-seat
aircraft for each departure. This is down from over 47
seats in 1978
EAS Service:
o Over 300 points now have EAS service in the 48 states
o Most EAS points have seats in excess of the Congressionally-
mandated guarantee
o Only 15% of the EAS points have the minimum two daily
flights or less in 1982
o Commuters are serving over 87% of the EAS points in 1982
o New England, Mid Atlantic and Pacific EAS points are
almost exclusively serviced by commuters
o The commuters served 75% of the EAS markets in 1982
o At small non-EAS and EAS points, no difference in the
percentage decrease in traffic is evident since
deregulation
o Commuters accounted for nearly two-thirds of the departures
at EAS points in 1982
Fares:
o The standard fares in EAS markets almost doubled from
1978 to 1982
o Fares in eastern areas (except in New England and the
upper Midwest) increased faster than average in EAS
markets since deregulation
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o The standard fare per mile increased almost 95% in EAS markets
since deregulation, but New England, Pacific and West South
Central standard EAS fares are lower than in other parts of
the country
o Short-haul EAS market fares increased at a slower rate than
long-haul fares from 1978 to 1982
o EAS market fares have increased at a rate well above both
those in the certificated domestic airline industry and the
CAB-established standard industry fare level since
deregulation
The operators of the small airports frequently cite lack
of reliability, larger fares, inadequate aircraft size, and absence
of marketing as creating image problems for the commuters.30
However, the brunt of the problem must be shared by the community
itself. The community's view of its place in the air transport system
is frequently inflated and unrealistic. After a community has had
jet service for years, its pride is bruised when it is required to
accept commuter replacement. Frequent schedule changes, canceled
flights, airline mismanagement, strikes, bankruptcies, equipment
failures and financial difficulties, have all contributed towards
the development of an adversarial relationship between the small
community and the commuter airline. (although often many of the problems
existed with the previous certificated airlines). Also, the
dependability of the interstate highway system had already weaned
ridership from the local airport long before airline deregulation.
Many of the communities simply want what they once had, especially
jet service. It is difficult for them to digest the proposition
that they get the level of service they can support.
The small-airport communities and commuter airlines are often
working at cross purposes. While the commuter airline is working to
improve its image and reliability, the communities (such as Worcester,
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Massachusetts) are developing studies in an attempt to win back
jet service. At the same time, travelers are driving to a nearby hub
to avoid using the commuter airline or to get their jet service.
Putting pride aside, the smaller communities have had their
severest impact from the inability to attract discount fares. The
commuter airlines are forced to attempt to recover all costs from
the individual markets. This has increased fares much faster than
those at large points. The plethora of deregulation-induced discount
fares at large points has encouraged potential travelers at smaller
points to use service means to travel to and from the hub point.
The average smaller community in the U.S. air transport system
has generally had the worst of all worlds since airline deregulation.
Departures have decreased, seats have decreased, passengers have
decreased, flights have decreased, and the fares have increased at
a rapid rate.
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TABLE 3.1
AIR SERVICE LEVEL
I/
AT ALL HUBS~
APRIL 1982
Hub Class 2/
No. of
Communities
Amount % of
Total
Departures/Week
Amount % of
Total
3.5% 63,588 49.8%Large
Medium
Small
Non-Hub
Total
541
666
5.6
9.8
81.1
25,158 19.7
13,746 10.8
25,084 19.7
1000 % 127,576 100.0%
Seats/Weeks
Amount % of
Total
7,201,619 61.9%
2,376,895 20.4
1,031,518 8.9
1,020,518 8.8
11,630,550 100.0%
Source: USCAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares, Traffic,
Load Factors and Market Shares", Issue No. 21,
June 1982, Tables 4 and 15.
1/48 States
2/Based on September 30, 1981 data.
Table 3.2
Domestic U.S. Short-Haul Air Service For U.S. Certificated Air Carriers
As Measured by Passenger Miles
1968 to 1981
Domestic 1968
One-Way Revenue
Trip Passenger
Length Miles %
(Miles) (Thousands) Total
SHORT HAUL AIR MARKETS
1977
Revenue
Passenger
Miles
(Thousands) Total
Change
1968
1981
Revenue
Passenger
Miles %
(Thousands) Total
0- 99 116,461
100-199 1,992,361
200-299 3,830,706
0-299 5,939,528
300-399 3,689,157
400-499 4,231,441
0-499
Total 13,960,125
Over
500 71,979,193
All U.S. Air
Markets 85,839,318
SOURCES: U.S. CAB,
U.S. CAB,
0.104
2.2
4.5
6.9
4.3
5.0
16.2
103,540
1,932,143
4,331,460
6,367,143
5,119,365
5,585,581
17,073,089
83.8 121,550,025
100.0 138,623,114
0.071
1.4
3.1
4.6
3.6
4.1
12.3
87.7
100.0
(11.1)
(3.0)
13.1
7.2
38.8
32.0
22.2
70,303
2,071.301
5,288,782
7,430,346
6,737,717
7,214,780
21,382,843
68.9 140,390,934
0.042
1.2
3.2
4.4
4.0
4.3
12.7
87.3
16.1 161,773,777 100.0
(32.1)
7.2
22.1
16.7
31.6
29.2
25.2
15.5
16.7
(37.6) V
(4.0)
38.1
25.1
82.6
70.5
53.2
95.0
88.4
"Handbook of Airline Statistics", 1969 edition, p. 386.
"Origin-Destination Survey of Airline Passenger Traffic--Domestic",
Calendar Year 1977 and 1981.
0()
Change
1977
Change
1968
(Table 3. 3
Domestic U.S. Short-Haul Air Service For U.S. Certificated Air Carriers
As Measured by No. of Non-Stop City Pairs
1968 to 1981
Domestic
One-Way
Trip Non-Stop
Length City
(Miles) Pairs
Non-Stop
% City
Total Pairs
% Change
Total 1968
Non-Stop
City
Pairs
% Change
Total 1977
0- 99
100-199
200-299
0-299
TOTAL
300-399
400-499
770
2,349
3,473
6,592
3,892
4,151
0-499
TOTAL 14,635
Over
500
All U.S.
Markets
42,425
Air
57,060
1.4 488
4.1 1,939
6.1 3,368
11.6 5,795
6.8 3,988
7.2 4,350
25.6 14,133
74.4 49,635
100.0 63,768
0.7 (36.6)
3.1 (17.5)
5.3 (3.0)
9.1 (12.1)
436
1,687
2,927
5,023
6.2 (2.5) 3,384
6.9 4.8 3,791
22.2 (4.4) 12,198
77.8 17.0 42,906
100.0 11.8 55,104
0.7
3.1
5.3
(10.7)
(13.0)
(13.1)
(43.4)
(28.2)
(15.7)
9.1 (13.3) (24.0)
6.2 (15.1) (13.1)
6.9 (12.9) (8.7)
22.1 (13.7) (16.7)
77.9 (13.6)
100.0 (13.6)
1.1
(3.4)
SOURCES: U.S. CAB, "Handbook of Airline Statistics", 1969 edition,
U.S. CAB, "Origin-Destination Survey of Airline Passenger
Calendar Year 1977 and 1981, Table 5.
p. 386.
Traffic--Domestic",
Change
1968
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TABLE 3.4
MILEAGE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUTER AIRLINE
PASSENGERS - 1977 - 1980
Mileage
Category
0 - 49
50 - 99
100 - 149
150 - 199
Subtotal
200 - 249
250 - 299
Subtotal
Over 300
Total
1977
Number
(000) %
1,418
3,004
2,151
1,145
7,708
498
16.7%
35.3
25.3
13.5
90.8
5.9
136 1.6
8,351
154
98.2
1.8
8,505 100.0%
1980
Number % Change
(000) % Over 1977
1,114
3,752
3,061
10.2%
34.5
28.2
1,847 17.0
9,774
757
89.0
7.0
(19.7)
24.9
42.3
61.3
26.8
214 2.0
10,645 98.0
220 2.0
10,865 100.0%
1/ Includes Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico
Source: US CAB "Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics"
12 Months Ended December 31, 1977, 1980, Table 7
27.5 s
27.7
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TABLE 3.5
MILEAGE DISTRIBUTION OF
COMMUTER AIRLINE NON-STOP CITY PAIRS1 '
1977 - 1980
Mileage Category
0 - 49
50 - 99
100 - 149
150 - 199
Subtotal
200 - 249
250 - 299
Subtotal
Over 300
Over 200
Total
Number
1977
230
389
343
274
1,236
168
94
1,498
358
1980 % Change
% Number % Over 1977
14.4%
24.4
21.5
17.2
77.6
10.5
5.9
94.0
6.0
22.5
1,594 100.0
248
445
422
353
1,468
232
153
1,853
234
619
2,087
11.8%
21.3
20.2
16.9
70.4
11.1
7.3
88.8
11.2
29.7
100.0
7.8
14.4
23.0
28.8
18.8
38.1
62.8
23.7
143.8
72.9
30.9
Source: US CAB, "Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics",
12 months ended December 31, 1977 and 1980, Table 7
1 Includes Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico.
Table 3.6
Summary of Certificated
& Commuter Passengers F:nplaned
By Hub Type
1978 - 1980
Large
Ilubs
Medium
Hubs
I. Certificated
1/Carriers-
Number of Points
1978
1980
Number of Enplaned
Passengers (000)
168,384
174,796
53,608
51,527
% Increase
(Decrease) in
Passengers (1979-1980)
II. Commuter Carriers
Number of Points
3.8 (3.9)
1978
1980
(Continued)
0
Small
Hubs Total
1978
1980
135
135
22,083
20,701
244,075
247,025
(6.3) 1.2
117
135
Table 3.6 (continued)
Large Medium Small
Hubs Hubs Hubs Total
II. Commuter Carriers
(Continued)
Number of Enplaned
Passengers (000)
1978 3825 907 614 5346
1980 5476 1514 1366 8356
% Increase
(Decrease) In
Passengers 43.2 66.9 122.5 56.3
III. Total Certificated
& Commuter
1/
Carriers-
1978 24 41 70
1980 24 41 70
(Continued)
Table 3.6 (continued)
III. Total Certificated
& Commuter Carriers-
Number of Enplaned
Passengers (000)
1978
1980
172,209
180,272
% Increase (Decrease)
In Passengers (1978-1980) 3.8
% Commuter of Total
1978
1980
SOURCE: US CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares, Traffic, Load Factors,
Shares", Issue Number 20, April 1982, Table 1, 2, & 3
and Market
1/ Certificated commuters are contained in commuter category,
0
Large
Hubs
Medium
Hubs
Small
Hubs Total
54,515
53,041
(2,7)
22,687
22,067
(2.8)
249,421
255,381
2,4
2.2
3.0
1.7
2.9
2.7
6.2
2.1
3.2
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Table 3. 7
'/Summary of Commuter Carriers-
Share of 2/Passengers- @ Small Hubs
Geographic Region
By Geographic Region
1978 - 1980
2/
% of Total Passengers-
1978 1980
New England 9.5 12.7
Mid Atlantic 10.5 11.4
East North Central 1.0 11.0
West North Central 0.8 3.3
South Atlantic 1.8 2.0
East South Central 0.5 1.2
West South Central 1.7 2.3
Mountain 3.8 4.9
Pacific 8.2 14.4
TOTAL 2.7 6.2
SOURCE: US CAB "Report on Airline Service, Fares, Traffic, Load
Factors, and Market Shares", Issue No. 20, April 1982, Table 3
Appendix 3.1
Table 3.7
- 48 states.
i/Certificated commuters included in commuter
category.
3/Defined by U.S. Census - Listing of states included in each
region is given in Appendix 3.1
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Table 3. 8
Summary of Changes in Passenger Traffic
Before & After Airline Deregulation
1/@ Airports Responding to Survey-
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
# of
AirportsCategory
A. Hub Type:
Large
Medium
Small
NonHub
TOTAL
B. Certificated
Airline by Hub
Type:
Large
Medium
Small
NonHub
TOTAL
C. Commuter Airline
by Hub Type;
Large
Medium
Small
NonHub
TOTAL
D. Essential Air
Service Airports
by Airline Type:
Certificated -
Commuter 29
TOTAL
SOURCE: Appendices 3.4, 3.5, 3.6
% Incr (Decr) in Pax Enplanements
75 to 78 78 to 81
1LAirports who responded and reported airline pax. traffic
35.9
26.8
31.1
48.2
34.8
35.0
26.1
31.0
41.7
33.8
73.2
65.6
37.1
98.2
75.5
36.5
95.9
41.8
7.8
(0.5)
(16.0)
(15.4)
4.8
6.4
(1.4)
(22.5)
(22.8)
3.2
54.7
37.3
834.8
25.7
57.6
(21.7)
30.8
(15.3)
()(
Table 3.9
Summary of Certificated and Commuter Airline Passenger Traffic
@ Large & Medium Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
Certificated Airlines
No. of Enpl.
Pax (000)
59,960.71
65,641.0
70,521,8
80,501.3:
89,992.1
84,465.4
84,787.6-J
% Incr.
34.3
Commuter Airlines
No. of Enpl.
Pax (000)
1,334.01
1,484.5
1,860.4
2,299.6
2,696.5
2,838.4'
3,514.01
5.3
% Incr.
72.4
52.8
No. of Airports with:
Pass. Increases 75-78
Pass. Decreases 75-78
Pass. Increases 78-81
Pass. Decreases 78-81
Total No. of Airports
(Continued)
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Table 3. 9
Summary of Certificated and Commuter Airline Passenger Traffic
.1/
@ Large & Medium Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
(Continued)
% Commuter of Total
1975
1978
1981
2.2
2.8
4.0
SOURCE: Appendix 3.4
I/Airports who responded and reported passenger traffic
()
-.- j
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TABLE 3. 10
SUMMARY OF CERTIFICATED AND COMMUTER AIRLINE
PASSENGER TRAFFIC @ SMALL AND NON-HUB AIRPORTS
RESPONDING TO SURVEY
YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31,1975 TO 1981
Certificated Airlines
No. of Enpl.
Pass. (000) % Incr.
4,773.8
5,376.6
5,877.9 34.8
6,432.7
6,536.6
5,825.9 (23.2)
4,939.3
Commuter Airlines
No. of Enpl.
Pass. (000) % Incr.
252.2
296.0 90.7
385.8
481.0
727.6
800.8 64
789.6
No. of Airports with
Passenger Increases 75-78
Passenger Decreases 75-78
Passenger Increases 78-81
Passenger Decreases 78-81
Total Number of Airports
Percent Commuter of Total
1975 5.0%
1978 7.0
1981 13.8
1/Airports who responded and reported passenger traffic in all years.
Source: Appendix 3.5 and 3.6.
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Table 3.11
Passenger Traffic Changes @ All Small & Nonhub
Points Responding
1/to Survey-
(1978, 1981)
Daily Enplaned
2/Passengers-
No. of
Poihts
0 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 75
76 - 100
101 - 200
Over 200
No. 'of Enplaned
Passengers (000)
1978 1981
60.2
9 132.6
7 153.4
8 254.6
14 687.2
56.9
101.7
110.0
136.7
507.9
29 8,357.5 7,236.8
TOTAL 80 9,645.5 8,150.0
% Increase
(Decrease)
(5.5)
(23.3)
(28.3)
(47.3)
(26.1)
(13.4)
(15.5)
SOURCE: Appendices 3.5, 3.6
1/.
- Points responding to survey and reporting enplaned passengers in both 1978 & 1981.
2 /Category based on 1978 enplaned passengers for each airport.
0
___j
Table 3.12
Summary of lcheduled Flight
Frequencies- by Fub Markets
April 1978 vs. April 1982
Type Flights per Week % Incr
Hub April April (Decr)
Market Type 1978 1982 1978/1982
NONHUB
NonHub - Large Hub 36,481 33,319
NonHub - Medium Hub 13,658 11,264
NonHub - Small Hub 9,859 7,520
Noniub. - NonHub 17,911 12,599
SUBTOTAL 77,909 64,702 (17.0)
SMALL HUB
Small Hub - Large Hub 26,391 25,087
Small Hub - Medium Hub 10,964 10,222 (14.0)
Samll Hub - Small Hub 3,443 3,225
Small Hub - NonHub 9,859 7,520
SUBTOTAL 50,657 46,054 (9.0)
MEDIUM HUB
Medium Hub - Large Hub 45,974 43,134
Medium Hub - Medium Hub 9,342 9,121
Medium Hub - Small Hub 10,964 10,222
Medium Hub - NonHub 13,658 11,264
SUBTOTAL 79,938 73,741 ( 7.8)
(Continued)
Table 3.12 (continued)
Flights
April
Market Type 1978
per Week
April
1982
% Incr
(Decr)
1978/1982
LARGE HUB
Large Hub - Large Hub
Large Hub - Medium Hub
Large Hub - Small Hub
Large Hub - Non Hub
SUBTOTAL
Total (Duplicated)
TOTAL (Unduplicated)
47,173
45,974
26,391
36,841
156,019
364,523
221,196
42,349
43,134
25,087
33,319
143,889
328, 386
197,840
(7.8)
(9.9)
(10.6)
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares, Traffic, Load Factors and
Market Shares," Issue No. 21, June 1982.
1/ Includes certificated and commuter airlines. Frequencies include non-stop
and multi-stop flights as listed in the Official Airline Guide.
()
Type
flub
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Table 3.13
Scheduled Airline Aircraft Departures
By Hub Size
April 1, 1978 and 1982
I. Departures by Hub Class
Departures/Week
Hub Class
Large Hubs
Medium Hubs
Small Hubs
Non-Hub
TOTAL
April 1978
59,884
23,400
13,424
27,259
123,967
April 1982
63,588
25,158
13,746
25,084
127,576
% Increase
(Decrease)
6.2
7.5
2.4
(8.0)
2.9
6.5
(4.5)
II. Distribution of Changes by Hub Class
Number of Hubs
With With No With
2 Increase Change DecreasesHub Class 78-82 78-82 78-82 Total
Large 16 0 7 23
Medium 24 1 12 37
Small 34 0 31 65
Non-Hub 202 16 323 541
TOTAL 276 17 373 666
III. Number of Destinations/Flight
April 1978 April 1982
Hub Dest./ Dest./
Type Departs Flights Flight Departs Flights Flight
Large 58,884 156,019 2.16
Medium 23,400 79,938 3.42
Small 13,424 50,561 3.77
Non-Hub 27,259 77,909 2.86
Total
3Dupl.
Flights 123,967 364,523 2.94
Total
Undupl.
Flights 123,967 221,196 1.78
63,588 143,889
25,158 73,741
13,746 46,054
25,048 64,702
127,576 328,386
127,576 197,840 1.55
2.26
2.93
3.35
2.58
2.57
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Table 3.13 (continued)
SOURCES: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares,
Traffic, Load Factor and Market Shares", Issue
No. 21, June 1982, Table 4.
Table 3.12.
1/ Includes both certificated and commuter departures
as published in the Official.Airline Guide.
2/ 48 states with hub classification based on
September 30, 1981 traffic.
3/ Duplicated flights are those that are counted at all
points where flight stops to all the subsequent
points. Thus a flight from A to B to C is counted
twice from point A and once from point B.
0(
Table 3.14
Summary of Certificated and Commuter Aircraft Reporting
At Large and Medium Airports 1 Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975-1976
No. of
Aircraft
Departures
Year (000)
% Increase
(Decrease)
No. of
Aircraft
Departures
(000)
% Increase
(Decrease)
No. of
Aircraft
Departures
(000)
% Increase
(Decrease)
1975 1,396.9
1976 1,453.4
1976 1,520.0
1978 1,558.8
1979 1,637.3
1980 1,606.8
1981 1,568.1
No. of Airports With:
1.6
0.6
243.5
262.6
303.1
340.0
387.2
361.1
410.4
1975-1978
Certificated C
39.6
20. 7
ommuter
1,640.4
1,760.0
1,823.1
1,898.8
2,024.5
1,967.9
1,978.5
15.8
4.2
1978-1981
Certificated Commuter
Departure Increases
Departure Decreases
Percent Commuter of
Aircraft Departures:
Source: Appendix 3.7
1 Airports which responded and reported airline aircraft departing in all years.
20
2
1975:
1978:
1981
14.8%
17.9%
20.7%
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TABLE 3.15
SUMMARY OF
CERTIFICATED & COMMUTER AIRLINE AIRCRAFT DEPARTURES
AT SMALL & NON-HUB AIRPORTS 1
RESPONDED TO THE SURVEY
YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1975 TO 1981
Certificated
No. of A/C
Departures
Year (000)
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
220.01
228.1
235.11
231.8
212.91
190.0
155.3_
Airlines Commuter Air
No. of A/C
% Incr. Departures
(Decr.) (000)
5.4
(33.0)
76.0
78'191.4
100.3 =
139.3
162.2
184.3 _
lines Total
No. of A/C
% Incr. Departures
(Decr.) (000)
32.0
83.7
296.0
306.2
326.51
332.1
352.21
352.2
339.6 .
Number of Airports with:
Departure Incr.
Departure Decr.
75-78 78-81
23 7
75-78 78-81
13 13
5
17Total
5
18
75-78 78-81
36 20
17
53
21
41
Percent Commuter of Total
1975 2.6%
1978 30.2
1981 54.3
1/Airports who responded and reported airline aircraft departures
in all years.
Source: APoendix 3.8 and 3.9
% Incr.
(Dec r.)
12.2
2.3
_T
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Table 3.16
Summary of Changes in Aircraft Departures
Before & After Airline Deregulation
1/
@ Airports Responding to Survey-
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
No. of
AirportsCategory
% Change in A/C
75 to 78
A. Hub Type -- Certificated & Commuter
Large 13
Medium 9
Small 11
NonHub 34
TOTAL 67
B. Hub Type -- Certificated
Large
Medium
Small
NonHub
TOTAL
17.0
10 . 3
(0.5)
21.2
14.8
Departures
78 to 81
5.0
0.8
18.1
(6.3)
5.4
Airlines
33.0
4.3
3.9
10.2
11.1
34
67
2.2
(2.8)
(10.3)
(33.7)
(2.3)
C. Hub Tvoe --
Large
Medium
Small
NonHub
TOTAL
Commuter Airlines
D. Essential Air Service
Airports By Airline Type
Certificated 15
Commuter 29
TOTAL
SOURCE: Apendices 3.7, 3.8, 3.9
11.4
44.7
21.8
(33.0)
25.6
(11.2)
1 Airports which responded and reported airline aircraft & departures
in all years.
38.6
44.2
(31.9)
40.6
37.2
17.9
32.0
125.7
22. 6
28.4
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TABLE 3.17
AIRLINE SEATS OFFERED
BY HUB SIZE'S
APRIL 1, 1978 AND 1982
I. Seats Offered By ub Class
1/Hub Class-
Large
Medium
Small
Non-Hub
Total
Seats Offered/Week
April April
1978 1982
6,630,893 7,201,619
2,361,281 2,376,895
1,117,884 1,031,518
1,283,76 1,020,518
11,393,822 11,630,550;
% Increase
(Decrease)
8.6% 6.0
0.7
(7.7) (14.5)
(20.5)
2.0%
II. Distribution of Changes by Hub Class
1/Hub Class-
Large
Medium
Small
Non-Hub
Total
Larger Hubs
Smaller Hubs
Number of Hubs
With With 2/ With
Increase No Change- Decrease
78-82 78-82 78-82 Total
15 - 8 23
18
165
216
33
183
4
6
1
5
18
46
372
444
26
418
37
65
541
666
60
606
1/Forty-eight states with Hub Classification based on September
30, 1981 Traffic.
2/Less than 1.0% change.
Source: US CAB,"Report on Airline Service, Fares, Traffic, Load
Factors and Market Shares", Issue No. 21, June 1982
Table 15.
Appendices 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12
Table 3. 18
State of Michigan
Comparison of Changes in
Departures, Seats & Passengers
1978 & 1981
Subtotal
Large Small Non Small & Non All
Item Hub Hub Hub" Hub Hubs
Number of Airports 1 3 17 20 21
Weekly Departures
October 1, 1978 1,767 529 752 1,281 3,048
October 1, 1981 1,810 450 913 1,363 3,171 CY
Weekly Seats
Oct. 1, 1978 210,544- 49,511 52,701 102,212 312,756
Oct. 1, 19811/ 182,964 38,679 37,162 75,841 258,805
Annual Passengers-
(000)
1978 9,659 1,741 1,405 3,146 12,805
1981 9,036 1,268 885 2,153 11,189
No. of Weekly
Seats/Departure
October 1978 119.2 93.6 70.1 79.8 102.6
October 1981 101.2 85.9 40.7 55.6 81.6
(Continued)
Table 3. 18
State of Michigan
Comparison of Changes in
Departures, Seats & Passengers
1978 & 1981
(Continued)
Subtotal
Large Small Non Small & Non All
Item Hub Hub Hub- Hub Hubs
% Increase (Decrease)
1978-1981
Weekly Deps.--
October 2.4 (14.9) 17.6 6.4 4.1
Weekly Seats--
October (13.0) (21.8) (29.5) (25.8) (17.3)
Annual
Pax- (6.9) (27.2) (37.0) (31.6) (10.6)
Weekly Seats/
Departure (15.2) (8.2) (41.9) (30.3) (20.5)
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares, Traffic, Load Factors &
Market Share," Issue No. 19 (December 1981), Table 15.
State of Michigan, "State of Michigan Total Airline Passengers," Aviation
Planning. Bureau of Transportation.
I/Simmons Airlines was in the process of eliminating service at three nonhub
points (Hancock, Pellston, and Sault Ste. Marie) in October 1981.
2/
- Enplanements and deplanements.
Table 3.19
Distribution of Michigan's Airline
Passenger Traffic
by Hub Category Airport
1975 through 1981
% Each Airport's Passengers of Michigan Total
Michigan Airport (Community) 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
A. Nonhubs
Alpena .18 .18 .19 .20 .19 .19 .19
Battle Creek .39 .42 .51 .46 .41 .38 .36
Benton Harbor .56 .57 .61 .54 .53 .45 .29
Escanaba .30 .32 .32 .27 .31 .31 .28
Flint 1.99 2.18 2.28 2.19 1.76 1.37 .98
Houghton .40 .41 .40 .40 .38 .39 .37
Iron Mt. .34 .34 .34 .35 .26 .31 .23
Ironwood .17 .17 .16 .16 .17 .19 .14
Jackson .18 .17 .18 .16 .12 .11 .06
Kalamazoo 1.92 2.09 1.86 2.14 2.03 1.92 1.82
Manistee .06 .05 .05 .04 .04 .04 .02
Marquette .66 .67 .66 .67 .61 .54 .52
Menominee .20 .18 .18 .18 .15 .16 .07
Muskegon 1.50 1.52 1.45 1.35 1.20 .87 .90
Pellston .46 .49 .48 .47 .43 .40 .33
Sault Ste. Marie .27 .29 .24 .20 .19 .17 .11
Traverse City 1.12 1.11 1.17 1.19 1.23 1.24 1.29
TOTAL Nonhub 10.69 11.18 11.06 10.98 10.01 9.06 7.09
(Continued)
Table 3.19
Distribution of Michigan's Airline
Passenger Traffic
by Hub Category Airport
1975 through 1981
(Continued)
Michigan Airport (Community) 1975
% Each Airport's Passengers of Michigan Total
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
B. Small Hubs
Grand Rapids
Lansing
Saginaw
TOTAL Small Hubs
TOTAL Small & Nonhubs
12.70 12.84 13.46 13.59 12.98 12.78 11.34
23.39 24.02 24.52 24.57 22.99 21.84 19.24
C. Large Hubs
Detroit
GRAND TOTAL
SOURCE: "Aviation Stastics
State of Michigan.
76.61 75.98 75.48 75.43 77.01 78.16 80.76
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1971-1978." Aviation Planning Section. Bureau of Transportatioi
April 6, 1982.
I Metropolitan and City Airports.
5.92
3.38
3.40
5.85
3.42
3.57
6.35
3.54
3.57
6.57
3.49
3.53
6.60
3.18
3.20
6.80
2.95
3.03
6.28
2.30
2.76
(TABLE 3.20
ESSENTIAL AIR SERVICES POINTS
WITH LESS THAN MINIMUM
REQUIRED DAILY SEATS
JULY 1981
EAS Point
Mileage
Distance
To Hub
Guaran-
teed
Daily
Seats
Actual
naily Seats
July 1981
Average
Daily
Enplaned
Passengers
1978
Santa Rosa, CA
Danville, IL
Kokomo, IN
Liberal, KS
Greenwood, Miss.
Alamogordo, NM
Plattsburgh, NY
Hickory, NC
Rocky Mount, NC
Clearfied, PA
Danville, VA
Hot Springs, VA
Staunton, VA
Wenatchee, Wash.
Source: Regional Airline Association,
Industry 1981 Annual Report"
"Regional Commuter Airline
June 1982 P. 26-41
56
116
139
284
107
160
135
225
55
95
67
158
103
98
56
75
16
57
24
38
74
60
32
18
30
75
45
5
38
7
32
34
44
41
50
15
17
47
36
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TABLE 3.2 1
ESSENTIAL AIR SERVICES POINTS
WITH MINIMUM OF TWO DAILY
FLIGHTS OR LESS
JULY 1981
Mileage No. of 1978
Distance Daily Freq. No. of
EAS Points To Hub To Hub Daily Enpl.
Gadsden, Alab. 98 2 17
Page, Ariz. 289 2 11
Prescott, Ariz. 96 2 3
Winslow, Ariz. 187 2 0
Blythe, Cal. 201 2 9
Lamar, Col. 166 2 7
Moultrie, Ga. 186 2 14
Marion, Ill. 100 2 51
Kokomo, Ind. 139 2 5
Clinton, Iowa 125 2 18
Goodland, Kan. 172 2 8
Independence, Kan. 137 2 10
London, Ky. 118 2 8
Fairmont, Minn. 140 2 16
Mankato, Minn. 70 2 20
Worthington, Minn. 170 2 7
Natchez, Miss. 123 2 10
Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo. 119 2 n/a
Kirksville 149 2 8
Clendive, Mont. 201 2 2
Haure, Mont. 107 2
Lewiston, Mont. 92 2
Miles City, Mont. 135 2 2
Lewiston, Mont. 245 2 3
Wolf Point, Mont. 212 2 3
Norfolk, Neb. 93 2 17
Alamogardo, NM 160 2 32
Santa Fe, NM 294 2 8
Silver City, NM 185 2 18
Stillwater, OK 60 2 3
Astoria, Oreg. 73 2
Clearfield, Pa. 95 2 50
Hazelton, Pa. 105 2 -
Brookings, SD 50 2 8
Huron, SD 93 2 19
Mitchell, SD 66 2 12
Clarksville, Tenn. 55 2 7
Paris, Tex. 105 2 9
Danville, VA 67 1 15
Hot Springs, VA 158 2 17
Beloit, Wisc. 83 20
Source: Regional Airline Association, "Regional/Commuter Airline
Industry 1981 Annual Report" June 1982 P. 26-41
Table 3.22
Summary of Airline Types
Supplying Air Service
at EAS Points1/
June 1978 and 1982
2/
Number of Points with
EAS Flights
June June
1978 1982
f
%Increase
(Decrease)
Trunklines
Local Service
Commuters
No Service
TOTAL
Unduplicated Total
SOURCE: Regional Airline Association,
Industry" 1981 Annual Report,
"Regional/Commuter Airline
pp. 26-41.
1 EAS points with flights in EAS markets in June 1978 or June 1982 in 40 staCOs.
2 There are 307 points analyzed, some points have more than one type of airline.
Type Airline
32
184
172
8
396
307
(56.3)
(54.9)
56.4
14
83
269
8
374
307
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Table 3.23
Type of Airline Rendering Air Service
at EAS Points by Geographic Region
June 1978 & 1982
Geographic Region
State
New England
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
Subtotal
Mid-Atlantic
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Subtotal
East North Central
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Ohio
Wisconsin
Subtotal
West South Central
Iowa
Minnesota
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
Subtotal
South Atlantic
Maryland
Virginia
West Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Subtotal
June 1978
Type Airline
No.
SVc. Tr. Local Comm.
3
4 - 17
12
3
1 11
- ~ 1 36
11 . 5
1 14 1
1 1 1
7 3
- 2 33 16
11 3
4 9
3 1 33 25
1 1 6
4 6
2 1
3 4 1
2 2 3
1 ~ 27 11
With Service
June 1982
No.
Svc. Tr. Local Comm.
1 6
2
2
5
3
- 1 - 18
12
3
1 _10
1 - - 25
4 12
1 10 11
1 1 1
6 7
1 T 21 37
2 5
2 9
3 10
4 ~ 15 40
2
3 7
7
6 4
1 1
3 2 6
2 2 4
- 5 14 31
(Continued)
1/ 2/
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Table 3.23 (continued)
Geographic Region
State
East South Central
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Subtotal
West South Central
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Subtotal
Type Airline
June 1978
No.
Svc. Tr. Local Comm.
2 2
1 1 1
5
2 10 1
1 2 18 4
5 5
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 6 12
1 2 15 23
1/ 2/
With Service
June 1982
No.
Svc. Tr. Local Comm.
3
2
3 2
1 7 6
- ~ 10 13
1
1 2
_2 14
- 1 5 28
Mountain
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
Subtotal
Pacific
Washington
Oregon
California
Subtotal
Grand Total
1 7 1
3 6
1 2
_ _ 2 _ _ 1
1 5 35 29
1 2 5
2 3 4
1 7 8 12
1 10 13 21
8 32 184 172
1 7
3 4
5 7
2 9
1 9
1 7
2
1 - 13 47
1 1 5
2 5
1 2 2 20
1 3 5 30
8 14 83 269
Source: Regional Airline Association, "Regional/Cormuter Airline
Industry" 19P1 Annual Report, pp. 26-41
1/Designated points for EAS in July 1978 and 1980 - type airline
serving 48 states.
2/If several types are rendering service at the point each type is
gounted.
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Table 3.24
Summary
EAS Marketsl/Served By
Each Type of Airline
June 1978 and 1982
Type of Airline
Number of
June 1978
Markets Served
June 1982
% Increase
(Decrease)
Trunkline
Locals
Commuters
No Service
TOTAL Duplicated
Unduplicated
255
212
17
126
332
17
491
431
532
431
(46.7)
(50.6)
36.6
SOURCE: Regional Airline Association, "Regional/Commuter Airline
Industry", 1981 Annual Report, pp. 26-41
Official Airline Guide, June 1978 and 1982
1/Designated EAS markets air service in June 1978 or June 1982
~ in 48 states. Includes two markets at points where a second
hub is designated or is an alternate.
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Table 3.25
Summary of Airline Combinations
Serving EAS Markets
June 1978 and 1982
Category/Type
Airline
Trunklines Alone
Number of Markets
June 1978 June 1982
Trunklines and Locals 10
Trunklines, Locals,
and Commuters
Trunklines and
Commuters
Locals and Commuters
Locals Alone
Commuters Alone
No Service
TOTAL
299
173
125
17
431
142
% Increase
(Decrease)
(53.4)
(100.0)
(100.0)
(46.7)
(26.1)
(57.2)
119 . 2274
17
431
SOURCE: Regional Airline Association, "Regional/Commuter Airline
Industry", 1981 Annual Report, pp. 26-41.
Official Airline Guide, June 1978 and 1982
: All EAS points with service in June 1978 or June 1982
in 48 states. Includes 2 markets at points where a
second hub is designated or is an alternate.
Table 3.26
Summary of Certificated & Commuter Passenger Traffic
@ Small & Non Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
No. of E
Year Pax (00
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Non EAS Airports
npl.
0) % Incr.(Decr.)
2854.8 1
3156.8
3491.1
3832.3 :
4110.7
3800.7
3179.4
34.2
(17.0)
No. of Enpl.
Pax (000)
2172.61
2515.8
2772.6
3081.4.
3153.5
2826.0
2549.5.
EAS Airports
% Incr.(Decr.)
41.8
(17.3)
No. of Airports with:
Pax Incr. 75-78 18
Pax Decr. 78-81 0
Pax Incr. 75-78 4
Pax Decr. 78-81 14
TOTAL # of Airports 18
SOURCE: Appendix 3.5 & 3.6
1/Airports who responded and reported tr- 'ic in all years.
I-
Table 3. 2 7
Summary of Commuter Passengers Enplaned
@ Small & Nonlub Airports1
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
Non-EAS Airports
No. of Enpl.
Pax (000) % Incr.(Decr.)
59.61
56.31
75.6
102. 8. 1
164.8
278.2
305.0 j
72.5
196.7
No. of Enpl.
Pax (000)
192.6
239.7
310.6
378.2
562.8
522.6
484.6 .
EAS Airports
% Incr.(Decr.)
96.4
28.1
No. of Airports with:
Pax Incr. 75-78
Pax Decr. 78-81
Pax Incr. 75-78
Pax Decr. 78-81
TOTAL # of Airports
(Continued)
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
8
Table 3.27
Summary of Commuter Passengers Enplaned
@ Small & Non~lub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31,
(Continued)
Non EAS Airports
1975 to 1981
EAS Airports
% Commuter of Total
1975
1978
1981
2.1
2.7
9.6
8.9
12.2
19.0
SOURCE: Appendix 3.5 and 3.6
-!Airports who responded and reported certificated or commuter airline passenger
traffic in all years.
Table 3.28
Passenger Traffic Changes @ EAS
Points Responding
1/
to Survey-
1978 - 1981
Daily Enplaned
Passengers
No. of
Points
No. of Enplaned
Passengers (000)
1978 1981
% Increase
(Decrease)
0 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 75
76 - 100
101 - 200
42.2
115.6
131.7
254.6
619.6
Over 200 12 3,075.5
TOTAL 56 4,238.8
SOURCE: Mail survey of airports.
Appendix 3.5
32.8
84.7
92.4
136.7
459.9
2,761.6
3,568.1
(22.2)
(26.7)
(29.8)
(46.3)
(25.7)
(10.2)
(15.8)
1/
Points responding to survey and reporting enplaned passengers in both 1978 & 1981.
2
'Based on 1978 enplaned passengers for each airport.
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Table 3.29
Passenger Traffic Changes at Non-EAS Smaller Points
Responding to Survey
1978 - 1981
Daily
Enplaned 2
Passengers
No. of Enplaned
No. of Passengers (000)
Points 1978 1981
0 - 100 46.7
% Increase
(Decrease)
58.7 25.7
101 - 200
Over 200
TOTAL
67.0
5,282.0
5,405.7
48.0
4,475.2
4,581.9
(28.4)
(15.3)
(15.2)
Sources: Mail survey of airports
Appendix 3.5
1 Points responding to survey and reporting enplaned
passengers in both 1978 and 1981.
2 Based on 1978 enplaned passengers for each airport.
(Table 3.30
Summary of Certificated & Commuter Aircraft Departures
@ Small & NonHub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31,
Non-EAS Airports
No. of
Departures (000)
94.21
89.9
97.4
92.7:
99.8
108.2
136.9
% Incr. (Decr.)
(1.6)
1975 to 1981
EAS Airports
No. of
Departures (000)
201.8
216.3
229.1
239.4
252.4
237.1
202.7 J
4.7
Total Decrease 1978 to 1981 Non-EAS & EAS Airports
No. of Airports with:
Departure Incr. 75-78 9
Departure Decr. 75-78 7
Departure Incr. 78-81 13
Departure Decr. 78-81 3
TOTAL Airports 16
SOURCE: Appendix 3. 8
!/Airports who responded and reported departures in all years.
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
% Incr. (Decr.)
18.6
(15.3)
( 3.3)
15
Table 3.31
Summary of Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
1/@ Small & NonHub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
No. of
Departures
Non-EAS Airports
(000)
19. 1-
16.419.1
18.1
23.1
36.01
51.1.
% Incr.(Decr.)
(5.2)
182.3
EAS Airports
No. of
Departures (000)_
56.9-
61.7
72.3
82.2
116.2
126.2
133.2J
% Incr.(Decr.)
44.5
62.0
No. of Airports with:
Dept. Increases 75-78
Dept. Decreases 75-78
Dept. Increases 75-78
Dept. Decreases 78-81
TOTAL # of Airports
(Continued)
()
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
)
__j
(Table 3.31
Summary of Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
@ Small & NonHub Airports
Responding to Survey
% Commuter of Total
1975
1978
1981
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
Non-EAS Airports
20.3
19.5
37.3
EAS Airports
28.2
34.3
65.7
SOURCE: Appendix 3.9
I/Airports who responded and reported certificated and commuter airline aircraft
departures in all years.
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Table 3.32
IncreAses in Normal2 oach Air Fares!/
In EAS Markets- by Region
Ranked by % Increase
June 1978 - 1982
3/Geographic Area-
East South Central
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
Mid Atlantic
Pacific
Mountain
New England
West South Central
TOTAL/AVERAGE
SOURCE: Appendix 3.13
# of
EAS 2/
Markets-
Normal
1978
Coach Air Fare
1982 Incr.
$44.36 $98.07 121.1%
41.97 89.26 112.7
45.46 96.57 112.4
44.88 91.68 103.8
37.27 74.17 99.0
32.72 64.72 97.8
45.69 89.77 96.5
37.20 68.88 85.2
44.41 77.73 75.0
$42.22 $83.88 98.7%
25
37
402
1 /Normal coach fare (Y) where auoted in OAG. Otherwise
the standard fare (A) or (C) used. Highest fare used
when range quoted.
2/EAS designated markets in 48 states and District of Columbia
with -ares quoted in both June 1978 and 1982.
Ranked in descendi..g order of % increase.
(Table 3.33 1/
Changes in Normal Coach Air Fares-
In EAS Markets Geographic
Regions
June 1978 and 1982
Geographic Region
State
# of EAS
Markets @
EAS Points
Non-
Stop
Miles
Normal Air Fare
1978 1982~
Air Fare
% Incr C/Pax Mile
(Decr) 1978 1982
NEW ENGLAND
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
SUBTOTAL/AVERAGE
193
170
138
141
107
25
$41.33
38.00
35.50
38.75
28.00
$ 85.83
64.00
64.50
74.50
107.7
68.4
81.7
92.2
40.50 44.6
154 $37.20 $ 68.88 85.2
22.7
22.3
25.9
30.6
46.3
38.3
46.9
55.6
MID ATLANTIC
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
SUBTOTAL/AVERAGE
15
3
12
30
141 $40,20
54 30.00
94 35.41
$ 77.07
64.33
73.00
91.7
114.4
106.2
114 $37.27 $ 74.17 99.0
30.5
62.5
42.1
58.0
132.7
86.2
38.3 76.8
EAST NORTH CENTRAL
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Ohio
Wisconsin
SUBTOTAL/AVERAGE 61 162 $41.97
(Continued)
$ 89.26 112.7 29.6 60.9
( 4
38.8 39.8
30.6 55.6
119
125
190
162
184
$35.30
39.46
45.48
37.33
44.79
$ 63.10
62.70
109.52
83.33
103.50
78.8
58,9
140,8
123.2
131.0
32.4
32.8
27.5
36.7
26.1
49.6
52.9
64.1
75.0
61.2
Table 3.33 1/
Chanqes in Normal Coach Air Fares-
in EAS Markets Geographic
Regions-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
Geographic Region
State
WEST NORTH CENTRAL
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
# of EAS
Markets @
EAS Points
7
8
7
3
4
14
13
Non-
Stop
Miles
196
220
154
185
221
205
184
Normal Air Fare
1978 1982
$43.00
48.87
39.14
43.33
46.50
48.21
45.31
$104.29
103.75
82.57
85'.00
117.50
92.43
96.23
Air Fare
% Incr "/Pax Mile
(Decr) 1978 1982
142.5
112.3
111.0
96.1
152.7
91.7
112,4
25.7
24.5
26.4
24.4
22.1
25.4
32.4
60.8
48.6
54.8
48.8
5698
47.4
64.8
SUBTOTAL/AVE RAGE
SOUTH ATLANTIC
Delaware
District of Columbia -
Maryland 2
Virginia 8
West Virginia 11
North Carolina 15
South Carolina 4
Georgia 8
Florida 9
SUBTOTAL/AVERAGE 57
195 $45.46 $ 96.57 112.4
74
152
157
255
258
145
255
$30.50
41.00
41.27
50.60
53.25
37.00
49.66
$ 60,50
88.63
72.82
100.53
105.00
80,75
112.44
98.4
116.2
76.4
98.7
97.2
118.2
126.4
200 $44.88 $ 91.46 103.8
26.8 55.0
42,2
33.0
30.6
23.1
22.3
28.1
20.8
84.3
66.7
51.0
45.3
43.4
62.1
45.1
26.8 53.0
(Continued)
()
(Table 3.3 3
Changes in Normal Coach Air Fares-
In EAS Markets Goegraphic
Regions
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
Geographic Region
State
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
# of EAS
Markets @
EAS Points
Non-
Stop
Miles
133
71
151
217
Normal Air Fare
1978 1982
$39.75
34.00
42.29
47.06
$ 66.00
42.00
95.86
110.56
Air Fare
% Incr C/Pax Mile
(Decr) 1978 1982
66.0
23.5
126.6
134.9
31.8
47.8
29.5
26.0
51.6
59.2
64.3
58.8
SUBTOTAL/AVERAGE
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
SUBTOTAL/AVERAGE
28
12
6
4
15
37
183 $44.36 $ 98.07 121.1
222
180
95
174
$49.08
46.00
31.25
43.53
$ 84.67
86.33
51.00
75.87
72.5
87.7
63.2
74.3
182 $44.41 $ 77.73 75.0
28.5 59.2
24.3
26.7
38.1
30.2
40.0
50.9
55.2
51.4
28.6 48.0
MOUNTAIN
230 $51.88 $ 96.13 85.3
155 42.75 96.38 125.5
25.4 45.0
29.2 66.3
(Continued)
Montana
Idaho
Table 3.33 1/
Changes in Normal Coach Air Fares-
In EAS Markets
Regions-
Geographic
June 1978 and 1982
Geographic Region
State
MOUNTAIN (Continued)
# of EAS
Markets @
EAS Points
Non-
Stop
Miles
Normal Air Fare
1978 1982
Air Fare
% Incr C/ Pax Mile
(Decr) 1978 1982
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
11
10
10
6
247
159
203
176
191
207
$52.18
41.90
46.20
39.67
41.50
42.75
$106.55 104.2
75.60 80.4
97.00 110.0
63.33 59.6
88.00 112.0
76.50 78.9
SUBTOTAL/AVE RAGE 198 $45.69 $ 89.77 96.5 24.8 47.8
Washington
Oregon
California
SUBTOTAL/AVERAGE
GRAND TOTAL/
AVERAGE
163 $35.80 $ 63.50
199 42.90 79.20
144 27.82 59.81
77.4
84.6
115.0
25.9
26.9
21.5
43.0
50.0
45.5
160 $32.72 $ 64.72 97.8 23.6 45.9
179 $42.22 $ 83.88 98.7 27.8 54.1402
SOURCE: Appendix 3.11
- Normal coach fare (Y) when quoted in OAG. Otherwise the standard fare
(A) or (C) used. Highest fare used when range quoted.
2/Markets in 48 states and District . Columbia
PACIFIC
23.2
27.4
24.0
23.5
22.7
19.6
46.7
47.6
49.4
37.1
44.3
35.0
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Table 3.34
Change /in Normal 2/
Coach Air Fare- in EAS Markets-
By Mileage Group
# of
Mileage EAS
Group Markets
0 - 50
51 - 100
101 - 150 92
151 - 200 100
201 - 250 55
251 - 300 38
301 - 350 14
351 - 400 13
Over 400 8
TOTAL/
AVERAGE 402
SOURCE: Appendix
June 1978 and 1982
Normal Coach Air Fare
1978 1982
$26.60
30.84
36.32
41.97
48.69
51.87
58.13
66.29
71.88
$42.22
$ 46.80
56.42
70.83
85.30
95.09
104.31
122.47
150.23
145.00
$ 83.88
3. 13
- Basic economy air fare (Y). When not quoted
in the Official Airline Guide then the standard (A or S) fares
are used. The highest fare used when a range quoted.
S EAS markets in 48 states and District of Columbia
when fare quoted in both June 1978 and 1982.
% Incr
Decr
75.9
82.9
95.0
103.2
95.3
101.1
110.7
126.6
101.7
98.7
-170-
Table 3.35
Chang7 in Normal Coach
Air Fare- p Passenger Mile
In EAS Markets- by Mileage Group
June 1978 and 1982
Mileage
# of
EAS
Group Markets
0 -50 5
51 -100 77
101 - 150
151 - 200
201 - 250
251 - 300
301 - 350
351 - 400
Over 400
TOTAL/
AVERAGE
Normal Coach Air Fare
per Passenger Mile.
100
8
402
SOURCE: Appendix
1978
71.6C
41.6
29.1
24.4
21.4
18.8
18.1
17.7
16.0
1982
128.7''
75.1
57.0
48.9
46.6
39.5
38.3
40.2
32.2
%
Incr
Decr
79.7%
80.5
95.9
100.4
117.8
110.1
111.6
127.1
101.3
94.6%
3.13
- Basic economy air fare (Y). When not quoted in
the Official Airline Guide then the standard (A or S)
fare used. The highest air fare used when a range is
quoted.
2/EAS markets in 48 states and the District of Columbia
when fare quoted in both June 1978 and 1982.
27. 8d 5 4. 10
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Table 3.36
Comparison of Air Fare Changes
EAS Markets Normal Coach Fare
Vs. Domestic Industry Averages
1977/78 to 1981/82
Air Fare/Pass. Mile
Domestic -
Certificated
Airline
Industry
EAS
Markets /
Index of Standard
Industry Fare Level
Formula2/
June 1978 = 100
lst
Class Coach Combined
12.21
11.98
11.34
14.29
15.04
7.924
7.81
8.34
10.82
12.20
8.610
8.49
8.94
11.49
12.83
1977-1981
1978-1981
1978-1982
lst Class
23.2%
25.5%
Coach Combined
54.0%
56.2%
EAS
49.0% -
51.2% -
- 94.6%
Annual Rate
of Increase
1977-1981
1978-1981
1978-1982
10.3% -
14.8% -
- 18.3%
Source: Air Transport Association "Air Transport"1979-1982
USCAB Order No. 81-12-107. "Establishment of the Interim
Standard Industry Fare Level" December 17, 1981
Appendix 3.31
1/Fare as of June 1978 and 1982
2/Formula in effect in June of each year.
Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
27.80
54.1
%Incr.
100.0
106.6
143.9
162.9
169.7
SIFL
62.9%
69.7%
17.7%
14.2%
Table 3.37
Summary of Air Service
Terminations & Requests for Reduction
In Essential Air Service
By Local Service & Commuter Airlines
Deregulation through April 30, 1982
Points
Reduced EAS
Request
Notices Filed
Reduced EAS
Term. Request
Local Service Carriers
Large Hubs
Medium Hubs
Small Hubs
Non Hubs
TOTAL
3
5
9
163
180
Commuter Carriers
Large Hubs
Medium Hubs
Small Hubs
Non Hubs
TOTAL
22
22
Local & Commuter Carrier Total
Large Hubs
Medium Hubs
(Continued)
Term.
10
167
186
2
34
36
26
26
((
Table 3.37
Summary of Air Service
Terminations & Request for Reduction
In Essential Air Service
By Local Service & Commuter Airlines
Deregulation through April 30, 1982
(Continued)
Points
Reduced EAS
Request
Notices Filed
Reduced EAS
Term. Request
Local & Commuter Carrier Total (Continued)
Small Hubs
Non Hubs
TOTAL
19
224
266
20
232
277
SOURCE: US CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares, Traffic, Load Factors and
Market Shares", Issue No. 21, June 1982, Table 19, 20 and 21.
Term.
---A
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CHAPTER 4
FEDERAL SUBSIDY OF AIRLINE SERVICES
4.1 Federal Subsidy
The purpose of this chapter is to provide historical insights
into the U.S. federal government's policy towards direct airline subsidy
over the past three-and-one half decades. The direct subsidy, repre-
senting cash payments, is distinguished from indirect subsidy, which takes
many forms, such as development of the airways infrastructureand
loan guarantees. The indirect subsidy will be discussed in Chapters
5 and 6.
The discussion of policies will point out the achievements
and lessons of past policies, and recommend future paths for
direct airline subsidies. The policy alternatives and recommen-
dations will be covered in Chapter 7.
4.2 The History of Airline Subsi
4.2.1 Mail Pay
At the time of passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
the need for financial support of airlines was fully recognized.
Such support was paid by the U.S. Postmaster General through air
mail rates from 1938 until October 7, 1953. The Civil Aeronautics
Act, specifically Section 406, directed the CAB to fix and
determine "fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the
transportation of mail by aircraft". This was in order to
"maintain and continue the development of air transportation
to the extent, and of the character and quality
required for the commerce of the United States, the
Postal Service, and the national defense." 1
During this period, the amount to be paid for the carriage of mail,
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as opposed to the amount for subsidy, was not established by
legislation or regulation. However, it was clear that the total
annual amount paid for the carriage of mail was growing at a rapid
rate. From 1946 to 1953, mail compensation for domestic U.S. air-
lines (including the unknown subsidy component), grew from $20.0
million to $71.2 million (Table 4.1). By 1953, the rate of mail
pay was 96.06 cents per mail-ton-mile for domestic U.S. airlines.
This compares with the 1953 passenger rate of 56.73 cents per
passenger-ton mile.2 Clearly, mail carriage required less space
and service, but was most costly per ton-mile to the U.S. Post
Office Department. In 1954 there was an adjustment which greatly
reduced Post Office rates.
An estimate of the amount of excess mail payment for all
domestic air mail has been made by the CAB. In 1952 and 1953,
almost $25 million per year was attributable to subsidy, as opposed
to compensation for carrying mail (Table 4.1). Not surprisingly,
the Post Office felt the airlines had come of age and should be
responsible to carry mail at cost, and any needed subsidy should
become a CAB budget item. The POD would negotiate its own mail
rates, while the CAB could establish, and pay for, the airline
subsidy. This separation officially occurred on October 7, 1953.
When the CAB first discussed in 1943 establishing feeder
carriers (later known as local-service carriers), it anticipated
that a subsidy would be necessary. The CAB had little experience
with this specialized, small-community, low-density service, and
thus undertook a study to forecast results. Revenue projections were
sketchy, but the general assumption was that air fares would be
three times the prevailing motor-bus rate, or a four or five cent
yield per revenue-passenger-mile. A target average load of two
passengers was deemed reasonable. Total costs were projected at
354 per aircraft mile. These projections were based on data
furnished by prospective carriers. Given this data, a temporary
mail/pay subsidy rate of 254 per aircraft mile was initially
established for feeders. 4
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Once this rate was established, a major difficulty proved
to be estimating costs, which ranged from 624 per aircraft mile in
1946 to 87t per aircraft mile in 1948. Revenues exclusive of
subsidy generated ranged from five to 25t per aircraft mile.5 This
experience made the CAB apprehensive about establishing final
rates. Table 4.2 shows the fairly-consistent high level of mail
pay per aircraft mile given to the feeders during the 1946-1951
period.
An important trend in the experience with the early feeder/
small-community carriers was their propensity to move to larger
aircraft, even though projected costs and achieved load factors
were related to smaller aircraft. For example, Essair/Pioneer,
during the 13 months ended August 31, 1946, averaged 5.4 passengers
for a 54% load factor with ten-seat aircraft. It then changed to
the 21- to 24-seat DC-3, causing a load factor decline to 30.61%
with an average passenger load of 7.35. Empire in 1947 averaged
2.77 passengers, or a 28% load factor, with ten-seat aircraft.
In 1947, when it moved to a DC-3 operation, its load factor
declined slightly to 25%. The highest DC-3 load factor (36%)
was attained by West Coast Airlines, an average load of approximately
seven passengers.6 Moving to larger aircraft was uneconomical
for the local-service carriers, considering that mail pay was based
on the cost for aten-seat aircraft. The reasons for the DC-3
acquisition by these forerunners of today's commuter airlines was
the low price ($18,000 from the War Assets Administration ), and
the image improvement afforded an airline in the traveling public's
mind through use of larger aircraft. As detailed later in this
thesis, similar reasoning still prevails among many commuter
airlines in the 1980's.
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4.3 Section 406 Subsidy
4.3.1 Individual Subsidy Rates
In October 1953, the CAB took on the responsibility of
constructing and paying subsidy to U.S. carriers, under Section 406
of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and continued to establish
the subsidy rates until 1961. Basically, the new subsidy rate was
determined carrier by carrier, so as to produce a breakeven plus
a reasonable return on investment for the carriers requiring
support. In the words of the CAB, the procedure for setting subsidy
was as follows:
"The financial and traffic reports and forecasts
are subjected to audit and analysis, and adjustments
are made to reflect more accurately the earnings
of the period as well as to disallow expenses
and investments found to be uneconomical or
inefficient or not in accord with statutory
standards. After all adjustments, a carrier's
subsidy rate is fixed in an amount sufficient to meet
its own breakeven need (the difference between
expense and other revenues) plus a reasonable return
on investment after taxes. 8
As indicated in Table 4.3, the local-service airlines received
virtually all the subsidy for operations within the 48 states from
1954 onward. The relatively-minor amounts paid to trunklines were
basically for small-community air service, primarily to the New
England routes of Northeast Airlines.
This system of individual-carrier subsidy negotiations proved
to be time-consuming and often acrimonious. As a consequence,
carriers frequently had an "open" rate for years after any given
year of operation. This meant that a carrier was paid a temporary
rate and the final rate was determined long after the end of the
year. This made it impossible to determine a carrier's profit or
loss during this hiatus. In turn, this affected the carrier's
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financing in private markets, since temporary interim rates were
normally set to show no profit.9
A common factor complicating all these rate issues was the
CAB's attempt to determine what were reasonable service and costs
under "honest, economic and efficient management". In effect, the
CAB was attempting to make judgments after-the-fact concerning
the soundness of management decisions. This affected management's
behavior. When a carrier was evaluating new aircraft for purchase,
the blessing of the CAB on their decision was often sought before
any decision was finalized. This reflected carrier concern that
if the new aircraft proved to be less economical than projected, the
CAB could claim, after the fact, that the decision was uneconomical
and impose large cost disallowances. In the early 1960's a benchmark
confrontation occurred when Mohawk Airlines wished to order BAC-lll
aircraft. The chairman of the CAB, Alan Boyd, engaged in an exchange
of intemperate letters and public pronouncements with Mohawk president
Robert Peach. 10 The CAB's pique at not having been consulted
during Mohawk's evaluation and decision-making process resulted in
its suggesting that the risk was all Mohawk's. In effect, the CAB
said that if the aircraft worked, gave good service, and was
efficient, Mohawk would require less subsidy. On the other hand, if
the aircraft turned out to be uneconomical, Mohawk could not expect
a subsidy bailout.
The CAB's stand against Mohawk was probably prompted by its
public announcement praising the management of Lake Central for its
decision to be a forerunner in the purchase of the new Nord 262
turboprop aircraft in 1960.11 In so doing, the CAB implicitly gave
Lake Central its blessing. The Nord 262 had a number of engine
problems in the early years, and its performance on Lake Central's
system was such that the subsidy requirement was increased. Because
of its support of the Nord 262 purchase, the CAB was obligated to fur-
nish subsidy for an aircraft which was not economical at the time. In
fact, the failure of this aircraft led to Lake Central's poor financial
performance and eventual merger with Allegheny Airlines (US Air)
in 1968.12
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The CAB also established maximum compensations for subsidized
carrier presidents and vice-presidents. Failure to comply with the
compensation standards could result in a subsidy disallowance.
This represented another example of the Section 406 subsidy process'
bringing the CAB extremely close to managing the airlines.
In summary, the individual carrier negotiation Section 406
subsidy determination technique fell short of the mark because:
1. From 1958 to 1960, the local service subsidy rates were
"open" more than 80% of the time. This led to uncertain
carrier earnings, negatively-impacted carrier financing,
and creation of an increasing administrative burden.
2. Little incentive existed to conduct cost-efficient
operations when it was possible for the airline to recover
excessive costs through reopening the subsidy
negotiations.
3. The need for the CAB's protecting the public interest by
keeping the subsidy at a reasonable level and assuring
that funds were expended under "honest, economic and
efficient management" required close scrutiny of carriers.
Thus, governmental employees' subjective judgments,
rather than objectively-determined facts, established
subsidy rates.
4. The carriers tended to spend an inordinate amount of time
devising strategies to influence the administration of
subsidy.
Even though the local-service subsidy bill had increased from
$24.3 million in 1954 to over $51 million in 1960 (Table 4.3), the
local-service airline earning, averaging only $338,000 per carrier
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from 1955 to 1960, were insufficient to support the 1960 investment
base of $52.7 million.14 Therefore, the CAB felt that:
"a soundly conceived system of subsidy payments which
creates strong incentives to managerial efficiency
and avoids the weaknesses inherent in the carrier by
carrier approach has a good chance of effecting a
reverse in the upward subsidy trend." 15
4.3.2 Class Rate 406 Subsidy
Effective January 1, 1961, the CAB established a "subsidy class
rate" system for the local-service carriers. The rate was based on
standard industry costs per available seat mile that varied inversely
with the traffic density of each carrier's route system. Traffic
density was measured by aircraft revenue miles per station per day.
This permitted a level for carriers with more favorable operating
conditions such that they received excess benefits. Accordingly, a
"profit sharing" formula was introduced whereby a carrier earning
a return on investment in excess of the CAB-set limit had to
return a portion of it.
Another unique aspect of this system was the CAB's act of
allowing the carriers to participate in the distribution of the
subsidy among themselves. This cut down on the administrative burden
and permitted the establishment of rates without lengthy hearing
process. However, this system taxed the analytical and negotiating
talents of the carriers. Some carriers, such as North Central,
Frontier and Piedmont, performed well under the system in the early
years. This is attested to by their profit levels and their return
on investment compared to the average local-service carrier (Table
4.4).
This Class Rate I formula was modified by successive class
rates up to the 1982 version, Class Rate IX. The initial revisions,
II and III, refined the basic rate-making elements but retained the
profit-sharing aspect. In 1967, Class Rate IV substituted
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revenue-sharing for profit-sharing, thus disregarding the profit
impact of revenue changes. This theory anticipated that growing
commercial revenue would be used to reduce subsidy, as opposed to
being dissipated in the higher service costs attributable to use of
larger equipment and lower load factors. At the same time, the CAB
permitted increased competition between locals and trunklines in
medium- and short-haul markets in an attempt to offset any adverse
impact of revenue-sharing on their net earnings.16
Under the revenue-sharing technique, the CAB had decreased local-
service subsidy from a 1963 high of $67.7 million to a low of $34.8
million in 1970 (Table 4.3). However, the period of subsidy decline
was paralleled by a gradual deterioration in the financial position
of local-service carriers. From 1967 to 1970, the local-service
carriers collectively lost an average of close to $40 million per
year. These losses, plus the deterioration of the position of a
number of individual carriers, caused the CAB to adopt Class Rate V
in August 1970.18 Under this rate, and its successors, subsidy for
the local-service and regional carriers rose to over $80 million
in 1981 (Table 4.3). Noteworthy is the fact that Allegheny voluntarily
eliminated subsidy in 197419.
Under revenue-sharing, the results were inconsistent with the
statutory requirement that the payments be adequate to cover carrier
financial needs. 20 Thus carriers, confident of an eventual bailout,
would expand capacity, increase investment, and acquire new jet
equipment. The results were a decline in load factors, an increase
in unit costs, and a negative impact on profits. 21 Again, the
CAB in the mid-1970's was faced with recognizing the financial need
aspects of the statutes existing at that time.
The Class Rate method of payment for subsidies to local-service
airlines was a step forward from the uncertainty and risk of the
"open" rate method. However, the financial need fulfillment
provision offered neither incentive for maximum efficiency nor
fully-effective methods for carrying out public policy objectives
in areas of small-community service. It distributed subsidy on the
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basis of each carrier's service in small city-pairs and limited
payments to the support of a maximum of two round trips per day.
In fact, the subsidy was based on the financial results of all
certificated-subsidy eligible operations of the local-service
airlines. Moreover, the statistical and financial data forming the
basis of the subsidy rate were furnished by the carriers with limited
CAB verification. In addition, an independent research firm employed
by the carriers was charged with developing an equitable formula
for subsidy distribution. 22
Since the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
the local-service carriers have operated under Class Rate IX. This
continued the basic concept of carrier need, but also added a "service
incentive payment" to encourage locals to continue Section 406
subsidized service for a reasonable four- to- seven-year transition
period. During this time, a shift was to be made to the new Section
419 small-community subsidy program mandated by the Airline
Deregulation Act.23 This incentive compensation was paid to the
local-service carriers because of the CAB's interpretation of the
amendments made to Section 406 as part of the Airline Deregulation
Act.
Congress made a policy determination that Section 406 should
continue during the transition to Section 419 subsidy.24 A two-step
process for phase-out was ordered. The first phase was a period of
four years (through 1982) during which the CAB determined the
method of calculating subsidy. During this period, excess profits
from non-subsidized services could not be used to reduce Section 406
subsidy.25
The second phase, 1983 to 1985, was supposed to be the period
wherein the CAB could modify Section 406 rate calculations, and the
profit offset could again be used to reduce subsidy. This, however,
will not occur since the Section 406 program is scheduled to end on
September 30, 1983.26
Since 1978, the Section 406 subsidy for local-service and
regional carriers increased from $62 million to over $80 million in
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1981, despite the local-service carriers' dropping service at 61
service points. In addition, as of mid-1981, the local-service
carriers had filed to drop service at another 24 subsidized points.27
As of September 1982, there were only 37 points (Table 4.5) left
with Section 406 service. In 1978, there were over 130 points in
the 48 states with Section 406-subsidized service.28
The Section 406 subsidy bill for the local-service carriers
to serve the 37 points listed in Table 4.5 comes to $30.88 per
enplaned passenger. The 2,804 daily passengers equals 75.8 enplaned
passengers per day per point. Only 5 of the points had 1981 passengers
fewer than 50 passengers per day. The distribution of the average
daily enplaned passengers for these 37 points is as follows:
1981 Number of Number of
Daily Enplaned Points With
Passengers 406 Service
0-25 0
26-50 5
51-75 10
76-100 17
Over 100 5
Source: Table 4.5
The Section 406 subsidy per passenger ranged from a low of
$10.31 per passenger to a high of $122.25 at Mason City, Iowa (Table
4.5). Interestingly, the local-service carriers now agree that points
enplaning 100 passengers are large enough to be served profitably
without government support.29 Yet $39.6 million annually was
being spent on Section 406 subsidy at communities enplaning 100 or
more passenqers per day (Table 4.6).
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The size of the Section 406 subsidy program since deregulation
has far exceeded expectations. The high subsidy was the result of:
1. the service incentive program to local-service carriers
to stay at Section 406 points
2. the performance of almost 20% of the September 30, 1980
Section 406-eligible flights with jets in which only
a few seats were filled; 30
3. the intrusion of commuters into Section 406 markets so as
to establish a track record in anticipation of the
certificated carriers' filing to terminate when Section 406
subsidy ended;31 and
4. the payment of large amounts to render service at points
generating over 100 passenger enplanements per day (Table
4.6).
The second area of Congressional concern at the time of passage
of the Airline Deregulation Act was that the local-service carriers
would not survive the competition with the trunklines. This fear
has proved to be groundless. As a group, the local-service carriers
have been relatively more profitable than the trunklines. In 1980,
the last year of the local-service category of airlines, the average
profit margin for locals was six percentage points greater than that
of the trunklines. The locals' share of the U.S. domestic market
increased from 8% in 1978 to almost 11% in 1980.32
The Section 406 subsidy program has paid local-service and
small regional carriers over $1.5 billion from October 1, 1953 to
November 30, 1981 to render small-community service (Table 4.7).
By the time Section 406 subsidy is terminated on September 30, 1983,
the payments will be in excess of $1.6 billion.
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4.3.3 Section 406 Achievements and Lessons
This brief review of the 30-year history of Section 406 subsidy
highlights some positive achievements as well as pointing out some
key lessons. The achievements are:
1. establishment of a foundation for a local-service industry
that is extremely viable today;
2. provision of service to a number of points that would not
otherwise have received service, especially in the early
years; and
3. provision of a quality of service with respect to aircraft
used that perhaps was higher than would otherwise have been
offered.
Out of the experience also comes a number of lessons. These
are:
1. The development phase of the local-service industry was
over about ten years ago. When all local service carriers
moved to jets in the early 1970's, the subsidy level
increased despite a decreasing number of points served.
From 1967 to 1978, 129 points lost certificated subsidized
service while subsidy increased from $55.2 million to
$75.3 million.33
2. The subsidized carriers gradually began playing a different
role than that originally envisioned. The intent to have
feeder carriers provide the link between small communities
and the main transportation system was modified when the
CAB embarked on a program of route strengthening. This
occurred in the mid-1960's when the CAB started awarding
certain high-density short- and medium-haul markets to the
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local-service carriers on a subsidy-ineligible basis "even
in instances where such an award may involve competition
with trunkline service."34 The local-service carriers
partially became mini-trunklines, requiring competitive
aircraft and lost the incentive to serve the small
community. By 1970, the locals had received permission to
delete 39 points.35 The deletions, as noted above, have
simply continued.
3. The initial subsidy determinations on an individual-carrier
basis proved costly, time-consuming, and sometimes imposed
undue financial constraints on a sound airline. This was
changed in 1961, when the CAB decided to convert to a
Class Rate system.
4. The Class Rate system, although administratively less
expensive, invited violations and made it difficult to monitor
the level of compliance. The Class Rate provided incentives
for efficiency, but at the same time it essentially
financed an airline's losses in operations to subsidy-
eligible communities regardless of the number of flights
flown daily or the type of aircraft used. For example,
in 1976 both Ozark and North Central received subsidy for
providing service between Sioux City, Iowa and Sioux Falls,
South Dakota. They provided different service and used
different types of aircraft, resulting in different subsidy
requirements as indicated by the table on the following page.
Similarly, the subsidized airline had great freedom to
determine routes to be flown from a subsidized city and
other cities in the route network, and could independently
determine the number of daily flights to be flown. For
example, Sioux City, Iowa, a subsidy-eligible community,
was connected with non-stop air service to nine other cities,
eight of which were hub airports. 36
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Sioux City-Sioux Falls
Services Ozark North Central
Departures/Month
(March 1976) 185 274
Aircraft DC-9 CV-580
(90 seats) (50 seats)
Subsidy Needed $738,000 $409,000
Average Subsidy/Passenger $25 $21
Source: GAO Report to Congress: "Why the Federal Airline Subsidy
Program Needs Revision", August 19, 1977, p. 7.
5. Once on subsidy, it was difficult for the carrier to walk
away from the security it provided. Of all the local-service
carriers, only Allegheny voluntarily went off the Section
406 subsidy program in 1974, before Congress mandated its
termination in the Airline Deregulaticn Act.
6. Communities that have had large aircraft service from
certificated carriers now find it extremely difficult to
adjust to the revised status of service from small
aircraft of commuter airlines. Republic Airlines, when
Section 406 subsidy was initially proposed for elimination
on September 30, 1981, embarked on a successful campaign
to continue this subsidy for another year. In presenting
its case, Republic forwarded 26 letters from state and
local officials throughout their Section 406 system.
These letters asked for retention of the Section 406
program because the officials wanted the big aircraft.37
None of the letters mentioned the extra subsidy costs to
be incurred in provision of this service.
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7. A review of several studies suggests that commuter airlines
can operate profitably with 18 enplaned passengers per
day.38 This would be nine passengers per flight for two
flights per day service. This is slightly less than a 50%
load factor on a 19-seat aircraft. The civil officials in
the Republic case requested maintaining Republic's 48- to
50-seat CV-580 and 90-seat DC-9 aircraft service, regardless
of the traffic available and need for subsidy. For
example, the City Council of Thief River Falls, Minnesota,
petitioned that the Section 406 program and Republic Airlines
remain until 1985.39 At the time of this request, March 25,
1981, Thief River Falls was served by two flights per day
with CV-580 aircraft, for a total of 100 seats per day.
Passenger enplanements at Thief River Falls numbered 25
per day in 1981.40 Based on the 18 enplaned passengers
per day standard for commuter breakeven with 19-seat
aircraft, a commuter airline could provide the same
frequencies and make a profit without subsidy. The small
community has its pride. This pride dictates the use of
large aircraft, especially if the subsidy comes from some
other level of government.
8. Subsidy paid under the carriers' financial need basis,
as required by Section 406 subsidy, is much more expensive
than one that pays only for the minimum level of required
service. According to the CAB, Section 406 subsidy costs
$718,000 per point per year, as opposed to $267,000 per
point per year for the new 419 subsidy (described in
subsequent pages) which is based on cost of service.41
9. Lack of defined objective standards for subsidy eligibility
probably cost extra amounts of Section 406 subsidy,
especially during the later years of the program. The only
real objective standard even used during the Section 406
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lifetime was the "use it or lose it" standard of 5
enplaned passengers per day in order to retain certificated
service.42 This standard was used to delete points, but
only addressed the lower end of the scale. There were no
firm guidelines governing when a community should no longer
require subsidized service until the last few years of 406,
when 80 enplanements per day was arbitrarily used as a
subsidy cut-off.43
10. In addition to the absence of sufficient standards for
subsidized service eligibility, there has been a lack of
clear definition of adequate subsidized service. The CAB
did not define the amount of linkage that was required to
the air transportation system. The subsidized airline had
great freedom in determining routes to be flown into the
subsidized city and other cities in the carrier's route
structure. Thus routings were often circuitous and
untimely because other points on the route dictated the
routing and time. The development of the traffic at
small communities was inhibited, but subsidy paid the
difference to produce a profit.
11. The Section 406 subsidy program produced subsidization
levels based on the needs of the community but not on the
basis of any independently-determined appraisal of national
need.44 This method of payment was consistent with the
legislative requirements. Returning to the Sioux City
example, there was no judgment made as to whether the
national interest required that the $1.4 million be paid
for the 1976 service.45 The payment was based on the needs
of the carriers rendering the service -- Ozark and North
Central -- which in turn was based on a stated national
need to retain viable local-service carriers.
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4.4 Section 419 Subsidy
4.4.1 Experience to Mid-1982
Section 3(a) of the Airline Deregulation Act specifically
directs the CAB to promote
"a comprehensive and convenient system of continuous
airline service for small communities and for isolated
areas, with direct Federal assistance where appropriate."
This objective is accomplished by Section 419 of the Act which
guarantees "essential air service" (EAS) for at least ten years --
1978 to 1988 -- to all communities receiving certificated airline
service on the date of the passage of the Act. The Act also called
for a review of service at a second category of communities which
were those deleted from carrier certificates between July 1, 1968
and October 24, 1978. Collectively, this amounted to 316
communities in the first category46 and 75 in the second category.47
If necessary to support the CAB services described in Chapter 3,
subsidy under Section 419 can be paid to carriers, including commuter
carriers.
The Section 419 subsidy program, as administered by the CAB,
is now paying two types of subsidy: "hold-in" subsidy and long-term
EAS compensation. The essential air service program has resulted
in the CAB's paying $13.9 million for long-term compensation through
November 1981; the "hold-in" compensation was $16.3 million (Table
4.8).
A further look at the long-term, or EAS 419, compensation,
through November 1981 shows that 28 commuter carriers received
subsidy, but that the following five carriers received 50% of
the total:
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State of EAS Compensation
Carrier Headquarters Through 1981 (000)
Air North Vermont $1,201
Big Sky Montana 2,955
Metro Texas 1 ,331
Pioneer Colorado 669
West Air California 791
$6,947
Source: Table 4.8
Although it appears that some areas, such as the southeast
and upper midwest, have not benefited from Section 419, the Section
406 program was still in effect in 1981, with Republic and Piedmont as
major beneficiaries in those areas (Table 4.6). Also, the EAS program
was still evolving in 1981 and the termination of 406 subsidy is
expected to increase rapidly the levels of 419 subsidy.
As of June 21, 1982, the annual rate of Section 419 EAS
compensation committed by the CAB was $20.4 million (Appendix 4.1).
This commitment means that 36 commuters will have been recipients
of 419 subsidy for EAS service in the 48 states. Of these 36, three
commuter airlines have already withdrawn from 419 subsidy. The 419
subsidy commitment in June 1982 covered services in 30 of the 48
states.
As of June 21, 1982, the annual commitment rate for Section 419
subsidy was $265,000 per service point (Appendix 4.1). If the large
traffic points (those over 80 enplaned passengers per day) are
eliminated, the subsidy on a per-passenger basis amounts to $23.31
at 1978 total passenger levels,48 or $46.62 per enplaned passenger.
At these points there are only 15.3 average enplaned passengers per
day, even at the generally-higher 1978 traffic levels. The $23.31
cost per passenger subsidy at points with fewer than 80 enplaned
passengers per day is similar to the $21.23 to $23.92 that the CAB
said was the subsidy to serve smaller (fewer than 80 enplaned
passengers per day) points in the early 1970's. 4
The "hold in" subsidy aspect of the Section 419 subsidy program
comes into effect when a carrier files for deletion from an EAS
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point. The CAB holds the carrier into that point while
negotiations are made with a substitute carrier, almost always a
commuter airline. This "hold in" policy cost $16.3 million through
November 1981 (Table 4.8). The intriguing element here is that $4.9
million was paid to the trunk and local-service carriers, and that
United Airlines (the largest U.S. airline with over $4.0 billion
in 1981 revenues) received the largest amount of any carrier -- $2.4
million (Table 4.8). Of equal interest is that 37 commuters received
"hold-in" subsidy but 16 of these commuters did not receive any 419
long-term compensation in June 1982. These commuters were incumbent
carriers seeking deletion or higher subsidy than the carrier selected
with the CAB-designated service levels. The trunk and local-service
carriers have too high a cost, thus, they have yet to win an award
for long-term subsidy. The 419 subsidy goes to the lowest qualified
bidder.
In viewing the progress of the Section 419 subsidy program, it
must be remembered that four commuter-type carriers50 were certificated
to be eligible for Section 406 subsidy in 1979 through 1981, and received
a total of $16.8 million (Table 4.9). This subsidy is anticipated to
end on September 30, 1983, the subsidized points remaining on their
systems reverting then to the Section 419 system of payment. However,
Air New England, the largest recipient with $12.0 million or 72%,
ceased to exist on October 31, 1981. All of its five EAS points
abandoned were then served by other commuters at no subsidy.
The data in Table 4.9 also provides an insight into the
financial posture of commuter carriers which are certificated. Only
two of the 12 certificated commuters with either 406 or 419 subsidy
reported an operating profit in the first nine months of 1981. Collec-
tively, these certificated carriers incurred an operating loss of $5.7
million, despite subsidy payments of $10.8 million. The operating
expenses of these carriers were 16% above the non-subsidy operating
revenues of $100.9 million (Table 4.9). Even the four Section 406
subsidized commuter carriers, for which financial need is supposed to
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be the subsidy criterion, were 24.7% percent away from covering
operating expenses of $54.4 million.
As indicated earlier, 37 points remaining under Section 406
subsidy will have ceased participating in that method of payment
by September 30, 1983, and consequently, the EAS requirement will be
put out to bid under Section 419. However, the traffic volume in
1981 at these points averaged 76 passengers per day (Table 4.5). This
is significantly above the 30.7 passengers per day figure in 1978
for the small communities receiving Section 419 subsidy in June
1982. Reason would suggest, then, either a subsidy-free operation
for these 37 points, or at least an average annual subsidy level lower
than the $260,000 per point now paid to the points currently under
Section 419 subsidy. This would suggest that the annual Section 419
subsidy for these 37 points would be less than $10 million.
Collectively, the Section 419 subsidy can be expected to reach an
annual level of $40 to $50 million (Table 4.10), exclusive of any new
points added as the result of the intent to review points deleted from
service between 1968 and 1978. Through July 1982, the CAB has
added, or is considering the addition of, the following eight points
from the 75 points in this group.
Annual
Community Carrier 419 Subsidy
Berlin, NH Air Vermont $298,877
Newport, VT Air Vermont
Lake Tahoe, CA To Be Determined
Waycross, GA To Be Determined
Bowling Green, KY To Be Determined
Sedalia, MO To Be Determined
Moab, UT To Be Determined
Aberdeen/Hoaquim, WA To Be Determined
Source: Conversations with CAB subsidy staff on August 25, 1982
As pointed out in Chapter 3, the CAB has also determined that
63 of the deleted points should not be eligible for EAS, 2 now have
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service, and 10 points remain to be evaluated.
The projected $40 to $45 million annual subsidy cost under
Section 419 (Table 4.10), approximately 50% reduction at 1982 price
levels from the $73.9 million paid in fiscal 1978, under Section 406
to the locals and small regionals (Table 4.3).
The transition to Section 419 subsidy has not been without
problems. The major complaint, as noted in Chapter 3, has been the
perceived quality of service at many of the EAS points, whether or
not they receive subsidy. The EAS requirement of minimum service,
only two flights per day, is often considered a limitation on service
since it is the sole basis for Section 419 subsidy payment. Despite
this complaint, there were only 27 out of 77 subsidized points whose
daily frequency was at the minimum service level or less. Fifty
(64%) of the points with Section 419 subsidy received more frequencies
to the designated hub than EAS required (Appendix 4.2). Only two
points received fewer frequencies than EAS-determined levels. The
daily seats offered were above EAS minimum levels at 71 (90%) of the
points. A summary of the July'1981 service at 419 subsidy points is
as follows:
Daily
Frequencies Daily Seats
Below EAS Requirements 1 , 5
At EAS Requirement 26 1
Above EAS Requirement 50 71
(See Appendix 4.2 and 4.3 for detailed frequencies of service at
Section 419 points.)
In 1982, a new, perhaps precedent-setting, problem surfaced with
Section 419 subsidized commuters. As is shown in Chapter 3, the
traffic levels at EAS points where commuters now offer the sole
service, decreased at a much higher rate between 1978 and 1981 than
elsewhere in the 48 states. When a carrier submits its subsidy
proposal under Section 419, they forecast traffic and revenues to
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determine a subsidy requirement for the next two years. The award
is a fixed amount for the next two years, and unfortunately, the
continued low levels of traffic were not always forecasted. Virtually
all the proposals used peak traffic levels as a base and then projected
further annual growth, not reductions in traffic. The failure to
achieve forecast traffic and revenue levels has thus imposed severe
financial problems, given fixed subsidy. Consequently, several
carriers have petitioned for subsidy rate increases even before their
first year is completed. For example, Big Sky requested, on
January 11, 1982, an increase in subsidy to Jamestown and Devil's
Lake, North Dakota. In its petition, Big Sky indicated that it was
losing $54,000 per month by serving the two points. Effective
April 11, 1982, the CAB agreed to almost double Big Sky's annual
Section 419 payment to $1.2 million.51 A request to make this
increase retroactive to April 24, 1981, when the 419 agreement became
effectiveat Devil's Lake, was denied.
Pursuant to the Big Sky case, several other carriers have
petitioned the CAB for added subsidy, including retroactive payments
to the date of service commencement. Clearly, there is a danger of
carriers' underestimating the subsidy need and returning to the CAB
for added subsidy if the amount fixed proves inadequate. The
petitions for increased subsidy also underscore the lack of fore-
casting skills that the commuters bring to their operations. The
CAB has, in a number of instances, granted a subsidy level that was
higher than requested by the carrier because of the CAB's concern
that smaller airlines frequently overestimate their ability to
generate enough traffic to make a profit. Perhaps the most striking
instance of the CAB's concern in this situation occurred in April
1982, when it awarded Southeastern $264,290 in annual Section 419
subsidy to serve Athens, Georgia, even though the carrier sought no
subsidy to provide this service.52 The press report indicated that
the CAB "convinced" officials of Southeastern that subsidy was
necessary and that the CAB preferred to grant subsidy rather than
begin the Essential Air Service process all over again. This also
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indicates that the CAB is again interposing itself into airline
management functions.
The final problem noted is the turnover of carriers in the
419 subsidy program. This experience is similar to the EAS turnover
as discussed in Chapter 3. By mid-1981, even though the program was
less than two years old, and only a portion of the full EAS deter-
minations had been made, 14 communities had a turnover of at least
one commuter receiving the 419 subsidy (Table 4.11). With the
above-mentioned filings for increased subsidy, the CAB has had to
petition for new bids at a number of points. Undoubtedly, this will
add to the turnovers. The turnovers confuse, and create uncertainty
in the mind of the potential travelers, adversely affecting the
amount of travel and increasing subsidy and financial problems for
the carriers.
The Section 419 subsidy program is still new and certainly
will have additional problems with the Section 406 phase-out.
However, there are some achievements and lessons that should be
highlighted for future assessment.
4.4.2 Achievements and Lessons of 419 Subsiy
The first achievement is the revelation that the Section 406
subsidy concept was very expensive, compared to the Section 419
payment for EAS service only. The Section 419 subsidy concept,
directly related to the small community, is being implemented at an
annual cost of $260,000 per point versus the $718,000 per point
under 406.53 It also eliminated subsidy payments to points with over
80 passengers per day with only three exceptions, all in California
(Appendix 4.1).
The second achievement, similar to 406, is maintenance of air
service at points that undoubtedly would otherwise have lost service
in the deregulation moves of the established carriers. As stated
earlier, only 37 points remain on Section 406 subsidy, from a total
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of 195 in mid-1978. The switch of 77 points to Section 419 subsidy
happened as carriers gave notice of intent to delete those points.
The 1978 traffic levels of 30.7 total passengers or 15.3 enplaned
passengers per day for the 72 points with fewer than 80 enplaned
passengers per day is below the breakeven level determined in
previous studies.
The lessons of the first three years of Section 419 subsidy
are as follows:
1. Continuous community participation and dialogue with
carriers are necessary in order to minimize subsidy cost
and reduce adverse publicity. Experience has indicated
that full community support can make a big difference in
traffic levels. For example, New Bedford, Massachusetts
is a former Section 406 airport which had between 40 and
70 enplaned and deplaned passengers per day, for the
five years prior to transfer to Section 419. The
community became extensively involved when it sensed the
imminent loss of certificated service at the end of 1980.
Section 419 subsidized service commenced in April 1981.
For the year 1981, traffic reached 80 passengers per day.54
Section 419 subsidy was $799,000 for the first year.55
The second year, the subsidy was reduced to $420,000.56
Discussion with the airport manager and the commuter
involved indicates that the traffic has responded so well
to the community and carrier effort that it is anticipated
that the subsidy will not be required in year three. This
attitude contrasts with that of communities using the
Section 419 subsidy program as an excuse to add fees and
charges because the Federal government is paying the bill.
Also, the dramatic reduction from 1978 to 1981 (18.6%)
in the traffic at the eight airports (Table 4.12)
receiving Section 419 subsidized service which responded
to the mail survey suggests that there is a missing
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ingredient. New Bedford is the only point on that list
with a strong and continuous community program to support
the service.
2. The CAB is dealing with small airlines having less-
sophisticated management, fewer management resources, and
limited financial capability, as compared with the former
local-service carriers, the smallest of which in 1981
generated over $250 million in annual revenues. The
differences manifest themselves in many ways, such as:
a) inability to make reasonable traffic forecasts; b)
high carrier turnover, as discussed in Chapter 6; and
c) the petitions to increase the fixed subsidy amount,
as mentioned earlier in this section.
3. Commuters have great flexibility and are more than willing
to invade markets to compete with subsidized commuters,
when there is the prospect of pushing a financially-weak
carrier to abandon service. Air New England and Big Sky,
the carrier referred to above as petitioning for increased
subsidy, have both experienced such competition. In fact,
Big Sky indicated that its $557,448 loss on $1.9 million
in revenue for the first quarter 1982 was in part due to
new competition. 57
4. Even though the subsidy requirement has been reduced
significantly under 419, the frequency and capacity offered
at subsidized points is well in excess of EAS requirements
at 472 Section 419 subsidized points generating less
than 80 enplaned passengers per day (Appendix 4.2),
as summarized below:
-199-
Number of Number of Number of
Daily Daily Seats Per
Frequencies Seats Flight
EAS Requirement 143 2,432 17.0
Actual Service 262 5,371 20.5
% Above Requirement 83.2% 120.8%
Number of Enplaned
Passengers Per Day in 1978 1,103
Source: Appendix 4.2
This suggests that there are more frequencies with larger
aircraft offered, than is deemed necessary under EAS. It
also suggests that, in order to obtain a reasonable load
factor, even assuming the higher 1978 traffic, multi-stop
services must be offered. The load factor assuming all
flights operate and 1978 traffic levels, produces only a
20% load factor if service is dedicated between the EAS
point and the designated hub point.
5. The large drop in traffic at EAS points in general (Chapter
3), and Section 419 EAS subsidized points in particular
(Table 4.12), is of concern. As discussed in Chapter 3,
the decrease from 1978 to 1981 was well above national
average and even a greater percentage above the traffic
decrease at the large and medium hubs. The reasons for
this dramatic difference are speculative at this point.
A number of possibilities exist: resistance to commuter
service; resistance to small aircraft; stabilized auto
fuel prices' permitting ease of travel to obtain discount
fares at large airports; the abnormally-high increases
in basic fares between EAS points and hub points; better
services offered by surface modes; greater impact of the
recession at small points; or, airline deregulation's
causing so drastic a change in airline route systems that
the travel habits of travelers to and from EAS points have
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been altered. Whatever the reasons, the situation bears
monitoring because it will have further impact on 419
subsidy requirements.
6. For points with over 45 passengers per day, the required
subsidy cost per passenger is less than $4.00 (Table
4.13).58 This level of subsidy is a small percentage
(5 to 10%) of the passenger fare. Modest traffic level
increases or cost economies could easily eliminate any
need for subsidy.
4.4.3 Section 419 Problems to Date
Despite the achievements of the Section 419 subsidy program,
the traffic decreases in 1980 and 1981 led to a plethora of termination
notices to receive subsidy support. In 1981, mostly late 1981, 19
commuters filed at 35 communities (Table 4.14). All of these were
communities which previously had been served, subsidy-free, by the
commuters. These termination filings mean that the CAB must request
EAS proposals from any carrier. As of June 21, 1982, the determination
had been made for only eight of these 35 points. All have required
subsidy. Inclusion of the remaining 27 points, could add another
$7 million to the $21 million already authorized. The potential
addition of 37 Section 406 subsidy points to Section 419 subsidy
would bring the program cost to $42 million, exclusive of the hold-in
subsidy, in the 48 states (Table 4.10).
It should be noted, in all fairness, that the Section 419
subsidy program does not always result in a lower subsidy than
Section 406 subsidy. For example, Section 406 subsidy cost
approximately $260,000 in New Bedford, Massachusetts; $240,000 in
Lewiston, Maine; and $220,000 at Montpelier, Vermont with Air New
England service. Section 419 subsidy replacement service costs
$799,000 at New Bedford, $323,000 at Lewiston, and $246,000 at
Montpelier.59 Similarly, Republic, in its successful attempt to
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retain Section 406 subsidy, quotes similar possibilities for
increases by using CAB-staff computations at Ironwood, Michigan,
Saulte Ste. Marie, Michigan, International Falls, Minnesota, and
Tupelo, Mississippi.60
Overall, not all communities, as noted in Chapter 3, have been
happy with EAS, even with Section 419 subsidy. The litany of
complaints cover issues from fares to aircraft, to service level,
to regulatory delay, to lack of local knowledge by the commuter.
The experience, good and bad, with Section 419 subsidy leads logically
to an assessment of the reasons for subsidy.
4.5 Rationale for Subsidy
Subsidy payment to the airlines over the past 30 years has been
almost exclusively for service to small communities. Today's Section
419 program helps guarantee service to eligible, Essential Air
Service communities, which are usually small. The guarantee of
service extends to providing subsidy when needed. However, there
would appear to be no basis for public underwriting of air
transportation services that are fully viable. It is true that the
higher quality made possible by subsidies could cause a non-viable
service to become fully self-sufficient sooner than would otherwise
be the case, thereby reducing long-term subsidy need. The
experience thus far under Section 419 subsidy suggests that the need
to pay subsidy to assure essential air service is limited. This is
because air transportation is normally self-supporting at all but
the smallest traffic generating points.
4.5.1 Community Need
The first reason often cited for providing subsidy is community
needs. 61  Communities seek air service and, in turn, the subsidy, on
the following basic grounds:
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o Economic Development
The community need for air service is structured so that
the community can have uninhibited economic development.
Air service will not in itself be a sufficient stimulus
to produce economic development. It must be accompanied
by availability of resources, such as material, labor,
incentives, and capital. New industry finds air service
an attractive entity, but it needs more support. If a
point will permit more cost-efficient operation, then a
national goal of economic efficiency is added. Merely
having a firm move from one point to another, because of
availability of air service, does not benefit the national
economic picture.
o Community Pride
This community pride argument supposedly proves that a
town or community is more progressive if it has air
service. The benefits of air service at a community accrue
almost completely to the local residents and its visitors
while virtually no national utility or improvement in
efficiency is gained.
o Isolation
An area's level of isolation, and consequent need for air
service, is extremely difficult to evaluate. The small,
isolated community is often the one which is least able
to pay for high-priced air service. It may well be that
in some communities, the isolation is such that air
service is the cheapest mode of air travel. This would
be true where there are significant natural barriers, such
as a large expanse of water or mountainous terrain. In
such areas, air service would improve the quality of life.
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Another difficult aspect of isolation is the nature and
destination of the service required. The ideal is an
evaluation of the spatial separation by ground service
to the trunkline, air transportation system, with the level
of air service available at the nearest airport. This
will provide insights into the travel options to the small
community.
o Land Use Planning
When tied up to economic development, population dispersion
or land use planning may well be a desired national goal,
especially if the objective is to utilize all resources.
However, it may well conflict with a goal of a better
transportation network. At best, the supportable argu-
ment for population dispersion as a reason for subsidized
air service is the prevention of concentration of
population in urban areas. Labor surplus areas often
attract business. The alternative for labor is to move
to labor-short areas, usually the large urban areas.
4.5.2 Infant Industry
The so-called "local-service" experiment which commenced in
1943 undoubtedly was in the category of assistance to infant industries.
The subsidy paid to the carriers developed a new breed of airlines
in the late 1940's and 1950's. Unfortunately, that industry was
then switched away from a "feeder" to a trunkline role. The infant
industry argument supports subsidy over a limited time frame to
accelerate growth in an industry of national benefit, such as an
improved air transportation system.
The problem in applying this rationale to the U.S. aviation
system today is that air service has been so readily available
at over 600 points in the 48 states, over the past 30 years, that
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it is hard to believe that the airlines, including the commuters,
have not provided air service to communities whose industries were
important to the nation. On the other hand, there is often the
community claim that the benefit is often clouded by poor service.
This argument cannot be put to rest without close scrutiny of the
potential damage to local industry when losing air service.
4.5.3 Urban-Rural Equity
The urban-rural equity issue62 equates small-community airline
subsidies with those given to mass transit in large cities. The
assumption, obviously, is that mass transit subsidies are given for
sound reasons. There is, however, a much clearer link to national
goals with mass transit than with small-community air services.
Mass transit reduces automobile exhaust pollution and transports the
poor. Aviation is basically a mode of transport for those with
higher incomes. Also, those persons benefiting from mass transit
far outnumber the beneficiaries of small-community air service.
4.5.4 Complete National Air Sse
This argument claims that the subsidized system feeds the
unsubsidized system and spreads fixed costs over more passengers,
thus producing lower transportation costs for all passengers. It
would then follow that the air transportation system has increasing
returns to scale beyond those already achieved. Most economists
would dismiss this thesis.63 Also, it should be recognized that
only the airline and its stockholders benefit from getting the
feeder traffic. Benefits to the travelers are difficult to trace.
Assuming it is a desirable national goal to lower transportation
costs, then a subsidy to the feeder carrier is only of secondary
benefit. The easiest approach would be to give direct subsidies
to all airlines. 64
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4.5.5 Transportation as a Public Function
This theory digs into history to support its contention that
the government has supported the transportation system for various
periods of time; for example, construction and maintenance of
highways. Clearly, some past government investments, such as Amtrak
subsidies, go beyond the scope of private investment. This is a
tenuous argument on which to support small-community air service
subsidies, especially in a day and age when user charges are common.
4.5.6 Development/Experimental Need
Laboratory-type subsidized services at small communities are
supported by this argument. It assumes there are insufficient
examples of all aspects of service to properly determine the results
of service changes. Subsidy of this type of experiment should be
above and beyond sustaining, or even transitional, type of subsidies.
In the case of small-community air service, there are sufficient
complaints against the service that perhaps there is a shortage of
information in such areas as impact on traffic of fare level changes,
changes in aircraft size, changes in frequency, etc. Certainly,
most communities and carriers seeking subsidized service do so to
improve the quality of service. An experimental program could be
justified on the basis of bringing the body of knowledge to a level
where more realistic determinations can be made of potential new
forms of services. Properly-executed experiments will provide a
foundation for more realistic decisions in this area.
4.5.7 Special National Benefits
In addition to serving passengers and shippers, the airlines
supply transportation for mail and maintain equipment and personnel
potentially available for defense-related uses. This suggests two
basic questions: 1. Do these public benefits require the support
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of services which cannot be supplied through normal, unregulated
market operations?; and 2. Should the support be shared through
requiring some portion of the commercial market to support a quantity
765
and quality of service which it would not otherwise support?
The answer to the first question in terms of defense needs
can only be determined by comparing the quality and quantity of
air service which can be supported under unrestricted conditions
with an independent estimate of defense needs at the EAS points,
if any, combined with calculation of the cost to the public to
remedy the deficiency. Then, a cost/benefit ratio can be constructed
for use in comparison with other defense fund uses. The second
defense question would require extraordinary circumstances to justify
a financing of defense needs through the carriers and in turn the
airline user. Equity and net public benefit suggest use of general
taxation to support these needs. 66
In the final analysis, it is difficult to envision a national
defense requirement of more than a fraction of the 3,000 aircraft
used by U.S. commercial air carriers. The varying aircraft sizes,
the long-range capacity, and the jet speed can provide capability
far in excess of the requirements of World War II. In the same vein,
the ability to provide air services to almost any airport near to
any military installation is almost unlimited with the more-than
200,000 aircraft registered in the U.S. Moreover, the entire highway
transportation system, thanks to the Highway Trust Fund of the
United States, makes access to virtually all parts of the United
States a reality. Certainly the highway network is many times
better than it was during World War II.
It is clear that there are a number of above arguments that
can support some measure of subsidized airline service to small
communities. It appears that a case can be made primarily for
community need, especially isolation, population dispersal and
developmental/experimental need. To a much-lesser extent, arguments
for economic development and a more complete national network may
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prove enough benefit, albeit small, to make a subsidy program viable,
at least in the short run. These all appear to be consistent with
the objectives of the Airline Deregulation Act. However, it is
obvious that the rationale and the reality of today's EAS subsidy
programs suggest that some important adjustments be made. These
adjustments will be covered in a final section of this chapter wherein
recommendations will be developed.
4.6 Summary
From 1954 through 1981, the U.S. local-service airlines received
almost $1.6 billion in direct subsidy to maintain and continue the
development of air transportation, especially at small communities.
Near the end of World War II, the CAB established feeder
airlines, later called local-service airlines, to provide service
where it did not appear warranted on economic grounds, but appeared
to have potential. This service was subsidized from 1954 under
Section 406 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. This subsidy
program was directed primarily to serving the financial needs of
the local-service carriers. The complexities of individual carrier
subsidy negotiations led to a class rate subsidy system. This system,
after establishment of eight different rates, has lasted through its
proposed terminal date of September 30, 1983.
The local-service airlines, once they upgraded to jets during
the late 1960's, changed their orientation away from the small
communities. The subsidy expanded for service to small communities
often paid for service with aircraft much larger than required
by the demand.
The Airline Deregulation Act legislated, through its amendment
to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, that subsidy be paid for
minimum service at small communities when necessary to insure the
continuation of service through 1988. As of June 1982, 77
communities received the type of subsidy called Section 419 subsidy.
The continuing subsidy cost per point, thus far, is approximately
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$260,000, as compared with over $718,000 per point for Section 406
subsidy in 1981.
The 419 subsidy story is neither complete nor totally
successful. Many communities have complained about a lower level
of service. Traffic has decreased from 1978 to 1981 at a rate well
above the total for the U.S. certificated airline industry. The
turnover of commuters, even though serving for a few years, has
commenced at a high level, thus exacerbating the instability of
service. Numerous carriers under a Section 419 subsidy contract
for two years have sought subsidy increases because of the failure
to achieve the traffic forecast.
The potential rationale for subsidizing airline service
can fall in any one of the following categories:
o Community need
o Infant industry
o Urban-rural equity
o More complete national system
o Transportation as a public function
o Development/experimental
o Postal and defense benefits
The community need, especially isolation, represents the most
compelling argument for future subsidization of airline service. The
remaining rationales have few strong points, given today's highly-
developed U.S. airline industry.
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Table 4.1
Summary of Mail Pay/Subsidy l/Payments for Domestic Service-
of U.S. Scheduled Airlines
1946 - 1953
Mail Revenue
Ton Miles
(000)
32,969
33,086
38,198
41 ,889
47,740
64,734
70,443
74,106
Mail Revenue
(000)
$ 20 , 000Y
60,663
64,394
71,186
Mail Reveue Per
Ton -Mile
(cents)
91.41
96.06
SOURCE: U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Handbook of Airline Statistics, 1961.
U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, "Subsidy for United States
Certificated Air Carrier," Appendix I, March 1974.
1/48 states
21CAB estimate of the portion of mail pay which is attributable
to subsidy.
3/Estimated
Year
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Domestic
Subsidy
(000)
$ 5,163-2/
12,730
30 ,98-52
38,584?'
41,597
33 ,829?'
25,597A
25,379-1/
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Table 4.2
U.S. Mail Revenue Accruing to
Local Service Airlines
1946 - 1951
Revenue
Miles
(000)-
1,277
8,353
16,279
24,539
33,022
37,983
Mail Pay Per
Revenue Aircraft Mile
(cents)
56
60
61
57
53
50
SOURCE: George Eads, The Local Service Airline Experiment (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1972), p. 91.
Year
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
Mail
Revenue
(000)
$ 720
5,000
9,941
13,961
17,403
19,144
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Table 4.3
Section 406 Subsidy Paymen$5
to U.S. Domestic Airlines-
1954 - 1981 (Fiscal Year)
Amount of Subsidy (000)
Trunklines Local Service Regionals
TOTAL $26,391
Fiscal
Year
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
$ 3,822
2,773
1,790
1 ,522
2,283
1 ,201
2,566
3,475
3,089
2,477
1 ,343
Total
$ 28,121
25,131
25,912
30,016
34,986
37,651
51 ,498
56,300
64,835
67.700
68,048
67,887
61 ,760
57,717
49,325
40,513
34,830
55,940
62,160
60,206
68,619
59,385
68,675
74,852
73,937
72,026
72,791
81,399
$1,522,320
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, "Impact of Advanced Air Transport
Technology," Part 3 (February 1982), pp. 15-16.
/48 states; excluding helicopters
$ 24,299
22,358
24,122
28,444
32,703
36,450
51 ,498
56,300
64,835
67,700
65,482
64,412
58,671
55,240
47,982
40,513
34,830
55,940
62,160
60,206
68,619
57,573
64,658
70,561
69,097
66,132
63,387
72,897
$1,487,069
$1,9812
4,017
4,391
4,840
5,894
9,404
8,502
$38,860
Number of
Points
Served
539
540
546
547
558
567
562
561
543
539
524
518
514
517
517
474
470
461
441
417
394
380
248
-I -- - -- -- I -- -- -11 N m p
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Table 4.4
Financial Performance
of Local Service Airlines
1961 - 1965
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Frontier
Total Transport Rev. (000) $ 7,960 $ 8,651 $11,687 $14,277 $17,664
Subsidy (000) 6,825 2,285 8,096 7,493 6,913
% Subsidy of Transport Rev. 85.7% 83.3% 69,3% 52.5% 39.1%
Net Income (000) 1/ $ 336 $ 575 $ 998 $ 856 $ 1,313
Return on Investment- 11.96% 16.46% 19.36% 11.99% 12.60%
North Central
Total Transport Rev. (000) $17,104 $18,529 $20,127 $22,372 $26,601
Subsidy (000) 8,032 8,529 7,869 7,090 7,199
% Subsidy of Transport Rev. 47.0% 46.0% 39.1% 31.7% 27.1%
Net Income (000) $ 1,855 $ 407 $ 506 $ 617 $ 1,139
Return on Investment 45.21% 9.90% 9.99% 9.11% 10.90%
Piedmont
Total Transport Rev. (000) $ 9,060 $13,078 $15,935 $18,898 $22,895
Subsidy (000) 4,446 4,830 5,576 5,402 4,494
% Subsidy of Transport Rev. 49.1% 36.9% 35.0% 28.7% 19.6%
Net Income (000) $ 473 $ 1,202 $ 633 $ 1,214 $ 1,704
Return on Investment 9.79% 15.23% 9.40% 13.32% 14.88%
Total Locals - Average
Total Transport Rev. (000) $ 8,711 $10,538 $12,053 $14,331 $17,193
Subsidy (000) 4,841 5,227 5,222 5,060 5,078
% Subsidy of Transport Rev. 55.6% 49.6% 43.3% 35.3% 29.5%
Net Income (000) $ 372 $ 459 $ 375 $ 598 $ 979
Return on Investment 7.12% 7.28% 5.28% 6.95% 8.50%
SOURCE: U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Handbook of Airline Statistics,
1967.
!/Without investment tax credits.
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Point
Table 4.5
Communities in the 48 States
Still Receiving Section 406
Subsidy Service
As of September 1, 1982
Maximum Annual
Subsidy
(000)_
Cheyenne, Wyo.
Laramie, Wyo.
Montrose/Del ta, Col
North Platte, Neb.
Riverton, Wyo.
Rock Springs, Wyo.
Salina, Kan.
Scottsbluff, Neb.
Subtotal
*Fort Dodge, Ia.
*Mason City, Ia.
$ 893
729
706
1 ,573
349
1 ,267
1,550
907
$ 7,974
$ 1,010
1,802
$ 2,812
.$ 777
1 ,581
$ 2,358
Subtotal
Greenbriar/White
Sulphur Sprs., W.V
Winston-Salem, N.C.
Subtotal
Republic West
*Bend/Redmond, Ore. $ 1,666
*Klamath Falls, Ore. 416
Subtotal $ 2,082
Annual Enplaned
Passengers
1981
Year Daily
28,130 77
22,920 63
32,050 88
28,950 79
30,620 84
39,710 109
26,620 73
34,370 94
243,370 667
9,670 26
14,740 40
24,410 66
32,040 88
47,020 129
79,060 217
29,100 80
27,160 74
56,260 154
Aberdeen, S.D.
Bemidji, Minn.
*Benton Harbor,
$1,550
526
Mich. 650
(Continued)
Carrier
Frontier
Ozark
Maximum
Subsi dy/
Passenger
$ 31.75
31.81
22.03
54.34
11.40
31.91
58.23
26.29
$ 32.76
$104.45
122.25
$115.20
Piedmont
Republic
$ 24.25
33.67
29.83
$ 57.25
15.32
37.01
37,400
25,490
28,970
102
70
79
$ 41.44
20.64
22.44
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Table 4.5 (Continued)
Communities in the 48 States
Still Receiving Section 406
Subsidy Service
As of September 1, 1982
Maximum Annual
Subsidy
(000)
Annual Enplaned
Passengers
1981
Year Daily
Brainerd, Minn. $
Eau Claire, Wisc.
Escanaba, Mich. 1
Greenville, Miss.
Hancock/Houghton,
Mich.
Hibbing/Chisholm,
Minn.
International Falls,
Minn.
*Iron Mountain, Mich.
*Ironwood, Mich.
Laurel, Miss.
Meridian, Miss.
Muscle Shoals, Ala.
Pellston, Mich.
Rhinelander, Wisc.
*Sault Ste. Marie, Mich.
*Thief River Falls,
Minn.
Tupelo, Miss.
Tuscaloosa, Ala.
Valdosta, Georgia
Watertown, S.D.
Subtotal
Class Rate 9?6 Subsidy Total
Air Midwest-
Grand Total
603
906
,002
833
365
706
318
881
578
562
657
590
780
716
206
483
725
733
591
1,421
$16,383
$31,608
1 ,498
$33,106
15,970
41 ,220
25,660
26,340
44
113
70
72
35,410 97
35,980 99
21,110
24,040
14,550
28,910
42,160
34,130
33,040
35,080
9,920
12,950
18,650
32,260
26,890
14,430
58
66
40
79
116
94
91
96
27
35
51
88
74
40
620,560 1,700
1,023,660 2,804
SOURCE: U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, "Airline Traffic Survey,"
Fourth quarter 1981.
Discussions with CAB subsidy and Essential Air Service personnel.
*Points on notice of suspension.
-'Total survey traffic as reported by certificated carriers less
traffi other certificated carriers at the point.
-JNotice filed to seek adjusted rate on May 4, 1982.
Carrier
Republic
Point
Maximum
Subsidy/
Passenger
$37.76
21.98
39.05
31.62
10.31
19.62
15.06
36.65
29.73
19.44
15.58
17.29
23.61
20.41
20.77
37.29
38.89
22.72
21.98
98.48
26.40
30.88
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Frontier
Ozark
Piedmont
Republic West
Republic
TOTAL
Table 4.6
Annual Federal Subsidy
At Rates Effective for Last Half of 1980
As Allocated by the Civil Aeronautics Board
Subsidy by Carrier by Passenger
Level, Class Rate Carriers
Passengers Per Day
Between 40
and 100
$ 7,924,586
Under
40
$ 6,505,618
Total
$22,795,320
4,843,602 2,761,754 13,085,678
1,763,615
2,081,225
7,860,588
$25,193,616
856,393
11,787,170
$21,910,935
8,308,975
8,342,328
34,217,155
$86,749,456
Over
100
$ 8,365,116
5,480,322
5,688,967
5,541,103
14,569,397
$39,644,905
SOURCE: Republic Airlines testimony in support of HR3901 Hearings
Before the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Public Works and Transportation. Exhibit RC-100.
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Table 4.7
Payments of Section 406 Subsidy1
to Local Service and Regional Airlines
October 1, 1953 - November 30, 1981
Carrier Amount of Subsidy
Air Midwest $ 6,669,164
Air New England 32,391,310
Cochise 1,480,947
Frontier 297,301,975
Hughes Airwest 247,135,695
Ozark 155,844,092
Piedmont 140,411,335
Republic 362,244,326
Republic West 10,677,821
Sky West 1,255,035
Texas International 122,638,388
USAir 169,301,325
TOTAL $1.,547,351 ,714
SOURCE: Aviation Daily, "Total Payments to Air Carriers Under
406 Subsidy Program"(February 17, 1982), p. 245.
1/Includes airlines merged into these carriers.
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Table 4.8
Cumulative Section 419 Subsidy
Obligations and Payments--48 States
March 30, 1979 - November 30, 1981
(000)
Essential Hold In
Air Compensation Total
Carrier Service For Losses Subsidy
A. Trunks and Local Service
Delta - $ 127 $ 127
Hughes Airwest - 166 166
Ozark - 179 179
Republic - 164 164
Texas International - 315 315
United - 2,350 2,350
USAir - 718 718
Western 867 867
Subtotal 4,886 4,886
B. Commuters
Aeromech $ 236 $ 341 $ 577
Air Illinois - 1,007 1,007
Air Kentucky 523 - 523
Air Midwest 551 711 1,262
Air New Mexico - 40 40
Air North 1,201 620 1,821
Air Oregon - 81 81
Air US - 14 14
Air Virginia - 110 110
Air Wisconsin - 103 103
Aspen 112 1,209 1,321
Atlantic Southeast 605 22 627
Bar Harbor 271 33 304
Big Sky 2,955 - 2,955
Cascade 463 316 779
Colgan 259 127 386
Direct Air 214 249 463
Golden West 361 361
Green Hills 262 261 523
Jamaire 96 280 376
Keys - 126 126
Mesaba 128 128
Metro 1/ 1,331 311 1,642
MidContinent~ - 29 29
MidSouth 397 22 419
Mississippi Valley 411 51 462
(Continued)
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Table 4.8 (Continued)
Cumulative Section 419 Subsidy
Obligations and Payments--48 States
March 30, 1979 - November 30, 1981
(000)
Carrier
B. Commuters (Cantinued)
Newai r
Noreast
Ocean
Pennsyl vani c
Perkiomen
Pioneer
Precision Valley
Provi ncetown-Boston
Rio 1/
Royal e-
Scheduled Skyways
Semo
Simmons-
Southeastern
SunBird
Sun International
Sun West
WestAir
Subtotal
GRAND TOTAL
Essential
Air
Service
$ 428
121
669
169
552
101
448
468
139
22
791.
$13,923
$13,923
SOURCE: Aviation Daily, "Carriers Receive
Air Service Program" C2/16/82)
Hold In
Compensation
For Losses
194
179
537
131
2,384
293
60
90
26
23
44
661
42
364
$11 ,452
$16,338
$28.4 Million Under Essential
11Some payments to MidContinent, Royale, and Simmons were for
Republic service.
Total
Subsidy
$ 428
194
179
537
252
3,053
169
552
101
741
528
90
165
23
44
661
64
1,155
$253375
$30,261
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Table 4.9
Publicly Reported Subsidy Payments As
A Percentage of Operating Revenue
For Commuter Type Airlines
1979 - 1981
Subsidy
(000)Carrier
% Subsidy
of Operating
Revenues
Operating
Profit/Loss
(000)
1981 - NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30
406 Air Midwest- $ 1,646
Air New England 4,914
Cochise 526
Skywest 225
SUBTOTAL $ 7,311
419 Air North $ 436
Aspen 216
Big Sky 1,497
Cascade 392
Colgan 172
MidSouth 208
Miss. Valley 336
Newair 226
SUBTOTAL $ 3,483
TOTAL for
1st 9 mos.
1981 $
1980
406 Air Midwest- $
Air New England
Cochise
SkyWest
SUBTOTAL $
419 Air North
Aspen
Big Sky
Cascade
MidSouth
10,794
1,886
7,117
373
260
9,536
$ 1,254
350
869
248
55
$ 16,206
20,325
4,251
3,610
$ 44,392
$ 7,470
12,487
5,588
11,543
1,123
1 ,772
14,543
2,065
$ 56,591
$ 100,983
$ 15,646
28,436
5,771
3,719
$ 53,572
$ 8,755
17,920
3,880
15,295
896
(Continued)
Operating
Revenues
(000)
10.2
24.2
12.4
6.2
16.5
5.8
1.7
26.8
3.4
15.3
11.7
2.3
11.0
6.2
10.7
12.1
25.0
6.5
7.0
17.9
14.3
2.0
22.4
1.6
6.2
$ 1,158
(3,812)( 856)
(143)
$(3,653)
$(1,528)
( 552)
104( 211)
343( 149)
( 198)( 144)
$(2,037)
$(5,690)
$(1 ,095)( 290)
125( 320)
610
$ 25
351( 706)
783( 195)
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Table 4.9
Publicly Reported Subsidy Payments As
A Percentage of Operating Revenue
For Commuter Type Airlines
1979 - 1981
(Continued)
Subsidy
(000)Carrier
% Subsidy
of Operating
Revenues
Operating
Profit/Loss
(000)
Miss. Valley $
Newai r
Skywest
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL - 1980
184 $ 14,236
161 1,863
260 3,719
$ 3,381
$ 12,917
$ 66,573
$120,145
1979
Air Midwest $ 1,460
Air New England
TOTAL
4,524
$ 5,984
SOURCE: Aviation Dail "Form 41 Subsidies as
Revenues" (February 4, 1982), p. 184.
Percent of Operating
i1$1,143,684 of Air Midwest's 1979-1981 subsidy was paid
under Section 419.
Operating
Revenues
(000)
$( 144)
( 119)
.( 320)
$( 325)
$ 285
1.3
8.6
7.0
5.1
10.8
18.8
17.2
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Table 4.10
ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL 419 SUBSIDY
(MILLION)
Annual Rate for Subsidy Granted by 6/25/82 $20.4
Transfer of 37 - 406 Subsidy Points to 419 Estimate 10.0
Subsidy for Communities who lost Service Prior to
1978 - Estimate 2.0
Communities Seeking 419 - 27 Points as of June,
1982 - Estimate 7.0
Increases at 77 June, 1982 Points - Estimate 3.0
$42.4
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419 Point
Chi co, CA
Mount Vernon, IL
Jonesboro, AR
Natchez, MS
Table 4.11
419 Cases - Turnover of Subsidized
Replacement Commuters
Through June 1981
Commuters Subsidized
under 419 Which Have
Served the Point
Air Pacific (Golden Gate)
replaced by WestAir
Air Illinois replaced
by Air Kentucky
Air Illinois replaced
by SEMO replaced by
RIO
Air Illinois replaced
by Royale
Alamagordo, NM
Silver City, NM
El Dorado/Camden, AR
Danville, VA
New Bedford, MA
Brunswick, GA
Kirkville, MO
Sullivan/Catskills, NY
Crescent City, CA
Santa Rosa, CA
SOURCE: Republic Airlines,
Hearings before the
Committee on Public
ZIA replaced by Air New
replaced by Air Midwest
Air Illinois replaced
by Jamaire replaced
by Scheduled Skyways
Cardinal Airlines
replaced by MidSouth
Northeast replaced
by Provincetown-Boston
Ocean replaced by
Atlantic Southeast
Air Illinois replaced
by Green Hills
Mexico
Ransome replaced
by New Haven
Century replaced
by WestAir
Century replaced
by WestAir
Testimony in support of HR3901
Aviation Subcommittee of the House
Works and Transportation, RC650.
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Table 4.12
Traffic Changes At Sample
Points Now Receiving Section
419 Subsidy
1978 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Pax (000)
1978 1981
52.2137.1
1.0
8.5
% Incr
(Decr)
(61.9)
.8 (20.0)
2.3
10.6 14.6
2.3
4.0
2.6
2.0
.8
2.0
166.3
(72.9)
37.7
13.0
(50.0)
.9 12.5
2.0 -
77.4
20.8 9.7
53.5
(18.6)
SOURCE: Confidential Mail Surveys - see Appendix 2.4.
Station
TOTAL
AVERAGE
wbffiw"*
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Table 4.13
Subsidy Levels
At 419 Points Where Enplaned
Passengers Are in Excess of
45/Day
419 Point
Bakersfield
Chico
Modesto
Stockton
Santa Rosa
EAS Hub
Point
Los Angeles
San Francisco
San Francisco
San Francisco
San Francisco
San Francisco
Number of
Enplaned Pax
680
144
218
390
99
Farelto Sub. per
Hub-' Pax
%Sub.
of Fare
$ 46$ 79
55
40
39
39
3.12 5.7
2.05 5.1
5.3
3.82 9.8
SOURCE: Regional Airline Association, "Regional/Commuter
1981 Annual Report."
Table 4.9
Official Airline Guide, June 1982
Airlines Industry
11The basic "y" fare.
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Table 4.14
Points for Which a Carried Filed
A 401(j) or 419 "Termination" Notice to Re give
Subsidy Support to Continue its Service-'
Poi rrt
Alpena, MI
Athens, GA
Beckley, WV
Bluefield, WV
Clarksburg, WV
Clovis, NM
Columbia, MO
Elkins, WV
Gadsen, AL
Hagerstown, MD
Hazleton, PA
Hot Springs, AR
Lake Charles, LA
Lewiston, MT
Liberal, KS
Manitowoc, WI
Menominee, MI
Merced, CA
Morgantown, WV
Moses Lake, WA
Carrier
Simmons Airlines
Atlantic Southeast
Aeromech
Aeromech
Aeromech
Air Midwest
Air Midwest
Aeormech
Southeast Commuter
Henson
Air Pennsylvania
Rio
Texas International
Cascade
Air Midwest
Simmons Airlines
Simmons Airlines
Golden Gate
Aeromech
Cascade
(Continued)
Date Filed
9/30/81
9/1/81
9/1/81
9/1/81
9/1/81
8/18/81
8/18/81
3/17/81
8/24/81
9/8/81
5/17/80
8/14/81
12/4/81
9/15/81
8/18/81
9/30/81
9/30/81
7/16/81
9/1/81
4/2/80
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Table 4.14
Points for Which a Carrier Filed
A 401(j) or 419 "Termination" Notice to Revgive
Subsidy Support to Continue its Service-
(Continued)
Point Carrier Date Filed
New Bern, NC Mid-South 8/17/81
Newport News, VA Henson 9/18/81
North Bend, OR Air Oregon 9/9/81
Pendleton, OR Air Oregon 9/9/81
Pullman, WA Cascade 9/15/81
Roswell, NM Air Midwest 8/18/81
Salem, OR Air Oregon 9/9/81
Salisbury, MD Henson 9/8/81
Santa Rosa, CA Westair 7/22/80
Sheridan, WY Air US 9/11/81
Staunton, VA Henson 9/8/81
Stockton, CA Golden Gate 9/4/81
Walla Walla, WA Cascade 9/15/81
Wentatchee, WA Cascade 9/12/80
Worcester, MA Bar Harbor 9/8/81
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report of Airline Service, Fares, Traffic,
Load Factors, and Market Shares," Issue No. 20 (April 1982).
- The carrier continues to provide essential air service
at the point.
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CHAPTER 5
COMMUTER & SMALL COMMUNITY AIRPORT ACCESS
5.1 Introduction
Given the increasing importance of the commuters to the
U.S. air transport system and the poor record of traffic and
service at the commuter-dominated small communities since de-
regulation, it is now appropriate to evaluate the basic issue of
access to the air transport system by these parties. This evalu-
ation is all the more important since the PATCO strike in August
1981 has imposed constraints on system capacity. Capacity con-
straints on aircraft movement have been imposed on 22 points and
24 air traffic control centers mentioned in Chapter One. The
constrained points are all large or medium hubs, but commuter
service from the small and non-hub points is almost exclusively
to the large and medium hubs where the passengers gain their ac-
cess to the air transport system. Thus, there is a need to evalu-
ate the access of the commuters in the rendering of their service
to small communities.
Also involved is the change in service and traffic at the
small communities since airline deregulation. As Chapters Three
and Four indicate, there have been both fewer departures and fewer
seatsespecially at EAS points. In addition, the rapid increase
in fares by the airlines at these points has impacted traffic and
created financial problems for many of the small airports. Higher
fares have contributed to lower traffic which has reduced fre-
quencies which have reduced airport revenues.
Conversely, the large airports are in the position of having
many new airlines and services. The vital question here is accom-
modation of the new airlines and the methods of assessing the new
airlines in light of the uncertainties caused by airline deregu-
lation. Of particular interest is the treatment that commuters
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receive at these large airports in view of the increased demands by
the large carriers and new entrants.
This chapter will focus upon the historical aspects of commuter
and small community airport access to the U.S. air transport system.
The governmental policy alternatives and recommendations actions will
be covered in Chapter 7.
5.2 Historical Perspective
The airport is the interface or the exchange point at which
the air traveller either changes mode of transport between ground
and air or makes connections from one aircraft to another. Prior
to World War II, air traffic was very modest so airport require-
ments were very modest. After World War II, as indicated in
Chapter Two, the commercial air transportation system grew by
leaps and bounds. This caused myriad problems for airports
trying to make the adjustment.
The rapid technological development of commercial aircraft
in the post World War II era required that airports have longer
runways and more sophisticated navigational aids. The constantly
increasing passenger volumes demanded the latest of aircraft and
equipment for the airlines. In the sixties and seventies, in
order for an airport to keep pace, it had to have runways and
facilities to handle jet aircraft. Many small airports in the
1970's mortgaged the future of their communities for 20 or more
years in order to provide the local passenger facilities that
would permit their use by newer jet aircraft of CAB-certified
airlines which began to serve them.
The large airports were faced with problems of congestion
both on the ground and in the air. To exacerbate the problems,
the environmental concerns of noise and air pollution became a
fact of life for the large airports. These factors placed pres-
sure on the FAA and the airports to change the system and facilities
to cope in a more realistic manner. The Airport and Airways
Development and Revenues Act (ADAP) was passed in 1970 to provide
funds to improve ATC equipment and aviation facilities at airports.
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Despite this infusion of funds ($500 million plus per year) there
were four airports, Washington National, O'Hare, LaGuardia, and
Kennedy, with restricted activity due to capacity constraints.
In late 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act was passed, and
it ushered in a major reshuffling of priorities and allocations
for each airline. In addition, a number of new airline entrants
appeared and the role of commuters as replacement carriers has
been encouraged. Since deregulation, September 1978 to December
1981, the former trunklines, local service carriers, intrastate
carriers, and new entrants deleted service at 232 points and added
300 points. With the imminent demise of Section 406 subsidy ,the
deletion of communities continued in 1982. Between 1978 and 1981,
there were 21 new entrant carriers certificated by the CAB in the
continental U.S. In addition, four former supplemental carriers
and four former intrastate carriers commenced interstate service.3
In addition to these largely deregulation-caused changes,
the air transport industry was adversely affected by the August
1981 strike of air traffic controllers which really impacted the
22 restricted airports listed in Chapter Two. Those airports, all
either large or medium hubs, have been the subject of FAA-imposed
slot restrictions since August 1981.
In December 1981, the FAA released its preliminary "National
Airspace System Plan" by saying that the "...FAA will control, not
constrain, regulate, but not interfere..."4 The plan proposes major
revisions in the air traffic control system at an estimated cost
of billions of dollars5by the year 2000. At least 34 U.S. airports
are projected by some analysts to have insufficient capacity to meet
the demands expected to be placed on them within the next decade. 6
The Airport Operator's Council International predicts the number
of capacity-restricted airports will swell to 79 by the year 2000,
based on a 1 to 2% annual growth rate in aircraft operations, unless
larger capacity aircraft can take in the growth. 7 One airport
official said "If they are concerned with having 22 airports with
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temporary capacity restrictions, wait until they have to deal with
this many airports having permanent restrictions"8 Table 5.1 lists
the 32 mainland airports that are projected to have capacity problems
by 1990. Of the 23 large and 9 medium hubs, 26 will have airside
problems and 27 will have landside problems.
Five hubs have been cited as having extreme ratios of hourly
instrument flight rule (IFR) demand versus hourly IFR capacity.
Atlanta has a capacity for 107 hourly movements with a demand for
137. Denver is worse with a 63 capacity and a 99 hourly demand.
The figures at New York's LaGuardia and JFK are 53 and 88, and 60
and 77 respectively. San Francisco has an hourly capacity for 53
and a demand for 72.9
All these projected future capacity problems assume that the
current PATCO restrictions have been resolved. The reality is that
many of the large and medium hubs have PATCO restrictions but most
may have non-PATCO related restrictions from now through the re-
mainder of the century. The allocation of slots, discussed later
in the chapter, will continue to be an alternative to airport
operators and airlines, including commuters. From the airport
standpoint restrictions inhibit traffic development.
5..3 Traffic and Operational Performance
The passenger traffic at large hubs increased at most points
from 1978 to 1980, before the recession and PATCO (Table 3.6).
The medium and small hubs showed a decline in traffic during the
same time period. When the 1981 PATCO period is included through
the data obtained on the airport survey, similar results are
indicated despite the PATCO strike effects. (Table 3.3) Also
significant in this data is the fact that commuter traffic at large
hubs has been increasing at a faster rate than that of the cer-
tificated carriers. Extrapolation of these trends would place the
commuters close to five percent of total passenger traffic at
large hub points within a few years. As indicated below, the
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commuter share of aircraft departures is around 20%.
Figure 5.1
COMMUTER SHARE OF DEPARTURES BY HUB TYPES
1975-1981
% Commuter of Total Departures
Large & Small &
Year Medium Hubs Non-hubs TOTAL
1975 14.8 25.6 16.5
1976 14.9 25.5 16.5
1977 16.6 28.0 18.2
1978 17.9 30.2 19.7
1979 19.1 39.6 22.2
1980 18.3 46.1 22.5
1981 20.7 54.3 25.6
Source: Tables 3.14 and 3.15. Airport Survey.
Another perspective looks at total U.S. domestic air traffic
and operations during the post-deregulation period, November 1978
to November 1981 (Table 5.2). The most notable aspect of this
comparison is the large decreases in departures, traffic, and
seats in segments under 300 miles. Thus, the short haul markets
have displayed a significant negative reaction to all the variables
occurring from 1978 to 1981.
A different analysis of the domestic system performance from
December 1978 to December 1981 shows that 365 or 58.4% of all points
had a decrease in both departures and seats (Table 5.3). Of this
total, 4 out of 24 large hubs and 18 out of 37 medium hubs had
decreases in both departures and seats.10 The 554 small and non-
hubs thus had a decline in both departures and seats at 343 or 60%
of the points from December 1978 to December 1981.
The 1981 data is susceptible to the impact of the air traffic
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controllers' strike in August 1981. Table 5.4 indicates that the
August through November 1981 period had declines in departures and
seats compared to 1978. Whereas the earlier months showed increases
or minimal declines from 1978. However, some passenger declines
did start two months prior to PATCO in June 1981.
Airports have had a significant reduction in the number of
certificated carriers offering service. For the three years through
July, 319 points lost one or more certificated carriers (Table 5.5).
From a regional viewpoint, the certificated carrier eliminations
appear to be evenly spread except for a high number of losses in
the North Central area and a low number of losses in New England.
There has been considerable station changing activity of
commuter airlines. During 1981 the commuters, either through
deliberate closings or total termination of business, dropped
almost 25% of their stations served at the beginning of the year
(Table 5.6). However, at the same time, commuters added almost
36% of their stations during the year. In part, this activity
is caused by the 24.3% loss of commuters who offered service at
the beginning of the year but did not at the end of the year
(Table 5.7).
Another segmentation of commuter station activity is by
geographic region (Table 5.8). Overall, the duplicated commuter
stations have increased 50.9% from 1976 to 1981. In net numbers,
the number of duplicated stations increased by 126 from 1976 to
1978. From 1978 to 1981, the number further increased by 205.
In order to gain another insight into the full extent of
commuter activity since deregulation at the U.S. airports, it is
necessary to analyze the increases in the number of stations that
commuters serve. The first view is of station points that are
served exclusively by commuters (Table 5.9) shows that the national
increase from 1976 to 1978 was 39 stations (17.9%), whereas the
1978 to 1981 increase was slightly more at 48 stations (18.7%).
A geographic area with the largest increase in exclusively served
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commuter points is New England, with a 107.7% increase from 1976.
Since airline deregulation, the West North Central region had a
66.7% increase in exclusive commuter points.
Looking at the point commuters served in combination with
other type airlines collectively, there were 57 new points served
by commuters in 1978 compared to 1976 for a 13.7% increase
(Table 5.10). The increase from 1978 to 1981 was 64 points, or
13.5%. From 1976 to 1981, the number of points served by commuters
rose 29.2%. Since airline deregulation, the increase in commuter
served stations appears to be concentrated in the North Central,
the South Atlantic, and the East South Central regions of the U.S.
The remaining areas appeared to stabilize at their 1976 to 1978
growth.
Another aspect of the commuter expansion into added U.S.
points is the activity of the established commuters (those in
existence in both 1975 and 1982).11 It is this group that perhaps
signals future expansion clues for the commuter airline industry.
The established commuters were very active during the post airline
deregulation period. The number of stations served by these
carriers, duplicated, increased by 94 (or 35.4%) since 1978, whereas
they only increased 20 stations (or 8.1%) from 1976 to 1978.
However, it should be noted that these carriers had abandoned, by
1982, 100 stations served in 1976 (Table 5.11). Collectively,
they closed 135 stations between 1976 and 1982 (Table 5.12).
5.4 Problems of Large and Medium Airports with Commuter Service
Since passenger traffic at large hubs has only grown a
small amount since airline deregulation and medium hub airports
have declined during the same period,12 these airports have had
to adjust to a lower than anticipated growth. Over the pre-
ceding 2 to 3 decades the large and medium hubs had continuing
growth. The financing for the expansion of the facilities required
long term revenue projection which indicated continuing growth.
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The very slow passenger growth (large hubs) or decline (medium
hubs) has brought in less revenues to the airport than anticipated.
Thus, ability to match revenues and expenses has been hampered.
The large hubs have benefitted from increased commuter
activity and new entrants since deregulation. However, the large
hubs have had problems because service to small communities has
been reduced 12, the turnover of commuters at the airports has been
high and the PATCO strike has created slot restrictions at many
large hubs.
A majority of the passengers (70%)13 boarding at low density
airports travel to medium or high density points where they must
be integrated with the traffic entering and departing the higher
density point. Since the number of commuter passengers entering
the higher density point is usually a very small percentage of the
total passengers at the airport,14 it is easy to overlook them
in the airport planning process. The bigger and more complex needs
of the large carriers tends to dominate the commuter needs at
large airports as indicated earlier, even though they account
for over 20% of the departures. The net result is that commuters
are often put in a separate terminal (for example, Washington
15
National) or handled at remote gates by a large carrier. From
the standpoint of the passenger, especially, this is less than
first class service. From the standpoint of the airport operator,
it is allocating scarce resources by inconveniencing only the
small number of commuter passengers.
Another aspect of commuter activity at the larger airports
is that competition among larger airlines for the passenger feed
provided by commuters is very keen. Gate space, ground handling,
baggage handling, and reservations are the most common incentives
offered by these airlines. Thus captive commuter networks, similar
to those of Allegheny Commuter airlines, have been launched by
several larger airlines since deregulation; for example: Air
Florida in Florida; Pan American in Florida and Texas; Eastern
in the Northeast; and recently, Delta with Ransome Airlines.
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This action generally assists the traveller in going from ori-
ginating airport to many airports on one ticket. The shortcoming,
of course, is that it restricts the commuter passenger's choice
of connecting carriers which frequently means inconvenience in
making connections to carriers serving points beyond the hub
airport.
However, this type of association does relieve the airport
operator from the persistent, and ever important, problem of
assessing the fitness of the commuter airline. The larger airline
pays the airport for the gate and terminal space and the commuter
pays the larger airline. The airport managers often express
frustation in trying to get reliable information about commuter
financial fitness, plans and needs. 16  The payment record to
airports by commuters has often been poor.17 The commuter realizes
full well that one of the missions of the airport operator is to
assure a continuous and reliable air service for airport users.
Shutting off commuters for non-payment of fees would almost
certainly result in service disruption. As a consequence, when a
commuter goes bankrupt, it is often the airports that are its
biggest creditors. To the large airports, these amounts are
relatively small, but when traffic is not growing and financing
payments are based on growth, the lost fees do make a difference.
Another commuter-caused financial problem at larger airports
is the fact that commuter landing fees are usually less than those
paid by larger carriers. After all, the landing fee for a Twin
Otter is only a small fraction of that paid by a DC-9. Thus, re-
placement of certificated carriers with commuters in feed service
from small communities will mean reduced income for the large
airport even if frequencies increase.
The commuters are concerned that the suggestions of the
Reagan Administration that the self sufficient large airports
should be defederalized and eliminated from receiving ADAP funds.
Without federal funding the airports would be free to obtain re-
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venues in any way they see fit. One of the most frequently
mentioned vehicles to generate airport revenues is through a
flat charge per passenger.18 This "passenger facility charge"
is not allowed under terms of ADAP funding. To the commuters
this flat fee would be a disporportionate increase for their average
fare which is lower than that of the long haul carriers. 19
The concern of the commuter airlines is that the fee would
reduce their oassenqer traffic.
The final large airport problem is environmental, e.g., noise
and air pollution, especially the former. The increase of jet
activity at large airports has increased lawsuits at airports.20
The net result, regardless of the eventual winner, will be increased
expenses which must be recovered by the airport. The commuter
may be asked to bear a portion of this expense even though its
aircraft do not contribute to the noise problem.
5.5 Problems of the Small and Non-Hub Airports with Commuter
Service
As indicated in Section 5.2, the traffic and operational
activity since deregulation has decreased at the small and non-hub
airports. Thus, it is not difficult to conclude that small air-
ports face financial and environmental problems similar to
those experienced at large airports, but they also have many
different problems. In a very general way, the managers of a small,
city-owned airports must maintain a sound public image for the
airport with their constituency. Since traffic is by definition
light, the managers must pay close attention to their costs and
attempt to obtain equitably distributed revenues from all that will
cover the costs. This latter task is extremely difficult for air-
port users without reliance upon support from other levels of government.
The financial problems at the small airport are much more
severe than at the large airport. Few, if any, small airports
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generate sufficient revenues to cover operating costs. let alone
any debt service. The entrance of the commuter as replacement
for a larger certificated airline has reduced revenues even further.
Some communities have used the Section 419 subsidy vehicle as a means
to assess added charges so that the federal government is paying for
more of the operating expenses of their airports.
A survey conducted by the American Association of Airport
Executives concludes that commuter airlines are paying higher
fees at smaller U.S. airports than at larger ones.21 However,
the survey is quick to note that communities with only one
commuter tend to charge lower fees. In the airport survey con-
ducted for this thesis, the number of small and non-hub airports
reporting the assessment of landing fees increased from 19 to
45 from 1978 to 1981, or 137 percent (Table 5.13). The failure
to report no landing fees resulted either if there were non-fees
or the airport felt the information was confidential. The number
of smaller airports not assessing a landing fee reduced from 75
in 1978 to 47 in 1981. The revenues collected from commuters almost
doubled in this period (Table 5.13).
Inherent in the decline in traffic and service at the small
airports is a revenue decline. This jeopardizes the community's
ability to promote airline service, much less capital improvements,
a formula that can prove fatal especially where community/municipal
budgets are also being squeezed.
5. 6 Commuter Problems with Airports
Many of the problems that commuters have with airports are
touched upon through the above discussions of airport problems.
However, we now change to the perspective of the commuter airlines.
To put the commuter perception of the importance of airport
problems into focus, Duane Ekedahl, President of the Regional
-242-
Airline Association, listed the following two problems at the
top of his list of five big problems for the commuters as of June
1982.22
1) Regional operators have to work around slot restraints
at the larger airports.
2) Regional operators must help pass an effective bill to
refurbish the nation's airports.
In the past, the commuters would frequently acknowledge that
they were treated like a fully certificated air carrier in the air
but like a second class carrier on the ground at large airports.
After landing, it has been claimed that they are directed to
facilities distant from the facilities of certificated carriers.
Often they are offered the use of general aviation facilities on
other parts of the field, such as the Marine Terminal at LaGuardia
Airport in New York.23 Air New England, during its entire existence,
explored every reasonable way to be able to use the main terminal
at LaGuardia. It was denied its use by the Port of New York
Authority every time it made the request. The alternative pro-
posed by the Port Authority was to use Newark Airport.
The treatment commuters would like is quite different than
above described. They want expedited air traffic control pro-
cedures that take advantage of the different characteristics of
small aircraft, using sort or non-duty runways and avoiding the
general traffic patterns.24 On the ground, commuters desire access
to major passenger terminals since traffic is primarily interline.
They want counter space in terminals and not be relegated to luggage
pickup, rental areas,25 or under stairwells.26 The shortage of
space at many terminals, especially those with many new entrants,
forces the airport to assign priorities. The commuters are often
low in priority and not willing to pay the regular fees charged
for these facilities.
The commuter problems at small airports are different from
those at large airports. Commuters, because of limited activity
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and traffic at these airports, have sufficient ramp and apron
space near the terminal and gates to satisfy those needs. The
terminals themselves are usually designed for reasonable passenger
comfort, access, and egress. The smaller aircraft pose no problem
to such terminals. Historically, the biggest need for a commuter
at a small airport is sufficient navigational aids to permit
dependable landing, improved safety, and service reliability.
In recent years, especially since deregulation, new problems
have emerged for the commuters at many airports, especially large
airports. The most serious of these problems, some of which may
be classified as discriminatory or prejudicial by the airport
operator are:
1. Handling of commuters by competitive carriers.27
2. Requiring commuters to purchase fuel from designated fixed
based operators at premium prices while other airlines
are permitted to bring in their own supply.
3. Forcing commuters to subcontract with tenants who have
long term leases.28
4. Exorbitant charges to commuters far in excess of the
cost of service being provided. Lawsuits in this area
are pending against Fort Lauderdale and Indianapolis.29
5. Requiring commuters, but not certificated carriers, to
post a bond.
6. Imposing a different standard for sign availability on
intrastate airlines (almost exclusively commuters) than
on interstate airlines.30
7. Problems in obtaining an equitable slot distribution for
commuters.
An interesting document attesting to large airport treatment
of a commuter is a listing of the problems that Provincetown/Boston
Airways/Naples Airways has had in obtaining equal facilities and
status since 1968. (Figure 5.2) PBA is one of the original and
stablest of all the commuters.
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One long time problem that commuters have had is their listing
in the Official Airline Guide for services offered from an airport.
Historically, commuter services were listed after certificated air-
lines rather than in chronological order of their city pair service.
Since airline deregulation, there have been major steps to cure
this problem. Approximately 25 commuters have received CAB 401
certificates since deregulation, thus eliminating their problem
listing. EAS carriers have had their listings integrated for EAS
services. Finally, the CAB is making fitness determinations of
all commuters. Once this is completed, the listing will be in-
tegrated. The argument still used against integrated commuter
listings is that the commuters are not as reliable as major air-
lines. 31
5.7 Airport Slots For Commuters
As has been mentioned a number of times the air traffic
control systems at 22 airports and 24 enroute centers have been
under FAA-imposed limitations since the PATCO air traffic control-
lers strike in August 1981. Prior to that, four airports -
Washington National, Chicago O'Hare, New York LaGuardia, and New
York JFK - were under FAA-controlled hourly slot limitations.
In addition, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the prospect
for more, rather than fewer, FAA-imposed aircraft activity
limitations exists over the next 10 to 15 years.
The original four airport allocation system allowed the
airlines, given anti-trust immunity by CAB, to sit down and decide
among themselves the slots that each should receive. This system
worked reasonably well until the CAB lost its power to grant anti-
trust immunity.
Deregulation brought new entrant carriers desiring access to
key airports, especially the constrained airports. Established
carriers reallocated their equipment resources and abandoned many
I~
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small points in favor of increased entry into large points. Charter
carriers obtained certificates and also clustered around the
large airports. The small points that lost their carriers to
greener pastures were given EAS protection and, more often than
not, received commuter service. These commuter services were
oriented to the large hubs as access to the air transportation
system and often increased the frequency of replacement service
at large points. Finally, the general aviation community,
especially corporate aviation, pressed for access to large airports
since service to their headquarters airport frequently deteriorated.
Thus, the air traffic activity at large airports was at an all-time
peak when the controllers decided to strike in August, 1981.
The immediate imposition of slots at the 22 large airports
and 24 enroute centers necessitated the establishent of some
priorities. The FAA, as the agency controlling the slot levels,
took the lead in developing a system. Table 5.6 provides some
insight as to the impact on the total system. For example, de-
partures in August of 1981 were 16.8% below the level of August,
1978. Even the November, 1981 departures were 11.1% below November,
1978.
The net result was that airlines were not able to operate
all the service scheduled, and aircraft were forced to sit on
the ground. Since the airlines had staffed for their full sched-
ules, severe losses were experienced. One of the hardest hit
groups were the commuter airlines. Many commuters were already in
weak financial condition, and this was the straw that broke their
back. Among those who either went bankrupt or decided to call it
quits after the strike were three certificated commuter carriers -
Air New England, Golden Gate, and Swiftair.
The difficulty was the determination of a fair slot allocation
system to accommodate each of the following groups:
- Incumbent airlines
- New entrants
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- Airlines at EAS points
- General Aviation
The largest group cutting across the top three classifications
was the commuter airlines.
Various systems for allocating slots have been used (or
proposed) including lotteries at each airport, nationwide lot-
tery, allowing slot sales, or flow control by having airlines sit
at airport gates until cleared. Commuter carriers have played
games such as seeking subsidy free EAS points in order to obtain
slots for use at other or beyond points. In other words, to
increase frequencies from A to C the commuter seeks EAS service
from B to C. This then permits added A to C flights via B.
Some of the results of the slot allocation activities were:
- EAS points were given priority for their minimum
guaranteed service levels.
- The most active slot sellers, when permitted, were the
commuters. Some commuters, such as Princeton Airlines,
were able to recoup losses, liquidate the airline, and
walk away with a profit.32
- New entrants were able to obtain slots but generally
not as many as desired.
- Many new entrants were delayed in starting service
or obtaining financing because of the uncertainty related
to receiving sufficient slots to permit an economic
operation.
- Services were increased on routes that by-pass con-
strained airports and ATC centers.
- Incumbent carriers in late 1982 were still not back to
their pre-strike levels at constrained airports.
- Commuters, principally due to the slot constraints, now
experience more restictions than they had prior to
deregulation.
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5.8 Summary of Problems Involved in Airport Access for
Computers and Small Communities
Since 1978, airline deregulation, the poor economy, and the
PATCO strike have been major contributions to the above discussed
problems of access to the air transportation system for both com-
muters and small communities. Airline deregulation has been the
cause, both directly and indirectly, whole or in part, of the
following problem areas:
- Increase in number of commuter airlines33 who, as a
group, are not regarded as highly as jet airlines by
the travelling public.
- Increase in commuter activity at all types of airports.
- Economic/financial problems for small community airports.
- Shifts to usage of surface transportation between small
community airports and large hub airports, caused by
lower fares at hubs and travellers' desire to avoid
commuter services or to save money.
- Small airports indirectly receiving 419 subsidy for
operating funds through increased charges.
- Through an increase in the number of commuters, the
degree of discrimination against commuters has increased
at some airports.
- Uncertainties in the operation of the terminal area air
air traffic control system caused by slot control.
The heart of these problems has been the method of allocation
of resources at the airports, especially where the resources are
scarce. This governmental policy alternative will be discussed with
recommendations in Chapter 7.
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Figure 5.2
Outline of PBA Problems
At Tampa - 1968 to 1981
Commuter Carrier's
Requests/Correspondence
To Airport Manager:Need
check-in counter space
with telephones.
To Airport Manager: Need
check-in counter space,
small identification
sign, telephone and
ramp vehicle.
Date/
Request
5/1/68
Letter
5/10/68
Letter
5/23/68
Letter
5/23/68
Letter
Date of
Response
5/10/68
Phone
5/17/68
Letter
5/28/68
Letter
8/5/68
Memo
To Airport Manager:
Please expedite 5/1/68
request for space.
TPA Response/
Correspondence
Aviation Authority
has problem
responding to
request.
Unable to ac-
commodate until
agreement reached
between commuter
and Aviation
Authority (also
no voice announce-
ments until agre-
ement).
No response.
From GTCC:
Authority claims
negotiations
underway with
different
carrier for space.
From Airport
Manager:Time
needed to prepare
intrastate service
standards & re-
gulations.
No response.
To Airport Manager:
Please expedite agreement.
To Greater Tampa Chamber
of Commerce (GTCC):
Please help obtain
space.
8/16/68
Letter
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Figure 5.2
(contd.)
Date/ Commuter Carrier's Date of TPA Response/
Request Requests/Correspondence Response Correspondence
9/6/68 To different
Letter commuter from
Airport Manager:
Temporary
authorization
for space, phone
sign and public
address system
prior to formal
agreement.
9/18/68 To commuter
Letter from Airport
Manager: re-
questing infor-
mation/documents
to comply with
minimum standards
for Authority
operating licenses.
9/27/68 To Airport Manager
Letter providing information
required by Authority,
10/1/68 To commuter from its
Letter attorney: contacted
Airport Manager about
materials sent by
commuter on 9/27/68.
10/25/68 Granting temporary
Letter authorization to
serve TPA & temporary
space, sign, tele-
phone and public
address system.
11/27/68 To Airport Manager
Letter from a passenger
requesting signs
for commuter.
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Figure 5.2
(contd. )
Commuter Carrier's
Requests/Correspondence
Date of
Response
12/3/68
Letter
TPA/Response/
Correspondence
From Authority:
proposed meeting
of commuters
about space.
12/18/68 From Airport
Manager: condition
for use of new space.
To Airport
requesting
to fuel at
Manager
permission
Gate 16.
To Airport Manager
requesting marquee
sign identification
by October 1, 1977.
To Airport Manager
begging for a
prompt action on
marquee sign.
6/20/77
Letter
8/1/77
Letter
1/12/78
Note
To Airport Manager
stating that new
carrier at TPA,~
Continental is
identified on marquee
and commuter carrying
24,692 monthly passengers
has waited long enough.
To Airport Manager
noting Continental's
sign and expressing
discouragement regarding
commuter's lack of sign,
From Airport
Manager: 100
octane refueling
at gate prohibited.
From Airport
Manager accepting
proposal to
add commuter to
selected terminal
graphics.
From Airport
Manager: that
Authority works
slowly.
No response.
No response.
Date/
Request
6/17/77
Letter
7/27/77
Letter
1/4/78
Note
3/6/78
Note
11/7/78
Letter
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Figure 5.2
(contd.)
Commuter Carrier's
Requests/Correspondence
Date of
Response
TPA/Response/
Correspondence
11/22/78 From Director
Letter of General
Aviation
offering new
one-year agre-
ement and
raising landing
fees.
12/18/78 To Authority protesting
Letter 32% increase in fees
conflicting with federal
inflation guidelines.
1/2/79
Note
1/3/79
Letter
From Authority
discussing
increased landing
fees and asking
that new agree-
ment be executed.
To passenger who called
about lack of signs for
commuter.
1/5/79 From passenger to Airport 1/9/79
Letter Manager complaining about Letter
lack of signs for
commuter.
1/9/79 To Authority again objecting
Letter to large increase in landing
fees.
2/4/80 To Airport Manager requesting
Letter fueling capabilities comparable
to large carriers in order to
avoid waste from tankering.
8/26/81 To Authority requesting permission
Letter to fuel from a 2,000-gallon
refueler at Gate 16.
Source: Straus, Michael V., "Viewpoint" Airport
September 1982.
From Airport's
Director of
Operations to
passenger stating
that a "graphics
package" is being
installed.
No response.
No response.
No reply as of
2/8/82.
Services Magazine,
Date/
Request
Table 5.1
Projected Major Hub Capatity Problems
Mainland Airports
By 1990
Terminal Airport
Type Runway Taxiway Gate Building Curbside Access
Hub Area Area Area Area Area Road Other
Atlanta L x
Baltimore/
Washington M x X
Boston L X
Buffalo M X X x
Charlotte M X x X x
Cleveland M X X x
Dallas/Ft. Worth L x x x x x U
Dallas (Love) L X x
Denver L x X x
Detroit L X x
Ft. Lauderdale L x x X x
Houston (Iobby) L x X x x X
Houston
(Intercontinental) L X x X x x X
J.F. Kennedy L X x X x
LaGuardia L x x X x X X X
Las Vegas L x X x x
Los Angeles L x X X x x x x
Memphis M x X
Miami L x X
Milwaukee M x x
Minneapolis/St. Paul T. Y X x
Newark L X x x x x x
Philadelphia L x x x
Phoenix L x X x X x
Pittsburgh L X X X
(Continued)
Table 5.1
Projected Major Hub Capacity Problems
Mainland Airports
By 1990
(Continued)
Runway Taxiway
Area Area
Gate
Area
Terminal
Building
Area
Curbside
Area
Portland, OR
San Antonio
Salt Lake City
Sea-Tac
St. Louis
Washington (Dulles)
Washington
(National)
TOTAL
SOURCE: Industry Task Force On Airport Capacity and Delay Reduction, Sept. 29, 1982 report.
Type
Hub
Airport
Access
Road Other
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Table 5.2
Percentage Change in Domestic Certificated Carrier
Departures, Passengers, & Available Seats
by Mileage Categcy
48 States - November 1978 vs. November 1981
Mileage Midpoint
100
200
300
400
500
700
% Increase
Departures
(48.6)
(33.9)
(15.7)
(7.1)
(4.5)
(7.5)
14.5
10.2
1000
1300
1600
1900
2200
2600
2800
TOTAL
0.6
(28.3)
(10.5)
(16.5)
(3.5)
(11.07)
(Decrease)
Passengers
(45.6)
(26.7)
(13.2)
(9.4)
(6.3)
(10.3)
11.2
6.9
0.6
(17.4)
(2.4)
(3.1)
(1.0)
(9.79)
11/78 to 11/81
Available Seats
(36.3)
(22.4)
(6.6)
1.2
3.3
(2.6)
21.5
17.6
2.2
(19.5)
14.1
(1.3)
1.0
(2.05)
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares,
Traffic. Load Factors, & Market Shares," Issue
No. 2.0, April 1982, Table 20
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Table 5.3
Summary of Service
Changes For.All Carrier Types at All U.S. Points1 !
December 1978 to December 1981
Number % of
Category of Points Total
1. Increase in Departures
Increase in Seats 129 20.6
2. Decrease in Departures
Decrease in Seats 365 58.4
3. Increase in Departures
Decrease in Seats 91 14.6
4. Decrease in Departures 4 0.6
Increase in Seats
5. Increase in Departures - -
No Change in Seats
6. Decrease in Departures
No Change in Seats - -
7. No Change in Departures
Increase in Seats 1 0.2
8. No Change in Departures
Decrease in Seats 7 1.1
9. No Change in Departures
No Change in Seats 28 4.5
TOTAL 625 100.0
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline, Service, Fares,
Traffic, Load Factors and Market Shares,"
Issue No. 19, February 1982, Table 15.
1/48 states and District of Columbia. Points with
scheduled service both in December 1978 and 1982.
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Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
Table 5.4 1/
Percentage Change in Domestic-
Departures, Passengers, & Available Seats
by Month
1978 vs. 1981
% Increase (Decrease) 1978 to 1981
Departures Passengers Available Seats
(.49) 2.01 8.27
(.43) 1.85 6.95
(1.90) (4.38) 5.12
(1.72) 0.74 5.80
1.26 2.57 10.13
1.12 (6.39) 10.11
3.23 (4.24) 12.05
(16.84) (15.21) (7.60)
(12.15) (9.71) (3.19)
(11.42) (5.86) (2.24)
(11.07) (9.79) (2.05)
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares,
Traffic, Load Factors and Market Shares,"
Issue No. 20 April 1982, Table 17.
1/48 states.
N
L
Geographic Region
New England
Mid Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
TOTAL
SOURCE: Appendix 5.1
Table 5.5
Summary of Points Losing Certificated
Air Service by Geographic Region
July 1978 - July 1981
umber of Points Losing Certificated Airlines
ost One Lost Two Lost Three
Airline Airlines Airlines Tota
19
32
29
40
36
31
27
34
24
272
2
4
4
8
1
7
3
9
38
45
46
32
34
37
36
319
1
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Table 5.6
Station Changes
by Commuter Airlines-
During 1981
Commuter Served2/
Items No. of Stations-
Stations Served December 1980 938
Stations Added During Year 334
Stations Dropped During Year 233
Stations Served December 1981 1039
% Stations Added (% of Dec.1980 - 938)35.6
% Stations Dropped (% of Dec.1980-938)24.8
% Net Change 10.8
SOURCE: Official Airline Guide, December 1980 and 1981
US CAB, "Report on Airline, Fares, Traffic, Load
Factors and Market Shares" February 1982,
Issue No. 19, Table 16
1 xcludes Allegheny Commuter data.
3ounts station each time a commuter serves.
Therefore, if two commuters serve a- point it is
counted twice, and so on.
-262-
Table 5.7
Commuter Airline1 "
Varying Stations
During 1981
No. of Commuter Airlines
- Increasing Stations
- Decreasing Stations
- No Station Change
- Starting Business
- Ending Business
TOTAL
% Commuter Turnover = 35
181 - 37
No. of Commuters-
55
15
39
37
35
181
24.3
SOURCE: Official Airline Guide - December 1980 and 1981
US CAB "Report on Airline, Fares, Traffic, Load
Factors and Market Shares", February 1982,
Issue No. 19, Table 16
-
1 Excludes Allegheny Commuters whose station
activity is reported by USAir.
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Table 5.8
Summary of Commuters At
U.S. Points by Geographic Region
June 1976, 1978, 1981
1/
Number of Commuter Stations~
Geographic Region
New England
Mid Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Total
No. of
Indiv. 2/
Stations -
38
63
79
74
97
31
68
116
101
670
June
1976
46
101
58
62
95
21
53
103
38
June
1978
68
116
71
63
109
27
78
128
118
June
1981
74
142
106
80
144
40
94
143
158
% Incr.
(Decr.)
76 to 76 to
78 81
47.8% 60.8%
14.9 40.6
22.4 82.7
1.6 29.0
14.7 51.6
28.6 90.5
47.1 77.4
24.3 38.8
210.5 315.8
650 776 981 19.3% 50.9%
Source: Commuter Airline Association of America "Commuter Airline
Industry" Annual Report 1976, 1978
Regional Airline Association "Regional/Commuter Airline
Industry" Annual Report 1981
1/ The total of each station times the number of commuters
2/ Number of stations served at least once during the periods
by commuter
Table 5.9
Summary of Trend in Points Served
Exclusively by Commuters by Geographic
Region - 48 States
1976 - 1981
# of Points Served Exclusively /
U.S. Region 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
% Increase
(Decrease)
76/78 78/81
New England
Mid Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
TOTAL - 48 States
13 15 16 29 28 27
25 29 32 36 33 36
26 28 20 20 27 31
22 19 21 34 31 35
28 25 29 31 30 36
7 5 7 9 5 8
17 21 25 29 36 29
37 38 45 45 45 51
43 41 52 49 57 52
218 221 257 292 292 305
23.0 68.8 107.7
28.0 12.5 44.0
15.4 3.3 19.2
(4.5) 66.7 59.0
3.6 24.1 28.6
0.0 14.3 14.3
47.1 16.0 70.6
18.4 13.3 37.8
20.9 0.0 20.9
17.9 18.7 39.9
SOURCE: CAAA, "Commuter Airlines Industry--Annual Report," 1976 through 1981.
1/
- Data as of June 1 of each year,
0
76/81
)
-265-
Table 5.10
Trend in U.S. Points
Served by U.S. Commuters
By Geographic Region - 48 States
1976 - 1981
Geographic Region
State
NEW ENGLAND
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
# Points Served by CommutersV
1976 1977 1978
4 4
4 4
1979 1980 1981
4
4
% Incr
(Decr)
76/78 78/81
4
5
SUBTOTAL 26 30 32 38 36 33 23.0
MID ATLANTIC
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
SUBTOTAL
21 24
6 6
18 20
26
7
19
26
8
19
25
9
21
45 50 52 53 53 55 15.6
EAST NORTH CENTRAL
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin
SUBTOTAL
6
14
10
7
13
8
13
12
10
13
44 46 50 56 57 69 13.6 38.0
WEST NORTH CENTRAL
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
SUBTOTAL
8 9
7 7
13 12
2 6
12 4
6
9
13
8
1
13
12
7
7
13
7
1
9
13
5
10
14
6
1
10
13
42 38 39 62 57 59 (7.1) 51.3
(Continued)
3.1
5.8
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Table 5.10
Trend in U.S. Points
Served by U.S. Commuters
By Geographic Region - 48 States
1976 - 1981
(Continued)
Geographic Region
State
1/
# Points Served by Commuters-
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
% Incr
(Decr)
76/78 78/81
SOUTH ATLANTIC
Delaware
District of Columbia
Maryland
Virginia
West Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
SUBTOTAL
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
SUBTOTAL
56 63 64 69 66 83 14.3 29.7,0
5
6
1
7
6
8
5
8
5
4
4
3
6
7
6
5
5
6
1
3
19 27 16 24 15 23 (18.8) 43.8
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
SUBTOTAL
11
10
6
26 29 33 35 34 29
43 49 57 62 63 57 36.5
MOUNTAIN
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
(Continued)
2
1
6
7
4
12
4
3
17
3
1
6
7
8
10
5
5
18
1
2
5
6
7
8
14
4
22
1
6
9
8
13
4
6
17
2
2
4
11
8
12
9
7
29
10
11
8
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Table 5.10
Trend in U.S. Points
Served by U.S. Commuters
By Geographic Region - 48 States
1976 - 1981
(Continued)
Geographic Region
State
MOUNTAIN (Continued)
# Points Served by Commuters-
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
% Incr
(Decr)
76/78 78/81
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
SUBTOTAL
10 9 9 12 12 12
9 11 12 12 14 16
17 15 14 12 10 4
4 3 10 4 3 14
67 65 80 80 74 81 19.4
PACIFIC
Washington
Oregon
California
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL U.S.
48 STATES
17 20 18 19 21 19
7 1 22 18 10 9
49 51 43 45 53 49
73 72 83 82 84 77 13.7 (7.2)
415 440 472 526 505 536 13.7 13.5
SOURCE: CAAA, "Commuter Airline Industry," Annual Report. 1976
through 1981.
!/Data as of June for each year.
1.3
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Table 5.11
Summary of No. of Stations
Operated by Commuter Airlines
Rendering Continuous Service
From 1976 to 1982
Commuter l/
Air Illinois
Air Midwest
Air Wisconsin
Altair
Aspen
Bar Harbor
Capitol Air Service
Cascade
Catskill
June
1976
10
12
9
Number of
June
1978
16
11
9
11
Stations Served
June
1982
14
31
14
14
12
13
3
17
2
Served in BothServed in Both
76 & 82
7
6
8
2
2
6
3
5
2
Cochise
Colgan
Command
Commuter
Cumberland
Harbor
Golden West
Imperial
9
4
7
8
11
3
11
2
(Continued)
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Table 5.11
(contd.)
Number of Stations Served
Served
June June June In Both
Commuter 1976 1978 1982 76 & 82
Lawrence 3 3 2 2
Mall 4 7 6 3
Marco Island 3 2 2 2
Mesaba 5 2 10 2
Metro 6 6 10 6
MidState 12 10 12 4
Mississippi Valley 6 7 13 3
Montauk 8 6 2 1
Phillips 3 4 4 3
Pilgrim 10 9 14 8
PBA 5 6 15 5
Rio 5 10 14 5
Rocky Mountain 7 5 9 2
Royale 9 10 13 9
San Juan 5 6 9 2
(Continued)
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Table 5.11
(contd.)
Number of
June
Commuter- 1976
Scenic
Scheduled Skyways
Sky West
Trans Mo
Wheeler
Wright
TOTAL
June
1978
2
6
10
5
6
3
265
3
245
Stations Served
June
1982
13
5
5
9
359
Numb ~~ ~ .rV Ston ere
In Both
76 & 82
3
145
SOURCE: Official Airline Guide, June 1976, 1978 & 1982.
U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares,
Traffic , Load Factors and Market Shares," Issue
No. 21 (December 1981).
1/Commuters who were in service continuously from 1975 to
1982. Exclused any commuter who served as an Allegheny
Commuter in any of the periods analyzed.
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Commuters 1
Table 5.12
Summary of Station
Changes by Commuters
Rendering Service From
1976 to 1982
Number of Stations
76 - 78 78 - 82
Closed Opened Closed Opened
76 - 82
Closed Opened
Air Illinois
Air Midwest
Air Wisconsin
Altair
Aspen
Bar Harbor
Capitol Air Service
Cascade
Catskill
Cochise
Colgan
Command
Commuter
Cumberland
Harbor
Golden West
Imperial
(Continued)
10
1
1
9
2
2
2
6
1
2
2
9
2
7
1
8
21
6
12
10
6
6
2
4
1
3
1
6
5
11
6
1
12
2
2
2
7
2
2
4
10
2
8
1
15
25
6
14
12
8
12
4
6
2
4
3
1
8
5
Commuters-
Lawrence
Mall
Marco Island
Mesaba
Metro
Midstate
Mississippi Valley
Montauk
Phillips
Pilgrim
PBA
Rio
Rocky Mountain
Royale
San Juan
Scenic
Scheduled Skyways
Sky West
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Table 5.12
(contd.)
76 - 78
Closed Opened
3
1
4
3
3
(Continued)
Number of Stations
78 - 82
Closed Opened
1 5
3 2
4
7
10
5
9
6
4
4
5
13
8
76 - 8276 - 82
Closed Opened
1 5
3 5
1 -
3 8
- 4
8 8
4 11
8 2
1
6
10
11
7
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Table 5.12
(contd.)
C/ 76 - 78
Comrmuters- Closed Opened
Number of Stations
78 - 82
Closed Opened
Trans Mo
Wheeler
Wright
TOTAL 47 65 88
2
6
184
76 - 82
Closed Opened
6
249135
SOURCE: Official Airline Guide, June 1976, 1978 & 1982.
U.S. Cab, "Report on Airline Service, Fares,
Traffic, Load Factors and Market Shares," Issue
No. 18, December 1981, Appendix.
1/48 States. Excludes commuters who served as an Allegheny
Commuter during any of the periods analyzed.
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Table 5.13
Sumary of Landing Fee Data
@ Airports Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975, 1978, & 1981
Category 1975 1978 1981
Total No. of Airports 109 109 109
A. Number of Airports
Assessing a Landing
Fee
Large Hubs 11 12 12
Medium Hubs 7 10 11
Small Hubs 14 17 17
Non Hubs 31 42 46
TOTAL 63 81 86
B. No. of Airports
Assessing Landing
Fee to Commuters
Large Hubs 8 9 9
Medium Hubs 3 6 8
Small Hubs 3 5 11
Non Hubs 7 14 34
TOTAL 21 34 62
C. No. of Airports
Not Assessing a
Landing Fee to
Commuters 88 75 47
D. Revenues Collected
From Landing
Fees (000)
Certificated
Airlines $70,096.1 $102,260.4 $136,084.1
Commuter
Airlines 870.7 1,996.5 3,799.5
TOTAL $70,966.8 $104,256.9 $139,883.6
% Commuter of
Total 1.2 1.9 2.7
SOURCE: Airport Survey
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CHAPTER 6
JOINT FARES, FINANCING ASSISTANCE,
AND COMMUTER AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
6.1 Objectives
The preceding three chapters have probed the major policy areas
involving the U.S. commuter airlines and small-community air service.
This chapter will probe and evaluate other policy
issues of joint fares, financing assistance and commuter aircraft
development. Each issue is treated separately by provisions of the
U.S. airline deregulation act.
The commuter industry considers these to be critical issues.
Duane Ekedahl, President of the Regional Airline Association, lists
joint fares and ability to acquire foreign aircraft as two of the top
five problems confronting commuter airlines today. Similar views
were expressed by commuter airline executives interviewed by the RAA
Times. In those interviews, seven out of ten considered the retention
of mandatory joint fares, and five out of ten considered financing
and/or FAA loan guarantees, as critical issues.2
6.2 Mandator Joint Fares
6.2.1 Background
After four years of hearings and studies, the CAB in 1974 published
in nine phases the results of the Domestic Passenger Fare
Investigation (DPFI). Essentially, this investigation established
a rate structure for certificated airlines which treated them as
though they were a public utility. Distance became the basic
criterion since the charge for, say, coach service over a 1,000-mile
segment would be the same over all markets in the U.S.A. It was
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average cost-plus return on capital-type of pricing that is used by
electrical power utilities in charging for kilowatt hours.3 The level
of fares was computed using a formula called SIFL (Standard Industry
Fare Level).
Prior to airline deregulation, the establishment of joint fares between
certificated airlines and commuter airlines was voluntary. In Phase
Four of DPFI, the CAB decided that a structure of joint fare ceilings
with a division of rates should be pre-determined. This was only
applicable between trunklines and local-service carriers; the
commuters were not considered at that time. The Airline Deregulation
Act directed that the commuters be part of the joint fare structure,
but when it terminated the CAB's rate-making authority on January 1,
1983, so too did it eliminate the mandatory joint fares for commuter airlines.
6.2.2 Why Joint Fares?
Basically, joint fares were established by the CAB in order to
insure that a passenger, by virtue of residence in a community with
limited access to the air transportation system, would not be unduly
penalized. The basic concern was that the passenger not be double-
charged for the fixed zero-distance elements of the price structure.
When a traveler from a small community is required to connect at a
large nearby hub, it often is more attractive to use cheaper surface
transport, usually private auto, to the large hub. The joint fare
was an inducement that encourages the traveler to fly directly from
the small community to the large hub. Figure 6.1, for example, shows
April 1979 joint fare savings over combined fares for travelers to
Boston in using air services from small communities near Pittsburgh.
The incremental chare to the passenger in Figure 6.1 was
minimal (in the case of Bradford, a savings) and was not related to
whether the additional miles are on the near or far side of
Pittsburgh. The joint fare arrangement was often perceived, and was
marketed by commuter airlines, as a substantial reduction in the
local short-haul air fare.
Figure 6.1
Example of Joint Fare Savings from Small Communities Via Pittsburge to Boston, April 1979
Small Miles Fares Combined Joint Incre.
Community to Pitt. to Pitt. Pitt.-Bos. Total Fares Savings Charge
Youngstown 57 $ 25 $ 72 $ 97 $ 73 $ 25 $ 1
Erie 107 37 72 109 74 74 2
Bradford 123 41 72 113 70 43 (2)
State Coll. 116 40 72 112 74 38 2
Altoona 102 38 72 110 75 35 3
Johnstown 75 34 72 106 75 31 3
Morgantown 61 32 72 102 80 22 8
Parkersburg 102 39 72 111 83 28 11
Source: U.S. CAB Memo to CAB from Director
Office of Economic Analysis,
June 26, 1979
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6.2.3 The Revenue Split Problem -- Cost Prorate Formula
The area of greatest conflict between the large airlines and
commuter airlines is not the joint fare theory but rather, the manner
in which the revenues are split between the airlines. The large
certificated carriers claim that the cost pro rate system introduced
in DPFI's Phase Four in March 1974 provides the short-haul and
commuter airlines with excessive revenue at the expense of the large
carriers.4
The CAB's 1974 formula for dividing revenue on joint fares is
referred to as a "cost prorate" wherein the fare is split in
proportion to the cost of operations. The cost per passenger mile
is greater on a short hop than on the long haul, which means the
short-haul carrier tends to get a disproportionate amount on a fare
that is already reduced by the elimination of a second terminal
charge.
A few examples can best illustrate the cost-prorate principle:
1. The published joint fare in August 1981 between Eureka,
California and Rochester, New York via San Francisco on
WestAir Commuter and American Airlines was $448.57. Under
the formula, WestAir would collect 20.3% ($91.06) of the fare
for flying the passenger on 9.2% of the total trip distance.
This means American received 79.7% of the fare to carry
the passenger 90.8% of the trip.5 The terminal charge of
$28.45 was only 6.3% of the joint fare.
2. When the short-haul segment is even a smaller proportion of
the total trip, the discrepancy between revenue and distance
becomes more dramatic. As an example, the joint Air Midwest
and TWA fare on a trip from Topeka, Kansas to Philadelphia
via Kansas City in August 1981 was $248.57. Air Midwest
received 26.3% ($65.36) for carrying the passenger on 5.1%
of the trip. Interestingly, the basic one-way fare from
Topeka to Kansas City on Air Midwest was only $36.19; thus
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Air Midwest received an additional $29.17 on the joint fare
or 80.1% more than that paid by a local passenger. On the
other hand, TWA received only $183.21 on the split, or $86.04
less than the $249.95 received if the passenger traveled on
a local ticket from Kansas City to Philadelphia.6
Interestingly, as in the Bradford-Boston example, the Topeka,
Philadelphia via Kansas City joint fare is $1.38 less than
if the Topeka passenger drove to Kansas City.
The CAB staff now admits that the cost pro-rate formula was
developed as an attempt to transfer wealth from the trunklines to
the local-service airlines.7 It seemed to be a small burden to impose
on the trunklines at the time, but deregulation changed the world of
the trunklines and the local-service airlines. The trunklines simply
no longer have the monopoly over the long-haul routes that were the
basis of the disproportionate trade-off in the cost pro-rate formula.
At the time of deregulation the commuters were mandated by
legislation into the joint fare system. However, the CAB did not
require that discount fares come under the system. This last,
seemingly-innocuous adjustment has diluted the use of joint fares
with commuters because passengers from the small communities are
finding out that they are better off driving to a hub point to secure
a significant reduction of the discount fares being offered. For
example, the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania passenger traveling on commuter
on a joint fare to Boston can save $160 round trip by driving 50
miles to Baltimore (which trip, coincidentally, has the same air
mileage to Boston). 8
Another example of the high price for joint fares is shown by
the current Houston to South Bend fare.9 ' The normal coach fare from
Houston to Chicago in March 1982 was $90, including tax, and since it
was discounted it could not be used for joint fare construction. The
SIFL fare basis for joint fare use was $212 over the Houston-Chicago
segment. The published joint fare for Houston-South Bent was $241.
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The cheaper option for the traveler was to take the $90 Houston-
Chicago discount fare plus the local $69 Chicago-South Bend fare on
Republic, and realize a savings of $82 over the joint fare.
6.2.4 Termination of CAB Fare Regulation
Mandatory joint fares for commuters expired when the CAB lost its
rate-setting duties effective January 1, 1983. The commuters are very
concerned that the absence of mandatory joint fares and its favorable
pro-rate will adversely affect their traffic base, as well as decrease
profitability if and when another basis is negotiated. The major
carriers have made their posture clear. They will negotiate joint
fares with commuter airlines when it is to their advantage and with
a formula such as a "mileage" or "revenue" pro rate. The mileage
pro-rate pays each carrier the same revenue per mile, while the
revenue pro rate distributes revenue based on the relationship that
the local fares for each segment bear to the total of the two local
fares. In either method, the short-haul operator will receive a
smaller share of the joint fare than he received under the CAB's old
cost pro-rate formula.
6.2.5 The Pros and Cons of Mandatory Joint Fares
Clearly, for the long-haul airlines, the cost pro-rate formula
made mandatory joint fares an undesirable proposition. The short-haul
carriers received the full fare or more while the long-haul carriers
were receiving a smaller fare. On the other hand, the same long-haul
carriers that complained the loudest set up discount fares on the
long-haul segment that were well below those received in a joint fare.
The Houston to South Bend example, cited above, had a normal coach
Houston-Chicago fare of $90. If Republic received its full $69 for
the Chicago-to-South Bend portion of the joint fare, then American
would receive $172 for the Houston-to-Chicago portion of the joint
fare.
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The commuters' fear is that the loss of mandatory joint fares
permits return of the old system, in which the large carriers are
free to pick and choose those segments over which they will give
joint fares, as well as which commuter will be permitted to use
joint fares. The concern is emphasized, given the recent trend
whereby large carriers make contractual arrangements with certain
commuters in order to feed traffic. Eastern, Pan Am, and Air Florida
are active in pioneering this approach, which would freeze out other
commuters who fail to feed all their traffic into the large airline.
The unavailability of joint fares likely means a loss in traffic
originating at small communities, since voluntary joint fares will
probably be offered only over highly-competitive large hub-to-large
hub segments and only to certain commuters. This loss of joint fares
will hurt the revenues of commuters because there will be less
incentive to fly the commuters to the hub point. Also, the lower
revenue share of a negotiated joint fare will adversely impact the
profits of commuters. When this scenario occurs, it means either
added subsidy to EAS points or a lower level of service.
Another strategy for the larger commuter airlines to minimize
impact of changed joint fare environment is to abandon the feed-
service pattern desired by the large carriers. A choice of mini-hubs
and linear routes for commuters may be appropriate using larger and
faster aircraft to serve short- and medium-haul markets.
The large carriers have reservations systems, good terminal
space and efficient baggage-handling systems. These provide very
strong incentives for a commuter to join forces with them. The
difficulty arises when commuter growth begins to antagonize the larger
carrier. A threat of withdrawal of free or marginal-cost usage of
these facilities and the connecting traffic from the large carrier
is devastating to the commuter. The large carrier providing the free
or reduced-rate services for the commuter airline can easily turn to
another commuter to exchange feed traffic. USAir did this when
Ransome decided that the constraints of allegiance to USAir were too
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restrictive and decided to drop its designation as on Allegheny
Commuter in the spring of 1982. The short-term impact on Ransome
was a 20-30% reduction in traffic, even though they made a less-
restrictive arrangement with Delta. The large carrier is in effect
selecting the commuter airline that will be permitted to survive in
a market. If the commuter doesn't want to abide by the carrier's
rules, a replacement carrier is obtained. Since most of these commuter
markets can't support competitive operations, the recalcitrant
commuter must develop an entirely new route structure, as did Ransome.
Despite all these arguments, the practicality of the present
situation is that the current discounting price structure has already
successfully mitigated the use of joint fares. During on-site
interviews by the author, one of the commuters reported its traffic
was 95% connecting, yet only a handful of the connecting traffic was
using joint fares in the past few years. Previously, upwards of 50%
had traveled on joint fares where available.
6.3 Commuter Aircraft Development
6.3.1 Background
The basic aircraft used during the emergence of the commuter
segment of the U.S. airline industry in the early 1960's included
the 10-seat Beech 18, a twin-engine aircraft developed in the mid-
1930's; a few light twin aircraft, such as the Piper Aztec with its
six-seat capacity; and a variety of single-engine aircraft. The
commuters were at that time restricted to operating aircraft with a
fully-loaded maximum gross takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds. A few
commuters operated slightly larger aircraft, but did so by obtaining
a special exemption from the CAB. This exemption was usually only
granted where there were no certificated carriers in the market.
As the commuter segment of the airline industry grew, several
derivatives of modern, executive/corporate-type aircraft with higher-
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density seating configurations were developed. In this category
were the nine-passenger Piper Chieftain and Cessna 402, and the
fifteen-seat Beech 99. At the same time, DeHavilland of Canada
developed a derivative of a work-horse aircraft, the Otter, into a
commuter aircraft known as the Twin Otter. This aircraft was
relatively slow and had a 200-mile range, but more importantly, it
contained 19 seats and was under 12,500 pounds. It was these 15-
to-19-seat aircraft that improved the cost economics and attracted
more commuter airlines into domestic operations in the 1960's.
In July 1972, the CAB changed the definition of the aircraft
limits within which a commuter was exempt from economic regulation.
It eliminated the gross takeoff weight limitation and substituted a
maximum of 30 passenger seats or maximum payload of 7,500 pounds as
criteria for exemption for economic regulation. This change spawned
the development of most of the commuter aircraft that were in
operation at the time of airline deregulation. When airline
deregulation was enacted into law in October 1978, Congress further
raised the limits to 56 seats and 18,000 pounds of payload. The CAB,
on its own initiative, then raised the 56-seat limit to 60 seats.
The FAA also changed its regulations concerning operational and
maintenance requirements for commuter aircraft. Prior to
deregulation, aircraft with gross takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or
less operated under FAR Part 135. Over that weight, FAR Part 121
regulations applied. The Part 135 regulations were not as rigorous
as Part 121 regulations: crew times were more lenient; record-
keeping was minimal; and flight dispatching was not required. Recent
revisions to Part 135 raised the limit to 30 seats or less but also
tightened up on requirements related to maintenance, flight crew
qualifications, training and equipment. Thus, although regulations
were relaxed in the economic aspects of commuter aircraft operation,
the FAA's operational and safety regulations have been made more
stringent for these carriers which use aircraft of larger seating
capacity.
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6.3.2 The Commuter Aircraft Inventory
The inventory of all commuter aircraft, both passenger and cargo,
in the United States is estimated to have reached 1,743 aircraft
(1,463 passenger aircraft) in 1981 by the Regional Airline Association
(Table 6.1). It should be recognized that obtaining an accurate
count of aircraft from commuters is difficult at best. Records are
not always accurate and an accurate count often requires the commuter
to allocate aircraft time between other services such as air taxi or
private use. Similarly, the count should reflect seasonal uses.
Acknowledging this caveat, the increase was 45.3% over the 1,200
aircraft estimated for 1978. For the three years prior to deregulation,
the number of commuter aircraft was estimated to have increased from
1,073 to 1,200 or only 11.8%. Thus, a dramatic growth seems to have
occurred after airline deregulation in 1978.
The passenger aircraft as opposed to the total of both passenger
and cargo aircraft, were 83.9% of the total commuter aircraft in
1981. For commuter aircraft, the average seating capacity rose
from 13.7 in 1979 to 16.0 in 1981.11 Table 6.2 indicates that the
number of available seats in the over-30 seat category increased
to 25.1% of the total in 1981, compared to only 19.4% in 1980.
The reduction in share came from aircraft under 19 seats.
A special survey of 184 passenger commuters based on the 48 states
conducted by the Commuter Airline Association of America (CAAA) in
June 1981 indicates that 11.2% of the aircraft operated had 30 or
more seats (Appendix 6.1). Assuming an average seat size of 45 seats
for the over-30-seat aircraft produces a 24.8% share for these
aircraft thus is consistent with the 25% share of available seat
capacity in aircraft with 30 or more seats. In fact, the average
seating per aircraft of the commuter in the 48 states was 20.3 seats
in June 1981 (Appendix 6.1) compared to the overall 16.012 seats
reported in all commuter aircraft. The larger size in the mainland
is understandable considering the large number of small aircraft
used for "bush" services in Alaska.
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Another interesting point of the CAAA survey is the decrease in
the number of commuters which reported operation in June 1982 as
compared with June 1981 (Appendix 6.1). One hundred and eighty-four
commuters reported in June 1981 but only 127 were still in operation
by June 1982. This is an overall 31% loss. This turnover seems to
confirm that the basic trends in carrier turnover reported in
Chapters 2, 3, and 5 are continuing.
Further analysis of the aircraft data in Appendix 6.1 confirms
the relative importance of the top commuters. The top 20 commuters
in 1978 accounted for 34.8% of the available seat capacity in
August 1981 (Table 6.3). In analyzing the size of aircraft operated
by the same top 20 commuter airlines in 1982 compared to those
operated in 1978, only Scenic and Rio had not increased the seating
in their largest aircraft in both periods (Table 6.4), but it should
be noted that later in 1982 Rio acquired a 50-seat DHC-7 aircraft
and Scenic acquired 19-seat DHC-6 aircraft. That would leave Scenic
and Aeromech as the only top commuters with their largest aircraft
less than 30 seats. Clearly the trend since air line deregulation is
for the larger established commuters to acquire larger aircraft.
6.3.3 Commuter Aircraft Bein Manufactured or Proposed
One of management's most important decisions in operating an
airline is selecting the right aircraft. The decision to acquire
a particular model of an aircraft has profound and lasting consequences
on operating costs, maintenance, training, customer acceptance and
corporate image. The selection often requires a mutual commitment
between an operator and a manufacturer due to the maintenance needs
and commonality of parts amongst the family of aircraft offered by
one manufacturer. Once a relationship has been developed, it is
often difficult, troublesome and expensive to break it. The task of
sorting alternatives is difficult today for U.S. commuters, as the
dramatic growth in commuter activity prompted by airline deregulation
has attracted many new foreign aircraft manufacturers in the arena.
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From 1978 to 1981, the percentage of aircraft of foreign
manufacture operated by the U.S. commuters has increased from 17.9%
to 29.8% of the total (Table 6.5). Thus, a trend towards the use
of foreign aircraft has begun.
As of the end of 1981 there were 20 different aircraft
manufacturers (excluding helicopters) offering commuter-type
aircraft, of which 12 were foreign (Table 6.6). In total, there are
34 different aircraft designs that are now being marketed to U.S.
commuters, of which 23 are foreign. The characteristics of these
aircraft vary widely, as each seeks to attract different segments of
the market. The prices range from slightly under $400,000 for the
nine-seat Britten Norman Islander and Piper T-1020 and 1040, up
to $14 million for BA146 jets (Appendix 6.2).The assortment and
choice is confusing to the unsophisticated commuters.
The forecast for commuter aircraft purchases in the United States
is optimistic. Since deregulation, the U.S. commuter aircraft
industry has committed to, or purchased, $1.43 billion in foreign-
built aircraft alone.13 As of the end of 1982, Avmark estimates
that there are 612 commuter aircraft of over 15 seats on order
throughout the world (Table 6.7). When delivered, this would increase
the over-15-seat fleet by 30%. One of the important sidelights of
this data is the small proportion of U.S.-made aircraft, 18.6% of
those in service and 15.8% of those on order if the Saab/Fairchild
340 is assigned totally to the U.S. This issue is addressed in
the following section.
The United States historically represents the largest aviation
market (excluding Russia and Eastern Europe) in the world. This is
due to the vast geographic area, population dispersion, economic
wealth, growth from the World War II industrial base, and a public
policy that has encouraged aviation growth. The U.S. has the largest
aircraft fleet, the most airports and highest utilization of aircraft
in the world.14 Approximately two-thirds of the 300,000 general
aviation aircraft in the world are registered in the United States.15
In 1979, the U.S. accounted for 37.9% of world revenue passenger
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miles16 including Russia and Eastern Bloc countries. From all of the
above data (Appendix 6.1 and 6.2), it is reasonable to assume that
the U.S. had 40% to 50% of the world's commuter aircraft with
capacity above 15 seats in 1981.
Forecasts of the future demand for commuter-type aircraft vary,
but there has been general agreement that considerable demand will
develop, and that new aircraft in this arena will find initial
success with U.S. commuter airlines. The commuter needs from the
year 1980 to 2000 for aircraft of 15-60 seats are forecast to average
between 203 and 270 per year (Table 6.8). Fairchild's forecast of
U.S. commuter aircraft requirements concludes that the annual needs
for new 19-seat aircraft will decrease each year after 1984
(Figure 6.2). It forecasts that the annual needs for 20- to 39-seat
aircraft and 40- to 60-seat aircraft will continue to grow through
1992.
The orders, including exclusive options, for commuter aircraft
with 15 or more seats were brisk during 1980 and 1981. In 1980,
500 aircraft worldwide were ordered, but in 1981 the number
decreased to 474 (Table 6.9). The 1982 data has yet to be reported,
but it is the consensus of manufacturers contacted that 1982 was
only a small fraction of 1981 orders.
The bottom line of the rosy forecast of commuter large aircraft,
15 to 60 seats, is that there are 27 different aircraft contenders
(Table 6.6). Even if the optimistic FAA forecast (Table 6.8) is
accepted, the following computation shows the limited market for each
aircraft type.
Seat Size of Aircraft
15-19 20-40 41-60
Seats Seats Seats
Number of Designs 10 9 8
FAA Forecast -- 1980-2000 2,187 1,996 1,215
Sales per Year -- 20 Years 194 100 63
Annual Sales/Aircraft Size 19.4 10.0 12.6
Source: Table 6.8 Appendix 6.2
Figure 6.2
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The forecast numbers when taken over a long period of time appear
impressive, but when broken down into market/seat segments and divided
by the number of candidates, the average monthly production would be
at best only 1 to 1.5 aircraft. This is hardly a number that can
sustain a manufacturer, and it means that a number of these aircraft
and manufacturers will drop by the wayside. Ahrens recently filed
for bankruptcy protection in Puerto Rico, and a U.S. contender,
Commuter Aircraft Corporation, has yet to announce any firm orders
and is struggling to obtain financing.18 This brings into focus the
fact that most of the new commuter aircraft of 15 seats or more are
being manufactured by foreign manufacturers. Without Ahrens and
CAC, the U.S. has 4.5 entrants in the area. The foreign manufacturers
have 19.5 entrants up through 60 seats and three more with 60-100
seats (Appendix 6.2). Even in 1980 and 1981, the number of U.S.
commuter aircraft that were foreign manufactured in the 15 or more
seat category increased from 35.7% to 39.6% (Table 6.10). Reflecting
the large number of U.S. aircraft used but no longer manufactured,
the foreign manufacturers had 65.6% of the large commuter aircraft
still in production (Table 6.10). A graphic presentation over time
of the major foreign commuter aircraft entering service is shown in
Figure 6.3.
6.3.4 The Increase in Commuter Aircraft Manufacturers
Shortly after US. airline deregulation was passed into law in
1978, the world's aircraft manufacturers focused upon the fact that
the U.S. commuter market share would be increasing in the 1980's.
The increase in seating capacity to 60 seats for economic regulatory
exemption made the potential market for new aircraft extremely
attractive to many smaller aircraft manufacturers around the world.
As a consequence, the United States commuters now find themselves
the target of high-pressure marketing because the choice of aircraft
is wide and the stakes large for the manufacturers, if they are to
survive in this market.
Figure 6. 3
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Figure 6 .3
Page 2
LEGEND FOR SCATTERGRAM
1. Dutch Fokker F-27
2. British Aerospace Corporation Model 748
3. deHavilland of Canada Twin Otter, DHC-6
4. Pilatus Britten-Norman Tr slander
5. Brazilian Embraer Bandeirante 110
6. Short Brothers (Northern Ireland) Shorts 330
7. DeHavilland of Canada Dash 7, DHC-7
8. Australian Government Aircraft Factories Nomad 22B
9. Australian Government Aircraft Factories Nomad 24A
10. Spanish CASA 212-200
11. Israeli Arava 101B
12. Puerto Rican Ahrens AR-404
13. German Dornier 228-100
14. German Dornier 228-200
15. British Aerospace Jetstream 31
16. Short Brothers (Northern Ireland) Shorts 360
17. deHavilland of Canada Dash 8, DHC-8
18. Swedish/American Saab-Fairchild SF-340
19. Brazilian Embraer Brasilia 120
20. French/Italian ATR-42
21. Spanish/Indonesian CN-235
Source: W. Stephen Piper, "The Commuter and General Aviation Air-
craft Industry: International Trade Aspects" Sntacment
before Subcommittee on Aviation, Comm.ittee on Comm'ce,
Science, and Transportation, US Senate, Aug. 27, 19181, P.4-5.
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The general economic outlook in the United States in early 1983
is not considered as good as it was when the current range of commuter
aircraft projects got under way. Traffic growth is depressed in the
U.S. airline industry and due to the ATC strike there are now slot
restrictions placed on airport movements at 22 major airports.19
So far the market for commuter aircraft has managed to avoid a
collapse. Perhaps the key reason is that the commuters have never
been able to raise the large sums for fleet expansion that often were
available to profitable trunks in good years. The commuters' fleet
expansion plans have usually been modest and related to actual
growth rather than long-term forecasts. Now the commuters have
placed orders and options which, in relation to their size, are far
more valuable than any transaction which the carriers have signed in
recent years. For example, one of the strong, established carriers
with an equity base of approximately $1.2 million recently placed
an order for 1985/86 delivery of three new aircraft with a cost
approaching $25 million.
These new foreign commuter aircraft manufacturing programs aimed
at U.S. commuter airlines have raised some political concerns in
Congress. As indicated in the above section, the U.S. has only 4.5
aircraft candidates in the 15-60 seat category versus 19.5 for the
foreign manufacturers. Some of these aircraft use U.S. engines;
more use Canadian engines. Most of the new aircraft use a large
proportion of high-value items such as electronics and propellers.20
By 1978, the 17-19 seat Swearingen Metro was the only U.S.
aircraft being manufactured in the 15-60 seat size. The 15-seat
Beech 99, which sold well in the early and mid-1970's had ceased
manufacturing. At that point in time, no new aircraft in the 15-19
seat size were planned by aircraft manufacturers.21 The investment
cost to design and produce a new aircraft was high but, more
importantly, the FAA was contemplating revision of its airworthiness
certification requirements for commuter-type aircraft. Knowledge of
this FAA revision was considered mandatory before substantial sums
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of money could be invested by the manufacturers in developing any new
aircraft.
The foreign manufacturers were in a different position. In most
cases their programs were, and still are, supported by their
governments, where quite frequently funds are available for launching
projects, or for continuing projects with low and inefficient
production rates.22 This type of public investment is desirable
because of the potential generation of cherished foreign exchange
and employment, and maintenance of local aircraft manufacturing
industry for defense reasons. Stated simply, the barriers to launching
a foreign program are often lower and less stringent than in the
United States.
A key reason for the lack of involvement by U.S. manufacturers
in commuter aircraft manufacturing is the size of the U.S. markets
for military aircraft for large transport aircraft, and for private
and business aircraft. To produce for these markets, the U.S.
aircraft industry has developed large and centralized organizations
that only carry out big programs efficiently. A program to sell
200-300 aircraft at a unit price of $4 million, over a five-year
period, is simply not attractive to a large manufacturer such as
Boeing or General Dynamics. Compared to Boeing or McDonnell-Douglas,
many of the foreign manufacturers, such as Saab, are small. Even
some of the big foreign manufacturerssuch as British Aerospace
and Aerospatiale, often run each program on a decentralized basis.
Separate divisions are separate profit centers. In addition, the lack
of anti-trust laws permits collaboration among many manufacturers.
With the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the FAA
revised its rules to permit commuter operation of aircraft of 30
seats or less under the lower standards of Part 135. This, when
coupled with the raising of the seat exemption to 60 seats,
the guarantee of protection for small-community service, and the
commuter eligibility for Section 419 subsidy, provided new horizons
for the world's commuter aircraft manufacturers.
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A few other factors that impacted the commuter aircraft market
were:
o The increased freedom for the established scheduled carriers
to eliminate the services of their large jets at points which
simply were not economically viable. From 1979 through 1981,
the trunklines and local-service carriers terminated all
services at 316 points in the United States.23
o In order to facilitate the substitution of commuter airlines
at small communities, the deregulation act provided that
the FAA could guarantee commercial loans used for the purpose
of purchasing new aircraft to serve commuter markets. This
entire area is the subject of a subsequent discussion in this
chapter.
6.3.5 U.S. Commuter Aircraft Manufacturers' Unfair Trade
Complaints Against Foreign Manufacturers
In recent years, the United States commuter aircraft manufacturers
have complained about unfair export practices on the part of certain
foreign governments that subsidize their aircraft manufacturers.
Fairchild Swearingen Aircraft Corporation decided to take action in
August 1982 by filing a petition with the United States International
Trade Commission (ITC) charging Brazil with unfairly subsidizing the
export of Embraer's 19-seat Banderante commuter aircraft.24  The
petition claimed that the sales of Swearingen's 19-seat Metro had
been adversely impacted by such subsidies, which included below-
market financing from Brazil's state bank.
The ultimate goal for Fairchild was to have the U.S. Government
impose duties on the importation of the Bandierante to nullify the
alleged competitive impact of Embraer due to the subsidies.
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Fairchild said, in presenting its case, that Embraer had increased
its share of the U.S. market from just under 7.5% in 1978 (two
aircraft) to approximately 35% during the first five months of 1982.
Over the same period, Fairchild Swearingen's share had dropped
proportionately from 60% of the market. Fairchild also claimed that
the most recent interest rate offered by Embraer to U.S. customers
was 9% compared to 18-20% rates available to Metro customers in
the U.S. 25
Embraer pointed out that Fairchild had indeed lost market share,
but actual Metro sales had increased 180% from 1977 to 1981.26
Thus, Fairchild was just sharing a bigger market with other firms.
Embraer claimed it wrested market shares from the DeHavilland Twin
Otter. Embraer also claimed that the Fairchild's injury was self-
inflicted because prior miscalculations on market size for its
earlier versions of Merlin and Metro aircraft. Thus, the Metro was
now asked to recover these losses. Thus, the price of the Metro
aircraft rose from $1.2 million in 1978 to $2.250 million in
1982.27
Embraer also claimed that the Metro and Bandierante, although
similar in many respects, were actually serving two different markets.
The Metro was more sophisticated with pressurization, while the
Bandierante was simpler, with no pressurization. The Bandierante
operators all supported this view.28 Finally, Embraer demonstrated
that almost all operators indicated that the lower interest rate
was not the controlling factor in the purchase decision.29
Fairchild tried to marshal the support of their Metro operators.
Unfortunately for Fairchild, most of these operators mentioned a
litany of operational and cost problems associated with the Metro.30
Faced with lopsided evidence, the ITC ruled that Fairchild had
failed to establish the connection between market share and the
gain by Embraer.
By coincidence, the ITC then held hearings in September 1982
regarding the broader issue of export credit subsidies in relation to
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other nations and other industries, besides aviation. At the
hearing the general aviation industry presented the view that the
predatory financing of foreign aircraft manufacturers, such as
Embraer,I hurt U.S. aircraft manufacturers' sales. The commuter
operators argued that they were forced to buy foreign because the
U.S. manufacturers had abandoned the market. The Metro was the only
true U.S. aircraft and it was pressurized. The U.S. general aviation
aircraft manufacturers abandoned the commuter market in the 1970's
because there was a lot more money to be made in the exploding market
for turbine-powered business aircraft. During the 1970's the total
15-19 seat commuter aircraft sales amounted to 700 units for a sales
value of approximately $750 million. By contrast, the sales for the
turbine business aircraft in the same period amounted to 11,000
units at a value of $12.5 billion.32
Commuter Aircraft Corporation of Youngstown, Ohio, a proposed
U.S. manufacturer of a 50-seat aircraft, has appealed to the ITC
twice to restrict favorable financing. The first petition was against
Embraer and then against Aerospatiale/Aeritalia, based on the
financing of ATR 42 to Wright Airlines, a prospective CAC customer.
CAC was also turned down.
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) recently studied
the impact of foreign financing subsidies on the U.S. Commuter Aircraft
Industry. In December 1982, the ITC reported that easy financing terms
reduce the cost of purchasing foreign-built commuter aircraft, but
those costs are not the paramount factor in U.S. buying decisions.
Contrary to the contention of U.S. aircraft manufacturers that export
subsidies are a vital determinative factor in commuter purchases,
financing ranked only 10th among 15 criteria of United States commuter
airlines. The first nine factors, before financing, in descending
order, were:
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1. Passenger capacity
2. Fuel efficiency
3. Quality
4. Technology
5. Price
6. Support, both technical and service
7. Fleet standardization
8. Engine
9. Availability
Other related findings of this report were:
o Foreign manufacturers have adopted "seller financing" more
widely than domestic manfuacturers. Many domestic sales
are made without seller financing. Between 1980 and 1982,
13 of 15 foreign sales were made with seller financing.
o Foreign loan guarantees have increased in importance for U.S.
commuter aircraft purchases. From 1977 to 1979, the U.S.
government was the main source of loan guarantees for U.S.
commuter purchases. In 1980 and 1981, the foreign guarantee
was equally as important.
o The FAA loan guarantee program guaranteed $89.9 million
in loans from 1977 to 1981. Of this amount 62.9% was used
to purchase foreign aircraft.
o U.S. commuters used Farmers Home Administration loan
guarantees to obtain $9 million in financing from 1978 to
1981.
o Since imported aircraft normally contain U.S. components
such as avionics, landing gear and hydraulic systems, the
effect of imports on the aviation industry is diminished.
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o High interest rates especially affect commuter airlines
because most of their domestic aircraft loans are tied to
the prime rate.
o Additionally, money is short for financing new aircraft.
6.3.6 Summary -- Commuter Aircraft Development
In summary fashion, the major observations that can be drawn
concerning commuter aircraft are:
1. There has been a large increase in U.S. commuter aircraft
operations between 1978 and 1981.
2. Between 1978 and 1981, the largest increase in U.S. commuter
aircraft operating was in the over-20-seat category.
3. The demand for the large commuter aircraft, 15 to 60 seats,
is expected to range from 4,000 to 5,000 worldwide from
1980 to 2000.
4. U.S. commuter airlines operate slightly less than 50% of the
world's commuter aircraft.
5. There are only four U.S.-manufactured commuter aircraft
competing for the projected demand of 4,000 to 5,000 of the
larger commuter aircraft. There are 34 different aircraft
types from 20 manufacturers. Each of the aircraft has
characteristics that would appeal to different market
segments.
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6. The softening of demand for commuter aircraft in 1982, caused
partly by poor economic conditions, has prompted commuter
aircraft manufacturers, who have speculated with manufacturing
uncommitted aircraft, to resort to unorthodox financing
techniques in order to sell aircraft. These schemes provide
full aircraft financing and often mechanisms to obtain working
capital.
7. U.S. manufacturers of small aircraft probably made the correct
decision to manufacture for the larger general aviation/
corporate market in the 1970's. The U.S. commuters only
acquired 700 new aircraft from 1972 to 1980 from approximately
10 manufacturers.
8. The projected market for 15 to 60-seat commuter aircraft is
simply not big enough to support all the different types
being proposed or being manufactured currently.
9. The foreign commuter-aircraft manufacturers are almost
exclusively government-supported and hence, can sustain very
low production rates.
10. Due to high U.S. interest rates over the past few years, the
U.S. commuters have saved millions of dollars by obtaining
cheaper financing programs from foreign, government-
supported manufacturers.
11. Research has been started to develop new, advanced-techology
commuter aircraft by NASA.
12. Improved, higher-technology aircraft wil be necessary if
there are to be expectations of a less-costly aircraft for
small-community service. This presents an 3pportunity for
the U.S. to take the lead in the 1990's in ozvelopment of
commuter aircraft, but the risks are high an( the financial
return questionable.
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13. Continuance of high commuter turnover of recent years means
more and more aircraft will be put into the used marketplace.
This will make it more difficult to sell new and more
costly aircraft.
6.4 FAA Loan Guarantees for Commuter Aircraft
6.4.1 Background
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 made commuter airlines
eligible for federal government guaranteed loans for the purchase
of aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is charged
with the responsibility for administering this program. This Public
Law, 95-504, contained the extension of the loan guarantee program
that had started in 195734 for local-service airlines. Benefits of
this program applied to, among others: (1) any air carrier whose
certificate authorizes it to provide local or feeder air service;
and (2) any commuter air carrier, or intrastate air carrier.
Although the Act authorizes the guarantee of aircraft
acquisition loans up to $10 million per carrier, a budget ceiling
of $100 million per year was initially established; it was then
raised to $650 million, with $50 million per carrier. Finally, $150
million was earmarked for commuter airlines for the purchase of
passenger aircraft with a maximum seating of 60 passengers, or cargo
aircraft with a capacity of less than 18,000 pounds.
The basic guarantee may not exceed 90% of the face value of the
loan, plus 100% of the unpaid interest up to the time of default.
The loan itself may not exceed 90% of the purchase price of the
aircraft, including spare parts and engines. The loan is limited to
a maximum of 15 years. It may be shorter depending on the aircraft
type being purchased.
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Public Law 95-504 made commuters eligible for federally-guaranteed
aircraft loans for the first time. It seemed reasonable to Congress
that if commuters were to be required to provide a significant role
35
in providing essential air service to the smaller communities,
their access to financing should be made equal to certificated
local air carriers. This segment of the aviation industry consisted
of smaller airlines which, with the use of conventional credit
standards, frequently had difficulty in obtaining financing available
to certificated air carriers. Thus, the guarantee can be extended
only if the FAA determines: (1) the air carrier would not otherwise
be able to obtain funds for the purchase of aircraft on reasonable
terms; (2) the aircraft to be purchased are needed to improve the
service and efficiency of the air carrier; and (3) there is a
reasonable assurance of the ability to repay; and (4) the value of
the security pledged furnishes a reasonable protection to the United
States.
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6.4.2 Experience With FAA Commuter Guarantees
The airline loan guarantee program began with the Government
36Guarantee of Equipment Loans Act of 1957. From that time until the
passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, only those carriers
operating with a CAB certificate of public convenience and necessity
were eligible for loan guarantees. The stated purpose of that
program was to assist local-service carriers in the purchase of
modern aircraft.
The program permitted the locals to obtain better financing than
that available through conventional institutions. At the same time,
it undoubtedly accelerated the locals' ability to acquire the
aircraft that were too large, and uneconomically-unsuited for small
communities. Thus, it could have been expected that over the long
term, the number of small communities served by locals would decline.
In a 1976 study, DOT said
"...certificated service has been lost by many small
communities, and the quality of service (measured either
in terms of frequency or markets served) has been reduced
at many small communities still served by certificated
carriers. This long term trend shows no sign of 38
slackening, and, if anything, is increasing in speed."
While local-service airline service to small communities has
declined, they have not been full 9isolated from the air transport
system. There have been problems, for many of the communities have
been displeased with their lot since airline deregulation. However,
the adverse impact has been mitigated by the existence of commuter
airlines.
Up to 1978, the old loan guarantee program had guaranteed over
$300 million in loans for 20 carriers who acquired 149 aircraft.
No carrier has yet defaulted under that program. That established
a precedent for the new loan guarantee program to follow in the
footsteps of the old program by serving as a basis for expansion
beyond commuter operation. The concern is that the loan guarantee
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program unwittingly enables commuters to acquire aircraft suggesting
service revisions and emphasizing growth opportunities in longer-haul,
higher-density markets to the detriment of small-community service.
The commitments of FAA aircraft loan guarantees for U.S. commuter
airlines started slowly. In 1979, the FAA guaranteed commitments
of $12,760,000 (Table 6.11) which applied to only five commuters and
eight aircraft of between 15 to 30 seats. The activity stepped up
in 1980 and 1981 when 26 and 22 loan guarantees, respectively,
were given (Table 6.11). Over the first three years after passage
of airline deregulation, 20 commuter airlines were given FAA loan
guarantees of $112.5 million (Table 6.11) for the purchase of 54
aircraft for less than the authorized levels of $200 million. Of
the total, only two were aircraft of less than 15 seats.
Of all the commuter aircraft purchases financed with FAA loan
guarantees from 1979 to 1981, 30 (53.6%) were of foreign manufacture.
Of the actual dollar amounts of FAA loan guarantees, $81.5 million,
or 72.5%, were for foreign-made aircraft (Table 6.12).
The commuters receiving most of the loan guarantees tended to be
the large carriers who were operating prior to airline deregulation.
Ten of the commuter beneficiaries were among the top 30 passenger-
carrying commuters for the year ended June 30, 1979 (Table 6.13).
These ten commuters received 81% of the loan guarantees from 1979
through 1981. Only 12.4% of the loan guarantees were authorized
for six commuters which commenced service between 1978 and 1980.
The new loan guarantee program has accomplished something that
did not happen in the old program. As of the end of 1982, the FAA
has had to repossess the following aircraft due to bankruptcy of the
carrier.
No. of Aircraft Amount of Loan
Commuter Aircraft Types Guarantees (000)
Altair 4 F-28 $36,856
Wheeler 1 F-28 583
Total $39,439
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6.4.3 Sources of Commuter Financing and Standards
During the course of this thesis work and previous work, the
author has had numerous contacts with all types of commuter financiers.
The results of these discussions are summarized below.
6.4.3.1 Commercial Banks
Commercial banks have been traditional sources of short-term
debt financing for commuter airlines. Since deregulation,banks are
making collaterized aircraft loans to commuters for terms of seven
to ten years. A leader in this area has been American Security of
Washington, D.C. Commercial banks tend to focus on the following
areas:
A. Management
This is undoubtedly the most important area of the banks'
analyses. The review emphasizes management background, management
references, past history of management's business performance,
overall management experience and previous problem management
areas.
B. Historical Performance
Commercial banks are really only interested in commuters which
have a track record of at least several years. The risks with
a new commuter are usually considered to be too high. At best,
the new commuter can only get the bank's attention with outside
guarantees. Without these guarantees, the new commuter
reluctantly must seek higher price financing from other sources.
C. Financial Ratios
Since banks are interested in repayment, the debt coverage ratio
for a discounted forecast is the key ratio. Beyond that debt/
equity, working capital and current ratios are construed and
evaluated. However, these ratios only buttress a decision made
on other factors.
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D. Financial Projection
These are a must for any firm seeking financing. The bank
often evaluates commuter-airline-sensitive areas, such as load
factor, market growth, and aircraft operating cost projections.
The cash-flow projections (usually the least understood by
commuter management) are important in determining adequacy of
debt-service coverage.
E. Collateral
If all else fails, the banks wish to be assured that sufficient
collateral exists to repay loans. Aircraft have generally been
good collateral since values, until recently, have tended to
stay well above a straight-line loan amortization. In addition,
the airplane is a flexible vehicle that can be moved elsewhere
for a buyer. However, banks, even though they like the
collateral, are not in the aircraft-selling business, so the
collateral values only give warmth and comfort if the other
aspects of the evaluation are sound.
Since commercial banks have been dealing with small businesses
for decades, they are alert to most of the tricks of the trade. As
a consequence, they place covenants in most loan agreements that
are usually very restrictive. Violation of these covenants will not
automatically trigger the calling of a loan. They will be held as
a weapon to force changes in an operation.
Typical of the affirmative covenants required of commuters by
commercial banks are:
o Submission of timely periodic financial statements
o Continuation of corporate existence
o Maintenance of stipulated levels of insurance
o Notification of management changes and new litigation
o Maintenance of FAA certificates of airworthiness
o Maintenance of certain working capital and equity levels
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Negative covenants often prohibit the following, without first
obtaining bank approval:
o Acquisition of added debt
o Consolidation or mergers
o Acquisition or sale of major assets
o Payment of dividends
These all seem logical, but in the pressures of day-to-day
management of commuters, they often become onerous. Invariably, the
commuter is in violation of one or more covenants within a few months.
The terms of commercial bank loans for commuters are not the
same as those given to long-established firms. The outside term of
an aircraft loan is ten years, and usually it is less. The interest
rates invariably start at two percentage points over prime rate and
may go as high as six percentage points over prime. Banks
historically will not finance more than 75% to 80% of an aircraft
value for commuters. Outside guarantees by manufacturers or
government agencies are helpful in obtaining financing, but reduce
interest rates very little except in the high-risk (six percent over
prime) commuters. However, small banks are attracted to government-
guaranteed loans because they can refinance the guarantee portion
and produce added funds to loan. Thus, they are attracted to that
type of loan.
6.4.3.2 Insurance Companies/Pension Funds
As a general rule, very few insurance companies or pension
funds are interested in commuter aircraft financing. In large measure,
this is the result of tight risk standards for loan-making that are
government-mandated. Commuters are considered high-risk investments.
When they do get involved with commuters, a government guarantee is
usually a must for these entities. At the same time, the collateral
values in the future must show a high degree of safety.
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Most frequently, insurance companies finance commuter aircraft
in concert with a commercial bank. The insurance company takes the
guaranteed portion in those cases. Even in doing this, the insurance
firms tend to apply tighter financial ratio standards than a bank.
6.4.3.3 Investment Banks
These banks are usually brokers, for a fee, and assist commuters
by placing only guaranteed loans with fixed-rate, long-term
investors, such as the insurance companies and pension funds. Thus,
government guarantees are very critical to investment-banker
involvement. The standards are the same as insurance-company or
pension-fund loans. The investment broker often leaves it to the
commuter to place the unguaranteed portion of an aircraft loan.
6.4.3.4 Venture Capital
Most new commuters, with limited funds available, often seek
out venture-capital firms. As a general rule, venture capitalists
shy away from service firms, especially those with high risks, such
as commuters. Simply stated, the rewards are not sufficient through
the earnings route. Thus, the only way venture capital would have
an interest is through strong equity participation. This
participation frequently is too high a price to pay for the
entrepreneurial commuter operators.
6.4.3.5 Finance Firms
With the tax incentives for individuals and highly-profitable
firms built into the U.S. tax laws, finance firms are usually
interested in aircraft leasing for the commuter airline. Leasing
involves giving up ownership of the aircraft by the commuter, and
giving up the residual values at the end of the term. Once in a
while, these firms are willing to inject debt funds into a commuter,
using less-conservative measures, but at extremely-high interest
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As a general rule, these firms are a last resort for commuters
because they will attempt to encumber all assets, even by taking
second or third mortgages.
6.4.3.6 Manufacturers
Historically, U.S. commuter manufacturers have been reluctant
to get directly involved in aircraft financing. They usually have
directed commuters to appropriate financial sources where they had
a working relationship. However, in recent years some U.S.
manufacturers have been forced to form their own financing subsidiary
or affiliated firm. Short of this, U.S. manufacturers have often
guaranteed a portion of the debt, usually 15% to 20%, required to
accomplish the financing.
Foreign manufacturers, usually government-supported, often have
a government guarantee to assist in financing exports. In addition,
when a government financing institution is involved, interest rates
are much more attractive than those obtainable from conventional
U.S. financing. Interest rates as low as 7.0% have been used over
the past few years. The term is usually seven to eight years, but a
large balloon payment may be required at the end. Thus, the earlier
years are amortized as if it were a 10- to 12-year loan instead
of seven to eight years. A final enticement, especially in today's
competitive environment, is deferral of early-year payments, to be
added at the end. Alternatively, some foreign manufacturers have
guaranteed repurchase of the aircraft at loan value plus accrued
interest. With these terms it is understandable why some manufacturers
like the FAA loan guarantee even though the manufacturer's financing
will have a secondary position on the collateral.
Since the FAA loan guarantees will not allow refinancing of an
aircraft loan (except for short-term loans up to 30% for aircraft
deposits), most of the manufacturers have adjusted their deposit
requirements to this standard. Interestingly, in the very-
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competitive commuter aircraft business of 1983, the aggressive
manufacturers have managed to offer 100% financing including progress
payments.
6.4.3.7 Commuter Credit
As generally observed by many financial experts, the commuters
are grossly over-leveraged. The number of aircraft operated by all40
U.S. commuters is estimated to have increased by 543 since 1978.
The loan guarantees were for only 56 aircraft, or 10% of the added
aircraft from 1978 to 1981. The remainder of the aircraft was
financed primarily through debt funds, since all commuters surveyed
indicated low equity position. Assuming an average value of $1.0
million for each added aircraft, the debt added for aircraft
acquisition was approximately $500 million adding the loans under
guarantee results in a total of approximately $600 million in new
debt, including lease financing or increased leverage. The Regional
Airline Association estimates that the commuters 4ve ordered
$1.4 billion in foreign aircraft alone since 1979. Potentially,
these orders bring debt since deregulation to over $2.0 billion.
The poor profit performance and high turnover of commuters makes
the pursuit of equity financing extremely difficult. When achieved,
it is costly in terms of ownership. The flexibility and traditionally-
high residual values of aircraft have made the acquisition of debt-
type financing much more attractive. The lack of an equity cushion
means when poor national economic conditions prevail, the commuters
struggle to survive. However, the mere fact that the aircraft have
been financed, mostly with non-FAA guarantee loans, means that
apparently the aircraft stand above the poor ratios and profit
performance. The collateral is more than acceptable. The FAA-
guaranteed loan program is not truly required, but is available if
necessary to finance commuter aircraft purchases.
The question of the need #or the FAA Guaranteed Loan becomes
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even more important in a review of the commuters which have received
the loan guarantees. The commuters accounting for over 80% of the
guarantees were in the top 30 in size as measured by number of
passengers (Table 6.13). Seven of the commuters, accounting for
$31 million, are personally known to be very profitable with low
debt/equity ratios. Thus, it is hard to fathom why they need FAA
loan guarantees. Foreign government financing and guarantees
undoubtedly could have replaced the 72.5% of the FAA guaranteed loans
allocated to acquisition of foreign-made aircraft from 1979 to
1981.
The biggest need for supported financing appears to be in the
area of the small commuters. Based on the Aerospace Corporation study
performed for the FAA, the small commuter operators only met debt-
service standards 8% of the time and met the long-term debt-equity
standard only 59% of the time (Table 6.14).
Another interesting facet of the Aerospace study is that the
ratio standard applied in evaluation for the loan guarantee will
only qualify a small proportion of those failing to meet conventional
financial institution standards. For example, only an addition 3%
of large commuters met the reduced total debt-to-equity standard
of the loan guarantee program. Of the small commuters, only 6% more
met the lower standard. The large and medium commuter carriers
increase their qualifications very little on all standards except on
the operating ratio, which coincidentally is the only profit-oriented
or income statement ratio normally used by the financial community
to help measure commuter financing posture.
The causes of the high failure rates in the commuter industry
are several, but in the final analysis they tend to get back to lack
of proper management knowledge and the failure to plan, especially
in the vital area of fleet planning. The FAA loan guarantee program
does not attempt to address any of these areas.
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It is clear from all of the above that the commuter airline
business is considered quite correctly to be a high-risk business by
most of the financial institutions. In order to put commuter
aircraft financing into the proper perspective, it is appropriate
that an evaluation of reasons for commuter failures be addressed
next.
6.4.4 Causes of Commuter Failures
In several of the early chapters, especially Chapters 2 and 5,
the high turnover of commuters since deregulation was noted. The
turnover is especially high among the commuters which have come into
existence since airline deregulation started in 1978. At the
beginning of 1981, there were approximately 62 commuters which had
been reporting continuous passenger service to the CAB from 1976
(Table 6.15). Of those 62, 10 ceased operation, either due to
bankruptcy or liquidation during 1981. However, for the other 100
or more commuters which offered service during 1981, the turnover
appears to be in the 35% to 40% range, since 39 new commuters
appeared in 1981, while 36 terminated in 1981 (Table 6.16).
The base 52 commuters still operating at the end of 1981 from
1976 carried over 55% of all 1981 commuter passengers (Table 6.15)
and should have sufficient resources to be able to finance modest
expansion. The remaining 100 commuters with their high turnover
are the carriers that create the financial problems for investors.
Financial information on commuters is difficult to obtain since
they are not normally required to file data with the CAB. The smaller
the carrier, the greater the problem in obtaining data. In many
instances, commuters refuse to divulge data for competitive reasons.
However, after considerable work with commuters over the past 10 to
15 years, frequent discussions with members of the financial
community, and discussions with successful commuters, the author's
objective view of the factors that have contributed to the financial
demise of many commuters are as follows:
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6.4.4.1. Management
The knowledge and experience often do not exist in commuter
airline management to make sound decisions. In order to
operate a small airline, a knowledge of the technical and
operational areas is necessary, and must be acquired for FAA
certification, but the functional management areas that are
the weakest in small commuters are invariably marketing and
financial.
6.4.4.2. Undercapitalization
Management with financial acumen would recognize the fact of
undercapitalization and its impact on the commuter's ability to
survive. However, there are many commuters operating with
deficit equity. In a survey of 30 commuters in 1980 by
42
Aerospace Corporation, four of the commuters evaluated had
a deficit equity in 1979 (Table 6.17). If the conventional
1.5 to 1 debt/equity ratio used by the CAB in subsidy cases
were applied, 19 of the 30 commuters would be below standard.
For the 12 commuters in business over ten years, six, or 50%,
were better than the CAB standard.
Many commuters evolve from fixed-base operations and are
not sufficiently aware of the basic differences in financial
requirements in flying scheduled services. By the time the
start-up costs are incurred, the equity is all gone and thus no
cushion exists against probable losses. Attesting to this is
the data for the same 30 commuters. In 1979 there were 16 which
had a deficit-retained earnings (Table 6.18).
Undercapitalization is an even-more-difficult problem in
1983, because a plethora of commuter aircraft manufacturers
are pressing hard to sell in a depressed market. A number of
these manufacturers are trying to get rid of aircraft already
manufactured but unsold. The hard-sell techniques usually
involve financial giveaways. The 100% financing by the
manufacturer or a manufacturer-arranged financial consortium
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is almost ensured at the present time. In addition, the
manufacturers are assisting in arranging some working capital
and operating cost financing either directly or indirectly
through principal moratoriums. The net result is that the
start-up or weak commuter is hard-pressed to say no to the
acquisition of larger and new aircraft. With zero equity and
zero down, it is an easy purchase.
6.4.4.3. Improper Aircraft Selection
Aircraft selection is perhaps the most important decision that
is made by a commuter airline. A logical planning and
evaluation process is generally overlooked for a variety of
reasons, such as lack of time, lack of knowhow, lack of funds,
etc. Decisions on aircraft acquisition are based on opportunities
available, as opposed to the carriers needs. Commuters which
were previously associated with a FBO often use high-cost,
low-seating-capacity aircraft because they are already owned.
Alternatively, commuters may equate bigness with potential
profits and exhibit a tendency to acquire aircraft that are
too large for their existing markets. This often compounds
problems because, in the quest to achieve a reasonable load
factor, frequencies are reduced, and in turn traffic declines.
For those commuters which do perform an aircraft evaluation,
there is a tendency to use manufacturers' cost data, since
commuters normally do not publicly report this type of data.
The unrealism of this information is attested to by many
commuters, who report experienced costs in excess of estimates.
However, the entire fleet and route planning is often left
to the manufacturers, with all their attendant biases, to perform
for the commuter. The selection is then made on the basis of
very gross numbers. There are a few exceptions among the
large commuters, but very few. When the aircraft selection
turns out to be successful for the commuter, it is more by luck
than design.
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6.4.4.4. Marketing
The most critical need for a new commuter or a commuter
entering new markets is marketing expertise. This is an area
of management in commuters that is woefully weak. Basic market
analysis cannot be accomplished because of poor or non-existent
traffic recordkeeping. There is some traffic data on file with
the CAB, but the average small commuter will not spend the time
or money to obtain this information. Thus, knowledge of traffic
data is often pitifully outdated, or based on conversations with
local business associations which are encouraging service. Even
when data is available and analyzed, there is a lack of
sophistication about deciding characteristics of the product to
be offered.
An analysis of the cost of operating a given route or
segment does not enter into the pricing decision, because usually
records cannot provide cost data by aircraft type. Thus, there
is a tendency to stay too long in an unprofitable service.
6.4.4.5. Competition
With freedom to enter new markets, airline competition is
possible for the commuter. Since deregulation started this has
been quite common, especially in areas like New England where
there are a large number of commuters which are looking for ways
to expand. Also, when a commuter has been in operation for
several years and labor costs tend to have risen, the opportunity
exists for a new commuter with lower labor costs to enter its
market with lower costs and prices. This chipping-away of older
commuters is a source of considerable concern to the financial
community, since the capital financing for aircraft is from
five to ten years. Even the CAB's bumping procedures for
replacement in EAS markets with 419 subsidy fail to take this
into consideration, since they allow bumping in two years.
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There are few, if any, commuter markets that can support
two or more commuters. Thus, two competitive commuter markets
generally suffer losses in competitive markets.
6.4.4.6. Inability to Grow
Many small commuters lack the resources -- financial and
managerial -- to respond to market demands. This leaves them
prey to competition. Some causal factors of this inability to
grow include: management inability to recognize the need;
unwillingness to move from one-person control into a larger
operation; lack of financial support; and lack of operational
support.
6.4.4.7. Lack of Recordkeeping
Implicit in all of the above deficiencies is the obvious
deficiency in record-keeping. The entire record-keeping area
probably would be a void if it were not for the necessity of
revenue accounting for interline tickets. Recordkeeping is often
considered a necessary evil; and only minimal efforts are
usually expended in this area. The basic financial statements,
profit and loss, and balance sheetsare usually prepared
annually. However, they are often too general to provide
management information. For example, very little is done with
revenue and market data. Similarly, it is a rare commuter that
has costs recorded by aircraft type.
6.4.5 Summar of FAA Commuter Aircraft Loan Guarantee
The loan guarantee program has some attractive features for
commuters, such as: (1) the access it permits to the long-term
fixed-rate financiers; (2) the ability it provides to finance
aircraft through debt and thus increase leverage; and (3) the
lower-than-conventional interest rate. However, these advantages are
diluted when U.S. interest rates greatly exceed those given by the
-316-
hungry foreign manufacturers. In a tight financial market, the
commuters are hard-pressed to obtain financing, but the manufacturers,
especially when they exist in abundant numbers, can find ways to
get aircraft into commuter operations. In times of tight money,
then, aircraft financing moves up on the list of commuter priorities
when deciding on new aircraft. Without financing, the commuter
cannot acquire the new aircraft. The manufacturer, given the present
oversupply of new and larger commuter aircraft, will find a way
to finance the order.
All the above suggests a scenario in which commuters will
acquire larger aircraft, regardless of the need, because that is what
is being offered. The manufacturers will do the fleet planning
work, and include financing with nothing down. Many of the commuters
will be unable to make the necessary management adjustments, for
many of the reasons suggested above. In turn, when
the commuter ceases operations the aircraft will appear in the
marketplace as used aircraft at probably a greatly-reduced price.
The manufacturer or the government financing agency will be the big
loser if this happens.
On the other hand, despite the priority assigned by Congress,
small-community services will be interrupted to an unacceptable level
because of instability and turnover of the small commuters. The
large and more stable commuters, with their larger aircraft, will have
abandoned the small communities in favor of the more financially
attractive, higher-density and perhaps longer-haul markets. Thus,
the need for financial assistance is at the small-community level.
This was the thrust of the FAA commuter loan guarantee program, but
for the most part, the program has been used by large commuters to
acquire larger aircraft.
Considering the number of commuters (approximately 150) and
the number of aircraft acquired from 1978 to 1981 by commuters
(approximately 550), the FAA loan guarantee program has been used for
financing assistance in only a few instances (56 through 1981). In
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fact, most recent FAA data indicated that only 2-G-159C commuter
aircraft were acquired through use of the FAA Loan Guarantee Program
from October 1, 1981 through December 31, 198243-
6.4.6 Non-FAA Federal Loan Program
At the lower end of the scale, the commuter has some other
federally-supported programs that may help. The Small Business
Administration (SBA) has a guaranteed loan program for loans up to
$500,000. This is small, but it appears to be a better fit between
small commuters and small communities. The Farmer's Home
Administration (FMHA) has a loan program designed to promote business
and industry in rural communities. This program can be used to
guarantee aircraft financing, equipment spares, facilities, training
and other related costs, if the facilities and air services they are
to support are located in rural areas of 50,000 population or less.
This sounds like a profile of most of the small communities with
Essential Air Service requirements. 44
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Table 6.1
Aircraft Operated By 1/
US Commuter Airlines -
1970-1981
Aircraft
Passenger
1,339
1,463
in Service
Cargo Total
267
280
687
782
791
885
997
1,073
1,009
1,119
1,200
1,350 2/
1,606
1,743
Source: RAA, "Regional/Commuter Airline Industry"
1981 Annual Report P. 124
1/ Includes all US commuter airlines, including
cargo operators.
2/ CAAA estimates
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
-322-
Table 6.2
Available Seat Capacity
For Passenger Aircraft In
US Commuter Operations
1980 & 1981 1/
Number of
Aircraft Seats
1 - 9
10 - 19
21 - 30
31 +
Total
% of Available Seat (apacity
1980
19.2%
46.1%
15.3%
19.4%
100.0%
1981
14.5%
44.7%
15.7%
25.1%
100.0%
Source: CAAA, "Commuter Airline Industry" 1980 Annual
Report" P. 121
RAA, "Regional/Commuter Airline Industry" 1981
Annual Report P. 129
1/ Excludes helicopters
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Table 6. 3
Available Seat Capacity
For the Top 20 Commuters
In June 1981
No. of Passengers
T.7..6/30/78Commuter 1
Available Seat
Capacity-Aug.1981
Golden West
Ransome
Air Wisconsin
Metro
Rio Airways
Henson
Provincetown-Boston
Pennsylvania Commuter
Cascade
Rocky Mountain
Britt
Altair
Suburban
Pilgrim
Aeromech
Scenic
Air Illinois
Command Airways
Air North
Bar Harbor
Total
Total All Aircraft
For All Commuters
% Top 20 of Total
572,536
410,479
358,973
333,748
297,688
231,561
221,779
215,548
192,815
192,314
191,314
184,885
159,711
152,990
140,946
135,152
134,017
121,663
119,588
104,970
4,472,677
Source: USCAB, "Commuter Air Carrier Statistics" 12 months
ended June 30, 1978
Aviation Consulting Inc./CAAA "Commuter Airline
Aircraft of America" 1981 edition
1/ Commuters providing service in August 1981 in 48 states.
Ranked by passengers carried for year ended June 30, 1978.
Excludes Air New England and Golden Gate who terminated
service in 1981.
2/ 48 States
255
616
547
533
399
360
818
364
204
157
424
672
150
236
165
461
227
150
160
364
7,262
20,888-
34.8%
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Table 6.4
Largest Capacity Aircraft
Operated by Top 20 Commuters-
In 1978 and 1982
6/30/78
Commuter- Passengers
Golden West 572,536
Ransome 410,479
Air Wisconsin 358,973
Metro 333,748
Rio Airways 297,688
Henson 231,561
Provincetown-Boston 221,779
Pennsylvania Commuter 215,548
Cascade 192,815
Rocky Mountain 192,314
Britt Airlines 191,314
Altair 184,885
Suburban 159,711
Pilgrim 152,990
Aeromech 140,946
Scenic 135,152
Air Illinois 134,017
Command Airways 121,663
#Seats in Largest A/C
June June
1978 1982
19 30
28 50
19 50
19 50
19 19
30 50
40 50
19 30
15 50
50 50
15 47
15 85
19 30
19 45
15 18
9 9
19 48
30 30
(Continued)
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Table 6.4
Largest Capacity Aircraft
Operated by Top 20 Commuters-
In 1978 and 1982
Commuter-
Air North
Bar Harbor
6/30/7 8
Passengers
#Seats in Largest A/C
June June
1978 1982
119,588
104,970
SOURCE: U.S. C.A.B., "Commuter Air Carrier Statistics,"
for the twelve months ended June 30, 1978.
Official Airline Guide, June 1978 and June 1982.
YCommutersproviding service in the 48 states in
both June 1978 and June 1982. Ranked according to number
of passengers for the year ended June 30, 1978.
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Table 6.5 1/
Passenger Aircraft~In
US Commuter Operations
By Aircraft Manufacturer
1978 & 1981
Number of:Aircraft
1978 1981
Aircraft Manufacturer US Foreign US Foreign
Aerospatiale 16
Beech 224 144
British Aerospace 20
Britten Norman 34 56
Cessna 231 337
CASA 11
Convair 8 41
DeHavilland 116 167
Douglas 71 30
Embraer 65
Fairchild/Swearingen 35 135
Fokker 22
7Gbv't. Aircraft Factories 10
Grumman 26 16
Martin 18 19
Piper 297 276
Shorts 11 52
Misc. 79 39 14 10
Total 981 208 1,012 429
% of Years Total 82.1% 17.9% 70.2% 29.8%
Source: NASA "Small Transport Aircraft Technology" An Interim
Report for the Committee on Commerce, Science & Trans-
portation, US Senate, October 1979, P. 17
RAA "Regional/Commuter Airline Industry" 1981 Annual
Report, P. 127
1/ Excludes helicopters and large jets
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Table 6.6
Summary of Commuter
Aircraft Being Manufactured
Or Proposed
As Of December 1982
Seating Category
Aircraft Manufacturer
# of
Model Seats
Country-of Manufacture
US Foreign
I. 9 Seats or Less
Cessna
Pilatus Britten Norman
Piper
II. 10 - 19 Seats
Beech
British Aerospace
DeHavilland
Dornier
Embraer
Fairchild Swearignen
Gov't. Aircraft Fac-
tories
Israel Aircraft Ind.
Pilatus Britten Norman
1900 15
Jetstream 18
DHC-6 19
228-100 15
228-200 19
Bandeirante18
Metro III 19
Nomad 19
Arava 19
Tri-Commuter
III. 20 - 30 Seats
Ahrens
CASA
Embraer
Grumman
Shorts
404
212
Brasilia
G-111
SD330
(Continued)
402C
BN2
T-1020
T-1040
Navajo
Chieftan
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Table 6. 6
Summary of Commuter
Aircraft Being Manufactured
Or Proposed
As Of December 1982
(Continued)
Aircraft Manufacturer Model
# of
Seats
Country of Manufacture
US Foreign
IV. 31 - 50 Seats
Aerospatiale/Aeritalia
British Aerospace
CASA
Commuter Aircraft Corp.
DeHavilland
Fokker
Gulfstream
SAAB/Fairchild
Shorts
V. Over 50 Seats
British Aerospace BA-146-100
BA-146-200
100
F-28 85Fokker
Total 11 1/2
x
x
22 1/2
Source: Commuter Air, "Commuter Aircraft Specifications Summary"
September 1982, P. 42-47
ATR42
748
CN235
CAC100
Dash 7
F27-500
Gl-C
340
360
42-49
48
34-38
50
50
50
37
34
36
x
1/2 1/2
x
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Table 6.7
Estimate of World Commuter
Modern-l/Aircraft 
.Fleet Over. 15 Seats
In Service & On Order
Late 1982
Number of Aircraft
US In On
Made Manufacturer/Model Service Order Total
Aerospatiale/Nord 262/
Mohawk 298 30 - 30
Aerospatiale/ATR42 - 52 52
BA/Jetstream 18 6 - 24
BA/748 150 5 155
x Bee ch/99/C99- 144 10 154
CASA/Nurtanio C-212 69 40 109
CASA/Nurtanio C-235 - 122 122
DeHavilland/DHC-6 501 13 514
DeHavilland/DHC-7 69 16 85
DeHavilland/Dash 8 - 102 102
Dornier/228. - 10 10
Embraer/Bandierante 204 24 228
Embraer/Brasilia - 71 71
Fokker/F27 412 16 428
GAF/Nomad 45 2 47
X Gulfstream/G1C 20 5 25
IAI/Arava 3 7 10
1/2 Saab/Fairchild - 55 55
Shorts/Skyvan 38 - 38
Shorts/330 82 11 93
Shorts/360 3 18 21
x Swearingen Metro 207 27 234
Total 1,992 612 2,604
Total US 371 97 467
% US 18.6% 15.8% 17.9%
Source: Avimark Inc., "More Than 2500 Commuterliners" January 1983
P. 16
1/ Aircraft built after 1958 for commercial service
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Table 6.8
Forecast of Added Worldwide Commuter
Aircraft 15 Seats and Above
1980 To 2000
FAA
ForecastSeat Category -
Period
15 - 19
1980-2000
2,187
Number of Added
OTA
1/ Forecast
1980-2000
1,500
Aircraft
Fairchild
Forecast
1982-1992
675-
20 - 40
41 - 60
Total
Average/Year
Source:
1,996
1,215
5,398
270
1,600
1,500
4,600
230
789
562
2,026
203
Aerospace Corp. "Light Transport Aircraft Market Forecast"
prepared for FAA Office of Aviation Policy, July 1979 P.15
John W. Drake, "Estimates of US Production of Light Trans-
ports for the US and Foreign Market to the Year 2000"
contractor report to OTA, January 1980, P. 34
Samuel C. Colwell "10-Year Outlook for Turboprop Transport
Aircraft Market in US" Commuter Air, June 1982, P. 19
1/ Consensus forecast
2/ US alone
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Table 6.9
Worldwide Airline Orders and Options for Commuter
Type Aircraft
1980 & 1981
Number of Aircraft Ordered-
Type Aircraft 1980 1981
ATR42 - 44
BA-146-200 5 10
BA-748 8 11
BA Jetstream - 6
CASA-212-200 46 42
CASA-235 - 26
DHC Dash 7 34 17
DHC Dash 8 90 20
DHC Twin Otter 47 37
DO-228 - 26
EMB-110 47 52
EMB-120 43 15
FS Metro 41 47
F-27 28 16
F-28 19 19
Saab Fairchild-340 56 24
Shorts 330 20 17
Shorts 360 10 16
Other 6 29
Total 500 474
Source: Airline Newsletter "ANL's Latest New Airliner Order
Survey" June 1, 1982, P. 25
1/ Includes options when deposits were made
Aircraft Type-f
Beech 99*
Nomad N24A
BA - Jetstream
Embraer Bandeirante
Twin Otter
Swearingen Metro
Mohawk 298
Nord 262
Douglas DC,-3*
Casa 212
Shorts 330
Gulfstream GII
Table 6.10
Summary of Major Commuter
Passenger Aircraft- in U. S. Commuter
Service2
August 1980 & 1981
Number of Aircraft
No. of 1980 1981
Seats U.S. Foreign U.S. Foreign
15
16
18
18
19
19
25
27
28
28
30
37
102
102 126
(Continued)
()
Table 6.111
3/
Aircraft Type
Martin 404*
Convair 440/580/
600*
Fairchild 227*
Summary of Major Commuter
Passenger Aircraft in U.S. Commuter
2/Service-
August 1980 & 1981
Number of Aircraft
No. of 1980 1981
Seats U.S. Foreign U.S. Foreign
44 20
44-50
46 12
Fokker F-27
DeHavilland
Dash 7
Fokker F-28
Grand Total
% of Total
Total for Aircraft
Still in Production
% of Total
361
64.3%
102
33.8%
SOURCE: Aviation Consulting, Inc.,
1981 edition, pp. 25-57.
5
200
35.7%
373
60.4%
8
244
39.6%
200 128 244
66.2% 34.4% 65.6%
"Commuter Airline Aircraft of America,"
* Out of production.
1/15 seats and above,
Data from 178 pax. commuters in the 48 states.
Y/iankied by seating capacity.
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Table 6.11 1/
Data On Commuter Aircraft-
Where FAA Loan Guarantees Executed
1979 Through 1981
No. of Commuters
Amount of Loan (000)
Amount of Guarantees
(000)
No. of Aircraft
6 - 9 seats
15 - 19 seats
20 - 30 seats
40 - 50 seats
Over 50 seats
Total
Foreign
Us
Total
1979
5
$14,178
1980
13
$63,611
1981
11
$47,258
Total
20-Y
$125,047
$12,760 $57,340 $42,406 $112,506
8
6
2
8
2
11
8
2
3
26
18
8
26
13
3
5
1
22
6
16
22
2
28
15
7
4
56,-1
30
26
56
Source: US FAA, "Aircraft Loan Guarantee Program Loans Executed"
Office of Aviation Policy, As of March 1, 1982
1/ Passengers commuters in 48 states
2/ Unduplicated total of number of commuters
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Table 6.12 1/
Summary of Commuter Airlines-
Obtaining FAA Loan Guarantees
For Aircraft Acquisition
1979 Through 1981
No. & Type Approx.
Aircraft No.-of Seats
Amount of FAA
Loan Guarantee (000)
Air Oregon
Air US
Air Wisconsin
Atlantic Southeast
Altair
Big Sky
Britt
Capitol Air Serv.
Cascade
Chapparal
Command Airways
Golden West
Mississippi Valley
Pioneer
Pocono
Rio Airways
Scheduled Skyways
Suburban
Tennessee Airways
Wheeler
Total
1 Metro III
3 HP137
1 G159-C
1 Dash 7
1 DHC-6
4 F-28
2 Cessna
1 Metro
3 Metro II
3 FH227
l DHC-6
2 HS748
3 B-99
1 CASA
3 SD330
4 SD330
2 SD330
3 B-99
2 Metro II
1 Metro
4 Metro II
4 Metro II
4 SD330
1 Embraer
l F-27
54
Foreign
Made
$ 3j,577
3,240
36,856
666
11,467
15
26
30
30
30
15
19
19
19
19
30
19
48
Ave. 27.1
1,559
4,675
6,lll
3,635
8,104
1,045
583
A 81,518%
72.5%
Source: US FAA, "Aircraft Loan Guarantee Program - Loans Executed"
Office of Aviation Policy, As of March 1, 1982
1/ Passenger commuters in 48 states
Commuter
Us
Vade
$1,585
3,382
1,038
493
1,508
4,661
1,633
1,377
2,596
2,700
4,893
5,122
$30,988
27.5%
~6
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Table 6.13 1/
1981 Passenger Carried By Commuters-
Obtaining FAA Loan Guarantees
Since Deregulation
Commuteri.assenger
Rank Y.E. 6/30/78 2/Commuter-
No. of 1981
Passengers
Enplaned
1979 - 1981
Amount of
FAA Loan
Guarantee (000)
Air Wisconsin 704,000
Golden West 651,000
Rio Airways 439,441
Britt 369,716
Mississippi Valley 352,784
Suburban 257,782
Cascade 235,000
Altair 233,000
Scheduled Skyways 169,702
Air Oregon 161,862
Command 153,263
Atlantic Southeast 148,672
Chapparal 113,645
Pocono 91,454
Big Sky 66,345
Capito1 Air Service 59,350
Pioneer 55,862
Tennessee Airways 47,923
Air US 37,472
Wheeler 27,018
Total 4,375,291
16.1
14.9
10.0
8.4
8.1
5.9
5.4
5.3
3.9
3.7
3.5
3.4
2.6
2.1
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.1
0.9
0.6
8 3,240
6,111
7,593
4,661
3,635
8,104
11,467
36,856
5,122
1,585
4,675
1,038
3,192
2,596
2,001
666
1,377
1,045
6,959
583
100.0 $112,506
Total All Commuters1 17,694,000
% With Guar. Loans 43.8%
Source: USCAB "Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics" 12 months
ended June 30, 1978
USCAB "Air Carrier Industry Scheduled Service Traffic Statistics"
Medium Regional Air Carrier Details, 12 months ended Dec. 31,
1981
US FAA "Aircraft Loan Guarantee Program - Loans Executed"
Office of Aviation Policy, As of March 1, 1982
1/ Commuters carrying passengers within 48 states
2/ Ranked in descending order of 1981 enplaned passengers
3/ Includes those ranked within top 50 for year ended 6/30/78
4/ Commenced since 1977
3 -
5
12
30
14
10
13
27
4/
24
4/
4/
4/
T/
2.9
6.4
6.7
4.1
3.2
7.2
10.2
32.8
4.6
1.4
4.2
0.9
2.8
2.3
1.8
0.6
1.2
0
6 .
0.5
100.0
(Table 6.14
Commuter Carriers Meeting
Financial Community Ratio Standards-
1973 - 1979
Total Debt
To Equity_
Long Term
to Eciui
% Meeting Standard
Debt Debt Services
ty - Coverage 2/
Operating
Ratio
I. Federally Guaranteed Loan Financial Ratio Standard
Large Fleet Operators 55% 70%
Medium Fleet Operators 70 93
Small Fleet Operators 33 59
Total 52% 70%
II. Non-Federally Guaranteed Loan Financial Ratio Standards
Large Fleet Operators 52% 64%
Medium Fleet Operators 61 87
Small Fleet Operators 27 38
Total 44% 58%
Source: US DOT, FAA "Commuter Carrier Loan Guarantee Study" Prepared
Policy by Aerospace Corporation, January, 1980, Table IV .
for Office of Aviation
1/ Sample of 30 commuters standards required from typical financial sources
2/ Net Income/current portion of Long Term Debt plus interest
3/ Operating Expenses/Operating Revenues
()
Current
Ratio
66%
55
8
42%
34%
23
39
52%
65
50
34% 54%
62%
55
_4
3%
8
4
39%
52%
65
50
54%
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Table 6.15
Number of 1981 Passengers Enplaned
By Commuter Airlines In
Business Since 1976
Number of Enplaned
Commuter Passengers - 1981
I. Commuters In Operation 1976 & All 1981
Aeromech 185,573
Air Illinois 183,658
Air Midwest 284,000
Air North 148,559
Air Wisconsin 704,000
Aspen Airways 221,000
Bar Harbor Airways 225,067
Britt 369,716
Capitol 59,350
Cascade 235,000
Catskill Airways 8,675
Chapparal Airlines 113,645
Chautauqua Airlines 165,964
Colgan Airways 18,111
Command Airways 153,623
Commuter Airlines 69,932
Crown Airways 192,212
Empire Airlines 408,000
Golden West 651,000
Gull Air 63,480
Harbor Airlines 54,089
Henson Aviation 495,945
Heussler Air 3,017
Lawrence Aviation 8,800
Mall Airways 22,032
Marco Island 47,876
Mesaba Aviation 7,867
Metro 609,092
Midstate 139,918
Mississippi Valley 352,784
Montauk Airways 5,556
New England Airlines 25,756
Pennsylvania Airlines 370,374
Pilgrim Airlines 219,372
Phillips Airlines 4,505
Pocono Airways 91,454
PBA 479,938
Ransome 754,652
Rio Airways 439,441
Ross Aviation 35,749
Royale Airlines 162,342
San Juan Airlines 42,470
Scenic 164,305
Scheduled Skyways 169,702
(Continued)
-339-
Table 6.15
Number of 1981 Passengers Enplaned
By Commuter Airlines In
Business Since 1976
(Continued)
Number of Enplaned
Passengers - 1981
Semo Aviation
Sky West
Suburban
Sun Aire
Trans Mo Airlines
Trans Western
Wheeler Flying
Wright Airlines
Total
Total All Commuters - 48 States
1, 360
82,255
257,782
162,813
9,309
14,727
27,018
147,892
9,849,759
17,694,000
55.7%
II. Commuters in Operation in
Terminating in 1981
Air New England
Air South
Apollo
Catalina
Cochise
Florida Airlines
Pearson
Semo Aviation
SwiftAire
Wheeler
Total
% of Total
1976 and Liquidating or
284,000
29,030
77,294
3,862
95,290
22,007
30,456
1,360
165,000
27,018
735,317
4.2%
Sources: U.S. CAB, "Air Carrier Industry Scheduled
Service Traffic Statistics - Medium Air
Carrier Details", 12 months ended December 31,
1981.
U.S. CAB, "Air Carrier Traffic Statistics",
December 1981.
Appendix 2.4.
Commuter
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Ta
Com
i
December 1
Commuter
Name-
Air Atlantic
Air Bahia
Air Chaparral
Air Chico
Air Colorado
Air Hyannis
Air Nebraska
Air New England
Air New Orleans
Air Olympia
Air Pennsylvania
Air Sierra
Air South
Airlifift Assoc.
Alamo Commuter
All Seasons Air Pacific
Alpine Aviation
Altus Airlines
Arizona Pacific
ble 6.16
muter Changes
n 48 States
980 to December 1981
Commuter Commuter
Starting Ceasing
Service Service
x
x
x
x
(Commuter)
(continued)
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Table 6.16
Commuter Changes
in 48 States
December 1980 to December 1981
(Continued)
Commuter Com
Starting Ce
Service Se
muter
asing
rvice
Atlantic Air
Bard Airlines
Bemidji Airlines
Bridger Air
Burlington Airlines
Catalina Airlines
CenTex Airlines
Centennial'Airlines
Century Airlines
Clinton Aero
Desert Pacific Airlines
Direct Air, Inc.
EJA Newport
Emerald Airlines
Erie Airways
Florida Airlines
Florida Commuter Airline
Galion Commuter
Gold Coast Air
x
x
(Continued)
Commuter
Name
-342-
Commuter
Name-
Table 6.16
Commuter Changes
in 48 States
December 1980 to December 1981
(Continued)
Commuter Com
Starting Cea
Service Ser
Golden Airways
Golden Carriage Air
Golden Gate
Great Sierra
Holiday Airlines
Jerdon Air Service
Lake State Airways
Las Vegas Airlines
Magnum Airlines
Mansfield Aviation
Mesa Aviation Service
Midwest Aviation
Mountain West Airlines
NorEast Commuter
North American Airlines
Northern Airlines
Ocean Airways
Pacific Cal Air
Pacific National Airways
x
(Continued)
muter
sing
vice
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Decemb
Commuter
Name
Pinehurst Airlines
Pocono Airlines
Pompano Airways
ProAir
Royal West Airways
Shavano Air
Skytrain
State Airlines
Sundance Airways
Swift Aire
Tejas Airlines
Terre Haute Commuter
Trans Air
Trans Colorado
Valley Airlines
Wills Air
Yosemite Airlines
Young Flying Service
TOTAL
Table 6.16
Commuter Changes
in 48 States
er 1980 to December 1981
(Continuedl
Commuter Commuter
Starting Ceasing
Service Service
x
x.
x
x
x
x
x
3639
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares,
Traffic, Load Factors, and Market Shares,"
Issue No. 19, February 1982, p. 69.
WWW&A*MAd6W#J0**---
-4
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Table 6.17
Summary of Long Term Debt
And Equity for 30 Commuters
1979
Commuter
Letter Code
Approximate
Years In:
Business
wX
Y
z
AB
AC
AD
AE
AH
Total
Amount of
Debt
(000,000)
$ 9.8
2.3
3.2
0.3
4.69
0.03
3.8
2.1
5.0
0.52
0
0.14
0.90
3.54
1.6
0.0-3
0.7
2.11
0.61
0.3
0.14
0.32
0.8
1.9
0.3
0.06
1.2
0.8
10.3
0.13_
$57.620
Amount of
Equity
(000,000)
$ 0.18
7.6
2.9
(0.22)
0.05
0.48
2.56
3.1
0.84
0.14
0.1
0.49
0.8
0.1
(1.1)
0.2
0.37
0 '*4
0.02
0.15
0.072
0.04
(0.75)
0.10
(0.30)
0.02
0.5
0.6
0.58
0.801
$20.633
Ratio of
Debt to
Equity
54.0 to 1
0.3
1.1
93.8
0.1
1.5
0.7
6.0
3.7
0.3
1.1
35.4
0-.3
1.9
5.3
30.5
2.0
1.9
8.0
19.0
3.0
2.4
1.3
17.8
0.2
2.79
Source: US DOT, FAA "Commuter Air Carrier Loan Guarantee Study"
Prepared for Office of Aviation Policy by Aerospace
Corporation, January 1980, Table XIII
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Table 6.18
Summary of Retained
Earnings for 30 Commuters
1979
Commuter
Letter Code
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
I
J
K
L
M
N
0
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
w
X
Y
AB
AC
AD
AE
AH
Approximate
No. of Years
In Business-
5
10
10
10
10
6
9
10
10
4
10
8
. 6
10
10
3
4
3
8
9
7
5
8
5
5
3
7
10
10
10
Cumulative ($M)
Retained
Earnings Deficit
$ (0.76)
5.00
2.90
(0.60)
(0.05)
(0.11)
2.14
3.50
(0.30)
(0.15)
0.30
(0.80)
(1.40)
(0.4)
(0.15)
0.1
0.001
(0.13)
0.07
0.03
(0.25)
(0.34)
(0.70)
0.20
(0.20)
(1.30)
0.56
0.80
0 58
0.80
Source: US DOT FAA, "Commuter Air Carrier Loan Guarantee
Study" Prepared for Office of Aviation Policy by
Aerospace Corporation, January 1980, Table XIII
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7.0 Introduction
In the foregoing chapters the historical experience of air service
at small communities, federal air subsidies, airport access for com-
muters, commuter development, and the FAA loan guarantee program was
discussed. Emphasis was placed on the experience since airline de-
regulation. This chapter will take that discussion a step further and
analyze the policy implications of the issues raised, probe alternative
policies and recommend courses of action.
7.1 Policy Implication of Small Community Service Trends
There is no doubt, based on the above data, that the Airline De-
regulation Act of 1978 triggered a major transition in provision of
air service at small communities in the United States. The service at
all but 150 to 200 communities out of over 600 communities previously
certificated, now and in the future will be supplied almost exclusively
by the commuter airlines.
Air service to the small communities in the United States has
declined since 1960 when the CAB allowed first the trunks and then the
local service airlines to withdraw from short haul and low density
markets. In response to the concern that airline deregulation would
continue this trend, Congress established a ten year guarantee to any
community currently receiving certificated airline service. The changes
that have taken place in air service patterns since 1978 suggest that
many, if not most, small communities and states have not shared equally
in these changes. Clearly, the Congressionally mandated provisions
have eliminated all service cessations at the previously certificated
points. However, the level and quality of service has been challenged
1by many communities and states . Also, there is a legitimate concern
about what will happen after the ten year period ends in 1988. This
leads to a discussion of the following policy issues as regards small
community air service.
- Federal role in the guarantee of air service.
- Time required for a community to display its value and
other air transportation system.
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- Role of Commuters in small community service.
- Speed of airline deregulation in relation to commuters and
small community service.
7.1.1. Causes of Reduction in Air Traffic and Service of Small
Communities Since Airline Deregulation
Before the basic issues can be addressed, a discussion of the
causes of adverse changes in small community air service is appropriate.
The primary culprit is undoubtedly deregulation itself. The de-
regulation process has allowed the large carriers to exit from small
communities with relative ease. These carriers built a cost structure
and fleet that simply could not compete with the commuter using more
appropriately sized aircraft than the large jets. The large carriers
that have remained have done so under the generous terms of the
transitional subsidy. Once this form of subsidy is eliminated in
fiscal 1983, these carriers will probably abandon most of their remaining
small points. This abandoment has created real problems for the travel-
ler at the small community. In effect he is being asked to accept what
he perceives as inferior service. This is manifested by fewer seats,
less modern aircraft (jets are invariably perceived as the only modern
aircraft), slower speeds, need to make more flight connections, fewer
amenities, etc. Passenger diffidence is clearly indicated in the
statement by Stephen Schmitt, Director of Aviation at Bakersfield,
California, "When the first small commuter plane showed up for boarding
at one of the gates, most of the 13 waiting passengers turned around
and headed for their cars to drive to Los Angeles".2 In many respects,
these communities were spoiled by the regulators who paid high subsidy
(see Chapter 4) and permitted the longer haul, high density services
to cross-subsidize the short haul, small community services. Since
deregulation, these communities have been forced to face reality that
they have to pay their own way and they find it difficult,
The large increases in fares since deregulation, as outlined
earlier in EAS markets, is an extension of large carrier termination
and the new-found freedom to set fares. The commuters' existence
depends upon the fares charged in these markets, since they normally do
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not have the aircraft size and characteristics to service the longer
haul, high density markets. The aircraft size limitations are also
deregulation-mandated. When the commuter enters the market, he often
is the only act in town and thus finds it easy to increase fares. Un-
fortunately for the commuter and the community's air service, the
astute traveller has found other means of getting to hub points. As a
result of the stabilization and reduction of auto fuel prices since
1980 and more fuel efficient autos, air fares have increased rapidly
at small communities while the cost of driving has gone in the opposite
direction. When service is restricted basically to one hub point, often
with time consuming intermediate stops, the potential air traveller
finds the drive to a hub point more palatable.
Several other facets of deregulation that have had an influence
on the air service traffic and activity at small communities are:
(1) the uncertainty that carrier turnover, both certificated and com-
muter, brings to the traveller; and, (2) related normal desire of a
carrier without subsidy, to gravitate to longer haul and higher density
routes. Even the commuters are not free from this desire, as witnessed
by the changing complexion of the route structure of the largest
commuters, such as Air Wisconsin, Empire, Henson, etc,
However, it is unfair to place all the blame on airline de-
regulation. The United States economy has been mired in the longest
and most severe recession since the depression of the 1930's, This
has curbed discretionary travel as well as reduced business travel by
air.
Another unforeseen villain in this picture is the after-effect
of the air traffic controllers' strike in August 1981. The capacity
of the air traffic control system has been severely restricted at 22
major 4, large or medium hubs, since that date. The FAA has been forced
to allocate slots at these points. Since many jet-operating new
entrants have been awarded valuable slots, the established carriers,
including commuters, have had difficulty in obtaining requested slots
at desirable times. 5 The net result has been poorly timed flights for
the hub connecting flights and/or time consuming multi-stop short haul
flights that take full advantage of the desirable slot times.
It should be noted that EAS points have been granted slots
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for the CAB-established frequencies. Of course, this has not been the
case for frequencies beyond this minimum level.
7.1.2 Recommendations for Small Community Service
The development in small community air service since 1978 lead
to the following recommendations as to government policy.
1. The years between 1983 and 1988 should be used to obtain
important data on the impact of various changes in air
service at small communities. To this end, the federal
government should develop and support controlled experiments
to measure impact of changes in frequency, seats, fares
and hub connections. The length of these experiments
must be sufficient to be meaningful. The funding for this
could come from the funds saved by eliminating the expensive6
Section 406 Subsidy or the FAA Loan Guarantee program,7
2. The role of air service to a small community must be part
of an overall integr-ted transportation planning program.
As it stands today, the CAB establishes standards, especially
for EAS points, with little or no evaluation of other aspects
of transportation. The need for area planning, as opposed
to local planning, is necessary since airports tend to serve
wide geographic areas. The lead in the integrated planning
should rest with the Federal Government, ideally the Depart-
ment of Transportation, but should be coordinated with state,
regional and local planning authorities. Implementation of
any programs relative to air service should be carried out
at the local and state levels, where there should be better
understanding of the environment.
3. Local communities with air service at stake should take
nothing for granted and should organize to address the
issues and make proper representations to high level
governmental agencies. The CAB, FAA or DOT should encourage
and pay more attention to local views. Ideally, the local
recommendations, should be a requirement before any EAS
standards are established. Similarly, appropriate state
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agencies should be an integral part of the process.
State, regional and local involvement can only be a
positive step in obtaining realistic air service.
4. Local investment in the air service to small communities
should be encouraged. The greater this investment, whether
government or commercial, the greater the prospects of
producing the optimal service and traffic response. Federal
incentives such as accelerated airport aid could be used
as a reward.
5. Federally supported air service to small communities
within reasonable driving distance of large or medium hub
points should be the exception rather than the rule, The
exceptions should require strong local support and
justification. Standards for this must be developed by
1988, thus there is a need for a study.
6. The primary objective for EAS from 1983 to 1988 should be
to create a stable and reliable level of service at the
small communities. One of the important aspects of this is
a need for closer monitoring of carrier fitness. The high
commuter turnover is destabilizing. Again, the appropriate
local and state organizations should be part of this process.
They are the ones impacted by carrier/commuter turnover
and failures. If commuters don't meet reasonable financial
standards they should not be given EAS designation.
7. The small communities receiving non-certificated service in
1978, should be part of the EAS program. These 100 or so
communities were served by commuters prior to 1978. Many
of those commuters have moved, or will move, up to larger
commuters and denser markets and abandon their routes.
Without EAS protection, there will be service disruptions
and an inability to justify the need for service.
8. The hub determinations at EAS points have been the source
of much concern. Should there be one hub or two hubs?
Where should the hubs be? At present, there appear to be
national, as opposed to local, standards and very few
dual-hub determinations, The local involvement again is
- 11 110, Ww"O ,, 4 , 0 , -1
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the key. In addition, the determinations must be fre-
quently reviewed. The world changes. The case for hub
determinations should be made at the local level not in
Washington, D.C.
9. The higher, and rapidly increasing fares are of concern
to small communities with respect to inhibiting optimal
traffic development. The offset to high fares is to
subsidize more economic aircraft and efficient operation.
These issues are addressed in subsequent chapters.
10. Long range accommodation of small communities and low
density air service appears to be politically, if not
economically, sound because of the need to appeal to the
constituency back home every two years by Congressmen.
This is especially true of business travel with its high
value of time input, and for communities relatively
isolated from regional centers once the new generation of
4th level commuter airlines well managed, well financed and
stable, is available. Some of these issues are also
addressed in subsequent chapters, but at this point it is
valid to suggest that the efforts of all levels of government
should be geared to achieving this type of commuter.
7.2 Policy Implications of Subsidy at -EAS Points
7.2.1 Federal Role in Guaranteeing Air Service To Small Communities
The subsidy rationale suggests that the barriers to obtaining,
maintaining and expanding air service to a small community fall into
the economic, technological, environmental and institutional categories.
According to Burco, (after his interviews in individual small com-
munities), the institutional issues seemed to be the most significant.
There was little environmental concern and the technological issue
focused on the aircraft and its characteristics. The economic issues
were evident in all areas of Burco's study but there was a belief
that they would be resolved if the institutional issues could be
addressed in dealing with small community service.9
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The White House recognized the basic tenet that institutional
barriers existed in the development of a rural transportation system
by publishing initiatives in the subject area in 1979.10 Commuter
airlines were the subject of various pledges of developmental assistance
from several federal agencies such as FAA, FMHA, SBA and CAB. Many
of the past policies of these agencies discriminated against small
carriers. For example, the FAA Loan Guarantee Program was not for
non-certificated commuters; commuters were severely restricted as to
aircraft size; subsidy was not available to commuters; and, SBA loan
guarantees were limited in amount, etc. The Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978 in itself dismantled many of these barriers.
The economic and institutional incentives for the local service
carriers to continue uneconomic service through payment of generous
subsidy has been a strong factor inhibiting growth of the commuters
in the past. In fact, it still does as long as Section 406 subsidy
continues to be paid.11
Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 5, the FAA's airport develop-
ment program heavily favored large airports with certificated service.
This has hurt the development of small community air service and
commuter airlines.
Another, and very natural, barrier is the provincialism of a
community or a region having its own airport. Once an airport exists
and a community, for whatever reason, invests funds to upgrade
facilities and equipment, there is often the feeling that a high
level of scheduled airline service is warranted. In fact, there often
is a prevailing feeling that an airline should be allowed to render
service at their airport. An example of this is Worcester, Massachu-
setts, which has lost the certificated service it had since post
World War II days.12 The facility is first class and sufficient
traffic to support certificated airline service in the past, but
deregulation has changed travel patterns so much that Worcester is
now an unwanted airport. The airport manager and Airport Commission
are fighting for survival, regardless of the need, in an area where
Boston (large hub) is 39 miles away, Providence (small hub) is 43
13
miles distant and Hartford (a medium hub) is 52 miles away. As
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the Worcester Gazette editorial warns its readers, "Under deregulation,
communities will get the kind of air service they are willing to
support."14  It is difficult to face the reality of the marketplace.
One of the keys to resolving the communities' problem is more
local and regional involvement. The establishment of priorities on a
regional basis may hurt some communities' air service. However, a
concerted community and commuter effort could create rewards wherein
an entire area could benefit from integrated transportation to link
with its air service. This effort could bring pressure upon all
appropriate governmental agencies, not just aviation-related, to
assist in the formation of a realistic, modern transportation system.
The local community and region should be the spokesperson for espousing
their service needs. Guarantee of air service by the federal government
is a blank check that is hard to refuse. Also the local perspective
often believes it is difficult to build a sound workable system when
the major input comes from Washington, D.C.
Transportation, as with most goods or services, is more costly
in small quantities. This is basic to service at small communities,
especially the EAS program. The quantities are small in terms of
number of passengers and length of trip. In addition, the uncertaini-
ties of weather, delays and congestion are relatively more costly to
commuters. 15  Delay costs are exacerbated by the competition from the
various modes of surface transportation when travel time to the airport
is considered, the trip time advantage for air transportation on a
short trip can be narrow and the perceived costs are higher 16than on
alternative modes of transportation. All these factors make it
difficult for a commuter to make a profit in rendering short haul,
low density air service. The justification for service guarantees is
the subject of discussion in the subsidy chapter.
7.2.2 Time for Communities to Show Support For Guaranteed Air Service
Depending on the circumstances, a ten year period of guaranteed
air service appears to be a reasonable period for a community to show
its need for air service. However, the data presented above suggests
that the program is more than sputtering. The need exists between
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now and 1988, for the government to do some experimentation to test
the impact of service and fare changes. These tests should provide
guidelines for the future judgements on the feasibility of continued
guarantees.
The key here is to obtain information that will give greater
insight into the causes of traffic responses, etc. The current concern
about the two daily flights can be put to rest if it is determined
that three or four flights will optimize traffic and profits.
7.2.3 Role of the Commuters in Small Community Service
The transportation economics, as suggested above mean that small
community air service is provided at a higher cost per passenger mile
than in denser markets. The tendency of airline operations in the
United States has been for the so-called mature airlines to leave the
low density markets, preferring the denser routes. The trunklines left
the short distance, low density routes to the local service carriers.
Since deregulation, the local service carriers are gladly leaving these
routes to the commuters, Now some of the commuters are graduating
from the small communities.
The Airline Deregulation Act has been heralded as the vehicle
for freeing entrepreneurs from governmental regulation so that the
small commuters can benefit from service to the small communities.
Not so, the commuturs are nore more regulated than before 1978. For
example, the EAS programs require filings with CAB; commuters are
subject to FAA's slot distribution system; the subsidy and EAS programs
are subject to guidelines, and reports.
When coupled with the high turnover at the lower end of the
commuter ranks, it becomes clear that the largest commuters will
probably move into larger markets and become the new breed of local
service carriers. The lower echelon of the commuters will become
another form of airline, a fourth level, as opposed to the third
level designation given commuters prior to deregulation. These
will be the primary servers of small communities, However, they will
probably manifest all the bad characteristics that are discussed
throughout this thesis, Rectifying these deficiencies, such as
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unacceptable aircraft, poor economics, high fares, poor financial
structure, can only be done with regulatory assistance. This, in
turn, means that some economic regulation will be required if the
objective of stability is to be achieved in small community service.
The alternative is proving to be undesirable. Simply ask any small
community; they will gladly recite the litany of the pitfalls in
the current programs.
7.2.4 Airline Deregulation in Relation to Small Community Air Service
The movement of the large airlines away from small points was
clearly anticipated at the time that the Airline Deregulation Act
was passed in 1978. A great deal of this abandonment17 occurred
during the few years prior to 1978, when the CAB sensed the atmosphere
and relaxed carrier exit barriers. Since deregulation, the abandon-
ment trend has continued and by the end of 1982, there simply were
not many of the old trunklines, local service airlines or even the
new entrants serving the 541 non-hub points. The ten year program
for these small communities has now turned into a four year program.
The transition has been abrupt and perhaps too fast for small com-
munities to fully analyze their future posture.
Effective January 1, 1983, another aspect of the EAS program -
"bumping" - becomes a reality. This means any carrier receiving
subsidy for essential air service can be bumped from serving a
community by another at the end of 2 years. Under these rules, a
subsidized incumbent can be bumped if another carrier shows it can
provide either substantially better service for the same subsidy or
the same essential service at substantially lower costs,18 This rule,
while designed to encourage efficiency, could easily accelerate the
already high turnover of commuters in the small points. CAB
Chairman McKinnon, in speaking before the Airport Operators Council
International, Inc., said, "This rule will give you (airport owners)
the means to discipline subsidized carriers at your airports. If a
subsidized carrier provides poor or inefficient service, you should
attract another carrier to challenge the incumbent."19 Considering
the poor performance at small points, this statement on penalizing
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commuters by substituting different commuters is probably the opposite
of what the air travelers need. From now to 1988, is the time to
create stability. Continued uncertainty will not provide the proper
test of air service feasibility.
7.2.5 Alternative EAS Subsidy Policies
7.2.5.1 Capacity Based Subsidy
Local service points should be serviced by local service
carriers; points requiring less capacity should be serviced by
commuters. Today, the 406 and 419 programs provide subsidy to a
mixture of local service and commuter airlines serving the small
communities, regardless of the traffic levels. The cost of providing
service to the subsidy payer, (or the airline if subsidy free), can
vary significantly, depending on many factors such as size of air-
craft used, timing of service, etc., but most importantly, it is a
matter of trying to match seat capacity with the demand.
Unfortunately, most small airlines have only one or two air-
craft types, such as a 9-seater and a 19-seater. To illustrate,
if the daily load is 20 passengers, then a single 9-seat and a
single 19-seat flight would produce 28 seats, or a 71% load factor.
If no 9-seat aircraft are available, then two 19-seat flights would
produce a 53% load factor. This is reasonable, but not as economical,
because of the cost involved in flying two of the more expensive
larger aircraft.
Even more inefficient is the airline which operates two 50-
seat flights because this is the smallest aircraft available, This
is a clearly uneconomical situation. Yet this is the predicament in
which the Section 406 subsidy program finds itself with virtually
all the 406 points still subsidized. The daily enplaned traffic at
the 37 remaining 406-subsidized points is approximately 40 enplaned
passengers per day. The smallest aircraft in the airlines fleets
currently servicing these points has 48 to 50 seats. The result is
an average load factor, assuming two flights, of only 40%. The
ultimate for efficiency in this case probably is a 30-seat aircraft
for both flights.
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An alternative subsidy system, then, would match the traffic
levels with the size aircraft operated, and thus insure a reasonable,
if not optimal, matching of capacity and demand. Thus, standards
such as the following may suggest size and, in turn, the type of
airline:
Average Enplaned
Passengers Minimum Number of
Per Day Service Level Seats on Aircraft
1-10 2 6
11-20 2-3 8-9
21-33 2 15-19
34-45 2 25-30
46-60 2 35-45
61-90 2 46-60
Over 90 2 Over 60
When a carrier's traffic at a point approaches a new plateau,
a larger aircraft should normally be available or the carrier may
increase the frequencies on its smaller aircraft. At some point, the
carrier's costs begin to increase to the point at which operation of
smaller aircraft becomes inefficient. The captain on a DeHavilland
Dash-7 (50 seats) receives $45,000 per year. For illustration
purposes this means perhaps $30,000 per year for the co-pilot. The
captain on a Beech-99 (15 seats) working for the same airline wants
more than $30,000 per year, whereas the small carrier which operates
only Beech-99 aircraft may pay its captain $20,000 per year.
This system sounds simple, but it flies in the face of reality.
It theorizes that a carrier which develops the traffic up to the
point of enrichment will turn over the market to a larger carrier.
Conversely, it suggests that larger aircraft operators must eliminate
service at points when enplanements fail to meet the traffic levels
required for their aircraft. A carrier may wish to continue at a
point because of the feed traffic that an otherwise weak point may
provide the route system. If so, subsidy from outside sources is not
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needed. Thus, this system evolves such that points not needing
subsidy will be assigned to local service carriers, with commuters only
serving the subsidized points.
This system, while potentially offering efficiencies, falls
short because of the following reasons:
- It fails to fully recognize the daily traffic range necessary
to achieve an average of 40 enplaned passengers. For
example, Nantucket has three times as many daily passengers
in July and August than it does from December through
March. Similarly, Sunday and Monday generally have five
times the traffic of Friday or Saturday even in July and
August.
- It might lead to a system of false reporting of
traffic, if a new plateau was close.
- It may well force a carrier to move to a larger aircraft
for one route, regardless of its overall utility or
efficiency.
- It would overlay a new level of regulations and
traffic monitoring.
7.2.5.2 Flow-Through Subsidy
A system of "flow-through" subsidy is established when a large
carrier makes arrangement with a commuter to provide the small com-
munity service. This concept was used on a limited experimental
basis for five years prior to deregulation. Frontier subcontracted
with Air Midwest to provide service at Dodge City, Great Bend, and
Hutchinson, Kansas.20  Frontier paid Air Midwest out of the 406
subsidy it received. This subcontracting appeared to be beneficial
21
in terms of better service and lower subsidy costs. 1 Moreover, it
potentially opened the door for the commuter to receive management
assistance. Like most other small businesses, commuters have limited
access to extensive management resources. The possibility that a
large carrier, usually with sophistication and specialization, would
assist in management, especially planning, had a great deal of appeal.
1-MMOR . i ___ __ __ - --
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The principal difficulty with this alternative is legal. The
concept allows a larger private carrier to control the entry, exit,
and market behavior of another carrier. The large carrier would
attempt to control the flow of connecting traffic and thus restrict
consumer choice. In addition, it puts a level of control on the com-
muter. Again, the previously unregulated commuters would be subject
to increased regulation.
7.2.5.3 Contract Bidding
The third alternative is a competitive "contract" bidding process
for points which fail to generate sufficient traffic but are in need
of air service. As with virtually all the alternatives, this option
imposes regulations on the carrier, but more significantly, it puts
the regulators in the position of both making an evaluating manage-
ment decisions. A limited term, in the Section 419 case - two years,
is essential in order to insure proper monitoring and to adjust to
changes in the environment. A fixed rate with no right of renegotia-
tion is desirable if low, unrealistic bidding is to be avoided.
The size of the aircraft to be used could be specified in advance,
thus eliminating a key management decision of the bidders. This
alternative is also geared to support service to the point.
Inherent in the use of a strict low bidder concept is the risk
of accepting service from poorly prepared carriers, Some evaluation
of fitness, often evaluation must probe financial, operational, and
management functions. The government involvement is necessary unless
subsidy is to be given without accountability. Until the community
can increase its traffic to levels to justify larger aircraft, the
community is stuck with small aircraft, connecting service, and less
reliable commuter airlines. This is reality, but by announcing it
to the world, and even prohibiting a local service carrier from
serving a point when it wishes to (e.g., Republic continuing service
to 25 former 406 subsidy points, Table 4.5), it is difficult for a
community to recover from the blow to its pride. In addition, it
would inhibit commuter airlines from developing into larger, local
service type carriers.
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This alternative relies on competitive bidding to insure that
the subsidy is efficient. The best case would be to have selected
carriers operating aircraft frequencies and capacities close to those
established for minimum essential service. A review of the 77 points
now receiving 419 subsidy indicates that 7 points received fewer
seats, while 37 points received twice the number of seats guaranteed
(Table 4.16).
7.2.6 On Demand Service
Another subsidy possibility is that of an on demand type of
service for communities which generate fewer than some minimum level
of daily passengers. If we use a minimum level of 25 enplaned pas-
sengers per day (as suggested by the CAB staff study22 ) there would
be 91 communities enplaning fewer than 25 passengers per day in 1978
eligible for this type of service (Table 4.9). For levels beneath
25, the number of communities, based on 1978 traffic, would be:
Daily Enplaned
Passengers
0-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-24
Number of Communities
In Group Cumulative
22 22
24 46
15 61
19 80
11 91
A fixed subsidy rate related to distance per passenger can be
calculated for air taxi service for these passengers. Again, based
on 1978 traffic, the following would be subsidy levels at varying
rates per passenger depending on the maximum enplaned traffic used as
the cut-off:
Daily Maximum
Enplaned
Passengers
Number of
Communities
Total 0 & D
Passengers
(000)
731
549
307
171
40
Annual Subsidy
At Different
Rates/Passengers (000)
$10 $20 $30
7310 14,620 21,930
5490 10,980 16,470
3070 6,140 9,210
1710 3,420 5,130
400 800 1,200
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A system of this type would put a cap on subsidy paid per
passenger. If traffic reached the standard for profitable operation,
say 25 enplaned passengers per day, or a commuter entered the market
with twice-daily service, the subsidy would be discontinued.
The main disadvantage of this system is that it would force the
use of unscheduled air taxi operators, who historically use smaller
aircraft than commuters. Most smaller aircraft are often difficult
for passengers to enter and exit and lack amenities such as galley
and lavatory. The service would be dependent upon the availability
of aircraft at the local air taxi operator. Also it would require
the establishment of a minimum load for the trip and some negotiated
departure time for the various passengers. Finally, the published
reports of the FAA and the NTSB indicate that General Aviation,
including air taxis, have a poorer safety record than the scheduled
carriers. 23
7.2.7 No-Subsidy
The absolute annual level of the projected 419 subsidy, $40
to $50 million, is certainly an insignificant amount when compared
24
with the $40 billion generated by U.S. certificated carriers in 1981.
Logic would suggest that these losses could be absorbed in the system
but only if regulations are imposed. Given a chance to avoid loss
making services, any profit seeking carrier will take it. The
certificated carriers have abandoned small communities in great numbers
since 1978 (Chapter 3); when the certificated carriers, primarily
local service, served most of these points, the subsidy needed to make
the carrier whole approximated $100 million. Trunks, in June 1982,
served only 11 large EAS points, whose lowest daily passenger en-
planements are 207. Thus, given the choice, the large certificated
carriers, with perhaps the exception of Republic, will choose not to
serve the EAS points, especially the subsidized points.
The commuters now receive subsidy at 77 EAS points, seek
deletion or 419 subsidy in 27 additional points and undoubtedly will
request subsidy at the 9 points on 406 subsidy where local service
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service carriers seek deletion on September 30, 1982 (Table 4.5).
If these communities are to receive regular airline service that
permits access to the U.S. air transport system, then a subsidy is
required.
7.2.8 Partially Government Operated Service
The Province of Ontario decided to support a service to
isolated northern mining communities who were 87 to 194 miles from
an Air Canada served point of Sudbury. The Province purchased Twin
Otter aircraft to perform this service. A bid was sent out to
operators who would wish to provide the service with these Twin Otter
aircraft in 6 markets over a period of five years. The Province
set the fares, paid the selected operator on the bid cost and
returned the revenues. This experiment has been so successful
that the operation became profitable. The profits were reinvested
into service expansions.
This option has a mixture of guaranteed government support
plus private operations. The fare is regulated but has been such
that sufficient traffic is generated to produce a profit.
7.2.9 Subsidy Recommendations
Accepting the Declaration of Policy of the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978,25 there are a number of reasons for payment of subsidy
in support of air service to small communities. It thus appears that
the most important remaining issue is to recommend the optimal type
of subsidy system from the alternatives described and discussed above.
Subsequent to that recommendation, the sources of subsidy funds can
be evaluated.
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7.2.9.1 Subsidy System
At this point the present contract bidding subsidy system of
Section 419 has clearly reduced the subsidy expenditures for service
to the small communities. It has done so by focusing on the service
rendered. It is still in its shakedown period, thus is not perfect.
The matching of capacity and demand has been difficult and produced
perhpas more seat capacity and cost than the theoretical system en-
visioned.
The alternative designation of points to carrier types, de-
pending on demand, also focuses on the service rendered. This is
similar to the present 419 subsidy system. The major flaw is the
division of the communities into the "haves" and "have nots". If
the community can increase its traffic to a certain level, then it
can get bigger aircraft and more frequencies.
The flow through subsidy alternative could conceivably build
a more reliable service through the monitoring of a small carrier
by a larger one. However, the legal and anti-trust problems it
engenders appear difficult because the large carrier would be
controlling the small carriers operations.
A no-subsidy scheme would be attractive if the policy
objectives of the Deregulation Act did not guarantee service to
small communities. The relatively small size of the subsidy bill -
$40 to $50 million - probably could be absorbed into the cost
structure of this $40 billion industry by using minimal cross sub-
sidized service. Realistically, a decision to select this alternative
most likely would doom airline service at up to 100 points in the
United States because the carriers would not want to absorb the
losses. Politically, no-subsidy probably would be unpalatable un-
less every effort had been made to stimulate traffic to reasonable
levels.
Subsidized on demand service is perhaps a variation of, or
compromise on, the no-subsidy alternative. Its principal advantage
is that it limits the subsidy per passenger and is paid only when
the passenger flies. The difficulty here is that it is necessary
to use an on-call service from air taxi operators who may be per-
ceived as rendering a lower quality of service than even the com-
__ -, - --- -- -A*A""Nq go, MA I
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muter airlines. It conceivably could be an option appended to any
of the other systems when dealing with communities with extremely low
traffic, say one to five enplaned passengers per day, yet requiring
service because of factors such as isolation. It could at least
fill emergency requirements.
All of the above suggests that the best subsidy system is
probably a continuation of the present service-oriented 419 program
with some important modifications which include parts of the no-
subsidy and on-demand alternatives. Accordingly, the recommended
system for airline service to small communities should have the
following ingredients:
- The subsidy payment should be strictly for a minimum
level of service. Section 419 and EAS requirements
of the Act say that two flights per day are sufficient,
but there are compelling arguments that suggest that
the time element of demand is such that at least three
daily flights are required to properly reflect traffic
levels at a community. In order to evaluate the impact
of the third flights, an experiment in several com-
munities should be undertaken to determine its validity.
- Points generating more than 25 enplaned passengers
per day should be eliminated from subsidy. CAB
studies 26, plus discussions with numerous commuter
airline managements, have indicated that this level
of traffic, or even slightly less with aircraft
of the proper size, can generate a profit, assuming
reasonable fare yields.
- Service should be to the nearest airport that permits
reasonable access to the mainline air transport system.
An objective minimum passenger enplanement standard might
be perhaps 500 enplaned passengers per day at the con-
necting point. In any event, this level should be sub-
jected to a detailed study. An alternative is use of
the FAA and CAB systems of designating points as large,
medium, small, or non-hubs points. The service at a
small community should minimally connect with the nearest
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small hub point where 900 passengers per day is the
minimum level. Based on June 30, 1981 airport data,
this would mean service has to be to one of the top 130
traffic points in the United States. 27
Subsidized service should be to and from only one point
that permits access to the mainline transport system.
Many of the current EAS points on subsidy have de-
signations to two or more hub points.
The minimum daily seat standards employed by the present
EAS system, from 16 to 80 seats, should be the basis
for subsidy determination. Carriers using larger air-
craft than the requirement should have the increased
cost disallowed in subsidy. Standard cost for each
aircraft should be used for basis of disallowance.
A definite time period, a maximum of five years, should
be given to a community to attempt to develop traffic to
a subsidy-free level. At the end of that period, the
need for future subsidized service will be reassessed.
Unless a community shows significant progress toward
the 25 per day minimum, and absent other compelling
reasons such as isolation, the community will be dropped
from the subsidized system.
The time period for the subsidy contract should be
consistent with a carrier's ability to reasonably
finance its aircraft. This does not suggest a contract
for the full financing period. Rather, it suggests an
evaluation of a time period after which a carrier could
sell its aircraft for a price in excess of the normal
depreciated value on the books of the carrier. The
minimum period should be two years so that carriers can
provide for reasonable planning.
Communities within a reasonable driving time from another
airport with scheduled service should not be eligible
for subsidy. A standard of perhaps 90 minutes to two
hours should not be unduly burdensome when one considers
that the driving time from large airports, such as New
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York, Chicago or Los Angeles, to the center of the city is
often one hour or more.
o Communities generating fewer than five passengers per day
should receive subsidy for on-demand air taxi service.
A rate per passenger for this subsidy should be determined
based on distance to the small hub point and should cap such
as a rate which is 50% of the rate per passenger-mile charged
by commuters on segments of similar distance.
o The subsidized carrier should be held responsible for
maintaining minimum standards of service, such as on-time
performance, proper passenger handling, use of aircraft
type scheduled, etc. Failure to perform to standard as
determined by the local airport manager, etc., would either
trigger subsidy penalties or termination when justified.
o Basic contracts should be reopened only when the carrier
experiences unusual and unforeseen events (such as the
closing of a military base near the airport, exceptional
rise in fuel prices, etc).
o Profit sharing should be considered for services that
generate traffic beyond the forecast level. Profit should be
a proportion of the incremental revenue less variable costs.
o All overall maximum subsidy per forecast passenger (enplaning
and deplaning) should be established at each point. This
level should not exceed a percentage, probably 50% of the
normal fare to the hub point. For example, the recent CAB
decision to subsidize new Berlin, New Hampshire- and Newport,
Vermont-to-Boston service provides subsidy 161% above the
Newport fare and 190% above the Berlin fare per passenger.28
The subsidy amounts to $120 per passenger forecast. This is
six times the bus fare from these points to Boston.29
o Fares charged on subsidized services should be consistent
with fares on similar segments flown by commuter airlines.
This will avoid discriminating against a passenger from a
small community.
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o In order to realistically prepare for the 1988 subsidy
termination date, as currently contained in the Airline
Deregulation Act,30 properly structured experiments should be
conducted in an effort to obtain more definitive insights
into traffic responses at small communities to:
1. varying levels of fare increases and decreases;
2. varying frequency levels;
3. varying aircraft sizes; and
4. varying times of service.
These experiments should provide for a more realistic
assessment of subsidized services.
o A regular review of performance should be made by the
subsidizing agency with all parties concerned -- the carrier,
the community, and the participating airport.
o A definite date should be set for termination of the airline
subsidy system, whatever it is. This will provide a deadline
before which the subsidizing agency must review the need, the
environmental changes, the system, and the need to make
adjustment. This procedure should prevent repetition of the
406 subsidy experience. That experience kept carriers on
subsidy long after its original intent had been fulfilled.
7.2.9.2 Sources of Subsidy
One of the principal, and perhaps most controversial aspects of
any subsidy system, is the source of funds. Airline subsidies are no
exception. Historically, the federal government has been the
subsidizing source, predicated on the theory that the service is
basically interstate. In recent years, the concept of cost-sharing
among the federal government, the states, and their local subdivisions
has been widely discussed. The Airport Development Aid Program (ADAP)
has incorporated cost-sharing, with the Federal Government share
ranging from 50 to 90%. The states and local subdivisions have been
responsible for the remaining 10 to 50% of the funds needed.
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Similarly, the Highway Trust Fund, for use in highway construction
and maintenance, and UMTA provision of mass transit capital and
operating funds, have been based on the principle of cost-sharing.
Thus, cost-sharing is a widely-used financial device under which
governmentally-financed or supported programs are jointly funded by
the federal government on the one hand, and local and state govern-
ments, or even public corporations, on the other.
The federal funding cost-sharing in cost programs is usually
voluntary in that the state and local interests may decide not to
participate. When this happens, the federal funding is not available.
There are perhaps three broad considerations which generally
favor the use of cost-sharing. These are:
1. Cost sharing usually results in more reasonably-defined
program objectives, and in lower cost for a specific program
objective, than if the federal government is the sole
funding source.31 When state and local entities are required
to pay a portion of the bill, there is strong incentive to
insure that maximum benefit is obtained for money spent.
This results in improved benefits and efficiency, and
constraint on total expenditures. For example, in conver-
sations with an airport manager whose airport received 406
subsidized service, and now receives 419 subsidized service,
it was determined that under 406, the airport charged no
landing fees as an incentive to retain the carrier. Under
419, where the payment relates to the cost of serving the
specific point, and the service was guaranteed until 1988,
the airport commenced charging a landing fee. The federal
government picks up the tab, and it helps the airport manager
to balance his budget.
2. The local entity has a greater opportunity to participate
in the design and implementation of the program when costs
are shared. This, in turn, results in decentralized
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decision-making and often more accurately reflects the local
preferences and environment. A better atmosphere and greater
customer satisfaction should be created. The alternative
is a national standard.
3. Cost-sharing facilitates a more realistic trade-off between
uniformity and differing local needs. The omnipresent
tension between federal standards and local standards and
desires can serve as a mutual check on excesses and abuses,
either federal or local. 33
Operating subsidies, except for geographic isolation, are
justified based on benefits that are generally derived from enhancing
the ability of a community to attract and maintain business and
professional activity. The CAB has received copious presentations
from communities suggesting that the externalities constitute the
need for subsidy support.34 It is difficult to quantify the
benefits in advance. If there is a remote chance that the subsidized
airline service will produce the desired results, it is easy for a
community to seek the service and subsidy when someone else pays.
Reality intrudes when there is a need to share the costs. Refusal
to participate in cost-sharing could signal that the benefits alleged
to ensue might be negligible. Similarly, reality might well hit home
when the cost of improved quality of service, such as increased
frequency or larger aircraft size, is calculated. Thus, cost-sharing
would provide more assurance that the level of service the community
professes to need will be reasonable.
A key benefit of cost-sharing for subsidized airline service
is the incentive to participate in, and encourage traffic development.
There are not many communities in which a strong effort is made to
encourage maximum traffic development. Where the effort has been
expended, the results have usually been rewarding. Examples are:
the support that the entire community of Newport, Vermont put behind
------- --- I 606M.Awf -_ - . I I
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the new service during its first year in the mid-1950's; and the
Louisville effort to obtain service in 1980 from People's Express
when the community lost a large portion of its service from established
certificated carriers. The only problem with most of these efforts
is that they all but disappear during the second year of service. The
community made its point in the first year; the second and subsequent
years saw the traffic settle in at lower levels.
Even though it is recommended that small-community service
subsidy be confined to minimum-service levels, excluding limited
experimental programs, the cost-sharing technique could be a vehicle
for communities to receive a higher quality of air service. This
would be of advantage to communities seeking to promote themselves as
growing centers of professional and business activity. At the
present time, it may well put a damper on the political pressures for
federal subsidy to support improved air service to a small community.
The arguments against cost-sharing revolve around the ability
of the community to pay. However, the annual amounts involved,
assuming 80-20 cost sharing, for state and local sources at an average
of the present EAS per-point subsidy, would be only $53,000. If
benefits accrue to the community as is believed, the price would be
recovered many-fold. Besides, without local fiscal and program
responsibility, the benefits of cost-sharing will not be achieved.
Developmental or experimental subsidy costs may run high,
depending on the additional qualitative features, or lower prices,
sought.
The next major step in cost-sharing is determination of the
level of sharing. The range used in prior ADAP funding has been as
low as 50-50, and as high as 90-10, federal to non-federal. The 10%
non-federal share appears to be so small -- average of $26,000 -- that
there is some question as to whether it will motivate, or create the
sense of urgency desired. Ideally, the cost-sharing could start at
80-20 for the first year, with the non-federal share increasing by
10% per year, with a 50-50 split target until subsidy is no longer
required. The higher shares for the non-federal appear stiff, but
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with growth the subsidy amounts should decrease rapidly. Also, as
growth occurs, and with increased monetary pressure from parties at
the local level, the chances of a carrier's moving to an aircraft
larger than is needed become less likely.
The final item for review in assessing a subsidy cost-sharing
program is the evaluation of potential candidates for the role of
cost-sharing partner. There appear to be the following four
alternatives:
1. Local Governments
The local community clearly is better prepared to understand
the local need than the federal government or even the state
government. In prior years, it has invariably been local
authorities appearing before the CAB in route cases. The
Airline Deregulation Act requires the EAS be determined in
consultation with local communities. Thus, the knowledge should
exist at the local level.
The monitoring function for cost-sharing would have a greater
sense of urgency at the local level. It would be an important
item in the local budget and a much more visible item than at
the state level.
The major difficulty with using the local level as the cost-
sharing partner is the distinct possibility that the airport's
service area might extend beyond the jurisdiction of the local
community. As with ADAP, where the local airport pays a
portion with the state, the surrounding communities often get
most of the benefit with none of the costs. The alternative
is to have a higher governmental agency allocate shares. This
is difficult, because the basis for allocation is often
elaborate and it also increases administrative costs.
2. State Government
Virtually all states have Departments of Transportation and
Departments of Aviation and, thus, have the experienced, full-
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time administrative personnel who are often missing at the local
level. At the same time, the administrative cost would be
minimal, for the program probably would not require much time.
Unlike the local alternative, the chances are that most, if
not all, the service area should be within the state. The
states have many alternative ways in which to assign the cost,
which in fact will be minimal in nearly all states. The
disadvantage is the fact that another layer is put between the
local community and the federal government. Also, there may
be a question as to the state agency's sensitivity to the local
environment.
3. Both Local and State Government
This combination is a hybrid of the above and should maximize
advantages and minimize the disadvantages of either. For
example, the state could be responsible for allocating cost-
sharing among the communities.
The more complex organization of such a structure, and the
contact level, will probably involve more administrative costs
at the federal level than either of the above two alternatives.
More contacts, and uncertainty as to the decision-maker, will
occur in this alternative.
4. Multi-State or Regional Organizations
Although this alternative can probably handle all jurisdictional
problems as far as service areas, it has a number of practical
problems. These organizations normally do not have authority
over any level of government. Similarly, they have no direct
method of obtaining funds. Thus, they would rely on the area,
or level of government, which funds them to obtain cost-sharing
funds. They also are very rarely accountable to the electorate,
as are state and local officials. Finally, these types of
agencies and commissions do not exist everywhere.
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Based on the above, it would appear that the more logical
funding source would be a combination of local and state government.
It has difficulties, but it provides for a full, and more equitable,
input for subsidized airline service cost-sharing.
Other issues pertaining to an airline subsidy program
deserve attention. The first relates to the preceding section on
cost sharing. In the past, the federal government has allowed state
and local governments to provide "in-kind" services as their portion
of the cost-sharing program. These are difficult to monitor,
difficult to quantify, and subject to potential abuse. The
communities, in particular, may well argue that they do not charge
landing fees or gate fees. Thus, there is little difference between
in-kind and cash payments. Problems arise in establishing the fee,
and allocating the amount of space a carrier is to take at the
airport and at what rate. The charges can easily be built up to
unrealistically-high levels in support of no cash payment. It is
easy for a state or local entity to allocate an unrealistic portion
of a staff-member salary to cover the in-kind service.
The basic issue is whether the costs represented as "in-kind"
services represent actual expenditures, and whether the cost-sharing
program can be administered as envisioned when "in-kind" contri-
butions are accepted. From a practical standpoint, requiring cash
payments rather than "in-kind" contributions is more likely to result
in creating the sense of urgency for monitoring and, thus, the more
meaningful commitment that cost-sharing seeks.
Costs may be higher if the local fees and services are assessed
to the airline, but the costs will be put into the proper category.
The cost of rendering service can be clearly identified. The hidden
costs involved with in-kind subsidy never show up on the records of
the airline.
The second area worthy of note relates to some of the alter-
native considerations discussed in the previous chapter on small-
community air service (Chapter 3). Rather than simply consider
subsidized air service to small communities, perhaps it is more
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appropriate to consider the entire transportation system to a
community and then decide which part, if any, should be subsidized.
This is part of the isolation scenario. Isolation means perhaps that
other means of transportation are poor.
Since World War II, the expansion of the highway system and
increased automobile ownership have caused air traffic to decline
in many small communities. Almost all of the communities losing air
service between 1968 and 1978, and for which re-establishment of air
service is being reviewed, lost the original service because of the
movement of the auto. Short trips by auto to nearby airports were
expensive to the traveler. For example, two of the commuters inter-
viewed reported yields per revenue passenger mile of 42 to 43 cents.
For a 100-mile trip, this means a $42 to $43 basic fare plus an
8% tax, for a total fare of $45 to $46 per person. Automobile
travel, except in the case when joint air fares are available, is
currently a less-expensive mode, if the traveler's own auto is
available. In addition, the limited service at small communities is
less than desirable when more-frequent service is available at nearby
airports.
The danger in providing too much subsidy is that it becomes the
only reason for the air service to exist. Often without subsidy,
there would be no air or ground services at the airport. Frequently,
there is a demand for at least ground connecting service to a nearby
connecting airport from the small community with or without subsidized
air service. For example, since Delta Airlines withdrew its two to
three daily New York flights at Worcester, Massachusetts, the air
traffic has declined from 31,000 annual passengers to 14,000 (55%),
even though the commuter now operates four daily New York flights.
The current alternative is to take hourly bus service direct to
Boston's Logan Airport, 45 miles distant, where the plethora of flights
direct to many destinations avoids the airline connections required
by the commuter service to New York. In addition, an on-call bus
service to Logan Airport costs only $15, compared with the $69 basic
fare on the commuter to New York.
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In this case, and many others, the public may be better served
if the subsidy is applied to the establishment of a sound ground
transportation system. From a practical standpoint, the option to use
the subsidy funds for air or bus service to the connecting point
should lie with the community. In doing so, subsidy may be reduced
and, if not reduced, certainly a greater level of frequency would
be available with the bus option. Moreover, it would make a
community's access to the national transportation system both less
costly and more reflective of the community's demand.
7.3 Policy Considerations for Airport Access by Commuters
Chapter 5 provides background data and material as to areas
of difficulty that larger and smaller hub airports have had with
commuter airlines and vice versa since the passage of the Airline
Deregulation Act in October 1978. The primary governmental policy
issue that emerges is the establishment of priorities for the
usage of the airport facilities and airways for commuters. A
secondary issue is the financial support for airports.
Prior to addressing the policy options, it is worthwhile to
put the issues into proper perspective. The commuters in 1981
accounted for less than 5% of U.S. passenger enplanements.35 Forecast
U.S. commuter passengers are forecast to increase to less than 8% of
total U.S. by the mid-1990's.3 6 At larger hubs the commuter airline
in 1981 represented approximately 20% of aircraft departures.37 At
smaller airports the commuter departures are in excess of 50% of the
total. Seats and aircraft size have increased. The high turnover of
commuters, approximately 25% per year and upwards of 40% for the
post-deregulation-spawned commuter, has been another deterrent to
encouraging traffic at smaller hubs.
The access to the U.S. transport system is not as available
for the smaller points in 1982 as it was in 1978. The real question
is how severe are the problems that have been created for the
commuter and the small community. The community perception problem
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(pride in receiving a lower level of service) can be remedied in
time through communication among all the actors. The economic and
financial problems may well require a realistic assessment of the
cost/benefit trade-offs for communities. As for charges of
discrimination and misuse of resource, the cases are limited, not
excessive, and almost entirely curable once identified.
The more difficult problems to address are improvement in the
air traffic control system at the airport itself, and release from
slot control regulation. Historically, the cure has been the
expenditure of huge sums of money so that the terminal area ATC
can eventually be restored to a high degree of dependability.
The PATCO strike and the increased demand to enter large points due
to entry freedoms of deregulation have been the major factors in
creating the need for slot control at the large airports. The
effects of deregulation have contributed to an earlier recognition
of these airport problems than would have happened in the regulated
environment.
Deregulation has caused some problems of access to the air
transportation system for commuters and small communities. However,
the conclusion here is that many of the problems are merely forcing
a realistic evaluation by commuters and communities. Some of the
problems, especially turnover and commuter image, will be rectified
as the deregulation process progresses. The different treatment
often given commuters can be cured by establishing a system of problem
identification and reporting. Then remedial action can be taken if
necessary. The rebuilding of the Air Traffic Control system is in
progress, and the proposed National Air Space Plan of the FAA holds
promise of curing or improving the ATC system problems over a period
of time, albeit a long 20 years. The airport access problem caused
by the need for ground facilities will/can be addressed in the 1982
Airport Aid Program, although this also may take years. The slot
program, on the other hand, is not addressed by NASP.
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7.3.1 Recommendations for Airport Access
Although it is not suggested that the path of airline deregu-
lation be significantly altered, there are some measures that should
be considered in order to accelerate curing the airport access
problems of commuter airlines.
It is recommended that:
1. Eventually the marketplace be allowed to settle economic
priorities of airport access. However, this can only be
done once the ground system is up to acceptable standards
and the slots are eliminated. In the allocation of the scarce
resources, the commuters, since they account for such a low
proportion of the traffic, will inevitably be the target
for any inconveniences. With facilities available, then
the commuter can have a choice.
2. More local and regional involvement should be encouraged to
assist in education of the air traveler as to the role of
air service at the small community. This should be done
with encouragement and incentives from the federal
government. The CAB until recently had 5 field offices.
These are now closed or are being closed. Community contact
is now to Washington. A governmental program of regular
dialogue in the field among all parties at smaller points
wherein open discussion of changes and reasons for changes
in airport access and air service occur.
3. The financial problem of commuters running out on unpaid
bills can be addressed in two ways. The first alternative
can be to require the commuter to post bond for performance
of the service. If necessary, the federal government could
be the source of this bonding. The second alternative is
to have the local airport manager pass on the credit-
worthiness of the commuter by requiring the commuter to
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furnish periodic financial statements. This puts the
airport manager into the role of a credit manager. The
chances are that he is ill-prepared to serve in that role.
Thus the logical selection is to require commuter bonding
with the federal government supporting or guaranteeing the
bonding.
4. The slot problem has taken a great deal of FAA staff time
to develop a fair and equitable system. This is attested
to by the need to make frequent modifications. From the
commuters' standpoint, it has been difficult to obtain a
consensus as to a position on slots. The areas that appear
to require special treatment are:
-- EAS service. Since service to EAS communities has been
guaranteed through 1988, if the guarantee is to be effective,
the EAS standard of service, basically 2 round trips per
day to a hub from a small community, should be given high
priority.
-- Experimental service. Since the subsidy section recommends
experimentation at services to smaller communities, the
increased needs of these services should be given slot
priority where applicable.
-- Airline EAS termination -- when an airline terminates EAS
service to a slot restricted hub, those slots should be
returned to the conventional slot priority system.
-- Use of non-slot airports. Since the objective is to
eliminate slot restrictions as soon as possible, then the
federal government should be encouraging airlines and
general aviation to use non-constrained airports, especially
satellite airports such as Oakland and Baltimore, Washington.
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For airlines this could take the form of priority for flights at
constrained airports for transfer of flights to non-constrained
airports.
Chairman Dan MacKinnon, in a recent address to the Airport
Operators Council International 1982 annual meeting, said
"In conclusion, the air transportation industry has never
demanded as much from its airport operators as it does
today. For some of you, too many airlines want to serve
your airport and you don't have enough space or facilities.
For others, it is a challenge just to keep traffic up
to retain the carriers you now have. Deregulation
eliminated the predictability of the controlled system.
And the new flexibility for airlines presents new
challenges -- and opportunities -- for you" 381
The future can be improved for both the small communities and
commuters, once the communication barriers are broken. Together they
can solve many of the deregulation-caused problems. Apart, the
road will be tortuous. The role of the federal government should be
limited to the above recommendations with respect to airport access.
7.4 Alternative Policy Options for Joint Fare
The options available on the issue of whether or not to mandate
joint fares appear to be:
1. Do nothing. This option means individual carrier negotiations.
It has all the plusses and minuses discussed above. It
would mean greater losses and perhaps less service in EAS
markets, which in turn would increase subsidy. On the other
hand, the number of passengers who preferred to travel by
surface to large hub points to take advantage of discount
fares has already taken most of the potential joint fare
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passengers from the commuter markets. Perhaps the major fear
in this option is the creation of combinations of the large
carriers and the large commuters. It is easy to envision a
scenario in which the commuter industry would eventually be
reduced to a limited number of commuters, all carrying a
significant connecting traffic base for a large carrier. New
commuter entrants would be excluded from sharing the joint-fare
traffic and would need public subsidy to survive.
2. Open joint fares. This option requires a large airline
which negotiates a joint fare with a commuter on one of its
routes to make the same basic joint fare arrangements available
to any other commuter or airline
--over the commuter segment, even though it competes with the
commuter which originally negotiated the joint fare. (For
example, if Eastern and Bar Harbor negotiate a joint fare
Portland-Miami, where Bar Harbor carries the passenger Portland-
Boston and Eastern Boston-Miami, then Maine Air which also
flies Portland-Boston should have the same fare, including
revenue pro-rate, available to it.)
--over any commuter segment that feeds passengers to the same
long-haul segment. For example, based on the above example,
Eastern would make a joint fare available to Precision Valley
for its Montpelier-Boston segment for those passengers who are
traveling Montpelier to Miami. The fare may well be different
than the Portland-Miami joint fare but the formula should be
the same.
This policy option requires that there be some system of notice
and availability of the agreement. This, of course, introduces an
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There are, of course, variations and combinations of the above
option possible. For example, the large carrier making a negotiated
joint fare is only available to others when there is a competitive
commuter airline. Similarly, a variation could be the requirement
for joint fares only in the top 100 U.S. markets.
7.4.1 Joint Fare Recommendations
The evidence on joint fares suggests that the old CAB cost
pro-rate system was a vestige of a different environment and not
applicable in today's deregulated environment. At the same time, the
joint fares when offered were of benefit to using passengers and to
commuters. However, in light of the environment fostered by airline
deregulation, the policy that appears to preserve the advantages of
joint fares is to free carriers to negotiate their own joint fares
and the basis for revenue division. When there appears to be a large
demand, the large carriers will most assuredly try to tap the
potential. They can do this through the various interlining techniques
as well as through the use of joint fares.
In order to ensure that the large carriers do not arbitrarily
try to exclude commuters or some small-community passengers because
they receive service from another non-captive commuter, it will be
necessary to require a filing of joint-fare agreements with the CAB
or its successor. When a joint fare is agreed upon between a commuter
and a large carrier, it is desirable that any other commuter feeding
the segments of the large carrier has the option to obtain a joint
fare using the same methodology. This complete area of carrier
operating agreements will need some degree of regulatory oversight
by DOT, DOJ and Congress. A final caveat is that any joint fare
policy should not be allowed to impact the interlining system for
reservations, baggage handling and joint marketing. These agreements
have clearly benefited connecting passengers and should not be
altered.
In selecting this option it should be recognized that it may
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have a slight adverse impact on current commuter revenues and
profits. This means some higher local fares or increased subsidy
will be likely and underscores the need for Congress to realistically
appraise and establish guidelines for support of small-community
service, including subsidy levels.
7.5 Policy Considerations for Commuter Aircraft
7.5.1 U.S. Trade Policy Perspective
Since the role of U.S. manufacturers is minimal in the current
generation of commuter aircraft programs, the concern here is to put
the entire matter into a realistic U.S. trade policy perspective.
Given the fact that aircraft manufacturing for military,
transport, and general aviation aircraft is a major industry in the
U.S., the need to be engaged in exports is critical to provide
economies of scale to the unrestricted domestic markets. This world-
wide market need is even more obvious for the generation of the huge
investments required to launch and develop major aircraft programs.
This in turn means that the U.S. cannot adopt a trade policy that
would promote trade restrictions or protective tariffs in countries
which now purchase significant amounts of aircraft and parts. The
invocation of U.S. trade barriers, as advocated by some U.S.
manufacturers such as Fairchild-Swearingen for the relatively-minor
commuter aircraft market, could do irreparable harm to the entire
and much larger U.S. aircraft industry in the long term. The U.S.
aircraft manufacturers need access to foreign markets unfettered
by trade constraints.
Another concern of U.S. policy should be the issue of unfair
competition from imports of aircraft to the domestic market. One
area that has been frequently raised by U.S. aircraft manufacturers,
especially Fairchild-Swearingen, is pricing of aircraft. The Agreement
on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Article 6.2,39 to which 18 countries
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Historically, the U.S. manufacturers were slow to assist in
financing; and that, while financing is a factor, it ranks tenth on
the criteria list according to the ITC study. When financing is
required, it has been obtainable in various forms for U.S. commuters.
There is no evidence to suggest that a potential buyer was turned
aside because of inability to obtain aircraft financing; sellers will
find a way in a competitive market. Any trade barriers that may be
imposed would only hurt the U.S. commuters, since they now have the
best of both worlds.
7.5.2 New Technology_ ommuter Aircraft
There is little doubt that aircraft technology is perhaps the
most important determinant of the operational and economic aspects
of low-density, short-haul air service as operated by commuters today.
It determines operating costs, the potential for revenues, and it
affects service characteristics offered, such as speed and comfort.
In addition, it determines competitiveness of air transport with other
modes of transportation in the very-short-haul, low-density markets.
A number of the new foreign-built commuter aircraft, such as the
Saab/Fairchild 340 and the ATR 42 aircraft, have incorporated more fuel-
efficient U.S. or Canadian engines. NASA has conducted preliminary
studies on the development of a prop fan commuter aircraft with
capacity in the 30-seat range. This aircraft proposes to have operating
cost economies, fuel economies, speeds up to 400 miles per hour,
and in general, a better appeal in small-community service. As
42
proposed by NASA, the so-called Small Transport Aircraft Technology
(STAT) program would work with interested U.S. manufacturers in hopes
of developing the new aircraft technology by the late 1980's or
1990's.
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The object of the NASA proposal is to reestablish the United
States as a leader in the development of commuter-type aircraft.
It is clear that the foreign manufacturers have taken the lead from
the United States for the 1980's. For the most part, the U.S.
commuter aircraft are derivatives of previously-designed general
aviation aircraft. The proposed U.S. government investment in this
research program would be $200 million, to be equally divided between
airframe and engine research. In order to make the program viable,
one or more present aircraft and engine manufacturers would be
expected to make similar investments in research plus their normal
large investment to finance the design, testing and FAA certification
once a decision is made to manufacture a particular aircraft.
Overall, the major barriers to applying new technology to a
commuter aircraft appear to be:
1. Difficulty in funding the necessary research and development
for an aircraft that may sell only a limited number of units,
perhaps 200 to 300 over a ten-year period of time.
2. Delay and costs associated with FAA certification and
initial production build-up.
3. Financial risk in competing with government-assisted
foreign manufacturers, especially for the next several
years.
4. More lucrative opportunities for the small-aircraft manu-
facturer in the general aviation marketplace.
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7.5.3 Commuter Aircraft Recommendations
1. Stabilization of interest rates for subsidized foreign-
aircraft export financing is desirable. It would not
eliminate financing programs from being a bargaining tool
for selling aircraft, but is a step in the direction of
aircraft selection, based solely on the proper criteria
of operating characteristics and performance.
2. The imposition of trade barriers on foreign aircraft, as
proposed by some U.S. commuter aircraft manufacturers, would
be a mistake. It would jeopardize other general aviation
or large jet sales in countries impacted. It also would
only mean increased aircraft purchase prices for U.S.
commuters. There is sufficient difference in each new
aircraft that acquisition of the best operational aircraft
would then be precluded by artificially-high prices.
Compromises will be costly.
3. The U.S. should let the marketplace work for commuter
aircraft manufacturers in the late 1980's. The high commuter
turnover, excess number of foreign manufacturers, and
relatively small demand for commuter-type aircraft, will
produce economic advantages for U.S. commuters at the
expense of foreign governments. The U.S. should be grateful
for the contributions in foreign subsidy and the purchase
of U.S. parts.
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7.6 FAA Commuter Loan Guarantee Policy
The FAA commuter loan guarantee program was set up as a support,
if needed, for commuters which were providing small-community
service, especially EAS. The facts indicate usage of the program
from 1979 to 1981 for approximately 10% of the aircraft purchased.
In 1982 the environment changed, there was an oversupply of commuter
aircraft and aircraft manufacturers. Financing then became a high
priority in the sales program of commutr aircraft manufacturers.
Even the few U.S. commuter aircraft manufacturers recognized
the need to provide a financing program in order to sell commuter
aircraft. The result was the commuters only financed 2 aircraft
in 1982 using the FAA commuter loan guarantee program.
The commuter airlines, especially the smaller commuters, have
poor financial performance indicators. The investment community has
refrained from making investments in commuter airlines for a variety
of reasons, but the commuters are considered a high risk investment.
The high failure rate is caused by poor management practices and
undercapitalization. However, the poor capitalization was not a
deterrent to aircraft financing.
7.6.1 FAA Commuter Loan Guarantee
1. The evidence since airline deregulation suggests that
very few of the commuters use the FAA aircraft loan
guarantee program. The only segment that could conceivably
benefit from the loan program are the small commuters which
operate into small EAS communities. However, these
commuters have access to other federal loan programs, such
as SBA and FMHA, that might better suit their size and
service levels. Therefore, the FAA Loan Guarantee Program
for commuter aircraft can be discontinued.
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2. Instead of spending time and money in the FAA Loan
Guarantee Program, the FAA could better use its resources
to assist commuters which are serving low-density subsidized
EAS service. Areas where the FAA could assist commuters
are:
(1) acquisition of a pool of properly-sized aircraft to
perform EAS service (such as the Norontair case). This
aircraft could be leased to the designated operator at
cost;
(2) providing appropriate training in commuter management
subjects and assistance in fleet and route planning.
Potentially this could be an element of the EAS program and
should enhance its success.
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Appendix 1.1
SURVEY OF U.S. COMMUTERS
A. For the calendar years beginning January 1, 1975 through December 31,
Please provide to the extent possible, the following:
1975
1. Revenues (000)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Passengers
Freight
Mail
Charter/Air Taxi
FBO
Subsidy
Other
Total
2. Operating Expenses
(000)
Airline
FBO
Other
Total
3. Nor-Operating Exp.
Interest
Capital Gains
Total
4. Total Expenses
5. Profit (Loss)-000-
Before Tax
After Tax
6. Misc. Expense Data
(000)
Pilot's Wages
Total Wages
Fuel Costs
Landing Fees
Terminal Fees
Hangar Rent
Depreciation
Outside Services_
1/ If your fiscal year ends other than December 31st please feel free to use data for
those years if more convenient. Also, please indicate dates for end of fiscal year.
1981-.
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5. Misc. Operating Data
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
No. of Enplaned
Passengers (000)
A/C Miles Operated (000)j
Rev. Pass. Miles (000)
Avail. Seat Miles (000)
Flight Hours by Type
(Indicate Type)
#1
#2
#3
#4
Total
No. of Departures (000)
Passenger Load Factor%
B. As of December 31st of each year please provide the following data:
1. Number Stations Operated
2. Number of Employees
3. Aircraft on hand by Type
(Indicate Type)
#1
#2
#3
#4
4. Unions (indicate Name)
please check if
applicableI
5. Financial (000)
Short Term Debt
Long Term Debt
Equity/Net Worth
Working Capital
Net Fixed Assets
Total Assets
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1975 1976 1977 1980 1981
6. Type of Corporate
Activity (Check
those applicable)
Scheduled Service
Charter/Air Taxi
FBO
Other
C. Miscellaneous Data
1. Aircraft on Order
(Number & Type)
As of 6/30/81
2. Location of Main
Base
3. Approximate % of
Traffic that is
interline connecting
before deregulation
Now
Would you like a summary of the result?
If yes please indicate your Name and Title
YES_
NAME
TITLE
1978 1979
NO
ow "' -- " - , -
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Visits/Direct Contacts
of Key Actors
June 1981 - June 1982
I. Trade Organizations:
- RAA - Alan Stephens
- ALPA - Arthur Brennan
- NASAO - Joe Mason
- CEATS - John Gulick
- AAAE - Russ Hoyt
II. Government Agencies:
- FAA - Jim Gansley
Lambert Irons
- CAB - Jim Lightsey
Tom O'Leary
Barbara Clark
Kurt Malloy
Julian Shrenk
- Mass. Aero.
Commission - Arnold Stymest
III. Commuter Airlines:
- Air New England - Bob Norris
- Air North - Andy Deeds
- Air Spur - Jack Gallagher
- Air Vectors - Jim Aspin
- Air Wisconsin - Press Willbourne, Karl Baldwin
- Bar Harbor - Joe & Allyn Caruso
- Chaparral - Bob Vick
- Comair - Dave Mueller
- Command Airways - King Morse
- Harbor Airlines - Wes Lupien
- Henson Aviation - Dick Henson
- Midstate - Bryce Appleton
- PBA - John Van Arsdale, Sr.
- Pilgrim Airlines - Joe Fugere, John Sterne
- Precision Valley - Walter Fawcett
- Ransome Airlines - Larry Crawford
- Rio Airlines - Pete Howe
- Senic Airlines - John Seibold
- Simmons Airlines - Gordon P4urray
- Wright Airlines - Gibby Singerman; Marty Schultz
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IV. Congress:
- Rep. Minetta's Staff - Dave Heimsfeld
Aviation Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Public Works and Transportation
- Sen. Cannon's Staff - Chip Barclay
Subcommittee on Aviation of the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation
V. Aircraft Manufacturers:
- ATR 42 - Jean Michel Neu
- BAE - Jetstream - John Masters
748
146
- Beech - 1900 - Bob Stagos
- CAC - 100 - Ken Gordon
- CASA 212 - Bill Hollenbeck
- Cessna - 402 & Titan
- DeHavilland - DHC-6 - Slim Jones
Dash 7
Dash 8
- Embraer - Bandierante - Recardo Pesce
Brasilic
- Fokker - F-27 - Wim Bakker
F-28
- Gulfstream I C
- Jonas Aircraft - PBN Islander - Bob Jonas
- Piper - T-1000 - Doug Smith
T-1020
T-1040
- Saab/Fairchild - 340 - John Drake
- Shorts Brothers - SD330 - Alex Roberts
SD360
- Swearingen Metro II & III - Earl Morton
VI. Airports:
- Worcester Airport - Chuck Olson
- Lewiston/Auburn Airport - Eric Waldron
- Stewart Field (Newburgh) - Jim Aspin
- New Bedford Airport - Izzy Einer
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VII. Aviation Attorneys:
- Charles Butler
- John Gillick
- Raymond Rasenberger
- V. Michael Straus
-402-
Appendix 1.3
Topical Outline of
Areas Discussed with Commuters
During Field Visits
I. Organizational
1. Organizational Structure
2. Ownership
3. Board of Directors - Composition
4. Personnel Policies
5. Goals & Objectives
- stated
- unstated
6. Controls
7. Reports
- frequency
8. Top Management background
9. Communications System
- within management
- to public
- to users
10. Major Risks
11. Major Problems
- short term
- long term
12. Non-Airline Activities
13. Planning
II. Operations
1. Aircraft
- Now
- Future
2. A/C Utilization
3. Crew Utilization
4. Crew Training
- In House
- Outside
- Training Aids - Major
5. Unions
- Contract Expiration
- Constraints
6. Safety Record
III. Maintenance
1. No. of Mechanics
- Licensed
- Unlicensed
2. Base
3. Percent Maintenance
- In house
- Outside
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VI. Miscellaneous
1. View of Deregulation
2. Changes since Deregulation
3. Impact of Deregulation on carrier
4. Policy changes for Deregulation
- subsidy
- CAB sunset
- fin. reporting
- joint fares
5. Impact of Controllers' strike
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4. Eng. O.H.
- Agency
- TBO
5. Unions
6. Training
IV. Marketing
1. Market trends
- short term
- long term
2. Route Characteristics
- short term
- long term
3. Schedules
- Freq. of change
- Method
4. Advertising
- $ amount/year
- type
- agency use
5. Route Analysis
- techniques
6. Pricing
- policy
- system
7. Competition
- type
- strength
8. Service Standards
9. Reservations System
V. Financial
1. Profitability
2. Long Term Debt
3. Equity
4. B.E. Load Factor
5. Cash Flow
6. Financial Planning
7. Ratios
- debt/equity
.8. Performance of Non-Airline Activity
- charter
- FBO
- other
9. Wage Structure
- management
- non-management
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the following data: (If fiscal
Appendix 1.4
SURVEYS OF AIRPORTS
1, 1975 through December 31, 1981. Please provide
year is used please indicate period.)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
1. Landing Fees Collected
(000)
Commercial Airlines
Commuter Airlines
General Aviation
Total
2. Landing Fee Formula
as of 12/31
Commercial Airlines
Commuter Airlines
General Aviation
3. Annual Departures
(000)
Commercial Airlines
Commuter Airlines
General Aviation
4. Amount of Terminal Space
Rented-# of Sq. Ft. As
of 12/31
Commercial Airlines
Commuter Airlines
5. Passenger Enplanements
(000)
Commercial Airlines
Commuter Airlines
Charter
6. Cargo Tonnage Boarded
Commercial Airlines
Commuter Airlines
Charter
7. Names of Commuters As
of 12/31 check each
year served
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COMMUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
6/30
1978
6/30
1979
6/30
1980
12/31
1977
AAA Action Air
Carrier
Aeric Airlines
Aeromech, Inc. 1
Aero Transit,
Inc.
Air Atlantic
Airlines
Air Atlantic,Inc.
Air Bahia
Air Carolina
Air Catalina 1
Air Central,Inc.
(Oklahoma)
Air Central
(Texas)
Air Chaparral
Air Chico
Air Colorado
Air East Airlines
Air Express
(Greensboro)
Air Gemini
Air Illionois
Air International
3,043
16,394
1,660
136,367 140,946 147,739 172,142 179,718 185,573
298
355
161566
19,292
12,243
3,530
98
134
4,747
11,759
21,698 23,725 20,996 21,022
183 29,024
391 1,134
22
219
1,105
47,486
Airlines 7
Air Kentuckey
Airlines
Air Kentuckey 12,5
(Owens Boro Aviation)
Air Link
Air Miami
Air Midwest 30,7
Air Mont., Inc. 6,4
Air Nebraska
Air Nevada Airlines
Air New England 411,0
Air New Mexico
Air New Ulm 2,3
Air North 115,7
Air Oregon
Air Pennsylvania
Air South 39,5
6,831
1,761
78,000
63
46
65
10
00
12
18
52
6,148
1,395
134,017 173,905 180,176 178,670 183,658
58,627 59,113
538 1,413
75,000 84,000 94,000 266,000
14,785 9,627 5,441 401
2,951 5,696 8,489 11,305
23,132
468,000 490,000 587,000 515,000
19,481
2,400 1,496
115,390 119,588
11,440
28,124 15,099
126,731 121,869
71,058 150,041
14,487
Commuter
Airline
12/31
1976
6/30
1981
12/31
1981
3,263
11,268
6,059
824
11,637
1,049
65,647
10,737
81,628
284,000
3,161
45,289
284,000
148,559
161,862
11,284
29,030
31,806
177,000
8,246
41,071
402,000
139,706
159,899
3,661
1,175
I:
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COMMUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
12/31
1977
6/30
1978
6/30
1979
6/30
1980
Air Speed 744
Air Sunshine 112,045
Air Wisconsin 252,624
Airbama, Inc.
Air Trails
Air U.S.
Air Vectors Airways
Air Vermont
Air Virginia
Air-Lift Assoc.
Airline Holdings
Airways of New Mexico
Alair 510
Alamo Commuter Airlines
Alector Airways 245
Altair Airlines 105,055
Altus Airlines
American Central
Amistad Airlines 3,832
Apollo Airways 12,545
Appalachian
Flying Service
Argosy Airlines
Aspen Airways 136,000
Astro Airways
Corp. 84
Arizona Aero Corp.
Arizona Pacific
Associated Aviation
Astec Air East
Atlantic City
Airlines 70,520
Atlantic Air
Atlantic Southeast
Atlantis Airlines
Aviation Services 851
Baltimore Airways 1,220
Bankair
Bar Harbor
Airways 72,375
Bard-Air Corp.
Bass Air
Bellair
Bemidji Airlines
Big Bird Airways
Big Sky Airlines
Birchwood Air Service
134,494 157,624 36,690
324,581 358,973 100,221
2,215
6,829
3,050
9,249
559,000 704,000 704,000
203
29,831 37,226
1,469 5,850
2,317 35,309 63,291
1,014
72,978 38,555
5,599 7,523 12,085
2,327
850
203
37,472
2,099
234
81,641
1,179
40,578
14,209
11,655
174,121 184,885 99,720 232,000 262,000 233,000
183
2,003 17,860
2,016
17,181
4,343
24,625
590 1,807
3,541
133,000 171,000
136
4,222
81,729
676
3,375
251,000
2,696
119,696 116,017 77,294
321,000 268,000 221,000
133
373
792
8,097
3,937
1,722
2,007
1,833
815
1,433
304
7,520
1,800
3,754
33,699 105,359
29,909 38,965
2,877
101,556 104,970 141,191 201,522
35
176
539
2,772
6,304
1,169
148,672
60,466
1,733 224,104
232,688
453
255
225,067
512
241
375
20,583 32,453 60,054
35 610
66,345
1,082
Commuter
Airline
12/31
1976
6/30
1981
12/31
1981
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COMMUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number
12/31
1977
of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
6/30
1978
6/30
1979
Britt Airlines 148,928
Britt Airways
Brower Airways 15,113
Burlington Airways
Business Aircraft 1,179
C & M American
Aviation
California Air
Commuter 15,354
Cannon Aviation 1,069
Capitol Airlines 57.989
Cardinal Airlines 3,789
Cascade Airways 92,252
Catalina Air-
;omes 49,371
Catalina-Vegas
Airlines 445
Catskill Airways 7,146
Cen-tex Airlines
Central States
Airline
Centennial Airlines
Century Airlines
Century Airlines
(California)
Chandler Flyer
Chaparral Air-
lines 3,611
Charlie Hammonds
Flying Service
Charter Airlines
Charterair
Chautauqua
Airlines, Inc. 55,494
Chitira Air Service 277
Choi Aviation, Inc.
Christmas Air System
Clinton Aero Corp.
Clipper Air Int'l.
Corp. 699
Coastal Air Ltd.
Southeastern 5,113
Coastal Airways 9,213
Coastal Plains
Commuter, Inc.
Cochise Airlines
Inc. 16,305
197,715 191,314
31,546
11,998 9,512
6,820 8,810
178,987
86,665
12,278
8,309
168,890
231,091
8,159
4
7,244
118,469
220,000
2,222
1,099 11,264 18,004
21,554
54,122
463
152,123
49,716
320,000
1,743
23,975
6,936
56,043 62,891 50,076 63,176 59,350
192,815 257,843 70,000 263,000 235,000
52.644 17,106 45,211 39,090 21,477
8,143 8,583 8,650
917
8,012
2,874
1,252
21,023
794
30
8,172
545
457
16,341
3,862
30
8,675
2,247
70
2,822
4,774
18,145 24,018 35,211 62,719 89,353 113,645
1,271
1,152
1,806
66,906
216
4,743
12,802
4,679
8,882
973
69,822
46
1,006
6,945
6,909
11,050 13,234
14,013
8,008
25,124
2,913
99,600 163,823
6
4,303 15,254
38
10,126
9,473
21,319 25,684
143,363 165,964
6
16,021
689
16,162
1,810
132
19,797 20,659 15,021 117,093 103,871
Commuter
Airline
12/31
1976
6/30
1980
6/30
1981
12/31
1981
95,290
'1
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COMMUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
12/31
1977
6/30
1978
6/30
1979
6/30
1980
Coleman Air
Transport
Colgan Airways,
Inc. 15,442
Columbia Pacific
Airlines, Inc.
Columbia Airlines 6,626
Comair Inc.
Command Airways,
Inc. 63,519
Commutair
Commuter
Airlines 56,272
Consolidated
Airways
Cosmopolitan
Comm. Airlines
Courtesy Air
Service Inc.
Crested Butte
Air. Serv.
Crown Airways,
Inc.
Cumberland
Airlines
Davis Air-
lines, Inc.
Delta Air
Serv., Inc.
Dansbury
AIrlines
Dauphine Island
Airways
Decatur
Aviation
Desert Airlines
Desert Pacific
Airlines, Inc.
Desert Pacific
Airways
Devor Airlines
Direct Air,
Inc.
Dolphin Air-
ways
234
820 7,865 15,312
18,773 18,346 18,473 12,155 11,772
36,291
18,111
6,663 24,431
8,690 17,284 41,950 53,007 88,862 112,541
81,314 121,663 126,523 124,061 138,790 153,623
9,069
73,855 84,804 118,254 113,031 74,854
436
703 1,823
991 3,857
48,895
2,594 1,267
1,297
7,936 10,077
69,932
1,487
4,249 3,370
58,100 60,655 64,662 85,966 188,814 192,212
22,468 21,492 15,790 22,416 14,042
40,462
12 ,466
43,552 21,670
885
3,520
3, 705
298
676
7,603
2,705
2,626
14,188
1,237
4,159
1,718
14,908
479
551 1,629
922
Commuter
Airline
12/31
1976
6/30
1981
12/31
1981
-410-
APPENDIX 2.1
1/
COMMUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number
12/31 12/31
1976 1977
of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
6/30
1978
6/30
1979
6/30
1980
Downeast Air-
lines, Inc. 19
E.D.A. Newport
Inc.
Eagle Airlines
Eagle Aviation
Eagle Commuter
Airlines Inc.
Eastern Carolina
Aviation
East Hampton
Air, Inc.
Eastern Indiana
Aviation Sales
Inc.
Ede Air
Emerald Airlines
Empire Aero Serv.
Empire Airlines,
Inc.
Erie Airways,Inc.
Evanston Aviation
Eureka Aero
Industries,Inc. 2
Execuair Air-
lines, Inc. 5
Far West Air-
lines
Federal Carriers
Flight Express
Cargo, Inc.
Florida Airlines
Inc. 5
Foster Aviation
Freedom Air
Freedom Airlines
Inc.
Galian Commuter
Services 2
Gem State Airlines
Go Flying Inc.
Golden Carriage
Hire
Golden South
Airlines,Inc.
Golden West Air-
lines 39
,398 21,786 22,670 27,372
114,202
5,739 6,787
12,365
1,384
9,704
339
937 2,621
15,629
10,664
1,042
16,894
2,732
4,580
6,943
3,231
12
3,591
2,751
1,296
6,745
0,862
2,128
9,978 28,775 78,021 88,483 270,670 408,uv
2,673 4,903
849
26,428 28,080 18,862
30,624
224 6,326
477
2,676
250
6,662
40,814
485
5,805
71,353
247
3,875
3,203
131,879
12,477
30,915 31,231 27,933
31,071
79,901 37,992
13,378 19,279
17,001 57,599
46,038 72,385
469
2,300
2,623
1,849
3,545
667,000 695,000 651,uuO
Commuter
Airline
6/30
1981
12/31
1981 _
9,300
4,936
2,751
22,007
16,944
77,379
98,259
2,486
510,449 572,536 325,5698,170
Sj--411-
12/31
1976
APPENDIX 2.1
1/
COMMUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
6/30
1978
6/30
1979
6/30
1980
6/30
1981
12/31
1977
1,353
5,953
19,281
Grand Canyon
Airlines
Great American
Airways
Great Plains
Airlines,Inc.
Green Bay Airways
Green Hills
Aviation Ltd.
Green Mountain
Airlines Ltd.
Grognet Flying
Service
Gromer Aviation
Gull Air, Inc.
Gunnel Aviation
Inc.
Hankins Airways
Inc.
Harbor Airlines
Inc.
Havasu Airlines
Hensly Flying
Service, Inc.
Henson Aviation
Inc.
Henssler Air
Service Corp.
Holiday Airlines
Inc.
Horizon Airlines
Hyannis Aviation
Idee Industries
Inc.
Imperial Airlines
Inc.
Imperial Commu-
ter Airlines
Inc. 13,147
Indiana Airways
Inc.
Indiana Airways
Inc. (Reid)
Inda Pacific Int'l.
Inland Empire
Airlines Inc.
9,819
19,004 25,413
403
168
33,763
2,106
1,954
27,074 28,428 40,509
30,760
4,594
1,480
1,564
1,206
47,736
4,014
580
1,250
62,515
5,115
3,698
1,690
63,480
851
225
28,513
84,932
1,409
37,640 42,679 50,842
5,182
62,711 57,479
12,280 10,145
54,089
9,951
218,837 231,561 287,641 385,052 434,634 495,945
3,084 3,736 4,347 4,127
71 5,334
855 1,411 3,678 14,106
1,966
4,888
4,146
3,017
9,831
22,994
699 512
32,196 70,919 189,910
13,429 13,297 21,900
4,313
225 14,585
6,050
15,779
24,338 34,948 16,078
36,190 34,786 36,487
Commuter
Airline
12/31
1981
2,661
-412-
Commuter
Airline
Inter-Mountain
Airways
Iowa Airlines
Iowa City Fly-
ing Serv. Inc.
Jamaire Inc.
Jamestown Avia-
tion Inc.
Jer-don Air
Kennedy Air Serv.
Key Airline
Kingman Aviation
Knight Airlines
Inc.
Lake Central
Aviation,Inc.
Lake Havasu
Air Service
Lake State
Airways,Inc.
Lakeland Avia-
tion
Las Vegas Air-
lines
Lawrence Avia-
tion
Macky Int'l.
Airlines
Magum Airlines
Mall Airways,
Inc.
Marco Island
Airways,Inc.
Marshall's
Air, Inc.
McPhillips Fly-
ing Service
Merrimack Avia-
tion Inc.
Mesaba Avia-
tion
Metroflight
Airlines 2
Metroplex
Airlines
Mid-South
Aviation, Inc.
12/31
1976
APPENDIX 2.1
1/
COMMUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
12/31
1977
6,519
6/30
1978
7,048
6/30
1979
6,584
698
1,425
6/30
1980
6/30
1981
10,942 15,877
144
985
40,268
1,357
30,560 36,782
1,933
1,037
51,832
1,117
550
2,267
766
3,859 4,604
1,749 3,366
3,124 10,650
21,551 21,499 20,434 16,643
3,382
182
10,417
12,856
3,083
5,502
8,204
9,480
121,663 42,082
6,570
61,695
472
1-,416
18,191
48,612
7,520 10,437 17,910
65,714 66,626 67,827
987
297
7,314
12,987
12/31
1981.
19,700
12,553
11,196
8,800
21,580 21,028
37,649 50,861
22,032
47,876
8,530
370
7,998 11,813
7,231 5,370 7,216
304,413 333,748 398,159 420,090 504,856 609,092
7,827 7,867
5,019 2,426
12,155 34,174 39,5(o3
-413-
APPENDIX 2.1
1/
COMNUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
Commuter
Airline
12/31
1976
Mid-South Commuter
Midstate Airlines 65,216
Midwest Aviation
Midwest Airlines 227
Mississippi Valley 55,000*
Monmouth Airlines 23,155
Montauk Caribbean
Airways 3,818
Morgan Air
Transport 132
Mountain Home
Air Service
Mountainwest
Airlines
Nelson Airlines
N.J. Merrimack
Airlines
Nevada Airlines 22,503
Newair FlightInc.
New England Air-
lines, Inc. 16,916
New Haven Air-
ways, Inc.
New Jersey Airways
New Mexico Air
Newport Aero,Inc. 14,827
Nitlyn Airways
Nor East Commuter
Airlines
Norcal Airlines 10,721
North American
Airlines
Ocean Airways,Inc.
Offshore Logistics
Omaha Aviation
Omak Aviation
Airlines
Pacific Cal Air
Pacific Missionary
Aviation
Pacific National
Airways
Palmas Air Corp. 2,143
Pennsylvania Air-
lines 180,000
Pilgrim Airlines 114,000*
12/31
1977
75,008
797
6/30
1978
6/30
1979
1,063
82,317 81,040
55,838 67,752
17,852 16,381
3,822
3,874
1,787
5,645
5,489
3,332
1,483
4,287
6/30
1980
6/30
1981
83,723 84,165
693
101,907 200,000* 275,000*
6,806
3,255
12,614
21,411 25,053 35,152
18,323 18,522 21,714
128
11,791
7,978
3,028
7,982
5
15,627
6,997
6,218
3,152
412
34,966
18,211
3,606
4,393
3,297
4,294
12/31
1981 _
119,918
1,609
352,784
5,556
4,046
49,012 22,999
10,588
58,944
19,402 39,999
20,214 24,321
17,512
42,970
2,667
334
7,401
10,588
22,767
42,702
24,756
1,484
96,468
3,335
374
29
1,345
1,542
1,231 15,532 5,899
207,264 215,548 270,733 410,979 397,235 370,374
139,955 152,990 189,816 192,012 200,000* 219,372
-414-
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1/
COMMUTER AIRLINE- PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
Commuter
Airline
Pocono Airlines
Inc. -
Pompano Airways
Ponderosa Avia-
tion, Inc.
Precision Valley
Aviation
Princeton Aviation
Corp.
Pro Air Services
Provincetown-Boston
Airline 1
Ransome Airlines 3
Rapid Air, Inc.
Realwest Airlines
Red Carpet Air-
lines Inc.
Reid Airways, Inc.
Resort Commuter
Airlines
Rio Airways,Inc. 1
Robert J. Smith
Roederes Avia-
tion Inc.
Ross Aviation
Inc.
Roswell Airlines
Royal Americas
AirwaysInc.
Royal-Air Ltd.
Royale Airlines
Inc.
San Juan Air-
lines, Inc.
Scenic Air Lines
(Utah)
Scenic Airlines
Inc. HSZ
Scheduled Sky-
ways
Seaco Airlines
Inc.
Semo Aviation
Inc.
Shasta Air,Inc.
Shavano Air,Inc.
12/31
1976
45,499
12/31
1977
6/30
1978
6/30
1979
48,855 52,783 61,618
6/30
1980
6/30
1981
81,641 93,397
886 2,563
14,215 33,331 73,702 112,741 107,525
2,953 14,836
56,784
39,527
198
193,603
375,458
308
221,779
410,479
917
22,389 32,189
72
12/31
1981.
91,454
1,426
2,471
98,827
32,345
274
274,787 308,493 366,471 479,938
495,233 752,913 832,904 754,652
8,740
1,342
1,111
87,677
7,976 15,349
1,995 1,782
244,823 297,688 430,777 42
3,794 11,033
7,783 431,755
205 941
140
25,445 29,732
2,390
30,379 33,022
9,214
439,441
1,764
146
33,936 36,854 35,749
1,139
20,447
53,988
15,084
82,677 90,988 101,287 143,741 145,120 162,342
14,931 20,804 26,263 32,697 31,709 42,470
65,152
23,802
32,659
136,918 135,152 83,392 188,278 206,780 164,305
63,465 71,952 85,414 129,930 152,292 169,702
1,651
5,129 5,690
1,408
5,610 18,177
2,174
14,403 6,653 1,360
10
1,695 1,899201 673 1,870
-415-
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1/
COMMUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
Commuter
Airline
-Shawnee'Airlines
Sierra Flite
Service,Inc.
Sierra Pacific
Airlines
Sizer Airways,
Inc.
Silver State Air-
lines
Simmons Airlines
Skycraft Inc.
Skyline Airlines
Skystream Air-
lines
Skyway Aviation
Inc.
Sky Train
Sky West Avia-
tion, Inc.
Slocum Air,Inc.
Pearson Aircraft
Perkiomen Air-
ways Ltd.
Permian Air-
ways,Inc.
Phillips Air-
lines
Phoenix Air-
lines
Piasa Commuter
Airlines
Pioneer Airways
Soonair Lines
Inc.
South Central
Air Transport
South Central
Air, Inc.
Southeast Air-
lines Inc.
Southeastern
Commuter
Southern Air-
lines, Inc.
12/31
1976
27,066
39,845
12/31
1977
8,856
6/30
1978
6/30
1979
56,583
5,790
42,027 53,149 47,232
6/30
1980
6/30
1981
1,755
4,895
2,752
163
23,357
25,746
15,893
10,912
1,461
152
7,287 32,184 57,060
30,742 31,627 21,490
19,805 25,290 32,316
14,461 16,270 29,589
206
12,103
5,778
243
4,359
8,103
8,595
21,061
10,951
527
6,146
55,991 81,118
56,893 43,726
8,097
14,320 14,147 12,206
17,405
10,698 7,191
348
4,524 7,247 16,718
1,091
20,723 39,408
843
18,353
8,178
31,218 16,074
5,393 37,918
1,322 9,679 25,149 6,302
10,945 9,593
3,507 2,119
12/31
1981.
34,480
38,984
8,113
930
82,255
413
30,456
4,505
1,484
55,862
53,993
11,901
-416-
Commuter
Airline
Southern-Jersey
Airways
Southern Seaplane
Southern Maryland
Aviation,Inc.
Stakmann Farns,
Inc.
Star Aviation
Corp.
'Star Flite Int'l.
Airlines
State Airlines
Sterling Air
Service
Stol Air.Inc.
Suburban Airlines
Sun Aire Lines
Sun Basin Air-
lines, Inc.
Sun Int'l.
Airways
Sunbelt
Sunbird Air-
lines,Inc.
Sunbird,Inc.
Sunwest Airlines
Swift Aire
Lines,Inc.
Tejas Airlines
Tennessee Air-
ways, Inc.
Terrehaute Air
Commuter
Thorson Aviation
Trans California
Airlines
Trans Catalina
Airlines
Trans Colorado
Trnas Commuter
Airlines
Trans Island Air-
ways, Inc.
Trans Mo Air-
lines
12/31
1976
APPENDIX 2.1
1/
COMMUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
12/31
1977
6/30
1978
6/30
1979
6/30
1980
6/30
1981
67,701 76,751 110,228 114,512 114,786
251 1,198
1,241
12/31
1981 _
112,135
560
390
1,775
2,158 14,719 16,532 20,369 14,944
8,205
1,790
1,501
18,946
141,413
16,417
1,951
23,693
157,098
26,070
1,760
51,261
159,711
42,058
1,152
168,367 204,453 243,986 257,782
62,590 105,553 141,967 162,813
3,245
132,474 176,775 203,491 223,852
47,320 47,320
10,300
13,937
5,049 14,298
13,699 73,703
1,405
1,440 5,985
255,000 273,000
75,109 22,488
20,537 38,514
6,641
13,839 52,296
14,878
10,409 8,420 9,010
14,120 975
7,119
19,388
91,,236
1,813
26,041
165,000
47,923
9,621
375
18,846
36,216 78,767 137,022
8,738 15,711
13,993 10,499
8,557
10,887
-417-
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1/
COMUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
Commuter
Airline
Trans Mountain
Air
Trans New York
Trans Pennsylvania
Airlines, Inc.
Trans Regional
Airline
Trans Sierra
Airlines, Inc.
Trans Western
Airlines
Trans -Americ an
Airways, Inc.
Trans-Central
Airlines, Inc.
Trans-Colorado
Airlines
Transtate Aviation
Tri-State Flite
Service Inc.
Tulsair Beechcraft
Inc.
Tuolumne Air Service
U.S. Aviation,Inc.
Universal Airways
Inc.
Vagabond Aviation
Inc.
Vale Int'l. Air-
lines
Valley Airlines
Valley Air Pack
Valley Aviation
Valley Commuter
Vee Neal Airlines
Vero Monmouth
Airlines
Weiss Aviation Co.
Westair
Westair Commuter
Airlines
Western Charter,
Inc.
Wheeler Flying
Service 1
Willis Air
12/31
1976
2,624
12/31
1977
9,837
2,148
6/30
1978
7 , 056
2,134
6/30
1979
6/30
1980
6/30
1981
1,026
4,240
385
390
611 1,491
2,0612,838
3,448 11,606 24,094 13,135
4,159 24,838
5,707
1,186
5,874
3,030
1,709
9,682
4,347
26,365
1,068 20,051
175
8,266
776
8,266
154
12,700 12,818
991
4,923
2,211
6,701
339
669 15,205
1,506 617
5,945
5,838
35,283
0,411 32,927 36,731 44,868
68,789 61,471
45,748
4,685
2,985
38,134
9,257
12/31
1981
1,026
14,727
23,851
18,840
53
17,853
2,247
338
21,331
64,585
917
27,018
4,198
-418-
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1/
COMMUTER AIRLINE PASSENGER
TRAFFIC AS REPORTED TO CAB
1976 - 1981
Number of Enplaned Passengers Year Ended
Commuter
Airline
Wings Airways
Wings West
Winnepesaukee
Aviation,Inc.
Wisc Air
Wright Air Lines
Inc.
Yosemite Airlines
Inc.
Young Flying
Service
Zia Airways
12/31
1976
8,788
62,000
12/31
1977
6/30
1978
6/30
1979
13,498 17,075 20,303
13,211 15,246 20,503
203
79,000 93,000 133,000
6/30
1980
6/30
1981
28,659 45,102
3,977 11,528
10,367
172
148,904 141,343
9,691
488
7,983
4,260
1,050
10,108 23,871
Totals 5,949,633 7,242,092 8,123,034 9,356,123 12,249,338 13,283,442 14,353,011
* Estimated
1/ Commuter airline operating domestically in the 48 states and District of Columbia.
Source: USCAB "Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics" 1976-1979 Table 2
USCAB "Air Carrier Industry Scheduled Service Traffic Statistics -
Medium Regional Air Carrier Details" June 30, 1981 & December 31, 1981
12/31
1981
41,706
26,436
147,892
_
-419-
APPENDIX 2.2 1/
SUMMARY OF RECENT COMMUTER TRAFFIC OPERATING DATA -
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1980, 1981 AND
DECEMBER 31, 1980 AND 1981
6/30/80
Revenue Passenger Miles (000,000)
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
Available Seat Miles (000,000)
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
Passenger Enplanements (000)
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
Aircraft Revenue Miles (000)
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
Aircraft Revenue Hours
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
Aircraft Departures
Medium Regionals
Large Regionals
Total
1,108
605
1,713
2,318
1,195
3,513
8,358
3,964
12,322
162,502
48,875
211,377
954,206
264,779
1,218,985
1,457,988
429,456
1,887,444
12 Months Ended
12/31/80 6/30/81
1,054
772
1,826
2,265
1,585
3,850
8,034
4,689
12,723
146,109
60,126
206,235
861,703
316,004
1,177,707
1,300,458
486,016
1,786,474
1,243
1,162
2,405
2,707
2,316
5,023
8,504
4,779
13,283
171,688
69,867
241,555
1,016,464
348,669
1,365,133
1,544,200
524,672
2,068,872
12/31/81
1,013
2,116
3,129
2,756
3,965
6,721
7,590
6,763
14,353
164,794
81,106
246,900
1,036,659
378,427
1,415,086
1,,522,483
523,433
2,045,916
Source: USCAB "Air Carrier Industry Scheduled Service Traffic Statistics" Medium
Regional Air Carrier Details, Years Ended June 30, 1981 & December 31, 1981.
USCAB "Air Carrier Traffic Statistics" Years Ended June 30, 1981 &
December 31, 1981.
l/ Passenger Commuter Carriers operating only in 48 states.
Item
6/30/80
APPENDIX 2.3
DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUTER1
PASSENGERS BY MILEAGE GROUP
1976, 1978, 1980
Number of 0 & D Passengers
1976 1978 1980
108,550
1,295,707
1,182,242
1,395,080
1,061,691
753,786
578,432
408,494
181,125
177,592
74,719
11,822
75,756
7,304,996
120,812
1,521,914
1,801,391
1,795,056
1,433,299
1,076,845
820,420
602,370
307,313
235,509
162,132
44,315
152,435
10,073,811
133,355
980,217
1,822,596
1,929,817
1,747,845
1,313,083
1,135,433
711,612
358,682
298,557
133,760
79,745
220,408
10,865,110
Source: USCAB "Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics" Years Ended December 31,
1976, 1978 & 1980.
1/ Excludes certificated commuter
-420-
Mileage
Category
0-24
25-49
50-74
75-99
100-124
125-149
150-174
175-199
200-224
225-249
250-274
275-299
over 300
Totals
-421-
Appendix 2.4
Comparison of Commuters!/ Offering
Service in 1975 and 1982
March June Both '82 '75
1975 1982 '75 & '82 Not '75 Not '82
I. 401 Certificated
Carriers
KC Aeromech Airlines X X X
ZV Air Midwest X X X
NE Air New England X X
NO Air North, Inc. X X X
BH Air US X X
ZW Air Wisconsin X X X
AK Altair Airlines, Inc. X X X
ID Apollo Airways, Inc. X- X
AP Aspen Airways, Inc. X X X
GQ Big Sky Airlines X X
RU Britt Airways X X
CZ Cascade Airways, Inc. X X X
DP Cochise Airlines X X- X
UR Empire Airlines X X
DN Freedom Airlines X~ X
GW Golden West Airlines X X X
II Imperial Airlines, Inc. X X X
LS Marco Island Airways X X X
VL Mid-South Commuter
Airlines X X
IU Midstate X X
(Continued)
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Appendix 2.4
Comparison of Commuters- Offering
Service in 1975 and 1982
(Continued)
March June Both '82 '75
1975 1982 '75 & '82 Not '75 Not '82
I. 401 Certificated
Carriers (Continued)
XV Mississippi Valley
Airlines, Inc. X X
NC Newair
PM Pilgrim Airlines
JC Rocky Mountain Airways
QG Sky West Aviation
NS Southeast Airlines
WI SwiftAireLines
WZ Transwestern Airlines
FW Wright Airlines
TOTALS (Certificated)
II. Part 298 Commuters
AAA Air Enterprises
Aerie Airlines
Aero Coach Aviation
Aero International
Aero Sun International
Air Catalina
Air Chico Corporation
Air Cortez
Air Exec
X X
X X
X X
X
X
X X
19 27
(Continued)
X
16
-421B-
Appendix 2.4
Comparison of Commuters- Offering
Service in 1975 and 1982
(Continued)
March June Both
1975 1982 '75 & '82
'82 '75
Not '75 Not '82
II. Part 298 Commuters
(Continued)
Air Idaho, Inc.
Air Illinois, Inc.
Air Kentucky
Air Lift Associates, Inc.
Air Lincoln
Air Link Corporation
Air Miami &
North American
Air New Orleans
Air New Ulum
Air Oregon, Inc.
Air South, Inc.
Air Speed, Inc.
Air Spur
Air Vector Airways
Air Virginia
Air Vermont
Airways of New Mexico
Allen Aviation, Inc.
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
(Continued)
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Appendix 2.41/
Comparison of Commuters- Offering
Service in 1975 and 1982
(Continued)
March June Both '82 '75
1975 1982 '75 & '82 Not '75 Not '82
II. Part 298 Commuters
(Continued)
All Seasons Air Pacific X X
Altus Airlines X X
American Central X X
Amistad Airlines, Inc. X X
Antelope Airlines X X
Arcata Flying Service X X
Arizona Pacific X X
Arkansas Traveler Airline X X
Astec Air East, Inc. X X
Asheville Flying Service X X
Atlanta Express X X
Atlantic Air X X
Atlantic Southeast X X
Atlantis Airlines, Inc. X X
Bankair, Inc. X X
Bar Harbor Airlines X X X
Bas Airlines X X
Bemedji X X
Brandt Air X X
(Continued)
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Appendix 2.4 /
Comparison of Commuters- Offering
Service in 1975 and 1982
(Continued)
March June Both '82 '75
1975 1982 '75 & '82 Not '75 Not '82
II. Part 298 Commuters
(Continued)
Bower Airways, Inc. X X
C & M Airlines X X
Cal Sierra Airlines X X
Calumbia Airlines X X
CAM Airlines X X
Cannon Aviation Co. X X
Capitol Air Service X X X
Catskill Airways X X X
Chaparral Airlines, Inc. X X
Chataqua Airlines X X
Christman Air System X X
Clinton Aero X X
Colgan Airways, Corp. X X X
Colorado Airlines, Inc. X X
Comair, Inc. X X
Command Airways, Inc. X X X
Commuter Ailines X X X
Cooper State Airways X X
Cross Sound Commuter
Airlines X X
(Continued)
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Appendix 2.4
Comparison of Commuters- Offering
Service in 1975 and 1982
(Continued)
March June Both '82 '75
1975 1982 '75 & '82 Not '75 Not '82
II. Part 298 Commuters
(Continued)
Crown International
Airlines X X
Cumberland Airlines X X X
Davis Airlines X X
Devoe Aviation X X
DirectAir X X
Dolphin Airways X X
Downeast Airlines, Inc. X X
Downtown Airlines X X,
Eagle Commuter Airlines X X
East Hampton Air X X
Eureka Aero Industries X X'
Execuair, Inc. X X
Flightways Corporation X X
Florida Airlines X X
GCS Airlines X X
Golden Airways X X
Golden Pacific Airlines X X
Green Hills Aviation X X
Gross Aviation X X
Gulf Coast Aviation X X
(Continued)
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Appendix 2.4/
Comparison of Commuters- Offering
Service in 1975 and 1982
(Continued)
March June Both '82 '75
1975 1982 '75 & '82 Not '75 Not '82
II. Part 298 Commuters
(Continued)
Gull Air, Inc.
Hammonds Air Service
Hankins Airways, Inc.
Harbor Airlines, Inc.
Havasu Airlines
Henson Airlines
Holiday Airlines, Inc.
Horizon Airlines
Horizon Airways, Inc.
Inland Empire Airlines
Lake Havasu Air Service
Lakeland Aviation
Las Vegas Airlines, Inc.
Lawrence Aviation, Inc.
Liberty Airlines
Mall Airways
Mesa Aviation Services, Inc.
Mesaba Aviation
Metro Airlines
X X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X X
X
X X X
X
X X X
X X X
(Continued)
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Appendix 2.4,/
Comparison of Commuters- Offering
Service in 1975 and 1980
(Continued)
March June Both '82 '75
1975 1982 '75 & '82 Not '75 Not '82
II. Part 298 Commuters
(Continued)
Metroflight Airlines
Michigan Airways
Mid-Continent Airlines
Midwest Aviation
Midwest Commuter Airways
Minuteman Aviation
Monmouth Airlines
Montauk Caribbean Airways
Mountain Air
Nevada Airlines
New England Airlines
Newport Aero
New York Air/Starlight
Nor-Cal Aviation, Inc.
Pacific Cal AIrlines
Pacific Coast Airlines
Pacific Express
Pearson Aircraft, Inc.
Pennsylvania Commuter
Phillips Airlines
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X X
(Continued)
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Appendix 2.41/
Comparison of Commuters- Offering
Service in 1975 and 1980
(Continued)
March June Both '82 '75
1975 1982 '75 & '82 Not '75 Not '82
II. Part 298 Commuters
(Continued)
Pioneer Airways, Inc. X X
Pompano Air Taxi X X
Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. X X
Precision Airlines X X
Princeton Aviation Corporation X X
Pro Air X X
Provincetown Boston Airlines &
Naples Airline Division X X X
Ransome Airlines X X X
Rio Airways X X X
Roederer Aviation, Inc. X X
Ross Aviation, Inc. X X
Royal West Airways, Inc. X X
Rovale Air Lines, Inc. X X X
SMB Stage Lines, Inc. X X
San Juan Airlines X X X
Scenic Airlines, Inc. X X X
Scheduled Skyways System X X
Semo Aviatiion X X
Shasta Air, Inc. X X
(Continued)
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Appendix 2.4 1/
Comparison of Commuters- Offering
Service in 1975 and 1980
(Continued)
March June Both '82 - '75
1975 1982 '75 & '82 Not '75 Not '82
II. Part 298 Commuters
(Continued)
Shawnee Airlines, Inc. X
Shorter Airways, Inc. X
Silver State Airlines, Inc.
Simmons Airlines
Skystream Airlines, Inc. X
Skyway Aviation, Inc. X
Slocum Air
South Central. Air Transport X
South Central Air
Southeastern Commuter
Airlines
Southern Jersey Airlines
Stol Air, Inc. X
State Airlines
Suburban Airlines X
Sun Aire Lines, Inc. X
Sun Airline, Inc. X
Sun Valley Key X
Sun West Airlines
Sunbelt Airlines
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
(Continued)
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Appendix 2.4 
Comparison of Commuters- Offering
Service in 1975 and 1980
(Continued)
March June Both '82 '75
1975 1982 '75 & '82 Not '75 Not '82
II. Part 298 Commuters
(Continued)
Sunbird Airlines, Inc. X X
Sunbird, Inc. X X
Susquehanna Airlines X X
Tennessee Airways, Inc. X X
Texas State Airlines X X
Trans Island X X
Trans-Central Airlines X X
Trans Colorado Airlines, Inc. X X
Trans Mo Airlines, Inc. X X X
Trans Mountain Air X X
Valley Airlines, Inc. X X
Vee Neal, Inc. X X
Western Air Stages X X
Wheeler Flying Service, Inc. X X X
Will's Air X X
Williams Air X X
Wings Airways X X
Wings West, Inc. X X
(Continued)
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Appendix 2.4i
Comparison of Commuters- Offering
Service in 1975 and 1980
(Continued)
March June
1975 1982
Both
'75 & '82
'82 '75
Not '75 Not '82
II. Part 298 Commuters
(Continued)
Winnipesaukee Aviation
Zia Airlines
TOTAL (298 Commuters)
GRAND TOTAL
(298 & Certificated)
X
86 132
105 158
35
51
X
97 51
107 54
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares, Traffic,
Load Factors, and Market Shares, Service Status"
(December 1982).
Official Airline Guide (June 15, 1982).
Carriers based in the 48 states offering domestic passenger
service with all aircraft having less than 90 seats.
-!Carrier in bankruptcy, but publishing schedules as of June
15, 1982.
(State-
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
15
38
18
132
45
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
13
49
62
152
45
42
3
30
38
11
38
64
(Continued)
I I
15
64
66
167
53
64
0
52
67
27
60
85
15.3
30.6
6.5
9.9
17.8
52.4
(100.0)
73.3
76.3
145.5
57.9
32.8
0.0
68.4
266.7
26.5
17.8
93.9
(50.0)
67.6
17.5
50.0
185.7
37.1
Appendix 2.5
Number of Segments Served
By U.S. Commuters by State-
1976, 1978 & 1980
Number of Segmentq/Served By
Commuters=
1976 1978 1980
% Incr
(Decr)
78/80 76/80
Appendix 2.5
Number of Segments Served
By U.S. Commuters by State-
1976, 1978 & 1980
(Continued)
Number of Segments Served
Commuters
1976 1978 1980State1 '
By % Incr
(Decr)
78/80 76/80
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
25
20
53
14
42
16
11
35
22
23
21
57
33
18
4
N.A.
58
25
32
60
30
30
15
61
(Continued)
19
18
11
11
46
58
36
65
31
16
10
82
(42.4)
0.0
175.0
N.A.
(20.7)
132.0
12.5
8.3
3.3
(46.7)
(33.3)
34.4
(24.0)
(10.0)
(79.2)
(21.2)
(21.4)
262.5
227.3
85.7
40.9
(30.4)
(52.4)
43.9
)
£Appendix 2.5
Number of Segments Served
By U.S. Commuters by State-
1976, 1978 & 1980
(Continued) ,
Number of Segments Served By
CommutersY
State 1976 1978 1980
% Incr
(Decr)
-78/80 76/80
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
0
1
45
2
20
14
122
32
0
18
6
6
39
67
7
32
26
151
26
1
23
19
(Continued)
II )~ (
3
33
27
25
75
45
230
86
18
34
34
(50.0)
(15.4)
(59.7)
257.1
134.4
73.1
52.3
230.8
1700.0
47,8
78.9
3200.0
(40.0)
1150.0
275.0
221.4
88.5
168.8
88.9
466.7
Appendix 2.5
Number of Segments Served
By U.S. Commuters by State!'
1976, 1978 & 1980
(Continued)
Number of Segments Served By
Commutersi'
State- 1976 1978 1980
% Incr
(Decr)
78/80 76/80
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermnont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
23
79
8
8
0
22
46
42
15
16
77
17
80
88
9
23
0
39
86
42
16
17
128
33
(Continued)
()
~ 1*
100
109
16
45
25.0
23.9
77.8
95.7
334.8
38.0
100.0
462.5
172.7
202.2
(31.0)
73.3
312.5
77.9
29.4
60
139
29
26
66
137
22
53.8
61.6
(31.0)
62.5
288.2
70.0
(33.3)
()
( S f
State4 !
Wisconsin
Wyoming
48 STATE S & DISTICT OF
COLUMBIA - TOTAL
Appendix 2,5
Number of Segments Served
By U.S. Commuters by Statei/
1976, 1978 & 1980
(Continued)
Number of Segments Served By
Commuters
-1916 -AM 17 1-9,80
15
1080
40
9
1384
% Incr
(Decr)
78/80 76/7
(35.0) (36.6)
66,7
1736
0,0
25.4 60.7
SOUlACE: U.S. CAB, "Commuter Air
1978, & 1980, Table 10.,
Carrier Traffic Statistics," December 1976,
148 states,
E xcludes commuters after certiftcation, Totals exclude dupilcation of interstate
segments since segment is counted in each state.
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Appendix 3.1
Listing of States Contained
In Geographic Region Analyses
Geographic Region Geographic Region
State State
New England
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
Mid Atlantic
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
East North Central
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Ohio
Wisconsin
West North Central
Minnesota
Iowa -
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
East South Central
Kentuckey
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
West South Central
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Mountain
Pacific
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
Washington
Oregon
California
South Atlantic
Delaware
District of Columbia
Maryland
Virginia
West Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
(Appendix 3.2
1/
Certificated & Commuter Enplanements-
Small Hubs-
By Geographic Region
1978 - 1980
Passenger Enplanements (000)
Geographic Region
Point
Cert.
Carriers
1978
Commuter
Carriers
% or
Total Total
Cert.
Carriefs
1980
Commuter
Carriers
% of
Total Total
NEW ENGLAND
Bangor ME
Burlington VT
Portland ME
Providence RI
SUBTOTAL
143
149
218
498
1008
16
43
42
5
106
MID ATLANTIC
Albany NY
Allentown PA
Harrisburg PA
Scranton PA
SUBTOTAL
663
280
314
166
1423
65
25
53
24
167
159
192
260
503
9.5 1,114
728
305
367
190
10.5 1,590
145
171
251
452
1,019
618
264
284
150
1,316
43
28
57
148
109
29
1
29
169
o
164
214
279
509
12.7 1,166
727
293
285
179
11.4 1,484
EAST NORTH CENTRAL
Akron OH
Evansville IN
(Continued)
284
249
292
251
139
211
161
228
Appendix 3.2
Certificated & Commuter Enplanements!!
Small Hubs 2
By Geographic Region
1978 - 1980
(Continued)
Passenger Enplanements (000)
Geographic Region
Point
EAST NORTH CENTRAL
(Continued)
Ft. Wayne IN
Grand Rapids MI
Green Bay WI
Lansing MI
Madison WI
Moline IL
Peoria IL
Saginaw MI
South Bend IN
Toledo OH
1978
Cert. Commuter % of
Carriers Carriers Total Total
254
419
329
221
354
335
271
226
230
336
SUBTOTAL 3508
0
11
0
37
271
424
330
181
355
335
271
226
241
336
1.0 3,545
1980
Cert. Commuter % of
Carriers Carriers Total Total
129
428
299
7
352
241
186
191
139
236
2,732
109
13
1
188
1
51
27
8
238
441
300
353
292
213
199
184
38 274
338 11.'0 3,070
WEST NORTH CENTRAL
Bismarck ND
Cedar Rapids IA
130
261
(Continued)
130
261
170
208
177
240
(Appendix 3.2
Certificated & Commuter Enplanements-
Small Hubs-
By Geographic Region
1978 - 1980
(Continued)
Geographic Region
Point
WEST NORTH CENTRAL
Passenger Enplanements (000)
1978 1980
Cert. Commuter % of
Carriers Carriers Total Total
Cert. Commuter % of
Carriers Carriers Total Total
(Continued)
Des Moines IA
Fargo ND
Lincoln NB
Rapid City SD
Rochester MN
Sioux Falls SD
Wichita KS
SUBTOTAL
647
152
229
150
149
279
561
2558
651
1.52
235
150
149
279
572
0.8 2,579
586
179
163
143
152
233
536
2,371
3
0
14
0
0
0
25
589
179
177
143
152
233
561
80 3.3 2,451
SOUTH ATLANTIC
Asheville NC
Augusta GA
Charleston SC
Charleston WV
(Continued)
182
201
261
443
191
204
261
447
165
182
209
432
174
183
240
432
Appendix 3.2
Certificated & Commuter Enplanementsi/
Small Hubs2/
By Geographic Region
1978 - 1980
(Continued)
Geographic Region
Point
Passenger Enplanements (000)
1978
Cert. Commuter % of
Carriers Carriers Total Total
1980
Cert. Commuter % of
Carriers Carriers Total Total
SOUTH ATLANTIC (Continued)
Columbia SC
Daytona Beach FL
Ft. Meyers FL
Gainsville FL
Greenville SC
Melbourne FL
Pensacola FL
Richmond VA
Roanoke VA
Sarasota FL
Savannah GA
Tallahassee FL
SUBTOTAL
415
340
328
169
334
193
247
564
391
443
346
302
5159
417
340
345
171
334
193
247
600
391
458
349
303
1.8 5,251
417
379
546
177
329
184
247.:
568
381
575
370
303
5,464
0
0
4
1
1
0
0
52
7
7
0
0
113
417
379
550
178
330
184
247
620
388
582
370
303
2.0 5,579
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL
Bristol TN
Chattanooga TN
228
307
(Continued)
229
308
211
252
213
256
(Appendix 3.2
1/Certificated & Commuter Enplanements-
Small Hubs-
By Geugraphic Region
1978 - 1980
(Continued)
Geographic Region
Point
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL
Passenger Enplanements (000)
1978 1980
Cert. Commuter % of Cert. Commuter~%7of
Carriers Carriers Total Total Carriers Carriers Total Total
(Continued)
Huntsville AL
Jackson MS
Knoxville TN
Lexington KY
Mobile AL
Montgomery AL
SUBTOTAL
275
420
473
325
343
237
2608
275
429
474
325
344
2381
14 0.5 2,622
240
387
428
319
324
202
2,363
0
11
7
2
0
2
28
240
398
435
321
324
204
1.2 2,391
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL
Amarillo TX
Baton Rouge LA
Corpus Christi
Harlingen TX
Little Rock AK
Lubbock TX
TX
(Continued)
299
249
355
273
554
491
299
253
365
274
580
493
353
272
369
284
518
462
357
276
281
285
552
469
Appendix 3.2
Certificated & Commuter Enplanements Y
Small Hubs2/
By Geographic Region
1978 - 1980
(Continued)
Passenger Enplanements (000)
Geographic Region
Point
19 !I
Cert. Commuter % of
Carriers Carriers Total Total
Cert.
Carriers
1980
Commuter % Ot
Carriers Total Total
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL (Continued)
Midland/Odessa TX
Shreveport LA
SUBTOTAL
422
427
3070
1
10
423
437
54 1.7 3,124
490
420
3,168
3
11
76
493
431
2.3 3,244
MOUNTAIN
Billings MT
Boise ID
Colorado Springs CO
Grand Junction CO
SUBTOTAL
285
458
288
158
1189
288
471
318
159
47 3.8 1,236
317
455
276
155
1,203
13
28
19
2
62
330
483
295
157
4.9 1,265
PACIFIC
Eugene OR
Fresno CA
204
541
(Continued)
()
207
571
231
371
243
415
(Appendix 3.2
Certificated & Commuter Enplanements-/
Small HubsJ
By Geographic Region
1978 - 1980
(Continued)
Passenger Enplanements (000)
Geographic Region
Point
PACIFIC (Continued)
Monterey CA
Palm Springs CA
Santa Barbara CA
1978
Cert. Commuter % of
Carriers Carriers Total Total
315
252
166
1478SUBTOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
% of TOTAL
22,084
97.3
0
25
74-
132
613
2.7
3]5
277
1980
Cert. Commuter % of
Carriers Carriers Total Total
166
247
240 82
8.2 1,610 1,097
22,683 22,699
100.0 93.8
45
0
136.
211
247
218
185 14.4 1,282
1,366
6.2
22,065
100.0
SOURCE: US CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares, Traffic, Load Factors, & Market Shares",
Issue No. 20, April 1982, Table 3
Appendix 3.1
!/Certificated commuters included in commuter category.
48 states.
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ADvendix 3.3
Commuter Passenger Traffic
Proportion of All Scheduled
Traffic at Small Hubs
1978 - 1980
% Enplaned Commuter Passengers
of Total
City 1978 1980
Akron/Canton 2.7 13.7
Albany 8.9 12.5
Allentown 8.2 9.9
Amarillo 0.0 0.6
Asheville 4.7 5.2
Augusta 1.5 0.5
Bangor 10.1 11.6
Baton Rouge 1.6 1.4
Billings .1.0 3.9
Bismarck 0.0 4.0
Boise 2,8 5.8
Bristol 0.4 0.9
Burlington 7.3 9.3
Cedar Rapids 0.0 12.9
Charleston SC 0,9 0.0
Charleston WV 3.6 5.3
Chattanooga 0.3 1.6
Colorado Springs 9.4 6,4
Columbia 0.5 0.0
Corpus Christi 2.7 3.1
(Continued)
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Appendix 3.3
Commuter Passenger Traffic
Proportion of All Scheduled
Traffic at Small Hubs-
1978 - 1980
(Continued)
% Enplaned Commuter Passengers
of Total
City 1978 1980
Daytona Beach
Des Moines
Eugene
Evansville
Fargo
Ft. Meyers
Ft. Wayne
Fresno
Gainsville
Grand Junction
Grand Rapids
Green Bay
Greenville/
Spartanburg
Harlingen
Harrisburg
Huntsville
Jackson MS
Knoxville
0.0
0.6
1.4
0.8
0.0
4.9
6.3
5.3
1.2
0.6
1.2
0.3
0.0
0.4
14.4
0.0
2.1
0.2
(Continued)
0.0
0.3
5.7
7.5
0.0
0.7
45.8
10.6
0.6
1.3
2.9
0.3
0.3
0.4
23.3
0.0
2.8
1.6
-437-
Appendix 3.3
Commuter Passengcr Traffic
Proportion of All Scheduled
Traffic at Small Hubs,
1978 & 1980
CContinued)
% Enplaned Commuter Passengers
of Total
City 1978 1980
Lansing
Lexington
Lincoln
Little Rock
Lubbock
Madison
Melbourne
Midland/Odessa
Mobile
Moline
Monterey
Montgomery
Palm Springs
Pensacola
Peoria
Portland ME
Providence
Rapid City
0.0
0.0
2.6
4.5
0.4
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.4
9.0
0.0
0.0
8.1
1.0
0,0
(Continued)
3.7
0.6
4.5
6.2
0.2
0.3
0.0
0.6
0.0
17.5
21.2
1.0
15.6
0.0
12.7
9,7
9.8
0.0
-438-
City
Richmond
Roanoke
Rochester MN
Saginaw
Santa Barbara
Sarasota
Savannah
Scranton
Shreveport
Sioux Falls
South Bend
Tallahassee
Toledo
Wichita
TOTAL
Appendix 3.3
Commuter Passenger Traffic
Proportion of All Scheduled
Traffic at Small Hubs-
1978 & 1980
(Continued)
% Enplaned Commuter Passengers
of Total
1978 1980
6.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
30.8
3.3
0.9
12.6
2.3
0.0
4.6
0.3
0.0
0.0
2.7
8.4
1.8
0.0
4.0
62.4
1.2
0.0
16.2
2.6
0.0
24.5
0.0
13.9
0.2
6.2
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares,
Traffic, Load Factors and Market Shares," Issue
No. 21 (April 1982), Table 6.
Appendix 3.4
Certificated & Commuter Airline Passenger Traffic
@ Large & Medium Hub Airports1 /
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 - 1981
Airport No. 1975 1976
Number of Enplaned Passengers (000)
1977 1978 1979 1980
I. Certificated Airline
A. Large Hubs
0206
0415
0502
0700
0701
1900
2001
2305
2602
4107
4508
1906.0
11554.0
5411.0
5404.0
2371.0
5153.4
3658.0
3089.0
2539.0
7179.0
2933.0
SUBTOTAL 51,197.4
B. Medium Hubs
0806 741.0
0824 671.0
2111.1
12647.0
6164.0
5870.0
2683.0
5582.2
3971.0
3259.0
2673.0
7798.0
3347.0
56,105.3
786.0
735.0
2326.0
13664.0
6876.0
6320.0
2693.0
5892.3
4263.0
3481.0
2867.0
8400.0
3577.8
60,360.1
789.0
791.0
2717.0
15828.0
8520.0
6751.0
3010.0
6540.5
4743.0
3933.0
3410.0
9599.0
4080.0
69,131.5
821.0
906.0
(Continued)
()
1981
3301.0
17067.0
9244.0
7161.0
3312.0
7313.0
5392.0
4260.0
4292.0
10983.0
4727.1
77,052.1
945.0
1187.0
3355.0
15923.0
9381.0
6804.0
2435.0
7085.7
4831.0
3730.0
4268.0
10468.0
4402.8
72,683.5
871.0
1287.0
3206.0
15843.0
10170.0
6594.0
2133.0
7052.5
4400.0
4727.0
3971.0
11282.0
4389.8
73,563.3
875.0
1303.0
4)
Appendix 3.4
Certificated & Commuter Airline Passenger Traffic
@ Large & Medium Hub Airports"
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 - 1981
Airport No. 1975 1976
Number of Enplaned Passengers (000)
1977 1978 1979
I. Certificated Airline (Continued)
B. Medium Hubs (Continued)
1202 1228.0
2303 2031.0
2901 771.3
4004 1685.0
4509 478.0
4705 1158.0
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL
8763.3
1308.0
2248.0
839.7
1809.0
544.0
1266.0
1391.0
2302.0
948.7
1973.0
596.0
1371.0
9535.7 10,161.7
59,960.7 65,641,0 70,521.8
1555.0
2612.0
1064.8
2316.0
635.0
1460.0
11,369.8
80,501.3
1724.0
2967.0
1183.0
2464.0
751.0
1719.0
11,940.0
89,992.1
1473.0
2524.0
1096.9
2258.0
649.0
1623.0
11,781.9
84,465.4
1295.0
2228.0
1023.3
2119.0
557.0
1814.0
11,214.3
84,787.6
II. Commuter Airlines
A. Large Hubs
0206 17
0415 178
18
219
(Continued)
1980 1981
13
282
8
338
22
394
56
365
59
589
Appendix 3.4k
Certificated & Commuter Airline Passenger Traffic
@ Large & Medium Hub Airports/
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 - 1981
(Continued)
Airport No. 1975
Number
1.976 1977
of Enplaned
1978
Passengers (000)
1979 1980
II. Commuter Airlines (Continued)
A. Large Hubs (Continued)
0502 481.0 547.0 61
0700 191.0 210.0 22
0701 23.0 15.0 1
1900 24.5 74.2 11
2001 - - 2
2305 33.0 37.0 4
2602 66.0 89.0 9
4107 141.0 143.0 21
4508 30.6 27.2 3
SUBTOTAL 1185.1 1379.4 167
B. Medium Hubs
0806 4.0 4
0824 25.0 26.0 1
1202 20.0 23.0 2
1.0
2.0
4.0
5.7
7.0
1.0
5.0
9.0
7.1
6.8
4.0
3.0
4.0
(Continued)
1981
757.0
254.0
11.0
163.5
33.0
53.0
108.0
274.0
53.5
2053.0
821.0
316.0
27.0
220.7
23.0
55.0
144.0
335.0
135.7
2493.4
16.0
42.0
833.0
362.0
22.0
234.0
25.0
83.0
145.0
331.0
139.9
2595.9
12.0
39.0
904.0
390.0
29.0
291.3
68.0
104.0
136.0
468.0
137.1
3175.4
1.0
2.0
83.0
68.0
14.0
36.0
--
(I
Appendix 3.4
Certificated & Commuter Airline Passenger Traffic
@ Large & Medium Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 - 1981
Airport No. 1975 1976
(Continued)
Number of Passengers Enplaned (000)
1977 1978 1979
II. Commuter Airlines (Continued)
B. Medium Hubs (Continued)
2303
2901
4004
4509
4705
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL
GRAND
TOTAL
43.0
14.8
17.1
20.0
2.0
148.9
1334.0
17.0
18.1
14.0
3.0
105.1
1484.5
61,294.7 67,125.5
36.0
23.1
18.5
21.0
4.0
183.6
1860.4
72,382.4
SOURCE: Airport Survey
1/Airports who responded and reported passenger traffic in all years.
1980 1981
38.0
35.9
12.7
37.0
5.0
246.6
2299.6
82,800,9
56.5
41.6
35.0
12.0
203.1
2696.5
92,688.6
56.0
52.8
47.7
27.0
8.0
242.5
2838.4
87,303.8
53.0
60.2
80.4
21.0
38.0
338.6
3514.0
88,301.6
Appendix 3.5
Certificated & Commuter Passenger Traffic @ Small & Non
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975-1981
Hub Airports
Airport Number
I. Non EAS Airports
0102
0800
0815
0817
0819
1101
1109
1110
1301
3200
3600
3700
3702
4702
4116
4506
4507
4605
No.
1975 1976
595.0
238.0
185.0
2.6
7.0
16.0
251.0
181.0
192.0
204.0
242.0
8.0
377.0
265.0
2.0
0.2
4.0
93.0
637.2
275.0
189.0
1.9
4.0
15.0
280.0
202.5
200.0
240.0
260.0
12.0
422.0
303.0
3.0
0.2
5.0
107.0
of Enplaned Passengers (000)
1977 1978 1979 1980
696.0
290.0
218.0
3.6
2.0
16.0
301.0
243.5
219.0
271.0
270.0.
14.0
265.0
346.0
3.0
1.0
7.0
125.0
777.1
342.0
238.0
21.7
1.0
18.0
335.0
270.5
249.0
257.0
304.0
17.0
502.0
354.0
3.0
4.0
9.0
130.0
795.2
397.0
269.0
23.3
0.1
22.0
320.0
270.5
252.0
371.0
319.0
14.0
523.0
380.6
3.0
5.0
23.0
124.0
700.3
379.0
257.0
21.3
0.1
22.0
293.0
205.5
278.0
348.0
292.0
18.6
500.0
351.6
3.0
4.0
24.0
104.0
2854.8 3156.8 3491.1 3832.3 4110.7 3800.7 3179.4
II. EAS Airports
22.0 24.0 21.0 20.0
- 11.3
14.0
13.0
11.0
12.9
(Continued)
()
1981
645.0
287.2
217.0
17.6
1.0
18.0
244.0
193.5
221.0
295.0
245.0
17.0
399.0
276.0
2.0
1.1
18.0
82.0
TOTAL
0303
0401
19.0
.4
(Appendix 3.5
1/
Certificated & Commuter Passenger Traffic @ Small & Non Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975-1981
Airport Number
II. EAS Airports
0412
0422
0424
0432
0436
0809
0903
1108
1206
1305
1504
1704
1707
2010
2503
2504
2703
2804
3007
3100
3102
1975
No. of Enplane
1976 1977
d Passengers (000)
1978 1979 1980
(Continued)
97.0
22.2
34.1
89.2
788.0
197.0
130.0
6.0
22.0
7.2
49.8
35.3
4.4
9.9
29.0
4.3
19.0
23.0
25.0
144.0
126.0
114.0
25.7
40.5
106.8
911.0
220.0
157.0
7.0
26.0
8.0
52.6
40.3
4.5
9.9
32.3
4.0
17.0
30.0
30.0
156.0
148.0
127.0
30.9
47.2
117.1
1082.0
161.0
169.0
7.3
28.0
8.3
55.5
43.3
7.3
10.4
35.4
2.7
23.0
49.0
32.0
171.0
146.0
147.0
42.7
59.6
137.1
1194.0
194.0
170.0
8.4
30.0
8.4
58.7
47.5
6.5
11.4
38.0
4.0
29.0
52.0
37.0
189.0
164.0
95.0
46.3
92.4
129.7
1284.0
204.0
149.0
8.0
32.0
3.4
50.9
43.2
1.3
10.7
42.0
3.3
35.0
48.0
40.0
178.0
158.0
95.0
36.7
88.0
95.2
1192.0
181.0
125.0
8.6
28.0
4.2
38.6
33.7
1.8
10.1
38.8
' 2.4
31.0
29.0
44.0
172.0
133.9
(Continued)
1981
60.0
30.0
53.9
52.2
1198.0
151.0
105.0
6.0
19.0
2.3
32.4
25.5
1.8
3.7
28.8
2.0
13.0
21.0
57.0
161.0
133.0
Appendix 3. 5
Certificated & Commuter Passenger Traffic @ Small & Non Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 - 1981
Airport Number
II. EAS Airports
(Continued)
3106
3503
3612
3805
3901
4114
4118
4119
4606
4607
4700
TOTAL
GRAND
TOTAL
1975
33.0
29.0
38.0
47.0
11.0
12.0
1.2
16.0
32.0
38.0
34.0
No. of Enplaned Passengers
1976 1977 1978 1979
34.0
34.0
41.0
66.0
11.0
18.0
1.2
25.0
35.0
47.0
41.0
36.0
37.0
44.0
72.0
10.0
23.0
1.2
31.0
38.0
52.0
51.0
34.0
33.0
51.0
84.0
12.0
26.0
2.0
37.0
40.0
54.0
59.0
28.0
37.0
52.0
107.0
13.0
40.0
2.0
41.0
37.0
48.0
63.0
(000)
1980
10.0
26.0
49.0
99.0
11.0
38.0
2.0
40.0
27.0
44.0
64.0
1981
12.0
12.0
39.0
100.0
8.0
33.0
2.0
44.0
18.0
43.0
58.0
2172.6 2515.8 2772.6 3081.4 3153,5 2826.0 2549.5
5027.4 5672.6 6263.7 6913.7 7264.2 6626.7 5728.9
Survey of Airports
'/Airports who responded and reported passenger traffic in all years.
SOURCE;
()
Appendix 3.6
Commuter Passengers Enplaned
@ Small & Non Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
Airport Number 1975
Number of Enplaned Passengers (000)
1976 1977 1978 1979
I. Non EAS Airports
0102
0800
0815
0817
0819
1101
1109
1110
1301
3200
3600
3700
3702
4702
4116
4506
4507
4605
TOTAL
0.2
2.6
7.0
16.0
20.0
8.0
0.2
4.0
59.6
1.9
4.0
15.0
15.0
12.0
3.0
0.2
5.0
56.3
6.0
3.6
2.0
16.0
23.0
14.0
3.0
1.0
7.0
75.6
5.1
21.7
1.0
18.0
24.0
17.0
3.0
4.0
9.0
102.8
2.2
23.3
0.2
-22.0
1.3
9.5
4.0
6.0
28.0
14.0
9.0
0.6
3.0
5.0
23.0
- - 8.0
164.8 278.2
(Continued)
1980 1981
0.3
21.2
0.1
22.0
5.3
29.0
19.0
14.0
29.0
18.0
41.0
0.6
3.0
4.0
24.0
1.5
0.2
3.0
17.6
1.0
18.0
8.6
45.0
32.0
23.0
61.0
17.0
47.0
1.0
2.0
1.1
18.0
305.0
Appendix 3. 6
Commuter Passengers Enplaned
@ Small & Non Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 3, 1975 to 1981
(Continued)
Airport Number
II. EAS Airports
0303
0401
0412
0422
0424
0432
0436
0809
0903
1108
1206
1305
1504
1704
1707
2010
2503
2504
1975
6.1
22.2
4.1
40.0
22.0
6.2
4.4
Number of Enplaned Passengers (000)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
7.3
25.7
3.0
61.0
26.0
7.6
4.5
6.9
30.9
2.4
94.0
28.0
2.4
10.7
7.3
2.0
7.7
42.7
4.2
121.0
30.0
3.4
12.9
6.5
1.2
1.6
18.0
11.3
46.3
13.9
138.0
7.0
32.0
3.4
70.0
25.3
1.3
5.0
3.3
14.0
13.0
36.7
3.6
105.0
14.0
28.0
4.2
31.5
33.7
1.8
5.8
2.4
(Continued)
1981
11.0
12.9
30.0
1.9
85.0
2.0
12.0
19.0
2.3
32.4
25.5
1.6
1.1
1.9
2.0
Appendix 3.6
Commuter Passengers Enplaned
@ Small & Non Hub Airports1 '
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 3, 1975 to 1981
(Continued)
Airport Number
II. EAS Airports
(Continued)
2703
2804
3007
3100
3102
3106
3503
3612
3805
3901
4114
4118
4119
4606
4607
4700
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
SOURCE: Airport
1975
23.0
25.0
5.0
0.6
34.0
192.6
252.2
Survey
Number of Enplaned Passengers (000)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
29.0
30.0
4.0
0.6
41.0
239.7
296.0
37.0
32.0
2.0
5.0
0.6
51.0
310.2
385.8
39.0
37.0
7.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
59.0
378.2
481.0
3.0
39.0
40.0
7.0
6.0
36.0
8.0
14.0
1.0
3.0
26.0
5.0
562.8
727.6
10.0
29.0
44.0
7.0
0.0
10.0
5.0
49.0
8.0
13.0
1.0
14.0
25.0
13.0
522.6
800.8
1 1Airports who responded and had certificated or commuter airline passenger
traffic in all years.
1981
13.0
21.0
37.0
7.0
1.0
12.0
8.0
39.0
6.0
10.0
1.0
28.0
18.0
43.0
484.6
789.6
Appendix 3.7
Airport Number
Certificated & Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
@ Large and Medium Hub Airports1 '
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
Number of Aircraft Departures (000)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
I. Certificated Airline
A. Large Hubs
47.0
177.0
103.0
28.5
102.2
80.0
175.0
53.0
146.0
65.0
8.0
57.5
50.0 53.0
180.0 190.0
106.0 104.0
27.9 27.4
105.5 104.3
83.0 84.0
185.0 193.0
55.0 58.0
152.0 158.0
73.0 84.0
12.0 14.0
59.6 59.9
59.0
194.0
103.5
26.6
101.8
06.0
203.0
64.0
168.0
91.0
20.0
65.8
SUBTOTAL 1131.1 1180.2 1242.0 1282.6 1352.7 1358.8 1315.2
B. Medium Hubs
0210
0426
0824
16.0
35.0
16.7
17.0
37.0
17.8
17.0
39.0
17.4
17.0
42.0
18.1
20.0
40.0
23.5
21.0
33.0
25.4
16.0
30.0
24.2
(Continued)
)
0216
0415
0700
0701
1900
2001
2305
2602
4107
4111
4112
4508
44.0
170.0
99.0
27.2
100.0
80.0
174.0
47.0
141.0
59.0
7.0
55.0
64.0
205.0
101.0
17.4
97.~6
90.0
203.0
66.0
172.0
84.0
24.0
76.8
60.0
195.0
97.0
14.6
92.7
79.0
188.0
62.0
176.0
88.0
34.0
70.9
Appendix 3. 7
Certificated & Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
@ Large and Medium Hub Airports-1/
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
(Continued)
Number of Aircraft Departures (000)
Airport Number 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
I. Certificated C)Cn
Airline
(Continued)
A. Medium Hubs
(Continued)
1202 84.0 85.0 84.0 79.0 71.0 63.0 60.0
2901 21.9 22.0 22.8 23.7 24.1 2/ 24.0
4004 28.6 28.7 29.5 32.0 30.7 28.5 26.0
4109 13.6 13.5 15.3 17.4 18.3 17.1 16.7
4509 13.0 14.0 14.0 13.0 16.0 18.0 17.0
4705 37.0 38.0 39.0 36.0 41.0 42.0 39.0
SUBTOTAL 265.8 273.0 278.0 278.2 284.6 248.0 252.9
TOTAL 1396.9 1453.5 1520.0 1558.8 1637.3 1606.8 1565.1
(Continued)
Appendix 3.7
Certificated & Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
@ Large and Medium Hub Airports1'
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
(Continued)
Airport Number
Number of Aircraft
1975 1976 1977 1978
Departures (000)
1979 1980
II. Commuter Airline
A. Large Hubs
0216
0415
0502
0700
0701
1900
2001
2305
2602
4107
4111
4112
4508
SUBTOTAL 196.8 213.3 250.4 272.7 299.2 298.5 321.5
(Continued)
1981
4.0
29.0
30.0
19.0
3.8
11.6
7.0
29.0
8.0
21.0
17.0
2.0
15.4
3.0
32.0
33.0
22.0
5.8
13.6
7.0
29.0
10.0
23.0
17.0
2.0
15.9
3.0
36.0
37.0
23.0
3.5
19.3
9.0
36.0
11.0
30.0
20.0
3.0
19.6
3.0
39.0
37.0
24.0
2.5
25.3
10.0
38.0
12.0
33.0
22.0
6.0
20.9
4.0
34.0
38.0
24.0
4.6
33.7
9.0
35.0
18.0
41.0
26.0
9.0
22.9
10.0
18.0
38.0
26.0
3.9
30.3
11.0
45.0
17.0
45.0
24.0
10.0
20.3
10.0
26.0
38.0
27.5
4.5
32.8
20.0
45.0
16.0
46.0
26.0
10.0
19.7
)
Appendix 3.7
Airport Number
Certificated & Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
@ Large and Medium Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
II. Commuter Airline
(Continued)
B. Medium Hubs
1.3 1.4
3.3 3.3
28.0 29.0
6.1 7.6
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
2.2
1.5
29.0
8.7
2.6 2.2 2.3 3.7
- 8.0 14.0 18.0
0.95
36.0
8.5
- 6.0
1.3
5.0
5.0
1.3
7.0
5.0
2.1
40.0
13.3
8.1
1.3
7.0
6.0
1.0
28.0
2/
8.0
1.3
4.0
4.0
1.6
37.0
10.5
12.2
1.3
4.0
0.6
46.7 49.3 52.7 67.35 88.0 62.6 88.9
243.5 262.6 303.1 340.0 387.2 361.1 410.4
GRAND
TOTAL 1640.4 1716.0 1823.1 1898.8 2024.5 1967.9 1978.5
SOURCE: Airport Survey
1/
Airports who responded and reported airline aircraft departures in all years.
2/This airport did not furnish usable data only for this year.
0210
0426
0824
1202
2901
4004
4109
4509
4705
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL
Appendix 3.8
Certificated & Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
@ Small & Non Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
Airport Number 1975 1976
Number of
1977
Aircraft
1978
Departures (000)
1979 1980
I. Non EAS Airports
6.0
4.2
9.0
8.0
4.0
12.0
3.0
11.0
7.0
14.0
0.7
0.5
9.8
5.0
94.2
6.0
4.3
9.0
7.0
3.5
9.0
4.0
11.0
7.0
13.0
0.7
0.5
9.9
5.0
89.9
6.0
5.8
10.0
8.0
3.4
11.0
5.0
11.0
8.0
13.7
0.8
1.0
9.7
4.0
97.4
6.0
4.6
11.0
7.0
3.4
10.0
5.0
10.0
9.0
11.9
0.8
1.0
9.0
4.0
92.7 99.8 108.2 136.9
(Continued)
1981
0800
0815
1109
1301
2008
3200
2308
3600
3700
3702
3801
4702
4116
4301
4602
4605
TOTAL
6.0
4.5
7.2
7.0
8.0
3.9
8.0
5.0
16.0
8.0
12.0
0.7
1.0
8.5
4.0
6.7
4.6
10.0
7.0
0.5
14.0
7.9
9.0
5.0
12.0
7.0
12.0
0.7
1.0
7.8
3.0
7.5
5.0
17.0
9.0
0.5
23.0
9.3
13.0
5.0
11.0
8.6
11.0
0.7
1.0
10.3
5.0
()
Appendix 3.8
Certificated & Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
@ Small & Non Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
Number of Aircraft Departures (000)
Airport Number 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
II. EAS Airports
0412 6.0 6.0 8.0 9.0 13.0 20.0 18.0
0422 4.9 5.4 5.6 6.7 6.1 4.8 2.8
0424 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.8 5,1 5.5 4.7
0432 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.0 2.6 3.8 4.5
0436 38.0 41.0 46.0 50.0 53.0 45.0 41.0
0809 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
0903 7.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 3.0 2.0 2.0
1108 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.7
1203 1.0 - 0.6 0.6 - - 0.5
1206 22.0 24.0 27.0 29.0 31.0 27.0 19.0
1305 7.5 8.4 8.2 8.8 3.6 4.0 2.4
1306 - - - - - 0.1 0.2
1504 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.9 4.1 5.1 4.7
1707 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1
1904 1.4 1.4 3.1 3.1 1.7 1.7 7.1
2010 1..8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6
2011 4.4 3.4 4.1 4.8 3.7 3.0 4.0
2503 29.0 32.0 35.0 37.0 40.0 38.0 28.0
2504 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 4.2 2.1 2.1
2703 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
(Continued)
Appendix 3, 8
Certificated & Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
@ Small & Non Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
Airport Number
II. EAS Airports
(Continued)
2804
3102
3106
3503
3601
3612
3901
4114
4119
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
SOURCE: Airport
1975
8.1
5.0
2.0
35.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
0.7
0.8
201.8
296.0
Survey
Number of Aircraft Departures (000)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
8.4
6.0
2.0
41.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
0.7
1.0
216.3
306.2
8.9
6.0
3.0
36.2
2.0
5.0
3.0
0.7
1.0
229.1
326.5
8.9
5.0
2.0
36.8
2.0
5.0
3.0
1.6
1.0
239.4
332.1
9.5
5.2
2.0
36.6
2.0
6.0
3.0
2.7
4.0
252.4
352.2
9.6
5.7
1.0
31.7
2.0
7.0
1.0
1.7
4.0
237.1
345.3
- Airports who responded and reported departures in all years.
1981
9.5
6.0
1.0
20.3
2.0
5.0
1.0
1.7
3.8
202.7
339.6
Appendix 3.9
Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
@ Small & Non Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
Airport Number 1975
Number of Aircraft Departures (000)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
I. Non EAS Airports
0800
0815
1109
1301
2008
3200
2308
3600
3700
3702
3801
4702
4116
4301
4602
4605
TOTAL
0.2
4.0
8.0
3.0
2.0
0.5
1.4
19.1
0.3
3.5
5.0
4.0
1.0
0.7
0.5
1.4
16.4
0.8
3.4
6.0
5.0
0.7
0.8
1.0
1.4
19.1
0.6
3.4
5.0
5.0
0.9
0.8
1.0
1.4
18.1
0.5
0.2
2.0
3.9
4.0
5.0
3.0
1.0
0.7
1.0
1.8
23.1
(Continued)
1981
0.7
0.6
4.0
4.0
0.5
7.9
4.0
5.0
3.0
2.0
0.7
1.0
1.6
36.0
1.5
1.0
7.0
5.0
0.5
9.3
9.0
5.0
3.0
0.6
2.0
0.7
1.0
3.5
2.0
51.1
Appendix 3.9
Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
1/@ Small & Non Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
(Continued)
Airport Number
II. EAS Airports
0412
0422
0424
0432
0436
0809
0903
1108
1203
1206
1305
1306
1504
1707
1904
2010
2011
2503
Number of Aircaft Departures (000)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
3.0
4.9
0.6
11.0
1.0
22.0
1.5
1.4
0.4
3.0
5.4
0.6
14.0
24.0
1.5
1.4
0.4
4.0
5.6
0.6
17.0
0.6
27.0
0.7
1.5
3.1
0.1
5.0
6.7
0.8
20.0
0.6
29.0
0.9
1.5
3.1
0.8
1.0
9.0
6.1
2.7
24.0
1.0
31.0
3.6
3.1
1.1
1.7
0.7
4.0
15.0
4.8
2.8
18.0
1.0
1.4
27.0
4.0
0.1
4.9
1.1
1.7
1.0
5.0
13.0
2.8
2.4
0.1
13.0
1.0
1.0
0.7
0.5
19.0
2.4
0.2
4.7
1.1
7.1
0.7
3.0
1.0
(Continued)
(Appendix 3.9
Commuter Airline Aircraft Departures
@ Small & Non Hub Airports-
Responding to Survey
Years Ended December 31, 1975 to 1981
(Continued)
Airport Number
II. EAS Airports
(Continued)
1975
Number of Aircraft Departures
1976 1977 1978 1979
2504
2705
2804
3102
3106
3503
3601
3612
3901
4114
4119
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
8.1
3.0
56.9
76.0
8.4
3.0
8.9
0.2
3.0
0.2
1.0
9.4
0.2
8.9
1.0
2.0
0.7
2.0
9.6
0.7
- 10.0
2.0
2.0
5.0
1.0
2.0
7.0
- - 0.9 2.0 1.0 1.0
- - - 3.0 3.0 3.0
61.7 72.3 82.2 116.2 126.2 133.2
78.1
0,1.0
4.0
9.5
1.0
12.0
1.0
2.0
5.0
91.4 100.3 139.3 162.2 184.3
SOURCE: Airport Survey
1/
-/Airports who responded and reported commuter aircraft departures in all
years.
(000)
1980 1981
-459-
Large Hub
Appendix 3.10
Seats Offered Per Week
At Large Hubs-
April 1, 1978 & 1982
# of Seats Per Week
April April
1978 1982
% Increase
(Decrease)
Atlanta
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
Houston
Las Vegas
Los Angeles
Miami
Minneapolis
New Orleans
New York/Newark
Orlando
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
San Francisco
572,990
239,255
768,024
408,151
299,962
202,252
232,621
117,348
534,205
318,545
165,935
122,312
824,450
104,574
199,992
121,514
196,446
198,107
348,080
(Continued)
649,790
274,308
605,025
596,507
381,488
191,857
354,164
153,460
517,424
391,202
197,853
131,659
893,6445
145,817
187,088
176,487
186,018
217,593
321,071
13.4
14.6
(21.2)
46.1
27.2
(5.1)
58.3
30.7
(3.1)
22.8
17.4
7.6
8.3
39.4
(6.4)
45.2
(5.3)
9.8
(7.7)
-460-
Appendix 3.10
Seats Offered Per Week
At Large Hubs-
April 1, 1978 & 1982
# of Seats Per Week
Large Hub
Seattle
Tampa
Washington D.C.
April
1978
171,712
181,080
303,338
April
1982
181,359
177,298
273,506
% Increase
(Decrease)
5.6
(2.0)
(9.8)
6,630,893 7,201,619
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares,
Traffic, Load Factors, and Market Shares,"
Issue No. 21, June 1982, Table 15.
!/Hub classification based on September 30, 1981
traffic data.
TOTAL 8.6
-461-
Medim Thub
Albuquerque
Austin
Baltimore
Buffalo
Charlotte
Cincinatti
Cleveland
Columbus, OH
Dayton
El Paso.
Greensboro
Hartford
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Louisville
Memphis
Milwaukee
Nashville
Norfolk
Appendix 3.11
Seats Offered Per Week
At Medium Hubs!!
April 1, 1978 & 1982
#~ of Seats Per Week
April April
1978 19-82
46,900 50,712
33,050 45,205
80,001 98,447
86,038 81,246
67,643 114,894
78,256 95,744
136,279 100,738
56,193 61,672
56,442 40,778
38,255 41,549
28,329 40,787
75,645 56,454
76,401 69,972
122,963 121,597
61,099 52,597
108,599 101,724
76,251 81,658
60,746 56,375
39,184 46,717
(Continued)
% Increase
(Decrease)
8.1
36.7
23.0
(5.5)
69.8
22.3
(26.0)
9.7
(27.7)
8.6
43.9
(25.3)
(8.4)
(1.1)
(13.9)
(6.3)
7.0
(7.1)
19.2
-462-
Medium Hub
Oakland
Oklahoma City
Omaha
Ontario
Portland, OR
Raleigh/Durham
Reno
Rochester NY
Sacramento
Salt Lake City
San Antonio
San Diego
San Jose
Spokane
Syracuse
Tucson
Tulsa
West Palm Beach
TOTAL
Appendix 3,11
Seats Offered Per Week
At Medium Hubs-
April 1, 1978 & 1982
(Continued)
# of Seats Per Week
April April
1978 1982
50,605
59,270
48,033
35,953
97,212
32,567
28,983
47,661
45,019
74,093
67,601
104,597
67,181
35,700
35,794
43,403
56,771
-57,725
2:,3-61:,281
47,936
48,435
36,678
36,228
78,502
43,276
47,386
45,016
45,417
81,192
72,104
93,829
53,143
31,965
38,067
41,196
51,006
- 79,159
2:,376,:895
% Increase
(Decrease)
(5.2)
(18.2)
(23.6)
0.7
(19.2)
32.8
63.4
(5.5)
0.8
9.5
6.6
(10.2)
(20.8)
(10.4)
6.3
(5.0)
(10.1)
- 37.1
0.7
-463-
Appendix 3.11
Seats Offered Per Week
At Medium Hubs"'
April 1, 1978 & 1982
(Continued)
Documentation
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares,
Traffic, Load Factors, and Market Shares,"
Issue No. 21, June 1982, Table 15.
-
1Hub classification based on September 30, 1978
traffic data.
-464-
Small Hub
Albany NY
Allentown
Amarillo
Asheville
Augusta GA
Baton Rouge
Billings
Birmingham
Bismarck
Boise
Bristol, TN
Burlington VT
Cedar Rapdis
Charleston SC
Charleston WV
Chattanooga
Colorado Springs
Columbia SC
Corpus Christi
Appendix 3.12
Seats Offered Per Week
At Small Hubsi/
April 1, 1978 & 1982
# of Seats Per Week
April April
1978 1982
27,918
13,459
15,819
13,098
13,664
15,780
18,215
41,519
10,380
21,039
15,692
8,189
14,679
19,979
15,603
19,477
16,466
24,459
13,250
(Continued)
26,793
14,122
15,712
9,641
5,754
18,635
18,922
35,437
12,104
23,215
12,746
11,409
13,406
18,241
13,383
11,169
9,216
19,787
14,770
% Increase
(Decrease)
(4.0)
4.9
(0.6)
(26.3)
(57.8)
18.0
3.8
(14.6)
16.6
10.3
(18.7)
39.3
(8.6)
(8.6)
(14.2)
(42.6)
(44.0)
(19.0)
11.4
-465-
Small Hub
Des Moines
Eugene
Evansville
Fargo
Fort Myers
Fort Wayne
Fresno
Gainsville
Grand Junction
Grand Rapids
Green Bay
Greenville SC
Harlingen
Harrisburg
Huntsville
Jackson MS
Knoxville
Lexington KY
Appendix 3.12
Seats Offered Per Week
At Small Hubs1
April 1, 1978 & 1982
(Continued)
# of Seats Per Week
April April
1978 1982
33,857 29,278
9,261 8,655
10,217 8,207
12,210 12,806
15,407 30,724
12,921 14,544
20,732 15,079
6,037 6,789
7,219 4,714
22,244 20,334
20,407 18,405
16,672 12,401
7,118 14,476
12,719 10,571
15,908 13,210
25,743 21,102
23,617 18,787
16,595 14,962
(Continued)
% Increase
(Decrease)
(13.5)
(6.5)
(19.6)
4.8
99.4
12.5
(27.2)
12.4
(34.7)
(8.5)
(9.8)
(25.6)
103.3
(16.8)
(16.9)
(18.0)
(20.4)
(9.8)
-466-
Small Hub
Appendix 3.12
Seats Offered Per Week
At Small Hubs1 '
April 1, 1978 & 1982
(Continued)
# of Seats Per Week
April April
1978 1982
% Increase
(Decrease)
Lincoln NB
Little Rock
Lubbock
Madison
Melbourne
Midland/Odessa
McAllen/Mission
Mobile
Moline
Montgomery
Palm Springs
Pensacola
Peoria
Portland ME
Providence
Richmond
Roanoke
Saginaw
17,825
26,242
24,299
26,895
9,212
21,073
3,600
20,438
19,998
14,428
14,961
10,857
17,329
12,778
25,497
29,879
25,174
11,050
(Continued)
9,662
24,287
24,335
22,481
7,950
23,758
8.460
18,876
14,753
7,915
12,952
11,532
12,619
11,803
19,716
31,921
21,551
8,476
(45.7)
(7.4)
0.1
(16.4)
(13.6)
12.7
135.0
(7.6)
(26.2)
(45.1)
(13.4)
6.2
(27.1)
(7.6)
(22.6)
6.8
(14.3)
(23.2)
-467-
Appendix 3.12
Seats Offered Per Week
At Small Hubs-
April 1, 1978 & 1982
(Continued)
# of Seats Per Week
Small Hub
Salinas/Monterey
Santa Barbara
Sarasota
Savannah
Shreveport
Sioux Falls
Tallahassee
Toledo
Wichita
TOTAL
April
1978
9,009
7,657
21,873
13,500
28,935
16,025
15,648
16,174
29,959
1,117,884
April
1982
6,917
6,065
34,481
16,313
20,277
15,337
1'/,240
14,500
26,935
1,031,518_
% Increase
(Decrease)
(23.2)
(20.7)
57.1
20.8
(29.9)
(4.2)
10.1
(10.3)
(10.0)
(7.7)
SOURCE: U.S. CAB, "Report on Airline Service, Fares,
Traffic, Load Factors and Market Shares,"
Issue No. 21, June 1982, Table 15.
!/Hub classification based on September 30, 1981
data.
(Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal 1/
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
EAS Point Hub Point
Nonstop Basic 1-way
Miles 1978
Air Fare
fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
ALABAMA
Anniston
Dothan
Gadsten
Muscle Shoals
Tuscaloosa
ARIZONA
Flagstaff
Grand Canyon
Kingman
Page
Prescott
Yuma
Phoenix
Las Vegas
Phoenix
Las vegas
Phoenix
Phoenix
ARKANSAS
El Dorado Dallas
Memphis
241
206
57.00
52.00
85.00
77.00
49,1
48,1
23.7 35.3
25.2 37.4
(Continued)
Atlanta
Atlanta
Atlanta
Atlanta
Memphis
Atlanta
Memphis
82
171
98
198
136
186
185
$33.00
47.00
33.00
51.00
43.00
49,00
40.00
$ 82.00
124.00
49.00
131.00
124.00
85.00
100.00
75.8
163.8
48.5
156.9
188.4
73.5
150.0
40.2
27.5
33.7
25.8
31.6
26.3
21.6
70.7
72.5
50.0
66.2
91.2
45.7
54.0
140
169
181
289
96
183
40.00
47.00
33.00
49,00
24.00
45.00
54.00
100.00
59.00
82.00
35.00
50.00
35,0
112.8
78.8
67.3
45.8
11.1
28.6
27.8
18.2
17.0
25.0
24.6
38.6
59.2
32.6
28.4
36.5
27.3
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point
ARKANSAS (Continued)
Fayetteville
Fort Smith
Harrison
Hot Springs
Jonesboro
Texarkana
Hub Point
Dallas
Kansas City
Dallas
Memphis
Kansas City
St. Louis
Dallas
Memphis
Memphis
Dallas
Air Fare
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
Miles 1978 1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
274
223
232
249
318
230
. 182
255
66
183
$49.00 $ 93.00
46.00 109.00
51.00 83.00
44.00 105.00
54.00 104.00
53.00 104.00
58.00 79.00
44.00 65.00
33.00 39.00
48.00 75.00
89.8
137.0
62.7
138.6
87.8
94.3
36.2
47.7
18.2
52.1
17.9
20.6
22.0
17.7
17.0
23.0
31.8
17.3
50.0
26.2
33.9
48.9
35.8
42.2
32.7
45.2
43.4
25.5
59.1
40.0
CALIFORNIA
Bakersfield
Chico
El Centro
Eureka
Inyokern
Lake Tahoe
Merced
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Portland
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Francisco
(Continued)
I
228
108
145
173
235
333
120
150
265
111
$20,15
24.85
26.74
28.84
30.93
68.00
30.20
22.00
28.00
17.60
$ 47.00
79.00
55.00
62.00
92.00
120.00
55.00
59.00
66.00
39.00
133.3
217,9
105.7
115.0
197.4
76.5
82.1
168.2
135.7
121.6
8.8
23.0
18.4
16.7
13.2
20.4
25.2
14,7
10.6
15.9
20.6
73.1
38.0
35.9
39.1
36.0
45.8
39.3
24.9
35.1
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare %Incr
Miles 1978 1982 (Decr)
Air Fare
C/Pax Mile
1978 1982
CALIFORNIA (Continued)
Modesto
Orange County/
Santa Ana
Oxnard
Palmdale
Redding
San Luis Obsipo
Santa Barbara
Santa Maria
Santa Rosa
Stockton
Visalia
Monterey
San Francisco
Los Angeles
Los Angeles
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Francisco
San Francisco
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Francisco
82 $17.60 $ 40.00 127.3
32
59
55
190
144
191
100
250
146
225
56
67
170
195
270
87
18.20
19.20
20.20
28.84
33.50
35.50
18.95
35.75
25.68
35.50
28.00
18.00
22.00
23.45
56.20
17.30
36.00
39.00
39.00
79.00
61.00
69.00
47.00
83.00
56.00
72.00
39.00
39.00
63.00
63.00
76.00
41.00
97.8
103.1
93.1
173.9
82.1
94.4
148.0
132.2
118.1
102.8
39.3
116.7
186.4
168.7
35.3
131.2
21.5 48.8
56.9
32.5
36.7
15.2
23.3
18.6
19.0
14.3
17.6
15.8
50.0
36.9
12.9
12.0
20.7
19.9
112.5
66.1
70.9
41.6
42.4
36.1
47.0
33.2
38.4
32.0
69.6
58.2
37.1
32.3
28.2
46.0
COLORADO
47.00
35.00
70.00
54.00
27.8 41.4
31.0 47.8
(Continued)
Alamosa
Aspen
Denver
Denver
169
113
48.9
54.3
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets!
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare
Miles 1978 1982
% Incr
(Decr)
Air Fare
C/Pax Mile
1978 1982
COLORADO (Continued)
Cortez
Durango
Gunnison
Lamar
Montrose
Pueblo
Steamboat Sprs.
CONNECTICUT
Bridgeport
New Haven
New London
Denver
Albuquerque
Denver
Denver
Denver
Denver
Denver
Denver
Boston
Boston
New York
New York
FLORIDA
Eglin AFB
Gainsville
Atlanta '
New Orleans
Atlanta
Miami
(Conttnued)
265
152
188
139
166
184
104
113
$53.00
42.00
53.00
34.00
47.00
34.00
32.00
42.00
29.00
29.00
32.00
22.00
$ 93.00
69.00
123.00
63.00
92.00
78.00
52.00
62.00
44.00
44.00
35.00
39.00
75.5
64.3
132.1
88.2
95.7
129.4
62.5
47.6
51.7
51.7
9.4
77.3
20.0
27.6
28.2
24.5
28.3
18.5
30.8
37.2
21.2
23.2
49.2
21.6
137
125
65
102
35.1
45.4
65.4
45.3
55.4
42.4
50.0
47.6
32.1
35.2
53.8
38.2
250
185
300
295
57.00
54.00
50.00
49.00
130.00
130.0
128.00
123.00
128.1
140.7
156.0
151.0
22.8
29.2
16.7
16.6
52.0
70.3
42.7
41.7
(Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Nonstop Basic 1-way
Miles 1978
fare % Incr
1982 (Decr)
Air Fare
C/Pax Mile
1978 1982
FLORIDA (Continued)
Key West
Melbourne
Panama City
GEORGIA
Albany
Athens
Augusta
Brunswick
Columbus
Macon
Moultrie
Valdosta
IDAHO
Lewiston
Pocatello
Miami
Atlanta
Miami
Atlanta
Orlando
Atlanta
Atlanta
Atlanta
Atlanta
Atlanta
Atlanta
Atlanta
Atlanta
Boise
Spokane
Boise
Salt Lake
(Continued)
126
443
160
247
288
146
67
143
247
. 183
79
186
208
$32.00
64.00
35.00
57.00
49.00
44.00
26.00
33.00
47.00
27.00
27.00
46.00
46.00
48.00
36.00
50.00
34.00
$ 45.00
152.00
58.00
135.00
111.00
117.00
49.00
78.00
90.00
66.00
66.00
88.00
88.00
115.00
90.00
120.00
61.00
40.6
137.5
65.7
136.8
126.5
165.9
88.5
136.4
91.5
144.4
144.4
91.1
91.1
139.6
150.0
140.0
79.4
25.4
14.4
21.9
23.1
17.0
30.1
38.3
23.1
19.0
32.5
34.2
24.7
22.1
24.2
40.4
26.5
22.7
35.7
34.3
36.3
54.7
38.5
80.1
73.1
54.5
36.4
79.5
83.5
47.3
42.3
58.1
101.1
63.5
40.7
198
89
189
150City
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal 1/
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Nonstop Basic 1-way
Miles 1978
Air Fare
fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
IDAHO (Continued)
Sun Valley
Twin Falls
ILLINOIS
Bloomington
Champaign
Danville
Decatur
Galesburg
Matoon
Mount Vernon
Quincy
Springfield
Sterling
Boise
Salt Lake
Boise
Salt Lake
Chicago
Chicago
St. Louis
Chicago
Chicago
St. Louis
Chicago
Chicago
St. Louis
St. Louis
Chicago
St. Louis
Chicago
INDIANA
Bloomington Chicago
Indianapolis
198
44
42.00
30.00
72.00
40.00
71.4
33.3
21.2 36.4
68.2 90.9
(Continued)
City
City
96
223
116
175
114
130
143
116
152
110
153
168
87
94
173
84
100
$33.00
55.00
40.00
46.00
39.00
42.00
43.00
40.00
45.00
39.00
34.00
45.00
36.00
37.00
45.00
36.00
32.00
$ 69.00
106.00
95.00
115.00
45.00
50.00
117.00
65.00
68.00
80.00
50.00
55.00
54.00
49.00
68.00
74.00
40.00
109.1
92.7
137.5
150.0
15.4
19.0
172.1
62.5
51.1
105.1
47.1
22.2
50.0
32.4
51.1
105.6
25.0
34.4
24.7
34.5
26.3
34.2
32.3
30.1
34.5
29.6
35.5
22.2
26.8
41.4
39.4
26.0
42.9
32.0
71.9
47.5
81.9
68.7
39.5
46.2
81.8
56.0
44.7
72.7
32.6
32.7
62.1
52.1
39.3
88.1
40.0
(: 1
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point
-Nonstop
Hub Point
Basic 1-way
Miles -1978
Air Fare
fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
INDIANA(Continued)
Elkhart
Kokomo
Lafayette
Muncie
Terre Haute
Burlington
Clinton
Dubuque
Fort Dodge
Mason City
Ottumwa
Waterloo
Chicago
Detroit
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Indianapolis
Chicago
Indianapolis
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Minneapolis
KANSAS
Dodge City
Garden City
Wichita
Wichita
139
182
40.00
48.00
86.00 115.0
96.00 100.0
28.8 61.9
26.4 52.8
(Continued)
IOWA
92
150
- 139
110
167
* 59
~ 169
58
191
125
156
333
298
249
242
167
$33.00
41.00
33.00
34.00
39.00
30.00
41.00
30.00
45.00
35.00
39.00
65.00
64.00
50.00
50.00
43.00
$ 64.00
95.00
65.00
77.00
67.00
40.00
71.00
40.00
88.00
69.00
78.00
138.00
135.00
104.00
114.00
104.00
93.9
131.7
97.0
126.5
71.8
33.3
73.2
33.3
95.6
97.1
100.0
112.3
110.9
108.0
128.0
141.9
35.9
29.3
33.1
30.9
23.4
50.8
24.3
51.7
23.6
28.0
25.0
19.5
21.5
20.1
20.7
37.3
70.0
63.3
46.8
70.0
40.1
67.8
42.0
69.0
46.1
55.2
50.0
41.4
45.3
41.8
47.1
62.2
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets!
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Air Fare
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
Miles 1978 1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
KANSAS (Continued)
Goodland
Great Bend
Hays
Hutchinson
Independence/
Parsons
Liberal
Manhattan
Salina
Topeka
Denver
Wichita
Wichita
Wichita
Kansas City
Denver
Kansas City
Kansas City
Denver
Kansas City
Denver
KENTUCKY
London
Owensboro
Paducah
Louisville
Louisville
Louisville
St. Louis
(Continued)
0
172
92
130
37
137
284
108
165
393
55
497
$47.00
35.00
40.00
27,00
39.00
61.00
38.00
46.00
66.00
29.00
73,00
$ 94.00
71,00
84.00
51.00
108.00
123.00
60.00
100.00
155.00
44.00
179.00
100.0
102.9
110.0
88.9
176,9
101.6
57.9
117.4
134.8
51.7
145.2
27.3
38.0
30.8
72.9
28.5
21.5
35.2
27.9
16.8
52.7
14.7
54.6
77.2
64.6
137.8
78.8
43.3
55.2
60.6
39.4
80.0
36.0
118
84
183
145
38.00
35.00
42.00
44.00
66.00
49.00
73.00
76.00
73.7
48.0
73.8
72.7
32.2
41.7
23.0
30.3
55.9
58.3
39.9
52.4
UAppendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
Hub PointEAS Point
LOUISIANA
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare % Incr
Miles 1978 1982 (Decr)
Air Fare
C/Pax Mile
1978 1982
Alexandria
Lafayette
Lake Charles
Dallas
New Orleans
Houston
New Orleans
Houston
New Orleans
Augusta
Bangor
Bar Harbor
Lewiston
Presque Isle
Rockland
MARYLAND
Hagerstown
Salisbury
Boston
Boston
Boston
Boston
Boston
Boston
Baltimore
Baltimore
156
201
196
122
332
151
62
85
38.00
39.00
43.00
35.00
53.00
39.00
29.00
32.00
75.00
91.00
89.00
62.00
119.00
79.00
60.00
61.00
97.4
133.3
107.0
77.1
124.5
102.6
106.9
90.6
24.4
19.4
21.9
28.7
16.0
25.8
48.1
45.3
45.4
50.8
35.8
52.8
46.8 96.8
37.6 71.8
(Continued)
MAINE
296
160
201
112
127
185
$64.00
35.00
50.00
38.00
41.00
48.00
$112.00
75.00
85.00
72.00
81.00
-93.00
75.0
114.3
70.0
89.5
97.6
93.8
21.6
21.9
24.9
33.9
32.2
25.9
37.8
46.9
42.3
64.3
63.8
50.3
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Air Fare
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
Miles 1978 1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
MASSACHUSETTS
Hyannis
Martha's
Vineyard
Nantucket
New Bedford
Worcester
MICHIGAN
Alpena
Battle Creek
Benton Harbor
Escanaba
Hancock
Iron Mountain
Jackson
Kalamazoo
Detroit
Chicago
Detroit
Chicago
Milwaukee
Chicago
Green Bay
Chicago
Detroit
Chicago
Detroit
(Continued)
It
Boston
New York
Boston
New York
Boston
New York
New York
New York
61
203
70
180
91
202
169
153
$26.00
49.00
32.00
46.00
32.00
49.00
42.00
34.00
$ 37.00
98.00
54.00
110.00
54.00
98.00
76.00
69.00
42.3
100.0
68.8
139.1
68.8
100.0
80.9
102.9
42.6
24.1
45.7
25.6
35.2
24.3
24.9
22.2
60.7
48.2
77.1
61.1
59.3
48.6
45.0
45.1
192
138
98
71
195
365
90
171
66
116
122
46.00
37.00
36.00
33.00
46.00
67.00
33.00
43.00
30.00
37.00
36.00
102.0
75.0
85.00
90.00
116.00
197.00
94.00
79.00
39.00
95.00
98.00
121.7
102.7
136.1
172.7
152.2
194.0
184.8
83.7
30.0
156.8
172.2
24.0
26.8
36.7
46.5
23.6
18.4
36.7
25.1
45.5
31.9
29.5
53.1
54.3
86.7
126.8
59.5
54.0
109.4
46.2
59.1
81.9
80.3
((
EAS Point Hub Point
Nonstop
Miles
Basic 1-way fare % Incr
1978 1982 (Decr)
Air Fare
C/Pax Mile
1978 1982
MICHIGAN (Continued)
Marinette/
Menominee
Marquette
Muskegon
Pellston
Sault Ste.
Marie
Traverse City
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Detroit
Chicago
Detroit
Detroit
Chicago
Detroit
224
322
118
167
295
239
286
226
207
$49.00 $ 99.00
61,00
31.00
35.00
59.00
52.00
60.00
53.00
47.00
139.00
89.00
98.00
145.00
125.00
145.00
125.00
120.00
MINNESOTA
Brainerd
Chisholm/
Hibbing
Duluth
Fairmont
Minneapolis
Minneapolis
Chicago
Minneapolis
Minneapolis
135
165
400
150
140
37.00 100.00 170.3
43.00
69.00
39.00
35.00
115.00
156.00
105.00
70.00
167.4
117.4
169.2
100.0
27.4 74.0
26.1
17.3
26.0
25.0
69.7
37.5
70.0
50.0
(Continued)
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
102.0
127.9
187.1
180.0
145.8
140.4
141.7
135,8
155.3
21.9
18.9
26.3
21.0
20.0
21.8
21.0
23.5
33.8
44.2
43.2
75.4
58.7
49.2
52.3
50.7
55.3
58.0
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal 1/
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Air Fare
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
Miles 1978 1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
MINNESOTA (Continued)
Mankato
Thief River
Falls
MISSISSIPPI
Columbus
Greenville
Greenwood
Gulfport/
Biloxi
Jackson
Laurel
Meridian
Natchez
Minneapolis
Minneapolis
Atlanta
Memphis
Memphis
Memphis
Atlanta
New Orleans
Atlanta
Dallas
Atlanta
Memphis
Atlanta
Memphis
New Orleans
70 $30.00 $ 60.00 100.0
310
241
196
122
107
352
170
341
409
308
250
267
200
123
48.00 120.00 150.0
53.00
40.00
38.00
38.00
71.00
32.00
54.00
61.00
54.00
55.00
45.00
51.00
41.00
125.00
108.00
103.00
62.00
140.00
91.00
128.00
125.00
138.00
135.00
138.00
131.00
69.00
135.8
170.0
171.1
63.1
97.2
184.4
137.0
104.9
155.6
145.5
206.7
156.9
68.3
42.9 85.7
15.5 38.7
22.0
20.4
31.1
35.5
20.2
18.8
15.8
14.9
17.5
22.0
16.9
25.5
33.3
51.9
55.1
84.4
57.9
39.8
53.5
37.5
30.6
44.8
54.0
51.7
65.5
56.1
(Continued)
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Comparison of Normal 1/
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Air Fare
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
Miles 1978 1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
MISSISSIPPI (Continued)
Tupelo
University/
Oxford
Atlanta
Memphis
Memphis
253
86
$53.00 $130.00
36.00 98.00
52 31.00 48.00
145.3
172.2
54.8
20.9 51.4
41.9 114.0
59.6 92.3
MISSOURI
Cape Girardeau
Columbia
Ft. Leonard
Wood
Kirksville
Springfield
St. Louis
Kansas City
St. Louis
St. Louis
St. Louis
Kansas City
St. Louis
MONTANA
Glasgow
Glendive
Lewiston
Billings
Billings
Billings
(Continued)
114
152
195
119
149
152
195
40.00
35.00
38.00
38.00
43.00
35.00
45.00
70.00
86.00
78.00
69.00
63.00
108.00
104.00
75.0
145.7
105.3
81.6
46.5
208.6
131.1
35.1
23.0
19.5
31.9
28.9
23.0
23.1
61.4
56.6
40.0
58.8
42.3
71.0
53.3
189
201
92
49.00
51.00
37.00
89.00
92.00
52.00
81.6
80.4
40.5
25.9
25.4
40.2
47.1
45.8
56.5
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal 1/
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Air Fare
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare % Incr <./Pax Mile
Miles 1978 1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
MONTANA (Continued)
Miles City
Sidney
Wolf Point
West
Yellowstone
Billings
Billings
Billings
Denver
Salt Lake City
NEBRASKA
Alliance
Chadron
Columbus
Grand Island
Hastings
Kearney
McCook
Norfolk
North Platte
Denver
Denver
Omaha
Denver
Omaha
Omaha
Denver
Omaha
Denver
Omaha
Denver
Omaha
135
245
212
480
280
210
240
95
357
128
170
318
190
254
93
240
251
(Continued)
$42.00-
56.00
51.00
82.00
47.00
49.00
50.00
35.00
63.00
41.00
43.00
63.00
46.00
54.00
33.00
55.00
56.00
$ 76.00
101.00
.93.00
174.00
92.00
82.00
89.00
50.00
148.00
90.00
82.00
113.00
82.00
89.00
51.00
123.00
126.00
81.0
80.4
82.4
112.2
95.7
67.3
78.0
42.9
134.9
119.5
90.7
79.4
78.3
64.8
54.5
123.6
125.0
36.1
22.9
24.1
17.1
16.8
23.3
20.8
36.8
17.6
32.0
25.3
19.8
24.2
21.3
35.5
22.9
22.3
56.3
41.2
43.9
36.6
32.9
39.0
37.0
52.6
41.5
70.3
48.2
35.5
43.2
35.0
54.8
51.3
50.2
(Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal 1/
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Nonstop Basic 1-wal
: Miles 1978
Air Fare
fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
Scottsbluff
Sidney
Denver
Denver
160
160
$45.00 $100.00
42.00 69.00
122.2
64.3
28.1 62.5
26.3 43.1
NEVADA
Reno
Salt Lake City
Reno
Salt Lake City
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Keene
Lebanon
Manchester
New York
Boston
New York
Boston
New York
NEW JERSEY
Atlantic City
Cape May
Trenton
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
(Continued)
Elko
Ely
230
200
264
184
48.00
39.00
46,00
38.00
0o
78.00
73.00
85.00
70,00
62.00
53.00
90.00
56,00
59.00
275
86
240
130
220
62.5
87,2
84.8
84.2
44,4
82,7
95,7
69.7
51,3
43.00
29.00
46.00
33.00
39,00
20.9
19.5
17.4
20.7
15.6
33.7
19.2
24.4
17.7
33.9
36.5
32.2
38.0
22.5
61.6
37.5
43.1
26.8
60
73
30
31,00
31,00
28,00
67,00
68.00
58.00
116.1
119.4
107.1
51.7
42,4
93.3
111.7
93.2
193.3
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal I/
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point
NEW MEXICO
Hub Point
Air Fare
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
Miles 1978 1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
Alamagordo
Carlsbad
Clovis
Farmington
Gallup
Hobbs
Roswell
Santa Fe
Silver City
NEW YORK
Binghamton
Catskill
Elmira
Ithaca
Jamestown
Massena
Ogdensburg
Albuquerque
Albuquerque
Albuquerque
Denver
Albuquerque
Albuquerque
Albuquerque
Denver
Albuquerque
New York
New York
New York
Pittsburgh
New York
Pittsburgh
Buffalo
Pittsburgh
Syracuse
Syracuse
(Continued)
160
230
194
277
127
253
163
284
185
145
81
182
208
178
236
61
127
141
113
$42,00
55.00
52.00
53.00
39.00
53.00
47.00
40.00
39,00
41.00
31.00
45.00
49.00
52.00
49.00
31.00
39.00
39.00
34.00
$ 70.00
109.00
102.00
123.00
77.00
116.00
94.00
99.00
99.00
88.00
53.00
86.00
108.00
89.00
119.00
63.00
86.00
70.00
69.00
66.7
98.2
96.2
132.0
97.4
118.9
100.0
147.5
153.8
114.6
71.0
91.1
120.4
71.2
142.9
103.2
120.5
79.5
102.9
26.3
23.9
26.8
19.1
30,7
20.9
28.8
13.6
21.1
28,3
38.3
24.7
23.6
29.2
20.8
50.8
30.7
27.7
30.1
43.8
47.4
52.6
44.4
60.6
45.8
57.7
33.7
53.5
60.7
65.4
47.3
51.9
50.0
50.4
103.3
67.7
49.6
61.1
)
( j
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal 1/
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare % Incr
Miles 1978 1982 (Decr)
Air Fare
C/Pax Mile
1978 1982
NEW YORK (Continued)
Plattsburgh
Saranac Lake
Utica
Watertown
White Plains
Albany
Albany
New York
Syracuse
Boston
NORTH CAROLINA
Asheville
Fayetteville
Hickory
Jacksonville
Kinston
New Bern
Rocky Mount
Atlanta
Washington
Atlanta
Washington
Atlanta
Atlanta
Washington
Atlanta
Washington
Raleigh
Richmond
Raleigh
(Continued)
(
135
115
183
61
151
$40.00
38.00
45.00
28.00
42.00
$ 70.00.
62.00
89.00
40.00
65.00
75.0
63.2
97.8
42.9
54.8
22.2
33.0
24.6
45.9
27.8
51.9
53.9
48.6
65.6
43.0
164
380
330
285
225
407
281
406
247
115
172
55
38.00
69.00
63.00
57.00
47.00
70.00
59.00
63.00
49.00
37.00
27.00
31.00
90.00
158.00
127.00
90.00
90.00
132.00
95.00
137.00
90.00
63.00
58.00
61.00
136.8
129.0
101.6
57.9
91.5
88.6
61.0
117.5
83.7
70.3
114.8
96.8
23.1
18.2
19.1
20.0
20.9
17.2
21.0
15.5
19.8
32.2
15.7
56.4
54.9
41.6
38.5
31.6
40.0
32.4
33.8
33.7
36.4
54.8
33.7
110.9
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Air Fare
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
Miles 1978 1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
NORTH CAROLINA (Continued)
Wilmington
Winston-Salem
NORTH DAKOTA
OHIO
Jamestown
Williston
Mansfield
Youngstown
OKLAHOMA
Enid
Lawton
Ponca City
Atlanta
Raleigh
Washington
Bismarck
Bismarck
Billings
Cleveland
Chicago
Pittsburgh
Oklahoma City
Dallas
Oklahoma City
Oklahoma City
(Continued)
377
123
253
105
166
284
59
320
37
69
140
73
96
$64.00
41.00
44.00
29.00
40.00
61.00
30.00
57.00
. 25,00
34,00
34,00
26.00
31.00
$132.00
70.00
115.00
59.00
85.00
111.00
49.00
142.00
59.00
43.00
70.00
44.00
47.00
102.3
70.7
161.4
103.4
112.5
82.0
63.3
149.1
136.0
26,4
105.9
69.2
51.6
17.0
33.3
17.4
21.6
24.1
21.5
50.8
15.4
43.9
49.3
24.3
46.6
32.3
35.0
56.9
45.5
56.2
51.2
39.1
83.1
38.4
103.5
62.3
50.0
60.3
49.0
( '(
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets1 '
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point
OREGON
Hub Point
Nonstop Basic 1-way
Miles 1978
Air Fare
fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
Astoria
Bend/Redmond
Klamath Falls
Medford
North Bend
Pendleton
Salem
Portland
Portland
San Francisco
Portland
San Francisco
Portland
Portland
Portland
Medford
Portland
PENNSYLVANIA
Altoona
Bellefonte/
State College
Bradford
Du Bois
Erie
Johnstown
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Buffalo
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
83 37.00
120
127
79
78
113
55
37.00
30.00
33.00
37.00
34.00
33.00
71.00
74.00
84.00
66.00
78.00
82.00
67.00
91.9
100.0
121.1
100.0
110.8
141.2
103.0
44.6 85.5
30.8
29.9
41.8
47.4
30.1
60.0
61.6
66.1
83.6
100.0
72.6
121.8
(Continued)
73
116
464
240
307
222
170
182
160
51
$34.00
40.00
74.00
43.00
51.00
42.00
47.00
37.00
37.00
24.00
$ 47.00
95.00
99.00
105.00
95.00
79.00
84.00
73.00
69.00
46.00
38.2
137.5
110.6
144.2
86.3
88.1
78.7
97.3
86.5
91.7
46.6
34.5
15.9
17.9
16.6
18.9
27.6
20.3
23.1
47.1
64.4
81.9
21.3
43.8
30.9
35.6
49.4
40.1
43.1
90.2
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Nonstop Basic 1-way fare
Miles 1978
% Incr
1982 (Decr)
Air Fare
"/Pax Mile
1978 1982
PENNSYLVANIA (Continued)
Lancaster
Oil City/
Franklin
Reading
Williamsport
SOUTH CAROLINA
Florence
Myrtle Beach
SOUTH DAKOTA
Aberdeen
Watertown
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Atlanta
Charlotte
Atlanta
Washington
Minneapolis
Sioux Falls
Minneapolis
Rapid City
58 $33.00 $ 65.00
70
47
135
163
273
100
323
336
261
154
167
298
31.00
30,00
39.00
43.00
57,00
30,00
65.00
61.00
53,00
40.00
42.00
51.00
61.00
63.00
76.00
89,00
93.00
58.00
116.00
153,00
130.00
105.00
115,00
120.00
97,0
96,8
110,0
94.9
107.0
63.2
93.3
78.5
150.8
145.3
162.5
173.8
235.3
56.9 112.1
44.3
63.8
28.9
26.4
20.9
30.0
20.1
18.1
20.3
26.0
25.1
17.1
87.1
134.0
56.3
54.6
34.1
58.0
35.9
45.5
49.8
68.2
68.9
40.2
(Continued)
()
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Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets!
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point
TENNESSEE
Hub Point
Nonstop..
Miles -
Basic 1-waN
1978
Air Fare
fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
Jackson
Abilene
Beaumont
Brownsville
Brownwood
Harlingen
Laredo
Longview
McAllen
Paris
San Angelo
Temple
Tyler
Victoria
Waco
Wichita Falls
Memphis
Dallas
Houston
Dallas
Dallas
Houston
San Antonio
Dallas
Houston
Dallas
Dallas
Dallas
Dallas
Houston
Dallas
Dallas
71 $34.00 $ 42.00
182
78
485
136
295
148
115
300
105
250
122
78
123
89
113
45.00
35.00
88.00
39.00
28.00
44.00
43.00
50.00
38.00
55.00
41.00
38.00
34.00
36.00
39.00
92.00
58.00
158.00
74.00
40.00
73.00
71.00
133.00
64.00
67.00
62.00
63.00
68.00
56.00
59.00
23.5
104.4
65.7
79.5
89.7
42.9
65.9
65.1
166.0
68.4
21.8
51.2
65.8
100.0
55.5
51.3
47.8 59.2
24.7
44.9
18.1
28.7
9.4
29.7
37.4
16.7
36.2
22.0
33.6
48.7
27.6
40.4
34.5
50.5
74.4
32.6
54.4
13.6
49.3
61.7
44.3
61.0
26.8
50.8
80.8
55.3
62.9
52.2
(Continued)
TEXAS
Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Nonstop Basic 1-way
Miles 1978
Air Fare
fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
UTAH
Cedar City
Vernal
Las Vegas
Salt Lake
Denver
Salt Lake
VERMONT
Montpelier
Rutland
Boston
Boston
149
127
36.00
35.00
67.00
62.00
86.1
77.1
24.2 45.0
27.6 48.8
VIRGINIA
Charlottesville
Hot Springs
Lynchburg
Newport News
Roanoke
Staunton
Washington
Washington
Roanoke
Washington
Washinton
Atlanta
Washington
Washington
(Continued)
U
City
City
160
221
250
131
$37.00
44.00
57.00
33.00
$ 55.00
70.00
171.00
56.00
48.6
59,1
200.0
69.7
23.1
19.9
22.8
25.2
34.4
31.7
68.4
42.7
86
158
45
152
127
357
187
103
34.00
43.00
30.00
42.00
34.00
66.00
44.00
35.00
70.00
85.00
49.00
99.00
70.00
161.00
105.00
70.00
105.9
97.7
63.3
135.7
105.9
144.0
138.6
100.0
39.5
27.2
66.7
27.6
26.8
18.5
23.5
34.0
81.4
53.8
108.9
65.1
55.1
45.1
56.1
68.0
(Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets!
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point
WASHINGTON
Rub Point
Nonstop
Miles
Basic lway fare % Incr
1978 1982 (Decr)
Air Fare
C /Pax Mile
1978 1982
Ephrata/
Moses Lake
Pasco
Pullman
Walla Walla
Wenatchee
Yakima
WEST VIRGINIA
Beckley
Clarksburg
Elkins
Greenbriar
Morgantown
Seattle
Portland
Seattle
Seattle
Spokane
Portland
Seattle
Seattle
Portland
Seattle
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Washington
Pittsburgh
Washington
Atlanta
Pittsburgh
Washington
142
174
175
250
64
211
215
98
200
105
$39.00
37,00
36,00
41.00
23.00
38.00
38.,00
35.00
35.00
36,00
224
83
163
113
141
369
61
160
(Continued)
45,00
34,00
44,00
33.00
34.00
65,00
31,00
43,00
$ 63.00
66.00
75.00
74.00
44.00
73.00
69.00
56,00
59,00
56,00
76.00
54.00
74,00
57,00
66.00
163,00
48.00
69,00
61.5
78,4
108.3
80,5
91.3
92,1
81.6
60.0
68,6
55.6
68,9
58,8
68,2
72,7
94,1
150,8
54.8
60,5
27.5
21,3
20,6
16.4
35.9
32.2
17,7
35.7
17,5
34,3
20,1
41,0
27,0
29,2
24,1
17.6
50,8
26.9
44.4
37.9
42.9
29.6
68.8
34.6
32.1
57.1
29.5
53.3
33.9
65.1
45.4
50.4
46,8
44,2
78,7
43.1
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Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Air Fare
Nonstop Basic 1-wAy fare % Incr 'C/Pax Mile
Miles 1978T182 (Decr) 1978 1982
WEST VIRGINIA (Continued)
Parkersburg
Princeton/
Bluefield
WISCONSIN
Appleton
Beloit
Eau Claire
Green Bay
LaCrosse
Manitowoc
Oshkosh
Rhinelander
Wausau
Columbus
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Chicago
Minneapolis
Chicago
ChicAgQ
Minneapolis
Chicago
Minneapolis
Chicago
Minneapolis
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Minneapolis
89 $36.00
102 38,00
227
160
232
83
269
85
191
248
225
117
156
151
273
219
174
51,00
40,00
49.00
31,00
54.00
39,00
44.00
49.00
49,00
37,00
40,00
40,00
55,00
48,00
42.00
$ 46,00
68,00
80,00
89.00
115.00
64.00
125.00
94.00
115.00
120.00
115.00
100.00
82.00
95.00
130.00
100.00
105,00
27.,8
78.9
56.9
122,5
134,7
106.5
131.5
141.0
161.4
144.9
134.7
170.3
105.0
137.5
136.4
108.3
24.1
40,4 51.7
37,3 66.7
22.5 35.2
25.0
21.1
37.3
20.0
45.9
24.3
19.8
21.8
31,6
25.6
26.5
20.1
21.9
60.3
55,6
49.6
77.1
56.1
110.6
63.5
48.4
51.1
85.5
52.6
62.9
47.6
45.7
(Continued)
(Appendix 3.13
Comparison of Normal
Coach Air Fares Over EAS Markets-
June 1978 and 1982
(Continued)
EAS Point Hub Point
Nonstop.
Miles ;
Basic 1-way
1978
Air Fare
fare % Incr C/Pax Mile
1982 (Decr) 1978 1982
WYOMING
Cheyenne
Jackson
Laramie
Lovell/Cody
Riverton
Rock Springs
Sheridan
Worland
Denver
Denver
Salt Lake
Denver
Denver
Denver
Denver
Salt Lake
Denver
Billings
Denver
SOURCE: RAA, "Regional/Commuter Airline Industry," 1981 Annual
Official Airline Guide (6/1/78 and 6/1/82)
Report, pp- 26-41.
!EAS markets in 48 states and District of Columbia with fares in both June 1978
and 1982. Both primary and alternative markets.
UBasic economy air fare (Y). When not quoted the standard (A or S) fare used.
The highest Y fare used when a range was quoted.
City
City
96
395
200
120
395
293
262
156
362
104
337
$29.00
82,00
51,00
31.00
66,00
61,00
57,00
46,00
56,00
30,00
65,00
$ 60,00
158,00
112,00
74.00
135,00
137,00
133,00
61,00
114.00
53.00
135,00
107.9
92.7
119.6
138,7
104,5
124,6
133.3
32.6
103.6
76,7
107,7
30.2
20.8
25.5
25.8
16,7
20.8
21.8
29.5
15.5
28,8
19.3
62.5
40.0
56.0
61.7
34.2
46.8
50.8
39.1
31.5
51.0
40.0
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Appendix 4.1
Annual 1 ates of 419 Subsidy
Payments- As of June 21, 1982
State
Community
ARIZONA
Ki ngman
Prescott
419 Subsidy
Annual
Amount
Daily
Amount-
~ Daily
Enplaned Pax
1978
$ 277,708 $ 760.84
Daily
Total Pax
19 78 3-
419 Subsidy
1978 Enpl
Per Pax
8 $ 95.10
ARKANSAS
ElDorado/Camden
Jonesboro
CALIFORNIA
Bakersfield
Chico
Cresceht City
Merced
Modesto
Stockton
Santa Rosa-
GEORGIA
Athens
Brunswick
Moultrie
ILLINOIS
Mount Vernon
INDIANA
Kokomo
IOWA
Cli nton]
Ottumw~a1
KENTUCKY 3/London/Corbi n3
MAINE
Lewiston/Auburn
MASSACHUSETTS
New Bedford
MICHIGAN
Jackson
267,602
136,676
136,000
327,719
185,892
520,585
910,935
275,949
264,920
184,000
282,000
194,779
281,966
716.72
374.45
372.60
897.86
509.29
1,426.26
2,495.71
756.02
725.81
504.11
772.60
4/
144
21
39
218
390]
99
533.64
772.51
790,814 2,166.61
250,460
323,308
18
22]
686.19
885.78
420,783 1,152,83
441,382 1,209.27
4/
288
42
78
1,216
198
17.06
8.92
3.12
12.13
18.29
2.05
3.82
9.07
5.86
27.59
(Continued)
42 12.71
10 77.25
80 27.08
16 42.89
16 55.36
54 21.35
112 10.80
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Appendix 4.1
Annualates of 419 Subsidy
Payments- As of June 21 , 1982
(Continued)
State
Communi ty
MINNESOTA
Fairmont
Mankato
Worthington
MISSISSIPPI
Greenwood
University/
Oxford
Natchez
MISSOURI
Kirksville
419 Subsidy
Annual Daily
Amount Amount
658,312 $ 1,803.59
97,370
359,052
356,784
MONTANA
Glasgow
Glendive
Havre
Lewiston 1,631,171
Miles City
Sidney
Wolf Point
Williston, ND,
W. Yellowstone 436,480
NEBRASKA
Alliance-
Chadronl 413,417
Sidney _
Col umbus-
Hastings 1,055,868
Kearney
McCook 2
Norfolk 566,101Yankton, S.D.]56,0
NEVADA
El ko]Ely
NEW MEXICO
Gallup
Carlsbad _
Hobbs
Roswell
1,102,274
253,042
587,213
256.77
983.70
922.70
4,468.96
1,195.84
1,132.65
2,892.79
1 ,550.96
3,019.93
693.27
1 ,608.80
(Continued)
Daily
Enplaned Pax
1978
16
20
17
5
10
8
72
2
1
2
3
3
18
7
8 -
8
6 j
8
9 -
15
32
23
13
66 ..
Dai ly
Total Pax
1978='
419 Subsidy
1978 Enpl.
Per Pax
86 $ 20.97
24 11.12
20 49.19
16 57.67
76 58.80
14 85.42
46 24.62
94 30.77
64 24.23
92 32.83
64 10.83
202 7.89
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Appendix 4.1
Annual1 ates of 419 Subsidy
Payments- As of June 21, 1982
(Continued)
State
Community
419 Subsidy
Annual Daily
Amount Amount
Daily
Enplaned Pax
1978
Daily
Total Pax
1978 2/
419 Subsidy
1978 Enpl.
Per Pax
NEW MEXICO( Cont'd)
Santa Fe $
Silver City
NEW YORK
Catskill/
Sullivan Co.
Massena
Ogdensburg
P1 attsburgh
Saranac Lake
Watertown
223,163 $ 611.41
195,842 536.55
363,775 996.64 24 41.53
1,892,496 5,184.92
NORTH CAROLINA
Rocky Mount 328,855 900.97 82 10.99
NORTH DAKOTA
Devils Lake
Jamestown
Willi'ston
337,035
40G,747
(see MONTANA)
OKLAHOMA
Entd
Ponca City
Stillwater
McAlester
Paris, Texas1
OREGON
Astoria
SOUTH DAKOTA
591,456 1 ,620.43
433,715 1,188.26
162,020
18
3
3
291
443.89
48 33.76
22 54.01
2 221.95
Yankton (see NEBRASKA)
TENNESSEE
Clarksville 116,174 318.28 14 22.73
TEXAS
Paris (see OKLAHOMA)
(Continued)
$ 38.21
14.90
176 29.46
923.38
1,097.94
41.97
78.42
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Appendix 4.1
Annuali 1 ates of 419 Subsidy
Payments- As of June 21, 1982
(Continued)
State
Community
419 Subsidy
Annual
Amount
VERMONT
Montpelier 1 $ 246,002
Daily
Amount
$ 673.98
Daily
Enplaned Pax
1978
Daily
Total 2/ax
1978-
419 Subsidy
1978 Enpl.
Per Pax
38 $ 17.74
VIRGINIA
Danville
Hot Springs
WASHINGTON 3/
Moses Lak
Wenatchee-
WEST VIRGINIA
Elkins
TOTAL
342,697
$ 20,420,141
938.90
$55,945.60
10 20 46.95
TOTAL for
points with
less than
160 pax/
day $ 18,772,485 $51,423.40 1103 2206 $ 23.31
NUMBER OF POINTS WITH SECTION 419 SUBSIDY -
419 SUBSIDY PER POINT: ALL
POINTS WITH LESS
THAN 160 PAX/
DAY
TOTAL DAILY PASSENGERS AT POINTS WITH
LESS THAN 160 PASSENGERS/DAY
ENPLANEMENTS/DAY AT POINTS WITH LESS
THAN 80 ENPLANEMENTS/DAY
SOURCE: U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Memo to
(July 2, 1982)
CAAA, Commuter Airline Industry Annual
- $265,196
- $260,729
30.7
15.3
CAB from John V. Coleman
Report (1980)
(Continued)
236,452
233,257
237,769
113,124
647.81
639.06
651.42
309.93
21.59
18.80
32.57
4.30
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Appendix 4.1
Annualaiates of 419 Subsidy
Payments- As of June 21, 1982
(Continued)
Notes
1/48 states--maximum amounts used. Some rates are subject to
reductions based on revenues earned.
- Double enplaned passengers
-/Old rates have expired. New rates and/or carrier selection
are being negotiated. Old rates are used here.
!/Bakersfield's 1978 traffic was in excess of 500 passengers
per day and therefore inclusion would unduly distort results.
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Appendix 4.2
Frequency of Service
At Section 419 Subsidy Points-
July 1981
State
Community
ARIZONA
Kingman
Prescott
Hub
Point
Daily Roundtrip Frequency
EAS Actual
Phoenix
Phoenix
ARKANSAS
El Dorado/Camden
Jonesboro
CALIFORNIA
Bakersfield
Chico
Crescent City
Merced
Modesto
Santa Rosa
Stockton
GEORGIA
Albany
Brunswick/Seaside
Moultrie
ILLINOIS
Mount Vernon
INDIANA
Kokomo
Dallas and Memphis
Memphis
San Francisco
& Los Angeles
San Francisco
San Francisco
San Francisco
& Los Angeles
San Francisco
San Francisco
San Francisco
Atlanta
Atlanta
Atlanta
St. Louis
Chicago or Detroit
or Indianapolis
5(Dallas); 7(Memphis)
5
IOWA
Clinton
Ottumwa
KENTUCKY
London/Corbin
MAINE
Lewi ston/Auburn
Chicago
Chi cago
& Kansas City
Louisville
Boston
(Continued)
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Appendix 4.2
State
Community
MASSACHUSETTS
New Bedford
MICHIGAN
Jackson
MINNESOTA
Fairmont
Mankato
Worthington
MISSISSIPPI
Greenwood
Natchez
University/
Oxford
MISSOURI
Kirksville
MONTANA
Glasgow
Glendive
Havre
Lewiston
Miles City
Sidney
West Yellowstone
Wolf Point
NEBRASKA
Alliance
Chadron
Columbus
Hastings
Frequency of Service 1At Section 419 Subsidy Points-
July 1981
(Cont' d)
Hub
Point
Daily Roundtrip Frequency
EAS Actual
New York
& Martha's Vineyard
or Nantucket
Chicago
& Detroit
Minneapolis
Minneapolis
Minneapolis
Memphis
New Orleans
Memphis
St. Louis
Billings
Billings
Billings
Billings
Billings
Billings
Denver
& Salt Lake City
Billings
Denver
& Rapid City
Denver
& Rapid City
Omaha
Omaha
(Continued)
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Appendix 4.2
Frequency of Service
At Section 419 Subsidy Points-
July 1981
(Cont'd)
State
Community
NEBRASKA (Continued)
Kearney
McCook
Norfolk
Sidney
NEVADA
Elko
Ely
NEW MEXICO
Carlsbad
Gallup
Hobbs
Roswell
Santa Fe
Silver City
NEW YORK
Catskill/
Sullivan
Massena
Ogdensburg
Plattsburgh
Co.
Saranac Lake
Watertown
Hub
Point
Denver
& Omaha
Denver
Omaha
Denver
& Rapid
Daily Roundtrip Frequency
EAS Actual
City
Reno
& Salt Lake City
Reno
& Salt Lake City
Albuquerque
or Lubbock
or Amarillo
or Midland/Odessa
Al buquerque
Albuquerque
or Lubbock
or Amarillo
or Midland Odessa
Albuquerque
& either Lubbock
or Midland/odessa
Albuquerque
or Denver
Albuquerque
New York
Syracuse
Syracuse
Albany
Albany
Syracuse
(Continued)
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Appendix 4.2
Frequency
At Section 419
July
State
Community
NORTH CAROLINA
Rocky Mount
NOTH DAKOTA
Devils Lake
Jamestown
Williston
OKLAHOMA
Enid
Mc~l 2/
McAlester-
Ponca City
Stillwater
OREGON
Astoria/Seaside
SOUTH DAKOTA
Yankton
Hub
Point
Raleigh
of Service 1/
Subsidy Points-
1981
(Cont'd)
Daily Roundtrip Frequency
EAS Actual
Bismarck
& Grand Forks
Bismarck
& Grand Forks
Bismarck
& Billings
Oklahoma City
or Wichita
Oklahoma City
or Tulsa
Oklahoma City
or Wichita
Oklahoma City
or Tulsa
Portland
Omaha
or Sioux Falls
TENNESSEE
Clarksville
TEXAS
Paris
VERMONT
Montpelier/Barre
(Continued)
Nashville
Dallas
Boston
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Appendix 4.2
Frequency of Service
At Section 419 Subsidy Points-
July 1981
(Cont'd)
State
Community
VIRGINIA
Dannville
Hot Springs
WASHINGTON
Moses Lake
Wenatchee
WEST VIRGINIA
Elkins
NUMBER OF POINTS ABOVE
NUMBER OF POINTS EQUAL
NUMBER OF POINTS BELOW
TOTAL NUMBER OF POINTS
Hub
Point
Greensboro
or Raleigh
or Roanoke
Washington
Seattle
Seattle/Portland
Pittsburgh
& Washington
EAS - 50
TO EAS - 26
EAS - 1
Daily Roundtrip Frequency
EAS Actual
SOURCE: Regional Airline Association, "Regional Commuter Airline
Industry," 1981 Annual Report, pp. 26-41.
Table 4.9
Points with Section 419 subsidy being paid as of June 25, 1982.
Service as of June 15, 1982.
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Appendix 4.3
Seats Offered
At EAS Points with 419
Subsidy
Point
ARIZONA
Ki ngman
Prescott
ARKANSAS
El Dorado
Jonesboro
Hub
Daily Seats
Guaranteed by EAS
Phoenix
Phoenix
Dallas
Memphi s
Memphis
Actual Daily Seats
(7/81)
16
16
CALIFORNIA
Bakersfield
Chico
Crescent City
Merced
Modesto
Santa Rosa
Stockton
GEORGIA
Albany
Brunswick
Moultrie
ILLINOIS
Mount Vernson
INDIANA
Kokomo
IOWA
Clinton
Ottunwa
KENTUCKY
, London/Corbin
150
300
80
32
100
57
150
56
188
397
90
96
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Francisco
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Francisco
San Francisco
San Francisco
San Francisco
Atlanta
Atlanta
Atlanta
St. Louis
Chicago]
Detroit
Chicago
Chicago
Kansas City
Louisville
(Continued)
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Appendix 4.3
Seats Offered
At EAS Points with 419
Subsidy
(Continued)
Point
MAINE
Lewiston/Auburn
Hub
Boston
Daily Seats
Guaranteed by EAS
18
Actual Daily Seats(7/81)
45
MASSACHUSETTS
New Bedford
MICHIGAN
Jackson
MINNESOTA
Fairmont
Mankato
Worthington
MISSISSIPPI
Greenwood
Natchez
University
MISSOURI
Kirksville
MONTANA
Glasgow
Glendive
Havre
Lewiston
Miles City
Sidney
West Yellowstone
Wolf Point
NEBRASKA
Alliance
New York
Martha's Vineyard]
Nantucket
Chicago)
Detroit
Minneapolis
Minneapolis
Minneapolis
Memphi s
New Orleans
Memphis
St. Louis
Billings
Billings
Great Falls
Billings
Billings
Billings
Denver
Salt Lake Ci
Billings
Denver
Rapid City
ty"
(Continued)
200
100
100
100
46
27
16
16
27
38
248
40
38
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Appendix 4.3
Seats Offered
At EAS Points with 419
Subsidy
(Continued)
Daily Seats
Guaranteed by EAS
Actual Daily
(7/81)
NEBRASKA (Continued)
Chadron
Columbus
Hastings
Kearney
McCook
Norfolk
Sidney
NEVADA
Elko
Ely
NEW MEXICO
Carlsbad
Gallup
Hobbs
Roswell
Santa Fe
Silver City
NEW YORK
Catskill/Sullivan
Massena
Ogdensburg
Plattsburgh
Saranac Lake
Watertown
NORTH CAROLINA
Rocky Mount
Denver
Rapid City
Omaha
Omaha
Denver
1Omaha
Denver
Omaha
Denver
Rapid City
Reno
Salt Lake City
Reno
Salt Lake City
Albuquerque1
Lubbock
Albuquerque
Albuquerque]
Lubbock
Al buquerque
Lubbock
Albuquerque]
Denver
Albuquerque
New York
Syracuse
Syracuse
Albany
Albany
Syracuse
Raleigh
(Continued)
Point Hub
Seats
45
30
45
45
45
102
45
100
45
30
120
104
38
38
57
19
116
57
38
114
38
34
38
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Appendix 4.3
Seats Offered
At EAS Points with
Subsidy
(Continued)
419
Point
NORTH DAKOTA
Devils Lake
Jamestown
Williston
OKLAHOMA
Enid
McAlester 2
Ponca City
Stillwater
Hub
Daily Seats
Guaranteed by EAS
Actual Daily Seats
(7/81)
Bismarck
Grand Forks
Bismarck
Grand Forks
Bismarcki
Billings
Oklahoma City]
Wichita
Oklahoma city1
Tulsa .
Oklahoma City1Wichita
Oklahoma City,
Tulsa
OREGON
Astoria/Seaside
SOUTH DAKOTA
Yankton
TENNESSEE
Clarksville
TEXAS
Paris
VERMONT
Montpel i er/Barre
VIRGINIA
Danville
Hot Springs
Portland
Omaha
Sioux Falls]
Nashville
Da11as
Boston
Raleigh1
Roanoke
Washington
Unspecified
(Continued)
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Appendix 4.3
Seats Offered
At EAS Points with 419
Subsidy
(Continued)
Daily Seats
Guaranteed by EAS
Actual Daily Seats
(7/81)
WASHINGTON
Moses Lake
Wenatchee
WEST VIRGINIA
Elkins
Seattl e
Seattle/Portl and
Pittsburghg
Washington
NUMBER OF POINTS ABOVE EAS - 71
NUMBER OF POINTS EQUAL TO EAS - 1
NUMBER OF POINTS BELOW EAS - 5
TOTAL NUMBER OF POINTS 77
SOURCE: Regional Airline Association,"Regional/Commuter Airline
Industry," 1981 Annual Report, pp. 26-41
Appendix 4.2
11Points with Section 419 subsidy being paid as of June 25, 1982.
2/Service as of June 15, 1982.
Point Hub
((
Appendix 5.1
Number of Cities Losing
Certificated Passenger Air Service-
By Geographic Area
July 1978 to July 1981
Geographic Region
State
Number of
Lost one
Airline
Cities Losing Certificated
Lost Two Lost Three
Airlines Airlines
Airlines
Total
NEW ENGLAND
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
SUBTOTAL
MID ATLANTIC
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
SUBTOTAL
EAST NORTH CENTRAL
Ohio
Indiana
(Continued)
5
17
1
14
17
1
14
Appendix 5.1
Number of Cities Losing
Certificated Passenger Air Service-
By Geographic Area
July 1978 to July 198 1
(Continued)
Geographic Region
States
Number of Cities Losing Certificated Airlines
Lost one Lost two Lost three
Airline Airlines Airlines Total
EAST NORTH CENTRAL (Continued)
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin
SUBTOTAL
WEST NORTH CENTRAL
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
N. Dakota
S. Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
SUBTOTAL
5
3
35
6
6
6
3
5
10
9
45
(CQntinued)
Geographic Region
States
SOUTH ATLANTIC
Appendix 5.1
Number of Cities Losing
Certificated Passenger Air Service
By Geographic Area
July 1978 to July 1981
(Continued)
Number of Cities Losing Certificated
Lost one Lost two Lost three
Airline Airlines Airlines
(
Airlines
Total
Delaware
District of Columbia
Maryland
Virginia
West Virginia
N, Caroli'na
S, Carolina
Georgia
Florida
SUBTOTAL
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
SUBTOTAL
(Continued)
Appendix 5.1
Number of Cities Losing
Certificated Passenger Air Service
By Geographic Area
July 1978 to July 1981
(Continued)
Geographic Region
States
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
SUBTOTAL
Number of Cities Losing Certificated Airlines
Lost one Lost two Lost three
Airline Airlines Airlines Total
8
2
4
13 17
MOUNTAIN
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
SUBTOTAL
3
2
2 3
(Continued)
)
fAppendix 5.1
Number of Cities Losing
Certificated Passenger Air Service
By Geographic Area
July 1978 to July 1981
(Continued)
Geographic Region
States
Number of Cities Losing Certificated Airlines
Lost one Lost two Lost three
Airline Airlines Airlines Total
PACIFIC
Washington
Oregon
California
SUBTOTAL
GRAND TOTAL 272
36
319138
SOURCE: Research & Economics Division, AmericanTrucking Association,
of Airline Deregulation--An Update," August 1981, p, 3.
"The Progress
1/48 states and District of Columbia., Includes points where carriers have
announced intent to terminate service.
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Appendix 6.1
Commuter 1/
Passenger Aircraft Inventory
June 1981
Service
Offered
6/15/82
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Number of Pax Aircraft
Number of Pax Seats
Under 15 15-19 20-30 30+ Total
10 10
16 16
6 6
2 2
1 1
4 4
7 2 9
3 3
3 3
2 2
3 4 7
'l5 15
1 1
11 11
9 8 17
2 3 1 6
1 1
7 1 8
4 2 1 7
2 2
(Continued)
Commuter
Aero Mech
Air Chapparal
Air Charter Services
Air Chico
Air Colorado
Air Cortez
Air Illinois
Air Kentucky
Air Lift Associates
Air Link
Air Miami
Air Midwest
Air Nebraska
Air Nevada
Air New England
Air North
Air Olympia
Air Oregon
Air Pennsylvania
Air South
# of
Seats
165
94
35
11
5
32
227
45
24
12
136
285
18
80
555
160
8
183
94
38
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Appendix 6.1
1/
Commuter -
Passenger Aircraft Inventory
June 1981
(Continued)
Number of Pax Aircraft
Number of Pax Seats
Commuter Under 15 15-19 20-30 30+ Total
Air Texas 2 2 1 5
Air Trails 5 5
Air US 2 1 3
Air Vector Airways 4 4
Air Virginia 5 5
Airways of New Mexico 4 4
Air Wisconsin 13 6 19
Altair 6 6 12
Apollo Airways 6 6
Arizona Pacific 4 4
Arkansas Traveler 4 4
Aspen Airways 10 10
Aztec Air East 11 11
Atlanta Express 2 2
Atlantic Southeast 7 7
Atlantis Airlines 3 4 7
Bangor International 1 1
Bankair Commuter 8 8
Bar Harbor Airlines 1 10 2 3 16
BAS Airlines 3 3
(Continued)
# of
Seats
106
32
73
28
95
37
547
672
108
28
24
500
83
60
130
100
3
38
364
25
Service
Offered
6/15/82
X
X
X
X
X
X
x
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Service
Offered
6/15/82
Appendix 6.1
Commuter-
Passenger Aircraft Inventory
June 1981
Number of Pax Aircraft
Number of Pax Seats # of
Under 15 15-19 20-30 30+ Total SeatsCommuter
X Bemidji Airlines 1
X Big Sky Airlines 3
Blue Line Air 3
X Britt Airways
X Burlington Air 2
X C & M Airlines 6
California
Amphibian Transport 2
X Cal Sierra Airlines
X Capitol Air Service 17
X Cascade Airways
X Catskill Airways 3
Cen-Tex Airlines 1
X Chalk's International
Airlines 6
X Chaparral Airlines 1
X Chatauqua Airlines
X Christman Air System 6
X Clinton Aero 1
X Cochise Airlines 4
X Colgan Airways 2
X Colorado Airlines 2
(Continued)
1
9
3
2 22
2
6
6
8
7
6
1
2 9
4
2
8
135
20
424
16
48
13
44
106
204
.16
8
60
17
150
48
7
177
46
10
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Appendix 6.1
Commuter-
Passenger Aircraft Inventory
June 1981
Service
Offered
6/15/82 Commuter
Number of Pax Aircraft
Number of Pax Seats
Under 15 15-19 20-30 30+ Total
11 2 13
5 5
4 4
2 2 4
4 4
1 1 2
3 3
2 2
1 1
2 2
2 2
3 3
5 5
5 2 7
2 2
X Comair
X Command Airways
X Copper State Airlines
Crown Airways
X Cumberland Airlines
Danbury Airways
Decatur Commuter
DHL Airlines
X Direct Air
X Eagle Commuter
X East Hampton Aire
Emerald Airlines
Emmet County Aviation
X Empire Airlines
Erie Airways
Fischer Brothers
Aviation
X Freedom Airlines
X Golden Airways
Golden Gate Arilines
X Golden West Airlines
X Green Hills Aviation
X Gull Air
3 3
5 17
1
10 20
3 5 9
4
6
# of
Seats
140
150
23
98
33
27
24
14
8
8
8
138
21
265
17
81
374
3
709
255
26
48
4
6
Continued)
Appendix 6.1
Commuter-
Passenger Aircraft Inventory
June 1981
(Continued)
Service
Offered
6/15/82
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Number of Pax Aircraft
Number of Pax Seats
Under 15 15-19 20-30 30+ Total
7
5
5
6 4 3 13
1
1
5 6
4 6
1 4
6
2
14
4
2 2
1
1. 5
6 6
3
2 2
# of
Seats
56
50
33
360
8
8
98
92
42
24
16
102
21
88
6
43
264
20
30
(Continued)
Commuter
Hammonds Commuter
Air
Harbor Airlines
Havasu Airlines
Henson Aviation
Heussler Air Service
Holiday Airlines
Imperial Airlines
Inland Empire
Jamaire
Kenosha Aero
Lakeland Commuter
Las Vegas Airlines
Lawrence Aviation
Liberty Airlines
MacKay Airlines
Mall Airways
Marco Island Airways
Mesa Air Shuttle
Mesaba Aviation
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Appendix 6.1
Commuter-
Passenger Aircraft Inventory
June 1981
(Continued)
rvice
fered
L5/82 Commuter
Se
Of
6/
Number of Pax Aircraft
Number of Pax Seats
er 15 15-19 20-30 30+ Total
17 7 24
3 3
1 2 3
6 6
1 1
6 6
4 6 1 11
3 1 4
3 3 6
7 7
1 1
1 1
2 2
2 2 4
2 2
X Metro Airlines
X Mid-Continent Airlines
X Mid South
X Mid State Airlines
X Midwest Aviation
Mission Airlines
X Mississippi Valley
X Montauk Caribbean
X New Air
X New England Airlines
Northern Airlines
X Pacific Cal Air
Pacific Mountain Air
Pacific National Airways
Pearson Aircraft
X Pennsylvania Commuter
Airlines
X Phillips Airlines
Piasa Commuter Airlines
X Pilgrim Airlines
17
6
2
2 10
(Continued)
10 7
# of
Seats
533
24
44
114
8
48
284
36
78
46
6
8
16
98
16
364
34
23
236
Service
Offered
6/15/82 Commuter
Appendix 6.1
Commuter-
Passenger Aircraft Inventory
June 1981
(Continued)
Number of Pax Aircraft
Number of Pax Seats
Pinehurst Airlines
X Pioneer Airlines
Planes Incorporated
Pocono Airlines
X Pompano Airways
X Ponderosa Aviation
X Precision Valley
X Princeton Airways
X Pro Air Services
X Provincetown-Boston
X Ransome Airlines
Red Carpet Airlines
X Rio Airways
X Rocky Mountain Airways
X Roederer Aviation
X Royal West Airways
Royale Airlines
X Saber Aviation
X San Juan Airlines
X Scenic Airlines
nder 15 15-19 20-30 30+ Total
3 3
7 7
4 4
4 4
5 5
1 1
7 4 11
4 1 5
3 3 6
16 5 12 6 39
-12 6 18
2 2
21 21
3 2 5
4 4
1 1 2
10 10
6 6
9 9
28 28
ontinued)
# of
Seats
150
109
68
68
40
6
128
48
108
818
616
88
399
157
22
36
174
40
51
461
-520-
Service
Offered
6/15/82 Commuter
X Scheduled Sky
Semo Aviation
X Shasta Air
Shawano Flyin
Sierra Pacifi
X Silver State
X Simmons Airli
Skytrain
X Sky West Airl
X Southeastern
Southern Airl
Southern Inte
Airways
X Southern Jers
Airways
X Starflight/
New York Air
X Suburban Airl
X Sunbird Airli
X Sunbird Incor
Sundance Airl
X Sun West Air
Appendix 6.1
Commuter-
Passenger Aircraft Inventory
June 1981
(Continued)
Number of Pax Aircraft
Number of Pax Seats
Under 15 15-19 20-30 30+ Total
ways 10 10
2 2
1 1
g Servuce 2 2
c Airlines 3 4 7
Airlines 6 2 8
nes 2 3 5
2 2
ines 5 3 8
Commuter 2 1 3
ines 3 2 5
rnat±onal
ey
ines
nes
porated
ines
lines
(Con
# of
Seats
163
30
8
17
257
80
66
16
97
34
113
7 7 308
5 95
9
3
4
8
tinued)
34
150
79
18
32
58
-521-
Appendix 6.1
Commuter1"
Passenger Aircraft Inventory
June 1981
(Continued)
Number of Pax Aircraft
Number of Pax Seats
6/1 der 15 15-19 20-30 30+ Total
4 3
5/82 Commuter Un
X Susquehanna Airlines
Swift Aire
X Tennessee Airways
Trans Catalina Airlines
X Trans Colorado Airlines
Trans Air
X Trans Mo Airlines
X Transwestern Airlines
Univeral Airways
X Vee Neal Airlines
X Westair Commuter
Airlines
Western States
Express
X Wheeler Airlines
William's Air
Will's Air
X Wings Aviation
X Wings West Airlines
X Wright Airlines
TOTAL
% 4
Average No. of Seats
Per Aircraft
364
33.3
(continued)
Service
Offered
507
6.4
# of
Seats
18
240
78
17
19
40
24
48
8
42
9 72
27
48
8
30
40
40
192
22152
2
5
2
5
5
5
4
1092
100.0
4
99 122
9.1 11.2
20.3
-522-
Appendix 6.1
1/Commuter-
Passenger Aircraft Inventory
June 1981
(Continued)
Number of Commuters Listed:
With Service in June 81 & 82 - 127 = 69%
Without Service in June 1982 - 57 =_31%
TOTAL 184 =100%
SOURCE: Aviation Consulting, Incorporated
CAAA, "Commuter Airline Aircraft of America," 1981
edition.
Official Airline Guide (6/15/81)
!/Commuters based in 48 states with passenger aircraft.
Appendix 6.2
Basic Specifications of Commuter Aircraft
in Manufacture or Proposal as of September 30, 1982
Takeoff U.S. Approximate
Manufacturer # of Pres- Normal Distance Certi- Fully
County_ Pax surized Cruise @ 5000' ficate Equipped
AircraftModel Seats (Y/N) MPH @ 200C Date Cost 1982
---------------------- 
----- ------- ----- - -----------------------
1 Aerospatiale/Aeritalia
France/Italy
1 ATR 42
2 Ahrens Aircraft, Inc.
Aguadilla, Puerto Rico
2 AR 404
3 Beech Aircraft Corp.
Wichita, KS
3 Commuter 1900
4 British Aerospace
Hatfield, England
4 Jetstream 31
5 Intercity 748
(HS 748-2B)
6 BAe 146-100
7 BAe 146-200
5 CASA
Madrid, Spain
8 C-212-200 Aviocar
9 CN-235
42/49 277
27 N
15 N
18 Y
48
82
100
27
34/38
172
249
230
244
383
383
192
4350
2500
2747
4480
4800
5850
5900
2200
(1985) $5 M
2.2 M
1981
Spring
1982
1961
Aug. 1982
1st qtr. 1983
1978
(1984)
1.5 M
2.2 M
6.1 M
12-14 M
12-14 M
2.3 M
3.9 M
()
Appendix 6.2 (continued)
Takeoff U.S. Approximate
Manufacturer # of Pres- Normal Distance Certi- Fully-
~Country Pax surized Cruise @ 5000' ficate Equipped
~Xircraft Model Seats (Y/N) MPH @ 200C Date Cost 1982
- - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - -
- - - - - --- - -- - - -- -
- -- - - - - - - ------------------------
6 Cessna Aircraft Co.
Wichita, Kansas
10 402C Utiliner 9 N 213 3310 1979 305,000
7 Commuter Aircraft Corp.
Youngstown, Ohio
11 CAC-100 50 Y 300 4939 Mid-1984 4 M
8 DeHavilland Aircraft of
Canada, Ltd.
12 DHC 6-300 19 N 150 1700 1965 1.4 M
13 DHC 7 50 Y 230 2300 1978 7.0 M
14 Dash 7 36 Y 265 2200 1984 4.0 M
9 Dornier GMBH
Munich, West Germany
15 Dorner 228-100 15 N -- 2500 1981 1.5 M
16 Dornier 28-200 19 N -- 2500 -- 1.7 M
10 Embraer
Brazil
17 Bandeirante EMB-110 Pl 18 N 187 3600 1973 1.6 M
18 Brasilia EMB-120 30 Y 290 6232 1982 3.79 M
11 Fairchild Swearingen
San Antonio, Texas
19 Metro III 19 Y 262 5300 1981 2.0 M
Appendix 6.2 (continued)
Manufacturer
Coun try
Aircraft Model
# of
Pax
Seats
Pres-
surized
(Y/N)
Normal
Cruise
MPH
Takeoff
Distance
@ 5000'
@ 200C
U.S.
Certi-
ficate
Date
Approximate
Fully-
Equipped
Cost 1982
12 Fokker Aircraft
The Netherlands
20 F27 MK500 Friendship
21 F28 MK4000
13 Government Aircraft Factories
Port Melbourne, Australia
22 N24A Nomad Commuter Liner
14 Grumman Aerospace Corporation
Bethpage, New York
23 G-111 Albatross
15 Gulfstream American Corp.
Savannah, Georgia
24 Gulfstream I-C
16 Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd.
Israel
25 Arava Cargo Commuterliner
17 Pilatus Britten-Norman Ltd.
Isle of Wight, England
26 BN2B
27 Tri-Commutair
259
320
16 N
28 N
37 Y
19 N
155
10,300
2850
162
300
147
127
143
7400
3625
970 (300 hp)
2400
--- ---- ----- -
-- -- - -- -- ---- 
- -- --1 9 5 5 --
1955
1967
1978
1980
7 M
11 M
1.18 M
3 M
3.6 M
1.8 M
357,640
695,000
1980
1980
1971
Appendix 6.2 (continued)
Takeoff U.S. Approximate
Manufacturer # of Pres- Normal Distance Cert- Fully-
Country Pax surized Cruise @ 5000' ficate Equipped
Airc raft Model Seats (Y/N) MPH @ 200C Date Cost 1982
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
-----------
18 Piper Aircraft Corporation
Lock Haven, PA/Lakeland FL
28 T-1020 Commuter
29 T-1040 Commuter
30 Navajo PA31
31 Chieftain PA31-350
19 SAAB-Scania
Linkoping, Sweden
Fairchild Industries
Germantown, MD
32 SAAB-Fairchild 340
20 Short Brothers Ltd.
Northern Ireland
33 Shorts 330-200
34 Shorts 360
198
236
204
210
34 Y 268
185
204
1981
3800 (50 ft.)
2800 (50 ft.) Feb. 1982
-- late 1983
4600 1976
4600 3rd qtr 1982
Source: Commuter Air, "Commuter Aircraft Specifications Summary", September 1982, pp. 42-47.
326,000
673,000
377,270
456,645
4.3 M
3.10 M
3.75 M
